Browse regulations

This Order amends the Legislative and Regulatory Reform (Regulatory Functions) Order 2007 to expand definitions of regulatory bodies (adding Scottish and Northern Irish local authorities, private sector bodies, and third sector bodies), add new regulatory bodies to Part 1 of the Schedule (including British Hallmarking Council, Coal Authority, Legal Services Board, Traffic Commissioners), insert a new Part 1A covering bodies regulating private/third sector bodies (Care Quality Commission, Ofsted, etc.), update numerous entries in Parts 2 and 3 by replacing 2005-2007 EU regulations with 2008 versions, add new regulatory entries under maritime transport, road transport and other headings, and extend the Schedule with new Parts 5-13.

This is a structural/administrative instrument that organizes which regulatory bodies fall under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 framework. While it adds some bodies to the regulatory scope, it is primarily machinery rather than regulatory imposition—it does not itself impose costs on businesses but determines accountability structures for existing regulators. The updates to newer EU regulation versions reflect legislative changes that occurred independently. Deletion would create administrative confusion about which bodies are subject to regulatory reform requirements under the 2006 Act, without reducing actual regulatory burden.

These regulations specify public authorities for the purposes of sections 54 and 1193 of the Companies Act 2006, which restrict business and company names that would give a false impression of government connection. They require applicants seeking such names to obtain approval from the Secretary of State and consult the relevant government department listed in the Schedule.

This regulation restricts the freedom of businesses to choose their own names, adding bureaucratic burden without justification. If a business misrepresents its connection to government, existing fraud and consumer protection laws are sufficient remedies. The market can discipline misrepresentation through reputation; statutory name restrictions merely impede legitimate commerce and create unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry.

This is a 2009 amendment to the School Organisation (Establishment and Discontinuance of Schools)(England) Regulations 2007. It removes the definition of 'APA rating' and replaces all references to 'APA' with 'performance' throughout regulation 9 (paragraphs 1, 2(a), 2(b), and 5). It also inserts a definition of 'current performance rating' referencing section 138(3) of the Act. Essentially a terminology update to reflect a renamed or restructured school performance assessment framework.

This instrument is merely a technical terminology amendment - it updates outdated 'APA rating' references to 'performance' and adds a definition. It does not create new regulatory burdens, expand scope, or impose new costs. Deleting it would leave the 2007 principal regulations with inconsistent and outdated terminology. The amendment itself is costless; any regulatory cost would derive from the underlying 2007 Regulations, which are not the subject of this review.

Amends the Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009 to add 'the Welsh Assembly Government' to the list of government/public authority names that LLPs cannot use without approval, alongside existing restrictions on names suggesting connection with government.

Name restriction regulations impose compliance costs and restrict commercial speech. Existing fraud and misrepresentation law adequately protects the public from LLPs falsely claiming government connection. The list of restricted names is arbitrary and ever-expanding, creating ongoing compliance burdens as new governmental bodies are created. Businesses should be free to choose their names subject only to general consumer protection law, not prior approval requirements against an ever-growing list of government entities.

The Saving Gateway Accounts Regulations 2009 implement a government-sponsored savings program for low-income individuals entitled to working tax credit or child tax credit. The regulations establish eligibility criteria, account requirements, maturity payments (calculated as A x B where B=50p), death payments, account provider approval requirements, transfer procedures, and reporting obligations. The program restricts monthly deposits to £25, mandates 24-month maturity periods, requires government-approved account providers, and creates extensive compliance burdens including statements, notifications, and Commissioners oversight.

This regulation represents government-mandated product design that distorts the savings market. It prescribes identical terms for all participants rather than allowing competitive innovation: capped deposits of £25/month, fixed 24-month maturity periods, and a taxpayer-funded maturity bonus that creates moral hazard. The regulatory burden—including provider approval under FISMA 2000, mandatory statements, Commissioners oversight, transfer rules, and disqualifying circumstances—imposes compliance costs that reduce participation. The program picks winners through tax credit eligibility criteria, denying the freedom of financial institutions to develop diverse savings products and consumers to choose alternatives. Market competition and individual choice, not bureaucratic prescription, would better serve those the regulation aims to help.

The Saving Gateway Accounts (No. 2) Regulations 2009 provide tax exemptions for Saving Gateway accounts - a government-supported savings scheme for eligible low-income individuals. They exempt interest, profit share returns, and building society bonuses from tax, and specify recovery procedures where incorrectly claimed relief must be returned to HMRC. The regulations establish joint and several liability for account providers, account holders, and others in respect of wrongly claimed tax relief.

These regulations create preferential tax treatment for a specific, government-designated savings product, distorting the market for savings. They introduce complexity through eligibility tracking, means-testing, clawback provisions, and joint liability rules that increase compliance costs for account providers and beneficiaries alike. Rather than removing barriers to financial services, they cement a government-favored product into the tax code, creating competitive advantages for designated account providers and penalising alternative savings mechanisms. A genuinely liberal approach would eliminate such distortions rather than perpetuate them through retained EU-derived legislation.

The Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999) implemented the EU Services Directive (2006/123/EC) into UK law. They establish rules governing access to and exercise of service activities in the UK, including: definitions of service providers and recipients; requirements for competent authorities to justify authorization schemes; prohibitions on certain restrictive requirements (economic needs tests, fixed pricing, territorial restrictions); information disclosure obligations for service providers; mutual recognition principles for professional qualifications; and procedural requirements for authorization schemes. The regulations exclude numerous sectors (financial services, healthcare, transport, audiovisual, gambling, social services, etc.) and contain savings provisions for requirements implementing pre-Brexit EU obligations.

This regulation is retained EU law that implements the EU Services Directive with its characteristic bureaucratic authorization requirements and compliance burdens. The authorization scheme regime restricts market entry by requiring competent authorities to 'justify' restrictions — an inherently discretionary approach that advantages incumbent providers. The information disclosure mandates impose compliance costs that fall disproportionately on smaller service providers. Prohibitions on fixed pricing and certain business structures constrain private contracting freedom. Post-Brexit, Britain should scrap this EU-derived framework and replace it with a minimalist regime based on contract law and common law duties — allowing markets, not regulators, to determine how services are provided, priced, and structured. The extensive sectoral exemptions suggest even the EU recognized the regulation's dirigiste nature.

A commencement order bringing specified provisions of the Banking Act 2009 into force on set dates: provisions enabling subordinate legislation (12 Nov 2009), Part 6 banknote provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland (23 Nov 2009), and Part 5 inter-bank payment systems (31 Dec 2009).

This is a procedural timing order that merely activates commencement dates for provisions already passed by Parliament. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty and gaps in the effective date regime for the Banking Act 2009, without reducing any substantive regulatory burden — those provisions would simply lack clear operative dates. No independent regulatory cost is imposed by this order itself.

The Offshore Funds (Tax) Regulations 2009 implement a comprehensive regime for taxing participants in offshore funds, distinguishing between 'reporting funds' and 'non-reporting funds', establishing charges to income tax and corporation tax on offshore income gains, and containing extensive anti-avoidance provisions including rules for transparent funds, guaranteed return funds, and temporary non-residence. The regulations apply to disposals made on or after 1st December 2009 and include consequential amendments to primary legislation.

This regulation imposes substantial compliance burdens on the fund management industry, creating a complex two-tier regime (reporting vs non-reporting funds) that distorts investment decisions through differential tax treatment. The extensive definitions, conditions, and anti-avoidance provisions add layers of bureaucracy that increase costs for funds and participants. As retained EU law implementing directives, it likely contains gold-plating of EU requirements. Such complexity drives business to competing financial centres (New York, Singapore, Dubai) and erodes City of London competitiveness. Tax policy objectives can be achieved through simpler, more targeted provisions that do not impose this level of ongoing regulatory burden on the fund industry.

This Order amends the Government of Wales Act 2006 to clarify and expand exceptions to the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales. It specifies matters in fields 10 (Highways and transport) and 15 (Social welfare) where the Assembly cannot legislate, including driver licensing, road traffic offences, child support, tax credits, and social security. The Order also adds a new paragraph A1 to Part 2 of Schedule 5 defining these exceptions and restructures Parts 2 and 3 of that Schedule.

This Order perpetuates a complex, EU-derived system of reserved legislative competence that restricts both Westminster and Welsh legislative freedom. The exceptions listed (driver licensing, road traffic offences, child support, tax credits, social security, etc.) represent matters that should be deregulated or devolved further rather than maintained as UK-wide reservations. The Transport and Social Welfare fields contain 30+ separate exceptions creating legal complexity that impedes legislative flexibility and economic dynamism. In a truly free Britain, driver licensing and road traffic regulation should be liberalised rather than preserved as exceptions to Welsh devolution, and social welfare matters should be opened to competition rather than reserved to Westminster. The baroque structure of exceptions, general restrictions, and exceptions from general restrictions imposes unnecessary administrative burden with no demonstrated benefit.

This Order appoints named individuals as Her Majesty's Inspectors of Education, Children's Services and Skills, effective 18th November 2009. It is an administrative appointment mechanism establishing the inspection corps for educational and children's services oversight.

This Order merely facilitates the appointment of inspectors who provide vital information to parents and the public about educational quality. Unlike restrictive regulations that impose costs on economic actors, this addresses information asymmetry in the education market. Deletion would create an operational gap without reducing any regulatory burden on businesses or trade.

The Burma (Restrictive Measures) (Overseas Territories) Order 2009 implements EU Council Regulation 194/2008 concerning restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar, extending these sanctions to British Overseas Territories. The Order prohibits: export of restricted goods to Burma; provision of military-related assistance; use of ships/aircraft/vehicles for carriage of restricted goods to Burma; importation of prohibited goods from Burma; dealing with funds/economic resources of listed persons; making funds available to listed persons; financing listed enterprises; and creating joint ventures with listed enterprises. It establishes licensing mechanisms through the Governor, reporting obligations for relevant financial institutions, search and seizure powers, and criminal offences with defences for those lacking knowledge.

This is an inherited EU law (explicitly implementing EC Regulation 194/2008) retained wholesale without democratic parliamentary review. It imposes significant compliance burdens on financial institutions through suspicious transaction reporting requirements, restricts trade with an entire country, and creates criminal liability for actions that would be legal in competing jurisdictions like Singapore, New York, or Dubai. The sanctions regime, originally designed as a diplomatic tool, has unclear effectiveness in achieving its stated goals while imposing documented costs on UK competitiveness and driving economic activity to less restrictive jurisdictions.

Amends the Films Co-Production Agreements Order 1985 by substituting the schedule of countries with bilateral film co-production agreements (Australia, Canada, France, India, Jamaica, Morocco, New Zealand, South Africa), updating their dates and Command Paper references, and revoking the 2008 version of this amendment order.

Film co-production agreements represent managed trade in the cultural sector, privileging specific nations' film industries over others through preferential treatment, tax incentive eligibility, and broadcast rights advantages. While UK filmmakers may gain access to partner country markets and financing, consumers and taxpayers bear the cost through subsidies and distorted market signals. A truly free-trading Britain would allow film co-production based on commercial merit rather than government-to-government bilateral deals that pick winners and create artificial advantages for listed countries over non-listed ones. The revocation of the 2008 version demonstrates these amendments are largely administrative rather than substantively beneficial.

The National Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence) (Social Welfare) Order 2009 amends Schedule 5 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 to expand the Welsh Assembly's legislative competence in social welfare. It modifies matter 15.1 (substituting 'any other person' for 'persons looking after them'), inserts a new Matter 15.9 defining 'carers' and their support services, adds 'information' to the definition of 'social care services', and updates the exceptions table to include 15.9 across multiple exception categories (child support, child trust funds, tax credits, child benefit, social security, independent living funds, motability, vaccine damage payments, Children's Commissioner, family law, and welfare foods).

This Order expands Welsh governmental legislative competence into social welfare and carer support, creating a framework for potential future regulations that could distort the market for care services. The expansion of Matter 15.9 and its broad definition of 'carers' provides constitutional justification for interventionist policies that could impose costs on employers, voluntary organizations, and the care sector. While technically a competence amendment rather than a direct regulation, it enables future regulatory expansion that would not otherwise be possible, making Britons worse off by entrenching government intervention in personal care decisions.

The Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (Guernsey) Order 2009 implements tax information exchange arrangements and double taxation relief with Guernsey. It declares that arrangements for exchanging tax information relevant to administration, enforcement, and recovery of taxes (including prevention of fiscal evasion) have been made with the States of Guernsey, and that these arrangements should have effect. It also provides for relief from double taxation in relation to income tax, corporation tax, and similar taxes.

Without double taxation relief, income taxed in both the UK and Guernsey would face punitive effective tax rates, discouraging cross-border investment and economic activity. While information exchange arrangements do expand tax enforcement capacity, they serve to prevent fiscal evasion rather than restrict legitimate commerce. These are standard bilateral tax arrangements that any major trading nation maintains to provide certainty for businesses and individuals engaged in international trade. Adam Smith recognised that secure property rights and contract enforcement facilitate commerce — these arrangements support the tax certainty necessary for international economic engagement. Britons would face greater financial uncertainty and potential double taxation without this relief.