Browse regulations

This Order amends the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007 to adjust payment rates for legally-aided criminal defence services. Key changes include: new hourly rate tables for solicitors and advocates (e.g., Level A solicitor at £119/hr), introduction of provisional representation order provisions, modifications to Very High Cost Case contract references, adjustments to PPE page thresholds (from 9998 to 9999, then 10000), and new fee structures for cases ceasing to be VHCCs. The Order applies to representation orders granted on or after 3 August 2009.

While this Order contains government price-fixing of legal services which is undesirable from a free-market perspective, deleting it would create a vacuum in criminal defence funding mechanisms. The core structure of legally-aided criminal representation exists because the state imposes criminal liability and therefore has a constitutional obligation to ensure access to justice. This Order merely adjusts rates within that existing framework and does not fundamentally expand state control over legal services. Without some mechanism to fund criminal defence, Britons accused of crimes would be unable to exercise their right to legal representation, undermining the justice system itself. The case for deletion would require a comprehensive替代 plan for market-based criminal defence funding, not merely the removal of this rate-adjustment instrument.

These Regulations modify Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit rules in two ways: (1) they insert additional categories of registered childcare providers (g through m) whose charges can be treated as child care charges for benefit purposes, and (2) they add child benefit to the list of sums disregarded in income calculations for both Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit.

The child benefit disregard creates welfare traps by ensuring additional children result in unearned income that doesn't reduce benefits, reducing work incentives. The expanded childcare provider categories embed the Childcare Act 2006's registration regime deeper into welfare law, restricting flexible childcare arrangements and reinforcing a heavily regulated, supply-constrained childcare market. Both mechanisms increase welfare dependency rather than economic freedom. As retained EU-derived law with origins in EU social directives, these regulations add regulatory burden without clear market-based alternatives.

This Order sets a maximum budget cap of £197,206,000 for Surrey Police Authority for the 2009 financial year, limiting the amount it can set as its budget requirement. It applies only to authorities in England.

This Order restricts local democratic choice by imposing a central government cap on local authority spending. Such top-down fiscal constraints prevent communities from deciding their own spending priorities through local democracy. Without such caps, local authorities would face natural market discipline through voter choice and competition between jurisdictions (Tiebout competition). The State, not individual taxpayers through their local councils, is being empowered to make spending decisions. This exemplifies the centralized control that suppresses the dynamic, locally-responsive governance that made Britain great.

This instrument appears to be a sea fishing regulation that was revoked in its entirety on 6 March 2015 by S.I. 2015/191 (The Sea Fishing (Enforcement and Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 2015). The original instrument is no longer in force.

This instrument has already been revoked and is no longer law. It was repealed in 2015 and has no current legal effect. Retaining reference to it serves no purpose as it cannot be relied upon or enforced.

The Financial Assistance Scheme (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2009 amend the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005, which established a compensation scheme for members of occupational pension schemes wound up with insufficient assets. These regulations add definitions (employment, indexation date, partner, qualifying course, shared initial payment), modify survivor and surviving dependant provisions, establish the Board of the Pension Protection Fund as scheme manager, provide for funding arrangements between the Secretary of State and scheme manager, allow the scheme manager to administer qualifying pension scheme transfers and pay administration costs, and modify annual payment entitlement rules for surviving dependants including provisions for children attending qualifying courses or with disabilities up to age 23.

This regulation is domestic in origin (arising from the Pensions Act 2004), not EU-derived, and does not exhibit gold-plating. It provides essential definitions and mechanisms for a targeted pension compensation scheme that protects vulnerable individuals who lost occupational pension entitlements through no fault of their own. Deleting it would leave widows, children, and disabled surviving dependants without statutory clarity on their entitlements. The costs fall primarily on the state apparatus rather than constraining private economic activity, and the scheme actually supports labour mobility by reducing pension risk for workers in affected sectors.

The Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2009 amends the Export Control Order 2008 by inserting article 9A, a restatement clause confirming that exports prohibited under articles 3-9 are indeed prohibited. It is a clarifying/enforcing provision with no independent restrictive effect.

This amendment Order adds no new restrictions—it merely restates what articles 3-9 of the principal Order already provide. As a pure clarification clause, it creates no additional regulatory burden but contributes to the accumulated volume of retained EU trade law. The underlying prohibitions in articles 3-9 would remain in force regardless; this Order serves only to create confusion about the source of legal authority. Deletion reduces legislative clutter without loosening actual export restrictions, which derive from the principal Order and its enabling legislation.

Amends the Criminal Defence Service (General) (No. 2) Regulations 2001 to introduce 'provisional representation orders' for criminal legal aid, rename 'junior counsel' to 'junior advocate', and establish rules for co-defendants selecting the same litigator. Some provisions were time-limited and expired in 2011.

While this concerns state-funded legal aid—a system that inherently restricts market competition in legal services—this particular instrument merely administers an existing scheme rather than expanding government intervention. The technical amendments (renaming counsel to advocate, defining provisional orders, co-defendant selection rules) are procedural in nature and unlikely to impose significant new costs or distortions. Deletion would create administrative chaos in the criminal justice system without advancing free-market principles, as the underlying legal aid monopoly would remain untouched. These are minor implementing details for a system already operating.

This Order amends the Community Legal Service (Funding) (Counsel in Family Proceedings) Order 2001 to modify fee structures for counsel in family proceedings funded under legal aid. It increases base fees and hearing unit fees for both Queen's Counsel and other counsel, revises special issue payment categories and percentages, and adds requirements for written information when counsel makes special preparation fee applications. The Order applies to work carried out under instructions received on or after 4th August 2009 where the certificate was granted on or after 28th February 2005.

This regulation perpetuates the Community Legal Service's state-monopoly pricing of legal services, which distorts the market for family law counsel. Fixed fee schedules determined by government bureaucrats replace the price signals that would otherwise allocate legal resources efficiently. The complex table of fees, special issue payments, and percentage categories creates administrative burden while distorting incentives—counsel are paid to handle certain case types over others regardless of actual demand or value. A genuine free market in legal aid would use competitive pricing, vouchers, or private alternatives rather than command-economy fee schedules. While access to justice for vulnerable families merits concern, the solution is not to perpetuate a centrally-planned pricing regime that undermines the very market forces that could expand affordable legal services.

This Order amends the Capital Allowances (Energy-saving Plant and Machinery) Order 2001 by updating the Energy Technology Criteria List and Energy Technology Product List to a July 2009 version, expanding qualifying equipment to include uninterruptible power supplies, and modifying component eligibility criteria in article 5(b). It provides enhanced tax allowances for plant and machinery meeting energy-saving specifications on government-maintained lists.

This regulation exemplifies government picking technological winners through bureaucratic lists, distorting capital allocation toward politically favoured technologies rather than market-discovered efficiency. The compliance cost is low, but the unseen costs are substantial: propping up uneconomical technologies, crowding out private R&D, and creating rent-seeking incentives as companies lobby for list inclusion. Tax policy should remain neutral across investment choices; if energy efficiency is genuinely valuable, the market will adopt it without regulatory nudge.

Amends the Capital Allowances (Environmentally Beneficial Plant and Machinery) Order 2003 by updating references to the Water Technology Criteria List and Water Technology Product List to versions dated 27th June 2009, with the amendment coming into force on 4th August 2009. The Order provides enhanced capital allowances (tax relief) for plant and machinery meeting environmentally beneficial criteria as specified on these lists.

This regulation represents government picking technological winners through the tax code — a form of corporate welfare disguised as environmental policy. The lists create distortions: businesses purchase items on the list for the tax break rather than genuine environmental merit, artificially inflating demand for certain technologies regardless of actual cost-effectiveness. Such subsidies obscure true market prices, impede natural innovation, and amount to wealth transfer from ordinary taxpayers to preferred industries. Post-Brexit Britain should let the market determine which technologies succeed, not bureaucrats with lists. The underlying 2003 Order already contained this flaw; this amendment merely updates the bureaucratic references without addressing the fundamental intervention problem.

These Regulations amend the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002 by expanding definitions for childcare, child minding and day care; substituting new criteria for regulated activities relating to children and vulnerable adults; adding new categories (x, y, z) covering immigration advice services, Misuse of Drugs licensing, and Criminal Records Bureau positions; revoking Regulations 5B, 5C, 6, 7, 8 and 8A; and prescribing enhanced criminal records certificate requirements for vulnerable adults and children in various care settings including adoption, fostering, childcare registration, and Ukraine Scheme sponsorship.

This regulation exemplifies the expansion of criminal records bureaucracy that creates barriers to employment in the care sector, inflates compliance costs for childcare providers, and restricts supply of vital services. The sweeping requirement to assess suitability of all persons aged 16+ living or working on childcare premises extends regulatory reach far beyond direct employees to entire households, imposing disproportionate burdens on providers and families alike. By expanding mandatory checks to immigration advice, drug licensing, and Criminal Records Bureau positions, it adds layers of administrative burden without clear evidence of proportionate safety benefits. The cumulative effect is to shrink the pool of available care workers and childcare providers at a time when Britain needs more supply, not more gatekeeping.

This Order temporarily disapplies Section 25 of the Terrorism Act 2006 for one year from 25 July 2009. Section 25 requires financial institutions to report information that might be of use in preventing terrorism or securing arrests/convictions for terrorism offences. This disapplication Order suspends that reporting obligation for the specified period.

While this Order itself is a temporary disapplication rather than a new regulation, the underlying Section 25 requirement imposes minimal compliance costs on financial institutions while serving a critical national security function. Terrorist financing intelligence is a low-cost, high-value security tool. The disapplication in 2009 may have reflected specific operational circumstances, but the general framework of financial sector cooperation with counter-terrorism authorities remains essential. Removing such cooperation mechanisms entirely would create gaps in the UK's ability to track terrorist funding streams, potentially increasing security risks at potentially catastrophic cost. The national security externality here is severe and market-failingly large, justifying this modest regulatory requirement.

Technical amendment regulations to the 2007 Lasting Powers of Attorney, Enduring Powers of Attorney and Public Guardian Regulations. They make minor textual corrections (omitting 'of', inserting 'relating'), substitute updated forms in Schedule 1 for creating lasting powers of attorney, and include a transition provision for instruments executed before 1 April 2011.

These are technical corrections and form updates essential for the functioning of lasting powers of attorney. Without standardized statutory forms, donors risk creating invalid LPAs that fail to effectuate their intentions, potentially leaving vulnerable persons without proper legal representation. While the forms could theoretically be provided non-statutorily, deleting these amendments would create legal uncertainty and potential gaps in the registration regime that could harm donors rather than protect their autonomy.

The Transfer of Functions (Transport Tribunal and Appeal Panel) Order 2009 transfers functions of the Transport Tribunal and a Lord Chancellor-appointed panel under the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal. It also contains schedules with consequential amendments, repeals, and transitional provisions to effect the consolidation of transport-related tribunal functions into the unified tribunal system established by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

This Order is administrative machinery consolidating fragmented tribunal functions into the unified tribunal system, which improves efficiency and consistency. Deleting it would preserve the old fragmented structure, causing confusion and inefficiency. This does not impose new regulatory burdens or restrict trade—it merely reorganises existing tribunal structures into a more coherent system, and Britons are better served by tribunals that can operate with unified procedures and governance.

The 2009 Amendment Regulations modify the 2004 Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts Regulations by inserting regulation 7A, which provides that exchange gains or losses from currency derivative contracts hedging anticipated or future proceeds from rights issues or open offers of shares are 'excluded amounts' (disregarded for tax purposes). The regulations also insert regulation 10A (bringing exchange gains into account when distributed to shareholders) and regulation 13 (transitional provisions for exchange losses on contracts entered between January-March 2009). These rules apply to periods of account beginning on or after 1 January 2009.

These regulations represent micro-management of corporate risk management through the tax code, creating preferential treatment for one specific type of hedging arrangement (currency derivatives on share issues) over other legitimate hedging strategies. The complex connected persons tests, proportional allocation rules, and anti-avoidance provisions impose significant compliance burdens while distorting commercial decisions about how to structure currency risk management. Such targeted tax exemptions for specific transaction types amount to corporate welfare that advantages companies undertaking rights issues over those using alternative financing methods, reducing economic efficiency and competitive neutrality.