Browse regulations

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 prohibit the import of Russian diamonds processed in third countries (effective March 2024 for stones ≥1 carat, September 2024 for ≥0.5 carats). The regulations also prohibit related technical assistance, financial services/funds, and brokering services. Violations constitute criminal offences with defences for those who did not know or suspect the connection.

Sanctions are a coercive intervention in voluntary market exchange that raise prices for British consumers and impose compliance costs on legitimate businesses. Diamond sanctions particularly harm UK jewellery retailers and traders while Russia continues selling through non-aligned third countries, making the policy ineffective at achieving its stated geopolitical goals. The criminal offence provisions create overcriminalisation risks for ordinary business activities. Such economic restrictions on consensual trade should be removed to restore Britain's free-trading heritage.

These Regulations designate the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and Magnox Ltd to amend nuclear pension schemes (CNPP and ME Group of ESPS) in accordance with section 311(1) of the Energy Act 2023. They provide 'reformed protection' ensuring protected employees retain pension benefits not less favourable than reformed benefits when schemes are restructured to career average revalued earnings structures. The Regulations also amend Schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2004 to extend reformed protection definitions to specific Sections (Closed, DSRL, GPS DRS, GPS SLC, LLWR, Magnox, Nirex, Sellafield, and the SLC Section), with provisions for scheme reorganisations.

These Regulations implement protections against harm for nuclear sector workers whose pension schemes are being reformed. Deletion would leave thousands of nuclear decommissioning workers vulnerable to losing accrued pension benefits, as the Regulations specifically prevent schemes from providing benefits 'less favourable than the reformed benefits' they first received. While the free-market perspective generally opposes regulatory intervention, this regulation preserves legitimate property rights in pension promises and addresses a specific, narrow industry context where workers have already accepted pension structures in exchange for their labour. Without these protections, workers face direct financial harm from retrospective benefit reductions.

Amendment regulations that incorporate EU Regulation 2017/746 (In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices) into UK law, create new Part 2A and Part 3A for IVD device market access and performance studies under the EU framework, add UK(NI) indication requirements for devices placed on the market in Northern Ireland, make technical amendments to align with the EU IVDR regime, and modify various other UK regulations including the Medical Devices Regulations 2002, Consumer Rights Act 2015, and multiple Brexit-related statutory instruments. The regulations primarily apply to Northern Ireland due to the Protocol, with some provisions applying to Great Britain only.

This regulation perpetuates EU regulatory capture in the IVD sector, imposing the EU's heavily-criticized IVDR compliance burden on UK manufacturers without democratic oversight. The EU's own IVDR has been widely condemned for its excessive complexity, astronomical compliance costs driving small manufacturers out of the market, and creating device shortages across Europe. Rather than using post-Brexit independence to liberalize this sector and attract investment to the UK, these regulations bind us even more tightly to the EU framework. The requirement for separate UK(NI) indications and the complex legal representative/contact person requirements for clinical investigations and performance studies add layers of bureaucracy that serve no safety purpose but entrench large established manufacturers and exclude innovative smaller competitors from the market. This is precisely the type of regulation Adam Smith warned against - special interest legislation masquerading as public protection.

These Regulations establish a statutory regime for approving and maintaining a list of security-approved air cargo agents (Regulated Agents, Known Consignors, and Regulated Suppliers) who handle cargo for civil aircraft. They set out application requirements including company details, security programmes, nominated individuals, and CAA site visits; approval criteria; listing durations (5 years for Regulated Agents/Regulated Suppliers, 18 months for Known Consignors); removal conditions and procedures; and transitional provisions for existing operators. The Regulations revoke earlier 1993-2023 instruments and omit certain EU-derived provisions from the Implementing Regulation following Brexit.

Aviation security regulations serve a legitimate public interest that cannot be achieved through market mechanisms alone — the catastrophic consequences of undetected explosives in air cargo justify government oversight. Without this regulatory framework, any agent could handle air cargo without security vetting, and the chain of custody for sensitive shipments would lack authoritative verification. The regulations also provide legal certainty and procedural fairness (notice, representations, appeal periods) that protect both businesses and the public. While the compliance costs are real, the existential risk from aviation security failures makes these costs a necessary insurance premium that Britons would ultimately bear whether through higher prices or through loss of life.

These Rules (Water Industry (Special Administration) (England and Wales) Rules 2024) establish procedural requirements for the special administration of water industry companies in England and Wales. They revoke the 2009 Rules and adapt the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 for water company insolvency proceedings, with modifications for water-specific contexts including notifications to regulators (Environment Agency, Consumer Council for Water, Water Services Regulation Authority), requirements for continued water service provision, and engagement with relevant authorities. The Rules apply when a court makes or may make a special administration order under section 23(1) of the Water Industry Act 1991.

These are industry-specific procedural rules for handling water company failures, not economic regulations restricting competition or market entry. Deleting them would create gaps in insolvency procedure for essential service providers without any corresponding liberalisation benefit. Unlike EU-derived regulations being reviewed for gold-plating, these are domestic rules addressing genuine industry characteristics of water utilities (monopoly infrastructure, essential service provision, environmental requirements). While technical in nature, they provide necessary clarity for rare but significant insolvency events that standard insolvency law alone might not adequately address. Removing procedural frameworks for utility failures would harm creditors, customers, and the public interest without advancing free-market objectives.

The Medworth Energy from Waste Combined Heat and Power Facility Order 2024 is a Development Consent Order under the Planning Act 2008 authorizing the construction and operation of a combined heat and power energy-from-waste facility. It grants the undertaker compulsory acquisition powers over land, rights to carry out street works, authority to override easements, and various related powers. The Order includes 34 articles covering development consent, land acquisition, street works, temporary use provisions, transfer of benefits, and environmental requirements. It identifies the authorized development as nine numbered works including the main energy-from-waste facility, heat main, and associated infrastructure.

This is a property rights authorization for a specific infrastructure project, not a regulatory burden that distorts market incentives. Deleting it would simply prevent the project from proceeding without removing any underlying regulatory requirements. Energy-from-waste provides baseload power and potential district heating, offering an alternative to landfilling. The environmental safeguards (air quality monitoring, noise management, odor management, flood emergency plans) are project-specific conditions that would need separate authorization anyway. Unlike EU-derived regulations creating persistent market distortions, a one-time development consent Order does not continuously interfere with economic activity.

These Regulations amend several retained EU fisheries decisions and regulations by extending their expiry dates from 2024 to 2026 (for the research surveys and data collection programmes) and removing expiry articles from discard plans and landing obligation regulations. They apply to England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

These regulations perpetuate retained EU fisheries rules without democratic scrutiny, extending burdensome landing obligations and discard plans that impose compliance costs on Britain's fishing industry. Post-Brexit Britain should be freeing its fishermen from EU-derived constraints, not automatically extending them. The expiry dates existed precisely because even the EU recognised these regulations needed review — removing them removes that pressure for reform. This represents regulatory inertia, not deliberate policy-making.

Establishes the East Midlands Combined County Authority, a new regional governance body comprising Derby City, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire councils. Creates an elected mayor with general functions. Transfers and confers functions regarding housing, planning, compulsory land acquisition, transportation, highways, road traffic enforcement, business rate supplements, and public health from constituent councils to the new Authority. Grants Authority concurrent and replacement powers over transport, highways, permits, and NHS/health arrangements.

Creates a new regional quango layer with significant coercive powers including compulsory land acquisition, transport planning monopoly, business rate levies, and housing control—concentrating power away from accountable local councils and distorting market incentives. This is precisely the type of bureaucratic intervention that Friedman and Hayek warned harms economic dynamism. The democratically accountable case for deletion is strong: thousands of retained EU laws sit unreviewed while Parliament creates new statutory instruments adding bureaucratic layers without proper scrutiny.

The Registered Office Address (Rectification of Register) Regulations 2024 allow the Companies Registrar to change a company's registered office address to a 'default address' if the Registrar believes the current address is not 'appropriate.' It enables any person to apply for such a change, requires companies to respond to notices or face address alteration, provides court appeal rights within 28 days, suspends certain company duties during a transition period, creates criminal offenses for non-compliance with fines, and grants the Registrar power to strike companies off the register for failure to comply. It revokes and replaces the 2016 Regulations.

This regulation imposes significant compliance costs and risks on legitimate businesses without proportionate benefit. The provision allowing 'any person' to apply to change a company's registered office creates clear potential for harassment and frivolous applications that could disrupt legitimate businesses. The ultimate sanction of striking a company off the register for non-compliance is Draconian. The state's power to unilaterally change a company's registered office address represents excessive interference in private corporate decisions. These regulations appear to be a replacement regime for the EU-derived 2016 Regulations, perpetuating regulatory burden rather than reducing it post-Brexit. The compliance period requirements, criminal penalties, and strike-off powers create a climate of regulatory coercion that harms the dynamism of British companies.

The Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Company Law) Regulations 2024 amend the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 and associated regulations to require LLPs to have an 'appropriate address' and 'appropriate email address', expand restrictions on LLP names (adding prohibitions on names facilitating criminal activity, names suggesting foreign government connections, and names containing computer code), establish procedures for the Secretary of State to direct name changes, and create penalties for non-compliance with name requirements.

While these regulations add compliance requirements, they serve legitimate purposes hard to achieve otherwise: the 'appropriate address' requirement ensures legal documents can be delivered to LLPs, the email address requirement enables electronic communication with the registrar, and the name restrictions (criminal purpose names, foreign government impersonation) protect the public from fraud and misrepresentation. Deleting these would expose the public to LLP name fraud and create gaps in Companies House's ability to communicate with LLPs, causing greater harm than the compliance costs.

The Service Address (Rectification of Register) Regulations 2024 establish procedures for the companies registrar to change relevant persons' registered service addresses to 'default addresses' when they don't meet statutory requirements. Key mechanisms include: applications by any person to challenge addresses, 14-day notice periods for objections, court appeals within 28 days, a 28-day compliance period for companies to register proper addresses, and criminal offenses with fines for non-compliance.

While maintaining accurate company registers serves a legitimate function, this regulation imposes significant regulatory burden: mandatory compliance periods, multiple notice requirements, and criminal offenses (regulation 20) with fines for relevant persons who fail 'without reasonable excuse' to ensure proper address registration. The criminalization of procedural failures is disproportionate and adds compliance costs that disproportionately affect smaller companies. The underlying goal of accurate service addresses could be achieved through less coercive mechanisms, such as voluntary correction incentives or market-driven quality signals, rather than threat of criminal liability.

These Regulations establish procedures for the Companies Registrar to change the registered principal office address of relevant persons (directors, secretaries, etc.) to a nominated 'default address' (PO box or registrar's address) where satisfied the registered address is not the actual principal office. They allow any person to apply for such a change, require 14-day notice periods for objections, create 28-day compliance periods for companies to update addresses, and impose criminal penalties (fines) for relevant persons who fail to ensure compliance.

The regulation imposes criminal liability (level 3 fines) on officers of relevant persons for failing to ensure address updates within 28 days — a coercive response to what is fundamentally an administrative matter. It enables any person to trigger address changes that create compliance burdens and business disruption, with no safeguard against harassment. Forcing use of PO boxes as 'default addresses' undermines rather than enhances transparency, since the actual location of directors and secretaries becomes hidden from public view while creating the illusion of compliance. These regulations add compliance costs with no corresponding benefit that cannot be achieved through existing Companies Act provisions for address changes and the civil law of document service.

These regulations amend the Mesothelioma Lump Sum Payments (Conditions and Amounts) Regulations 2008 to update payment tables for victims of diffuse mesothelioma and their dependants. The amendments apply to those first diagnosed or who die from the disease on or after 1 April 2024, with payment amounts varying by age at diagnosis or death. Payments range from £114,210 (for those 37 or under) down to £17,745 (for those 77 or over) for victims, with lower amounts for dependants.

Without these regulations, mesothelioma victims and their families would lose statutory lump sum payments they are entitled to under the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008. These are not regulatory burdens on business but compensation for industrial disease victims. Deleting this would cause direct financial harm to vulnerable people suffering from a terminal cancer caused by historical workplace asbestos exposure, with no corresponding economic benefit.

These Regulations amend the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers' Compensation) (Payment of Claims) Regulations 1988 to increase statutory payment rates for victims of industrial diseases (pneumoconiosis, diffuse mesothelioma, tuberculosis). The changes include: raising the death payment from £3,771 to £4,024, increasing tuberculosis accompaniment payments from £7,801 to £8,324, and substituting updated compensation tables (Tables 1 and 2) that calculate payments based on the disabled person's age and percentage assessment. The Regulations apply to cases where entitlement arises on or after 1st April 2024 and extend to England, Wales, and Scotland.

This is not a typical regulatory burden but a statutory workers' compensation scheme addressing a genuine market failure — victims of industrial diseases like pneumoconiosis and mesothelioma often could not establish civil liability against employers who had since ceased trading or become insolvent. Without this scheme, these individuals would have no recourse to compensation. The inflation-linked adjustments (£3,771→£4,024, £7,801→£8,324) merely maintain the real value of entitlements already established by primary legislation in 1979. Deletion would leave dying workers and their dependants without vital financial support, with no market mechanism to replace it.

These Regulations establish the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) levy and fee system for 2024-25, imposing a total levy of £38,465,000 on petroleum licensees comprising a production levy on offshore production licenses and a non-production levy on exploration and certain production licenses, with discounts of 80-90% for micro-enterprises. The Regulations also amend the 2016 Fees Regulations, updating various consent and license application fees downward, including pipeline authorisations (£3,330), petroleum extraction consents (£1,200), and production licenses (£10,030), as well as storage and carbon dioxide appraisal fees.

The £38.465M levy on oil and gas licensees funds the OGA's regulatory operations but adds significant compliance costs that are passed through to consumers and reduce UK competitiveness in global energy markets. While the 80-90% micro-enterprise discounts show awareness of small business burden, the regulatory regime itself—with its licensing requirements, consent requirements, and fee structures—creates barriers to entry and restricts supply. Petroleum licensing is inherently a monopolistic grant system; these Regulations reinforce that structure by imposing levies on those who hold licenses rather than promoting free market competition. The OGA's functions could be funded through general taxation or more efficient user-pays models with clearer cost-benefit justification. The 2024 fee reductions are modest and do not address the fundamental competitive disadvantage of UK regulation.