Browse regulations

These regulations extend the application of section 116B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which restricts public sector wage deductions for trade union subscriptions. They treat certain non-public bodies as public authorities for this purpose, specify additional public sector employers (government departments, Scottish Ministers, Schedule-listed bodies), and retroactively treat existing contracts and collective agreements as prohibiting union subscription deductions not in accordance with section 116B(1).

These regulations restrict voluntary contractual arrangements by mandating government-dictated terms for how public sector wage deductions for union subscriptions must operate. The retroactive treatment of existing contracts as containing different terms than those actually agreed upon is particularly problematic — it modifies contractual obligations by legislative fiat rather than negotiation. Such restrictions limit the freedom of public sector bodies and workers to enter into mutually beneficial arrangements of their choosing, imposing costs through reduced contractual flexibility and enforced compliance with a one-size-fits-all statutory framework.

The Road Vehicles (Type-Approval) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 amend retained EU Regulation 2018/858 on motor vehicle type-approval, updating technical tables in Annex II for heavy duty vehicle emissions standards, CO2 simulation tools, and UN Regulation equivalence references. It also adds rolling resistance determination requirements, modifies the GB type-approval marking from 'E' to 'g' with number 11, and updates rear registration plate mounting provisions.

This amendment perpetuates EU-derived bureaucratic type-approval requirements without leveraging post-Brexit regulatory independence to reduce costs. The regulation maintains complex multi-layered emissions standards (Euro VI, real driving emissions) and heavy administrative requirements that drive up vehicle costs, restrict market access, and impede the automotive sector's competitiveness. Rather than using Brexit to simplify and streamline approval processes, it merely relabels EU references ('E' to 'g') while preserving the underlying regulatory burden. The automotive industry would benefit more from rationalized, outcome-based standards rather than detailed prescriptive requirements that add manufacturing costs with unclear benefits over simpler compliance mechanisms.

Sets court fees for the UK Supreme Court effective 1 April 2024, applying to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Establishes a fee table in Schedule 1, with criminal proceedings largely exempt except for costs claims. Includes transitional provisions for pre-1 April 2024 appeals and a remission scheme in Schedule 2. Revokes prior fee orders via Schedule 3.

Court fees represent cost recovery for a judicial service that must be funded somehow. User-pays principles are more market-compatible than general taxation. The remission scheme in Schedule 2 provides a safety valve for those who cannot afford fees. Unlike regulatory instruments that distort incentives, suppress supply, or create monopolies, court fee schedules merely allocate the cost of a necessary public good. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is inherently limited and cannot be 'shopped around' to avoid these fees.

This Order implements a bilateral social security coordination agreement between the UK and Gibraltar (the 'Agreement' set out in Exchange of Letters dated 25th/26th January 2024). It modifies multiple UK social security statutes—including the Social Security Administration Act 1992, Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, various Welfare Reform Acts, and retained EU Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009—to give effect to the Agreement in England, Wales, and Scotland. The Agreement governs cross-border social security contributions, benefits, and coordination between the UK and Gibraltar.

Deleting this instrument would create harmful gaps in social security coverage for UK workers in Gibraltar and Gibraltarian workers in the UK, potentially leaving individuals without contributory benefits they have earned. Without this coordination framework, there is no clear alternative mechanism to prevent double contributions or ensure benefit portability. While it retains EU-style administrative procedures, the practical harm to British citizens from deletion outweighs the regulatory burden costs, and a replacement could be designed if needed.

Amends the Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004 to increase TV licence fees: black-and-white licences rise from £53.50 to £57.00, colour licences from £159.00 to £169.50, with corresponding increases to instalment payment amounts and updates to various reference tables for different payment plan options.

The TV licence is a compulsory tax on households for watching television, regardless of whether they consume BBC content. This regulation perpetuates a regressive flat-rate charge that funds a state-favoured broadcaster with a near-monopoly, distorting the media market and suppressing private competition. Rather than allowing market forces to determine broadcasting funding and content provision, it mandates price increases that burden households without democratic scrutiny of the BBC's spending or performance. The instalment structures add further complexity to a system that should be abolished entirely.

These Regulations establish the fee structure for the Registrar of Companies in relation to the register of overseas entities, as established under the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. They set out fees payable for filing, registration, and associated administrative functions for overseas entities owning UK property. The regulations came into force on 1 May 2024 and include transitional provisions for documents filed before that date.

These regulations merely establish cost-recovery fees for an existing administrative function mandated by Parliament. Deleting them would not eliminate the underlying requirement for overseas entity registration but would create operational difficulties by removing the fee framework. The fees appear proportionate as cost-recovery rather than revenue-raising, and removing this statutory fee schedule would leave the registry without a legal basis to collect fees for services rendered. The underlying policy debate about the register of overseas entities itself falls outside the scope of these fee regulations.

These Regulations amend the Registrar of Companies (Fees) Regulations 2012 to increase filing fees for company registration, re-registration, striking off, and restoration services at Companies House. They introduce a new Document Upload Service, remove the fee for disclosure of protected information, and raise most fees substantially—some by over 100% (e.g., same-day filing for overseas companies from £50 to £136).

These fee increases act as a tax on business formation and entrepreneurship. Substantial fee hikes (56-172% for many services) create unnecessary barriers to entry for small businesses and startups, discouraging company registration and economic activity. While the regulation is framed as cost-recovery, the magnitude of increases exceeds demonstrable cost increases and functions as revenue extraction from the business community. The old fee structure adequately funded Companies House operations. As Adam Smith's principles recognize, unnecessary costs on commercial activity reduce economic dynamism; lower, more competitive filing fees would encourage the entrepreneurial activity that made Britain great.

This Order abolishes the existing electoral wards of Dudley borough and replaces them with 24 new wards, each returning 3 councillors. It establishes staggered retirement schedules for councillors elected in 2024 (retiring in 2026, 2027, and 2028), determines retirement order by vote count with tie-breaking by lot, and sets election dates and procedures. The Order is made by the Local Government Boundary Commission for England under its statutory authority.

This is a technical electoral administration order from an independent expert body (the Local Government Boundary Commission for England) exercising its statutory function to review local government boundaries. It does not impose regulatory burdens on businesses, distort market incentives, restrict supply, increase costs, or create monopolies. Unlike the EU-derived regulations, gold-plated directives, financial regulations, planning restrictions, and healthcare licensing rules that are the focus of Better Britain's review, this Order is administrative machinery for democratic representation—it reorganises ward boundaries and election timing, not economic activity. The Boundary Commission's expertise and statutory mandate provide legitimate justification for this administrative structure.

Statutory instrument establishing new electoral arrangements for North Northamptonshire council. It abolishes existing wards and creates 31 new wards with specified councillor numbers, and reorganises parish wards within Barton Seagrave, Corby, Kettering Town, Rushden, and Wellingborough parishes. Electoral proceedings take effect October 2024; full implementation from May 2025.

This is a technical administrative instrument implementing Local Government Boundary Commission recommendations for electoral geometry. Unlike regulatory burdens on commerce, this simply defines ward boundaries and councillor allocations necessary for lawful elections. Deletion would create legal uncertainty, void the electoral map, and prevent legitimate local elections. The Commission already performed the scrutiny this body would replicate. No economic activity is burdened by these boundary definitions.

This Order extends the Universal Credit (Work-Related Requirements) In Work Pilot Scheme for another 12 months from 19th February 2024. The pilot, originally created in 2015, tests modified work-related requirements for Universal Credit claimants who are already in employment, allowing different conditionality rules compared to standard Universal Credit claimants. It applies to England, Wales, and Scotland.

A 'pilot' scheme running since 2015 is no longer a pilot — it is de facto permanent policy implemented without proper primary legislation. Extending indefinitely under annual SI authority denies parliamentary scrutiny. Imposing work-related requirements on those already in employment represents government overreach into voluntary labor arrangements, adds compliance burdens, and may discourage flexible working arrangements that benefit both workers and employers. Nearly a decade of 'temporary' piloting suggests either failure to properly evaluate or deliberate avoidance of democratic accountability.

This Order establishes a 500-metre safety zone around a specified offshore petroleum installation and amends the 2001 Order by removing three obsolete entries (North Leadon Cluster 'A', FPSO at Mid-Line Structure, and South Leadon Cluster 'B'). The safety zone restricts navigation around offshore installations under the Petroleum Act 1987.

Safety zones around offshore petroleum installations prevent collision externalities that private liability law alone cannot adequately address. Without such zones, ships could inadvertently collide with installations, causing catastrophic oil spills whose costs (environmental damage, cleanup, economic harm) would far exceed the inconvenience of navigation restrictions. The removed entries demonstrate the regulation's ongoing review mechanism. While ideally such zones could be negotiated via property rights, the practical difficulty of coordinating all maritime parties makes this a case where regulation serves a legitimate function in preventing irreversible environmental harm.

These Regulations amend the UK Internal Market Act 2020 to implement Article 6(1) of the Windsor Framework, ensuring 'unfettered access' for qualifying Northern Ireland goods moving to Great Britain. They establish mutual recognition and non-discrimination principles for NI goods, prohibit export procedures on such goods (with limited exceptions), restrict new NI-GB checks/controls, and provide definitions for qualifying Northern Ireland goods including exceptions for certain food/feed products and anti-circumvention provisions.

This regulation advances free market principles by removing internal barriers to trade within the UK. The mutual recognition principle (if legal to sell in NI, legal to sell in GB) and non-discrimination principle are classic free market mechanisms that reduce fragmentation and enable commerce. Deletion would risk reimposing export procedures on NI-GB trade, create legal uncertainty around the Windsor Framework commitments, and potentially subject goods to discriminatory treatment based on regional origin. While some EU-retained references remain, the regulation's core effect is trade-liberalising within the UK single market, making Britons materially better off through expanded market access and reduced transaction costs for Northern Irish businesses.

These regulations amend the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and Northern Ireland Act 1998 to: (1) codify Northern Ireland's constitutional status as part of the UK and its role in the UK economy; (2) prohibit HM Government from ratifying any NI-related EU agreement creating a new regulatory border between GB and NI without parliamentary process; (3) require ministerial statements on bills affecting NI-GB trade; (4) establish review and reporting mechanisms for the Windsor Framework. The regulations aim to ensure democratic consent for EU law application in Northern Ireland and protect the UK internal market.

Section 38A restricts the UK's sovereign ability to negotiate trade agreements with the EU by creating a prohibition and parliamentary hurdles on ratifying agreements that would create regulatory borders. While framed as preventing barriers, this constrains beneficial trade liberalisation and gives the EU veto power over regulatory divergence. The consent mechanisms add complexity that creates uncertainty for businesses. The definition of 'new regulatory border' references EU-derived meanings, perpetuating EU legal concepts in UK law. These restrictions on executive trade authority are anti-free-trade and undermine Britain's post-Brexit regulatory independence.

These Regulations amend the Nutrition and Health Claims (England) Regulations 2007, which implemented EU Regulation 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims. The amendment defines 'specified provisions,' simplifies offence references, applies modified provisions of the Food Safety Act 1990 (improvement notices, powers of entry, obstruction offences, punishment, appeals), and replaces court-based appeals with First-tier Tribunal procedures. The regulations restrict commercial speech regarding food products, requiring scientific justification for health claims and prohibiting certain claims outright.

This is retained EU law imposing pre-market approval requirements and restrictions on commercial speech for food products. It adds compliance costs through mandated nutrition information, scientific substantiation requirements, and bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms without evidence of net benefit. Post-Brexit Britain should allow consumers to judge claims through market mechanisms rather than regulatory prohibition; existing consumer protection law (trade descriptions, advertising standards) already addresses fraud. The tribunal-based appeals system adds complexity without clear advantage over courts.

UK statutory instrument requiring evidence providers under preferential trade arrangements to notify recipients of material errors in evidence of origin, establishing a penalty regime (maximum £1,000) for failure to notify, with provisions for appeals, HMRC reviews, and demand notices. Implements notification obligations that certain UK preferential trade arrangements require HM Government to impose.

This regulation imposes government-mandated notification obligations and penalty regimes onto private commercial relationships governed by voluntary trade arrangements. The costs are significant: businesses face administrative burden navigating complex compliance requirements, potential £1,000 penalties for innocent errors despite narrow 'reasonable excuse' defenses, and multi-layered appeals processes that favor institutional resistance. Critically, the regulation creates perverse incentives—businesses discovering errors face a choice between disclosure (with potential penalties) and silence, discouraging participation in preferential trade arrangements altogether. The market and contractual freedom of parties to preferential trade arrangements should determine notification obligations and remedies for error, not government prescription. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should reduce, not expand, such intervention in commercial relationships.