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A 2013 statutory instrument that varies the M67 Denton Relief Road Motorway and Connecting Roads Scheme 1972 by inserting a new Schedule 1A. It came into force on 28th October 2013 and is signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Transport.

This is a technical road scheme variation instrument, not a regulatory burden in the sense of EU directives, gold-plating, financial regulation, or planning restrictions. It merely inserts a schedule into a 1972 highway scheme and is necessary administrative infrastructure law. Without such variation schemes, existing road infrastructure cannot be legally modified or extended, which would impede legitimate infrastructure development. It does not create market distortions, restrict trade, or impose bureaucratic costs on citizens or businesses.

This Order, effective 1 October 2013, revokes three earlier statutory instruments relating to the extent of domestic gas supply licences: the 1996 Order, the 1996 Amendment Order, and the 1997 Order. These earlier Orders were likely transitional measures governing who could supply gas to domestic customers during market liberalisation — by 2013 the domestic gas market was fully competitive, making these instruments obsolete.

This Order is itself deregulatory — it removes regulatory burdens by revoking obsolete Orders from the market liberalisation era. Deleting it would mean the revocations never take effect, leaving those three Orders on the books as dead weight. However, the better approach is to recognise this Order for what it is: a successful deregulation that should be preserved precisely because it eliminates unnecessary licensing restrictions that served no purpose once full competition was established. The original 1996-1997 Orders restricted domestic gas supply to specified licensees — a necessary transition measure that became unnecessary and costly once the market matured.

This Order designates boundaries for the Port of Liverpool and Manchester Ship Canal for purposes of the Port Security Regulations 2009 (which implemented EU Directive 2005/65/EC on port security). It establishes the Liverpool and Manchester Ship Canal Port Security Authority Limited as the port security authority, specifies the authority is not a Crown entity, and requires the Secretary of State to conduct periodic reviews every five years assessing implementation and whether objectives could be achieved with less regulation.

This Order creates an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy for port security governance by establishing a company limited by guarantee to perform functions that government could administer more efficiently. As a retained EU law implementing Directive 2005/65/EC, it represents the exact type of inherited EU regulatory framework that warrants post-Brexit scrutiny. While port security itself is a legitimate objective, the creation of a dedicated private authority with periodic five-year review cycles imposes ongoing administrative costs and complexity without clear justification that this structure achieves better security outcomes than simpler arrangements. The review mechanism is itself a bureaucratic requirement that could be eliminated.

Amends the Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) Regulations 1999 to allow disabled 16-year-olds to drive small vehicles without a trailer, lowering the minimum age from 17 to 16 for those: (a) who previously received higher rate disability living allowance before age 16 and have claimed personal independence payment, or (b) who receive personal independence payment with mobility component at enhanced rate.

This regulation expands liberty for disabled young people, not restricts it. Deleting it would force vulnerable 16-17 year olds with disabilities to wait an additional year for driving independence, harming their mobility, employment prospects, and autonomy during a critical developmental period. The rule is tightly targeted at genuinely disabled individuals with demonstrated mobility needs, imposes no cost on others, and reflects a rational policy judgment that disability-related mobility barriers warrant accommodation.

Amends the Local Authorities (Functions and Responsibilities) (England) Regulations 2000 to: (1) broaden item 14A from 'Functions relating to licensing' to 'Any function of a licensing authority', expanding the legal reference from just Sections 5-8 of the Licensing Act 2003 to the entire Act plus all regulations made under it; and (2) add new item 14AZA for late night levy requirements under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Essentially reassigns administrative responsibility for licensing functions to local authorities.

This amendment expands the scope of regulatory functions captured under 'licensing authority' beyond the original limited reference (Sections 5-8 of the Licensing Act 2003) to encompass the entire Act and all subordinate regulations—creating a broader administrative burden without corresponding benefit. The addition of late night levy functions adds another layer of regulatory enforcement cost imposed on late-night venues, whose operating constraints already drive business overseas to jurisdictions with more permissive regimes. While this is an administrative reallocation, it perpetuates a licensing framework that constrains economic activity in hospitality sectors.

The Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013 establish the composition, appointment mechanisms, and procedures for the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC). The Commission comprises 15 Commissioners: 7 holders of judicial office (including specific judicial ranks from Lord Justice of Appeal to district judges), 5 lay members, and 2 practising/employed lawyers. The regulations detail selection processes involving panels, the Judges' Council, and Senior President of Tribunals for different categories of commissioners, along with term limits (5 years per term, 10 years maximum), grounds for cessation of office, and transition provisions from prior arrangements.

While the quota requirements are prescriptive, deletion would create a constitutional vacuum for judicial appointments. The JAC provides a mechanism for judicial involvement in selecting new commissioners, reducing pure political control over the judiciary—a reform begun under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Without this framework, the Lord Chancellor would have unfettered discretion over judicial appointments, undermining judicial independence. The procedural complexity serves the constitutional purpose of maintaining an independent appointments process, and the lay member element provides external scrutiny. The net benefit of structured, multi-stakeholder involvement in judicial appointments outweighs the costs of the bureaucratic overhead.

The Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013 establish detailed procedures for selecting judges to senior judicial offices (Lord Chief Justice, Heads of Division, Senior President of Tribunals, and Lord Justices of Appeal). They specify the composition of five-member selection panels, consultation requirements with the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice, and others, a three-stage selection process (with Stage 1, 2, and 3 rejections/reconsiderations), and reporting requirements to the Lord Chancellor. The regulations also define seniority rules for Supreme Court judges and contain provisions on diversity in panel composition.

Without these regulations, judicial appointments would lack the structured merit-based process that constrains political interference in judicial selection. The transparent panel system, consultation requirements, and multi-stage review mechanism ensure accountability while protecting judicial independence from arbitrary political capture. The focus on suitability and best candidate on merit provides a framework that, despite its complexity, serves to maintain public confidence in the judiciary—a fundamental institution for the rule of law that underpins economic freedom and contractual enforcement in a market economy.

The Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations 2013 establish the procedural framework for selecting Supreme Court judges in the UK, including the convening and composition of selection commissions (with representatives from the Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, and Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission), requirements for gender and racial diversity on commissions, a multi-stage consultation and approval process involving the Lord Chancellor and Prime Minister, and provisions for filling vacancies on commissions.

These regulations impose bureaucratic procedural requirements that go beyond what is necessary to produce a qualified Supreme Court judiciary. The mandatory diversity quotas (requiring gender and racial composition) substitute demographic considerations for merit-based selection, potentially resulting in less capable judges. The multi-stage approval process with Lord Chancellor oversight adds political influence without clear benefit—the 2005 Act's underlying framework is sufficient. Post-Brexit, this domestic statutory instrument should be repealed to allow Parliament to redesign judicial appointments on principles of pure meritocracy, without identity-based quotas, and with simpler, less costly procedures that reduce delays in filling judicial vacancies.

Amends the 2004 NHS General Medical Services Contracts Regulations to modify Schedule 2's list of restricted drugs. The key changes remove specific brand names (Viagra, Cialis, Levitra, etc.) for erectile dysfunction drugs from column 1, and substantially expand the patient eligibility criteria in column 2 to allow any patient with erectile dysfunction to receive these treatments, while also adding a separate pathway for other conditions where the drug is appropriate.

While the NHS's near-monopoly on healthcare suppresses competition, these 2013 regulations actually liberalize access by expanding eligibility for erectile dysfunction treatments to all patients rather than restricting it further. The deletion of brand-specific limitations and expansion of clinical discretion represents deregulation that increases patient access. Removing this would revert to more restrictive prescribing rules that limit treatment options for patients.

These Regulations implement EU requirements on contaminants in food, setting maximum levels for erucic acid in oils/fats (5% limit), aflatoxins, and other contaminants in foodstuffs per Regulation 1881/2006, and coccidiostats/histomonostats per Regulation 124/2009. They create criminal offences for placing non-compliant food on the market, establish enforcement mechanisms through food authorities, and apply to oils, fats, and compound foods containing them. The Regulations transposed EU directives verbatim without significant gold-plating.

This regulation consists entirely of retained EU law that was never democratically scrutinized by Parliament — transposed wholesale on 31st October 2013 without proper legislative debate. While contaminants like aflatoxins do pose genuine health risks, the blanket prohibition approach prevents consumers from making informed choices and producers from supplying products with appropriate labeling. The UK's post-Brexit independence provides the opportunity to replace prescriptive maximum limits with a risk-proportionate labeling regime that empowers consumer choice rather than criminalizing supply. A labeling system requiring disclosure of contaminant levels (as is done for calories, allergens, and nutritional information) would better serve both public health and economic freedom, allowing markets to differentiate products by quality rather than enforcing one-size-fits-all limits that eliminate entire categories of trade.

This is a commencement order bringing specified provisions of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 into force on dates between September-November 2013. It activates sections relating to the judiciary, court administration, Schedule 13 (covering the single Family Court, magistrates' courts, and related procedural changes), and related transitional provisions. It also removes a previously commenced provision via amendment to Commencement No. 3 Order.

A commencement order merely activates primary legislation and adds no intrinsic regulatory value — it is organizational machinery, not substantive law. The underlying policy concerns (EU gold-plating, financial regulation, NHS monopolies, planning restrictions) are not addressed by this instrument. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 provisions it brings into force would remain on the statute book regardless; deleting this SI would simply leave those provisions uncommenced, demonstrating the instrument's subordinate and expendable nature.

Amends the Town and Country Planning (Public Path Orders) Regulations 1993 by substituting new preamble wording in Schedule 1 (forms of public path order). The regulation provides updated form language for authorities making orders under section 257 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to stop up or divert footpaths, bridleways, or restricted byways to enable development, either where planning permission is already granted or where an application has been made.

This is a technical amendment that merely updates form wording to reflect current legal requirements. The regulation imposes no substantive regulatory burden—it simply clarifies the procedural language authorities must use when making public path orders. Deleting it would create confusion and potentially lead to defective orders using outdated language, without removing any underlying substantive power or restriction. The costs of keeping this are effectively zero, while deletion creates administrative inefficiency.

A Commencement Order bringing the Disabled Persons' Parking Badges Act 2013 into force on 8th October 2013. This is a procedural instrument that activates the parent Act, which governs the Blue Badge parking scheme for disabled persons.

This Commencement Order is procedural infrastructure that merely activates a regulatory scheme imposing parking privileges for disabled persons that: (1) restricts finite kerbside parking supply for non-disabled road users without compensation; (2) creates an entitlement that crowds out private parking alternatives; (3) administrative burden of badge issuance, enforcement and fraud investigation. The underlying Act, now in force since 2013, has contributed to congestion around high streets and hospitals where disabled badge holders enjoy extended parking rights that distort market pricing of kerbside space. A commencement order that activates such a scheme should not be retained when the scheme itself represents a regulatory allocation of public space based on status rather than market mechanisms.

Amends the Disabled Persons (Badges for Motor Vehicles) (England) Regulations 2000 to: allow Secretary of State to specify/approve badge forms rather than prescribing a specific form; update badge validity definitions to include badges under the 1970 Act or recognised badges; modify return of badge procedures; remove prescribed time periods for appeals; and specify prescribed places outside UK for service personnel parking badges under s.21(8B) of the 1970 Act.

These amendments primarily align domestic regulations with the Disabled Persons' Parking Badges Act 2013 and remove overly rigid prescription requirements. The regulations provide essential parking access for disabled persons. Deletion would cause confusion about valid badge forms, create inconsistency in badge recognition, and remove the practical flexibilities introduced (such as allowing Secretary of State to approve modern badge formats). While any regulation imposes costs, this targets a specific vulnerable group with limited scope for market distortion, and the 2013 changes actually reduced bureaucratic rigidity by removing the prescribed form requirement in favour of approval mechanisms.

These 2013 Regulations implement and enforce four EU regulations on food additives (1333/2008), flavourings (1334/2008), smoke flavourings (2065/2003), and food enzymes (1332/2008) in England. They establish enforcement mechanisms including compliance notices, offences for non-compliance, and apply provisions of the Food Safety Act 1990 for prosecution purposes. The Regulations also set out rules for permitted extraction solvents, labeling requirements, and include a review mechanism (regulation 20) requiring periodic assessment of whether objectives could be achieved with less regulation.

These regulations simply transpose four EU instruments into domestic law without independent British scrutiny or tailoring. Post-Brexit regulatory independence demands that we review inherited EU laws on their merits, not merely retain them because they were mandated by Brussels. The compliance notice regime, criminal offences, and enforcement bureaucracy impose costs on food businesses without evidence of proportionate benefit. The mandatory 5-year review mechanism (regulation 20) explicitly acknowledges that the objectives may be achievable with less regulation — yet this review has never resulted in meaningful deregulation. The regulations restrain competitive innovation in food additives, flavourings, and extraction solvents, benefiting incumbent producers at consumers' expense. Free trade requires removing such barriers to entry.