Browse regulations

A Commencement Order bringing into force section 2(1)(d) of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 on 1st September 2011, which extends the 'relevant duty of care' concept to persons in custody.

This is a technical Commencement Order that merely activates a provision of an existing Act of Parliament. Unlike retained EU laws that were inherited without democratic review, the parent Act was fully debated and passed by Parliament. Deleting this would simply prevent a democratically-authorised statutory duty from taking effect, creating a gap in the law rather than reducing regulatory burden. The underlying policy question about corporate liability for deaths in custody is properly one for Parliament, not for deletion by administrative instrument.

This Order amends the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 to extend the definition of 'relevant duty of care' to include persons detained in service custody premises (military detention facilities) and customs premises. It adds definitions for 'service custody premises' (per the Armed Forces Act 2006) and 'customs premises' (per the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009), ensuring corporate manslaughter liability applies to deaths occurring in these detention contexts.

While this expands regulatory scope, it fills a genuine accountability gap for deaths in military and customs detention. Without this amendment, organisations operating these facilities could escape corporate manslaughter liability for gross failures in duty of care. The extension applies to public-sector detention facilities rather than private enterprise, and the core rationale—ensuring accountability for deaths in state custody—reflects a legitimate public interest that would be difficult to achieve through alternative means. Maintaining this preserves the Act's coherence and prevents a gap in liability that could otherwise encourage neglect of detainee welfare.

The Toys (Safety) Regulations 2011 implement EU Directive 2009/48/EC on toy safety, applying to toys placed on the market for play by children under 14. They establish essential safety requirements (general and particular), mandatory conformity assessment procedures, requirements for technical documentation, UK/CE marking obligations, and obligations for manufacturers, importers, and distributors. They also establish a system of approved bodies for type examination and set detailed warning and labeling requirements.

These regulations impose substantial compliance costs (safety assessments, technical documentation, conformity assessment procedures, approved body testing) that are passed to consumers, while the Consumer Protection Act 1987 already provides a robust safety net. The EU-derived requirements create barriers to entry for small manufacturers and gold-plated EU directives with restrictions that go beyond the original Directive. Post-Brexit, Britain should trust market mechanisms and the 1987 Act's negligence-based framework rather than maintaining this detailed command-and-control regime that echoes EU bureaucracy.

These Regulations (2011 Amendment) modify the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009, primarily transposing EU Directive 2010/35/EU on transportable pressure equipment and aligning with the Dangerous Goods Directive. They establish obligations for manufacturers, importers, distributors, owners and operators regarding conformity assessment, marking, record-keeping (20-year retention), risk reporting, and recall procedures. They also create a 5-year regulatory review mechanism and designate competent authorities for enforcement.

This regulation is a transposed EU directive that imposes substantial compliance costs with no corresponding democratic accountability in post-Brexit Britain. The 20-year record-keeping mandates, conformity assessment requirements involving notified bodies, and obligations to report to EU member state authorities create unnecessary bureaucratic burden and competitive disadvantage for UK businesses. The regulation's requirement to coordinate with EU TPED competent authorities is particularly anachronistic after Brexit, creating friction rather than facilitating trade. While safety of dangerous goods carriage is a legitimate objective, the specific mechanisms here—prescriptive EU-derived requirements, mandated third-party conformity assessment, and multi-jurisdictional reporting—represent the 'bureaucratic burden' the task seeks to eliminate. The retained EU law should be replaced with a streamlined, UK-focused regime that achieves safety objectives through modern, performance-based requirements without the inherited EU compliance apparatus.

This Order temporarily relaxed certain Education Act 1996 requirements for three specific schools (Morpeth, Oaklands, and Swanlea) regarding pupil registration registers and information reporting for pupils over compulsory school age. It modified the Education (Pupil Registration) (England) Regulations 2006 to only apply to compulsory school age pupils at these schools. The Order had effect from 1st September 2011 until 31st August 2012 only.

The regulation has already expired (31st August 2012) and was never renewed, meaning it is obsolete. It served only as a temporary exemption for three specific schools and cannot be considered general law. Keeping expired, non-renewed regulations on the books creates unnecessary statutory clutter and raises questions about whether any residual effects persist. Parliament's failure to renew suggests the deregulation was sufficient or the schools transitioned to normal compliance. There is no evidence of ongoing harm from deletion.

This Order incorporates by reference the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document 2011, establishing a centralized national framework for determining teacher remuneration and conditions relating to professional duties and working time in England and Wales. It came into force on 1st September 2011 and revoked the 2010 Order.

This Order centralizes wage-fixing for 450,000+ teachers, removing all flexibility from schools to set competitive, performance-linked, or region-adjusted pay. It perpetuates a rigid national pay spine that: prevents schools from competing for talent through differentiated compensation; blocks teachers in high-cost areas (London, SE) from receiving market rates; stifles innovation in pay structures; and creates uniform labor costs regardless of local market conditions or school performance. The 'working time' conditions micromanage professional duties without allowing schools to innovate. In Adam Smith's tradition, labor markets function best when employers and employees negotiate freely — this Order eliminates that negotiation for an entire sector. Its only effect is to create uniform mediocrity instead of allowing excellence to be rewarded.

This Order amends Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to designate Loch Ryan as a seaport for port and border controls in Great Britain, while removing Stranraer from the designated ports list. It follows the relocation of Stena Line ferry services from Stranraer to Loch Ryan, ensuring continued border security coverage at the new crossing point.

Without this machinery, Loch Ryan would lack the formal designation required for Schedule 7 border control powers to operate, creating a security gap at Britain's principal Irish Sea ferry crossing. Deleting this Order would not reduce the regulatory burden of the Terrorism Act 2000's port control regime—it would merely leave the designation list misaligned with operational reality. The practical cost is impaired border security at the actual crossing point, with no corresponding deregulatory benefit since the underlying Act remains intact.

The Agency Workers (Amendment) Regulations 2011 make technical amendments to the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, including modifications to the definition of 'agency worker', adjustments to permanent contracts for pay between assignments, changes to liability provisions for temporary work agencies and hirers, and consequential amendments to Schedule 2. The 2010 regulations implemented EU Directive 2008/104/EC on agency workers.

These amendments are minor technical changes that neither materially strengthen nor weaken the regulatory burden of the underlying Agency Workers Regulations 2010. The 2010 regulations, implementing an EU directive, would remain in force regardless. While the original 2010 framework represents gold-plating of EU requirements that constrains labour market flexibility, deleting these specific 2011 amendments would provide no meaningful regulatory relief — the parent regulations persist unchanged. Britons would be marginally worse off from the loss of these clarifying amendments without any corresponding benefit.

This Order transfers grant agreements, along with associated rights, obligations, liabilities, and records, from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) on specified dates. It is an administrative reorganization instrument enabling the TSB to assume responsibility for existing R&D grant agreements listed in a Schedule.

This Order merely transfers contractual responsibilities between government bodies without adding regulatory constraints on market participants. However, it perpetuates government involvement in R&D funding decisions through the TSB/Innovate UK, which represents picking technological winners rather than allowing markets to allocate capital. While the transfer mechanism itself imposes no direct burden, the underlying regime of state-funded R&D grants distorts investment signals and should be wound down rather than reorganized. If these grant obligations must continue temporarily, they should be managed by the private sector or allowed to expire rather than being transferred to another government body.

These Regulations (2011) revoke the Changing of School Session Times (England) Regulations 1999, removing the regulatory framework that governed how schools in England could change their session times. The Regulations come into force on 1st September 2011.

These regulations remove a layer of bureaucratic control over how schools organize their daily schedules. The 1999 regulations likely imposed procedural requirements, consultations, or approval processes when schools sought to change session times. Removing this regulation restores autonomy to individual schools to manage their own timetables without state interference. Britons are better off because schools can respond more flexibly to local needs, parent preferences, and operational requirements without navigating unnecessary regulatory hurdles. This represents the kind of common-sense deregulation that Adam Smith would have endorsed — allowing private actors (in this case, schools) to make their own decisions rather than having the state dictate the terms.

Establishes the London Borough of Greenwich Permit Scheme effective 5th September 2011, applying Part 8 of the Traffic Management Permit Scheme (England) Regulations 2007 to specified streets. The scheme requires permits for road works to coordinate activities and manage traffic flow in Greenwich.

Permit schemes impose bureaucratic costs on construction firms, utilities, and infrastructure operators without clear evidence of corresponding benefits. Coordination of road works can be achieved through voluntary industry agreements and private contracts between utilities and local authorities. The administrative apparatus required to process permits, enforce compliance, and manage the scheme diverts resources from productive activity. Such schemes disproportionately burden smaller contractors and new market entrants who lack dedicated compliance staff, reducing competition. Road users ultimately bear higher costs through increased service charges and delayed infrastructure projects. The coordination rationale does not require mandatory permit regimes—the market and voluntary coordination can achieve similar results at lower cost.

This Order implements the London Borough of Southwark Permit Scheme under the Traffic Management Permit Scheme (England) Regulations 2007, requiring permits for street works on specified streets within Southwark. The scheme came into force on 5th September 2011 and applies Part 8 of the 2007 Regulations to specified streets in the borough.

Permit schemes for street works impose significant administrative costs and bureaucratic barriers on utility companies and infrastructure providers without demonstrated proportionate benefits. These requirements, derived from EU street works directives and retained post-Brexit, create unnecessary regulatory burden that drives up costs for infrastructure maintenance and construction—costs ultimately passed to consumers. Less restrictive alternatives such as notification requirements or voluntary coordination mechanisms could achieve the same legitimate goal of minimizing disruptive street works at considerably lower economic cost.

This Order establishes the London Borough of Lambeth Permit Scheme, effective 5th September 2011, which requires permits for carrying out road works on specified streets within Lambeth. It applies Part 8 of the Traffic Management Permit Scheme (England) Regulations 2007 to specified streets in the borough, creating a licensing regime for excavation and highway works.

Permit schemes for road works create unnecessary regulatory barriers that raise costs for utilities, contractors, and ultimately consumers. While coordination of road excavations has genuine benefits, a permit/licensing regime is an unnecessarily restrictive mechanism to achieve this — information sharing and voluntary coordination between utilities could achieve similar benefits without the administrative burden, compliance costs, and barriers to entry that permit schemes create. Such schemes tend to advantage large established players over smaller competitors and amount to government control over access to public infrastructure that markets could allocate more efficiently.

Establishes the London Borough of Waltham Forest Permit Scheme under which parties must obtain permits to carry out street works on specified streets, applying Part 8 of the Traffic Management Permit Scheme (England) Regulations 2007 to coordinate road works and minimize disruption.

Permit schemes for street works create unnecessary licensing barriers that favor established utilities over smaller contractors, impose administrative costs that raise prices for consumers, and amount to government coordination that the market could achieve more efficiently. The coordination rationale does not justify the costs of mandatory permitting, delays, and reduced competition in the construction and utility sectors.

This Order approves and brings into effect the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames Permit Scheme, requiring permits for street works on specified streets within the borough. It applies Part 8 of the Traffic Management Permit Scheme (England) Regulations 2007 to these streets, establishing a permit regime for coordinating road works to manage traffic.

Permit schemes for street works impose direct costs through permit fees and administrative burden, create barriers to entry for smaller contractors, and add bureaucratic delays to infrastructure maintenance. While coordination of street works is a legitimate goal, this can be achieved through voluntary industry coordination, local authority powers without detailed permit mandates, or competitive market mechanisms. This regulation represents the kind of EU-derived bureaucratic overlay that adds cost without corresponding benefit — the permit regime primarily serves to control existing utility providers rather than improve outcomes for road users. The coordination objective does not require statutory permit requirements; simpler notification systems or voluntary coordination schemes would achieve the same ends at lower cost.