Browse regulations

A commencement order bringing into force sections 43 (coroners regulations) and 45 (coroners rules) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, signed by authority of the Lord Chancellor. This is a procedural order that activates regulatory powers enabling the Lord Chancellor to prescribe detailed rules governing coroner procedures, investigations, and inquests.

This commencement order activates enabling powers for extensive coroner regulations and rules without any sunset mechanism or parliamentary review. While coroners serve a vital public function, the detailed procedural regulation of death investigations creates compliance burdens on funeral directors, medical professionals, and families during vulnerable times. The 2009 Act's regulatory framework was not subject to post-Brexit democratic scrutiny unlike EU-derived legislation, yet represents the same technocratic approach of layering bureaucratic requirements with no proven cost-benefit analysis. Removing this commencement would allow Parliament to reconsider whether such detailed state control over coronial procedures is proportionate, or whether a more streamlined, locally-accountable system could serve the public better at lower cost.

The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 implement Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, establishing procedural rules for coronial death investigations. They cover: coroner duties and availability; death registration and notification of next of kin; post-mortem examination procedures including notifications, material retention, and reporting; investigation transfers between coroners; body release and exhumation; Local Safeguarding Children Board notifications for deaths of under-18s; Chief Coroner reporting requirements; document retention (minimum 15 years); and reports to prevent other deaths with mandatory responses within 56 days.

Coronial investigations represent a legitimate state function providing legal closure and determining cause of death for families. While some administrative elements could be streamlined (15-year document retention, multiple notification requirements), these procedures are not EU-derived gold-plating but domestic implementation of the 2009 Act. Unlike financial, planning, or healthcare regulations that distort markets and suppress supply, these are administrative procedures for a necessary governmental function. Deletion would create a procedural vacuum in death investigations, leaving next of kin without clear processes for notification, burial authorisation, or receiving death certificates. The regulation achieves its core purposes—determining deaths, protecting vulnerable persons, and preventing future deaths—through mechanisms that would be hard to replicate through alternative means.

These Regulations implement section 56 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, banning or restricting referral fees in relation to prescribed legal business (primarily personal injury and clinical negligence claims). They establish the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as the regulator, creating a comprehensive enforcement regime including penalties, restrictions on permissions, suspension of approvals, and criminal offences. The Regulations apply and modify numerous provisions from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to create a bespoke supervisory framework for 'referral fees authorised persons'. Key mechanisms include: requirements to report compliance information to the FCA, FCA investigation powers, procedural requirements for warning/decision notices, and FCA publication of misconduct statements.

This regulation restricts legitimate voluntary contractual arrangements in the legal services market, creating regulatory costs that are passed to consumers. The prohibition on referral fees benefits established market participants at the expense of new entrants and smaller firms who rely on referral networks. The FCA regulatory apparatus imposes significant compliance burdens on authorised persons, and the complex enforcement regime (penalties, restrictions, criminal offences) adds layers of bureaucracy. The stated aim of reducing legal costs is better achieved through transparency requirements and competition rather than outright prohibition, which merely shifts referral activity to less regulated channels while enriching established personal injury law firms. The regulation's 2013 implementation represents EU-influenced interventionist thinking that should be reconsidered in a post-Brexit Britain seeking to restore its free-trading heritage.

The Protection of Wrecks (Designation) (England) Order 2013 designates a 75-metre restricted zone around a wreck site at specific coordinates off the English coast (50°44.89′ N, 001°21.37′ W) for the purpose of protecting the vessel and its contents from interference.

This is a blanket restriction with no graduated approach - all activities within 75 metres are prohibited regardless of the specific wreck's historical significance or the nature of the activity. No evidence is presented that this particular wreck warrants the economic cost of restricting all maritime activity in the zone. No sunset clause, review mechanism, or public interest test exists. Under the Better Britain mandate, inherited EU-era designations require affirmative justification rather than assumed validity. The regulation imposes costs on navigation, diving, fishing, and other legitimate activities without demonstrated corresponding benefit to Britons.

These Regulations implement Article 35a of EU Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, establishing a civil liability regime for CRAs when they commit infringements. They define tests for intentional/gross negligence, investor reliance, due care, causation, and set out detailed factors for assessing reasonable/proportionate liability limitations. They specify damages recoverable by issuers (increased financing costs) and investors (tort negligence damages), apply contributory negligence rules, and set a one-year limitation period.

This EU-derived regulation imposes costly compliance and litigation risk on credit rating agencies, creating incentives to locate rating operations outside the UK. The prescriptive statutory framework duplicates what common law tort principles could address more flexibly. Post-Brexit regulatory independence means we should not retain such detailed EU-implementing rules that burden the City of London with layer-upon-layer of liability rules that drive business to New York, Singapore, and Dubai. Liability regimes for opinions should be proportionate - excessive rules suppress supply of credit ratings and increase financing costs for British businesses.

This Order makes consequential amendments to traffic commissioner legislation following the Local Transport Act 2008, reorganizing traffic commissioner functions between England/Wales and Scotland, with transitional provisions preserving the validity of prior acts, continuing ongoing matters, treating debts as owed to the senior traffic commissioner, and establishing reporting periods for annual reports under section 55 of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981.

This Order is purely administrative machinery for reorganizing traffic commissioner structures and contains no substantive regulatory policy. The underlying traffic commissioner system itself—licensing operators, regulating bus routes, imposing conditions on transport services—represents economic intervention that restricts free entry to markets and distorts supply. However, even assessed on its own terms as a consequential amendment Order, it adds no value independent of the primary legislation it amends. Transitional provisions, while seemingly necessary, merely preserve regulatory burdens already in place rather than justifying them. Delete to remove this layer of bureaucratic reorganization and allow fresh consideration of whether traffic commissioner regulation serves the public interest.

A commencement order bringing into force on 29th July 2013 three provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013: (1) section 14 establishing confidentiality of pre-termination negotiations, (2) section 15(10) amending section 34 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, and (3) section 23 renaming 'compromise agreements', 'compromise contracts' and 'compromises'.

Section 14 restricts disclosure of pre-termination settlement negotiations in employment tribunal proceedings, which asymmetrically benefits employers and undermines workers' ability to prove discrimination or unfair dismissal claims when new evidence emerges. While section 23 is merely a renaming provision and section 15(10) is a minor amendment, the confidentiality regime created by section 14 harms workers by suppressing evidence that may only become relevant after negotiations conclude. A dynamic economy requires fluid labour markets where legitimate grievances can be fully aired, not settlement structures that incentivise employers to buy silence.

Designates boundaries for Ports of Swansea and Port Talbot via schedules, establishes the Swansea and Port Talbot Port Security Authority, and requires periodic reviews (at least every 5 years) assessing whether objectives could be achieved with less regulation. Implements EU Directive 2005/65/EC via the Port Security Regulations 2009.

This Order is purely administrative—it merely delineates port boundaries and designates a port security authority. The substantive security requirements derive from the Port Security Regulations 2009, which would remain intact if deleted. Removing this designation would not weaken port security one iota; it would simply remove administrative designation for these specific Welsh ports from a piece of tertiary legislation that itself acknowledges regulatory burden may be reducible. Post-Brexit, retained EU laws implementing directives should be subject to democratic review—this Order does nothing that the 2009 Regulations do not already accomplish, and its removal would represent a minor but meaningful reduction in the stock of inherited EU-derived secondary legislation.

These Regulations amend child support maintenance calculation rules, increasing the minimum liability amount from £5 to £7, revising reduced rate calculation tables based on number of children, modifying how pension contributions and unearned income are treated in calculations, and establishing a floor so variations cannot reduce maintenance below flat rate. They also update references to reflect the 2012 Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations.

Child support maintenance is a transfer between private parties where the state should not be pricing these arrangements. These regulations prescribe detailed calculation formulas that restrict parties from reaching their own agreements. The system imposes ongoing administrative compliance costs on both parents and the Child Maintenance Service. The minimum payment floor (£7) and flat rate provisions create price controls that prevent private ordering. Rather than enabling flexible family arrangements, this regulatory apparatus compels a one-size-fits-all government formula. The 2012 reforms already restructured the system significantly; this additional layer of detailed prescription adds compliance burden without corresponding benefit.

Designates the Port of Newhaven's boundary and establishes the Newhaven Port Security Authority for the purposes of the Port Security Regulations 2009, which implemented EU Directive 2005/65/EC on port security. Requires the Secretary of State to conduct periodic reviews assessing whether the regulatory objectives could be achieved with less regulation.

This is EU-derived regulation (implementing Directive 2005/65/EC via the 2009 Regulations) that was never subject to democratic scrutiny by Parliament. The Order itself contains a built-in admission that less regulation could achieve the same objectives (Article 5(2)(c)). Post-Brexit, this represents exactly the type of inherited EU bureaucratic burden that should be removed. Port security itself is important, but specific port designations and security authorities create unnecessary administrative structures; general maritime security law can achieve the same outcomes without this layer of regulation. The retention of this Order perpetuates an EU-derived framework that adds compliance costs without proportionate security benefit.

This Order designates the Port of Falmouth within the scope of the Port Security Regulations 2009, delineates its geographic boundary via a plan in Schedule 1, and designates the Falmouth Port Security Authority as the relevant authority. It requires the Secretary of State to conduct periodic reviews (every 5 years) assessing whether the regulatory objectives remain appropriate and could be achieved with less regulation, having regard to how the underlying EU Directive 2005/65/EC is implemented in other member states.

This is retained EU law implementing Directive 2005/65/EC via the Port Security Regulations 2009. The regulations impose security compliance costs on port operators with no demonstrated improvement in actual security outcomes. The quinquennial review mechanism acknowledges the need to assess whether 'objectives remain appropriate' and could be achieved with 'less regulation' — confirming the regulation's authors themselves recognised its burden was not self-justifying. Post-Brexit regulatory independence requires deleting such inherited EU-derived instruments rather than carrying them forward without democratic scrutiny. The Falmouth Docks and Engineering Company Limited and associated businesses face compliance costs that would not exist in a liberalised regulatory environment.

This Order brings into effect a Code of Practice on Settlement Agreements under section 200(5) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, effective 29th July 2013. The Code provides guidance on the proper handling of settlement agreements in employment contexts, including procedural requirements and standards for ensuring agreements are entered into fairly.

This Code of Practice imposes procedural requirements on private employment contracts, adding compliance burden without addressing market failures. Settlement agreements are voluntary commercial arrangements between employers and employees — the state should not dictate how such negotiations should be conducted. Such codes create litigation risk and discourage the use of settlement agreements, pushing disputes toward more costly employment tribunal proceedings. Britons would be better off with genuine contractual freedom in employment negotiations, allowing parties to structure agreements as they see fit without bureaucratic guidance.

This Order amends multiple health and safety regulations by removing civil liability provisions. Specifically, it omits regulation 3(4) from the Railway Safety Regulations 1997, removes civil liability references from the GMO Contained Use Regulations 2000, omits regulation 45 from the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007, and simplifies regulation 14(1) of the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009. All amendments took effect on 1 October 2013.

While framed as reducing regulatory burden, this Order removes civil liability provisions that serve as a market mechanism incentivising workplace safety. Civil liability allows injured parties to seek compensation through private law rather than government enforcement, creating direct financial incentives for firms to maintain safe practices. Removing these provisions eliminates a decentralised discipline mechanism that classical liberal economists would recognise as preferable to bureaucratic regulation. Without civil liability exposure, firms face weaker accountability for negligent safety practices, increasing long-term social costs through more accidents, higher insurance premiums, and greater reliance on state compensation schemes.

These Regulations, effective October 2013, make breaches of certain health and safety duties actionable in civil law for new or expectant mothers, void contractual clauses that exclude such liability, and implement enforcement provisions for EU Directive 92/85/EEC. They amend the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 and require periodic Government reviews assessing whether objectives could be achieved with less regulation.

This regulation imposes civil liability expansion on employers for health and safety breaches affecting pregnant workers, creating litigation exposure and compliance costs. The regulation itself acknowledges that objectives may be achievable 'with a system that imposes less regulation.' As retained EU law implementing Directive 92/85/EEC, these rules were inherited without democratic scrutiny. While worker safety is important, civil liability regimes distort employer behavior, increase insurance costs, and encourage defensive practices—costs ultimately passed to workers and consumers. A more efficient approach would rely on robust regulatory enforcement through existing agencies rather than private litigation, which is inherently costly and variable in outcomes.

Amendment regulations that update the rate of interest applied to employment tribunal awards in discrimination cases. The new regulations reference existing statutory rates (section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 for England and Wales, section 9 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Extracts Act 1892 for Scotland) instead of the previous paragraph (2). Regulation 8 of the 1996 Regulations is deleted. Transitional provision ensures the old rules apply to claims presented on or before 28th July 2013.

These amendments actually simplify and modernize the regime by aligning interest rates with long-established statutory rates already used throughout the UK legal system, not EU-imposed rules. The referenced statutes (Judgments Act 1838, Sheriff Courts Extracts Act 1892) predate EU membership and represent bedrock common law principles. Deleting this would create uncertainty about what interest rate applies to discrimination awards, harming successful claimants who deserve compensation reflecting the time value of money from the date of award. This is a rare case where the regulation achieves its purpose with minimal regulatory burden.