Browse regulations

This Order revokes the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Commencement No. 8 and Saving Provisions) Order 2015, which was itself a commencement order bringing certain provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 into force. This is a revocation of an administrative/procedural instrument, not a substantive regulation.

This Order is itself a deregulatory measure that removes a prior commencement order from the statute book. Deleting it would paradoxically resurrect the original Commencement No. 8 order, potentially reinstating procedural requirements. As a revocation instrument that advances deregulation rather than restricts it, there is no regulatory cost to maintaining it.

This 2015 amendment removes subsection (h) from the disqualification criteria in the NHS Trust Development Authority Regulations 2012, effectively liberalizing who may be appointed to the Authority. It removes a prior restriction on appointment.

Removing unnecessary disqualification criteria expands the pool of eligible candidates for public appointments, reducing barriers to entry for skilled individuals. Britons benefit from having a broader selection of qualified people overseeing NHS trusts. This is consistent with the goal of reducing regulatory barriers to public service.

The Legislative Reform (Duchy of Lancaster) Order 2015 amends the Duchy of Lancaster Act 1817 to allow the Duchy to treat preparatory costs for proposed improvements as improvement costs even if the improvement never takes place, and expands the definition of 'improvement' to include any development.

This is a special privilege for a historical anomaly (the Duchy of Lancaster) allowing capitalization of costs for abandoned projects, deviating from standard accounting principles. It serves no broader public interest and represents the kind of narrow private-interest legislation that should be eliminated. The Order is unnecessary government intervention in property management that could be handled through normal commercial practice.

The Preesall Underground Gas Storage Facility Order 2015 is a Development Consent Order (DCO) made under the Planning Act 2008 granting development consent for the construction and operation of an underground natural gas storage facility using solution-mined salt caverns in Lancashire. The Order confers compulsory acquisition powers, street works rights, water discharge permissions, and related authorisations on Halite Energy Group. It includes deemed marine licence provisions under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, protective provisions for buildings, and various operational consents.

Development Consent Orders are project-specific permissions, not general regulations—once the project is constructed and operational, the Order serves no ongoing regulatory function and remains as dead weight on the statute book. The Planning Act 2008 regime itself represents a significant barrier to energy infrastructure: the NSIP designation process is costly, time-consuming, and creates a near-monopoly of decision-making in the Planning Inspectorate rather than allowing market forces and local accountability to determine infrastructure deployment. Gas storage facilities enhance energy security and market competition by providing backup supply and balancing services; the solution mining process creates valuable salt caverns without ongoing regulatory burden. While this specific project may have merit, the regime that produced it should be reformed to allow faster, cheaper consenting—meaning this Order should be deleted as obsolete project-specific consent that has served its purpose, and the regulatory architecture that created it warrants fundamental reform.

The Childcare (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2015 amend multiple childcare registration regulations to: (1) allow childcare to be provided on non-domestic premises in addition to domestic premises; (2) create a new 'additional premises' approval regime requiring providers to seek pre-approval for extra premises; (3) define 'approved premises' and 'relevant person' (Chief Inspector or childminder agency); (4) create criminal offences for providing childcare on non-approved premises; and (5) mandate 5-year reviews by the Secretary of State. The regulations affect Early Years Register, General Childcare Register, and Common Provisions regulations.

These regulations create an expensive bureaucratic pre-approval regime for additional premises that imposes compliance costs on childcare providers without clear safety benefits proportional to the burden. The criminal offence provision (regulation 7B) criminalises administrative failures rather than actual harm. While the regulations do liberalise by allowing non-domestic premises, they add layers of approval requirements that raise barriers to entry for childcare providers, potentially reducing supply and increasing costs for parents. The 5-year review mechanism is inadequate parliamentary oversight for retained EU-derived rules.

This Order amends the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (Chambers) Order 2010 to add two new jurisdiction functions: (1) Property Chamber approval of local authority powers of entry under Schedule 9 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 and section 25A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, and (2) Social Entitlement Chamber jurisdiction over Childcare Payments Act 2014 appeals.

This Order expands bureaucratic jurisdiction without clear justification. Adding tribunal approval requirements for powers of entry creates unnecessary procedural hurdles for local authorities conducting legitimate functions, potentially delaying enforcement and increasing costs with no corresponding benefit to those being entered. The Childcare Payments appeal function similarly adds another layer of state review for what should be straightforward administrative disputes. Expanding tribunal jurisdictions imposes additional administrative burden on an already overstretched system, with costs borne by taxpayers and users. No evidence demonstrates these additions improve outcomes or that deleting the underlying authorities would leave gaps. Jurisdiction expansions of this kind are typically driven by bureaucratic momentum rather than genuine need.

These Regulations, which apply to further education institutions in England, prescribe the activities (education, employment, training, or combinations thereof) that can be tracked as 'destination information' for students who cease being students. They establish the 'information year' and 'relevant period' (October to following April) for collecting and reporting this data under section 49B(3) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992.

This regulation imposes administrative compliance burdens on further education institutions with no corresponding public benefit that the market cannot provide. Institutions already have strong incentives to track graduate outcomes for their own reputation and recruitment. The state-mandated collection creates bureaucracy without demonstrating that the data leads to better student outcomes. Like most information-gathering regulations, it tends to expand over time into more reporting requirements, increasing costs with no clear benefit.

Amends the Education (School Performance Information) (England) Regulations 2007 to expand SEN reporting requirements (adding details on SEN type, primary/secondary needs, statement/EHCP status, and SEN support provision) and to replace Part 2 paragraph 1 with extensive new requirements for tracking individual pupil data including qualifications taken, grades, course study details, funding eligibility, provider information, and outcomes for all registered pupils aged 16-18.

This regulation imposes substantial administrative compliance costs on schools with no corresponding improvement in educational outcomes. While transparency is desirable, mandating this level of granular data collection—from individual SEN classifications to detailed course funding information and provider names—creates bureaucratic burden without proven benefit. Parents seeking school performance information can obtain it through voluntary disclosure, market mechanisms, or targeted requests. The regulation's extensive individual pupil tracking requirements (gender, DOB, name, qualification grades, course outcomes) represent a data collection regime that exceeds what is necessary for genuine accountability and appears designed to satisfy bureaucratic specifications rather than serve families. The market for education information functions better when schools voluntarily demonstrate performance to attract students, not when the state mandates disclosure templates.

These Regulations govern the sharing of student information in England, prescribing which bodies can collect and share student data, under what circumstances, and what types of information. They apply to students in the fourth key stage and those undertaking 16 to 19 Study Programmes, establishing a framework involving the Secretary of State, information collators, local authorities, Ofsted, examination bodies, and various commissioners.

This regulation creates an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus for sharing sensitive student data across nine categories of bodies, including multiple government agencies, commissioners, and quangos. The complexity of the framework—with detailed definitions, multi-part schedules, and prescribed circumstances—suggests significant gold-plating beyond what is necessary for legitimate educational administration. Such detailed prescriptive regulation drives compliance costs for schools and learning providers while the extensive data sharing network raises serious privacy concerns for students and families. A principles-based approach with clearer boundaries would better protect privacy while reducing administrative burden.

The Faculty Jurisdiction Rules 2021 govern procedure in Church of England consistory courts for faculty proceedings (permissions for works to churches, churchyards, and listed buildings), including case management, consultation requirements with Historic England/amenity societies/Chartered Buildings Council, DAC notification requirements, and matters that may be undertaken without a faculty (Lists A and B).

These procedural rules impose extensive administrative burden on parishes through mandatory multi-body consultation requirements (Historic England, national amenity societies, Church Buildings Council), 42-day response periods, formal statement of significance and needs documentation, and formal court petition requirements for what are often routine works to church buildings. The regime generates significant compliance costs and delays, particularly for smaller parishes with limited resources, while the stated objectives of expedition and proportionality are undermined by the layered consultation and procedural requirements. These are retained EU-era ecclesiastical procedures that represent exactly the kind of bureaucratic burden that should be reviewed for deletion.

The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2015 amends the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Key changes include: new Rule 3.1A introducing special case management procedures for proceedings with unrepresented parties (allowing the court to question witnesses and assist unrepresented parties); amendments to rules 5.4D, 7.4, and 47.6 (costs budget requirements); new Rule 52.15B establishing a specific appeals process for planning statutory review refusals; and insertion of Part 63A (intellectual property proceedings).

Rule 3.1A fundamentally compromises judicial impartiality by requiring courts to question witnesses and act as advocate for unrepresented parties, blurring the adjudicative role. While access to justice is important, this creates perverse incentives and asymmetric procedure that disadvantages represented parties. The paternalistic 'helpfulness' standard is unmeasurable and unenforceable without arbitrary judicial discretion. Rule 47.6's mandatory phase breakdowns add compliance costs to litigation without improving settlement incentives. Overall, these amendments compound complexity in an already overburdened court system, with each procedural requirement creating new opportunities for satellite litigation and delay.

The Progress Power (Gas Fired Power Station) Order 2015 is a development consent order under the Planning Act 2008 granting Progress Power Limited permission to construct and operate a gas-fired power station with associated development (pipelines, grid connections, roads, and related infrastructure). The Order contains 32 articles addressing: definitions and interpretation; development consent grant; transfer of benefits; financial guarantees; street alterations; street works; means of access; water discharge and drainage rights; land survey powers; handling of human remains; compulsory acquisition of land and rights; compensation provisions; and various protective provisions. Schedule 2 contains 17 Requirements the developer must comply with (covering ecology, archaeology, landscaping, noise, traffic, flood risk, and operational matters). The Order also modifies the Hedgerows Regulations 1997 for the project.

This is not a regulatory burden but rather a project-specific development consent order granting permission for infrastructure that has already undergone full public examination. The power station will enhance Britain's energy security and contribute to economic growth. The Conditions in Schedule 2 ensure environmental and community protections. Unlike EU-derived regulations that were gold-plated, this bespoke consent was granted after independent examination and contains only project-specific requirements proportionate to the development. Deleting it would prevent investment, harm energy infrastructure development, and provide no benefit to Britons.

Amends Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 to add a 'very poor' prospects category (under 20% success chance), expand legal aid eligibility criteria to cover cases with 'borderline or poor' prospects if Convention rights or enforceable EU rights would be breached, and create new 'unclear prospects' categories for immigration and family cases with public interest or rights-based exceptions. Applies to determinations made from 27th July 2015 onwards.

These regulations expand government-funded legal aid by lowering prospects-of-success thresholds and creating vague 'unclear prospects' exceptions that invite subjective discretion. The 'unclear prospects' category with its 'significant wider public interest' and 'overwhelming importance to the individual' tests creates moral hazard and could fund virtually any case, regardless of merit. While access to justice has value, this amendment expands state intervention in legal services markets without demonstrated cost-effectiveness. The rules codify EU-derived rights as a basis for public funding, perpetuating the post-Brexit regulatory burden rather than reducing it. A genuinely competitive legal services market would handle much of this through conditional fee agreements and private insurance, not taxpayer-funded representation.

This Order extends the duration of non-jury trial provisions originally enacted in the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. It is a temporal extension Order that keeps existing emergency judicial provisions in force, without creating new regulatory burdens.

Non-jury trial provisions in Northern Ireland remain necessary due to documented risks of jury intimidation in terrorism-related cases. The 2007 Act's safeguards limit these trials to specific serious offences where evidence cannot be safely heard before a jury. While imperfect, deleting this extension would restore jury trial rights only for cases where the integrity of trials cannot be guaranteed, potentially endangering witnesses, jurors, and the administration of justice. The extension does not impose economic regulation, restrict trade, or burden business—it maintains the existing judicial framework for a specific security context.

The Hirwaun Generating Station Order 2015 is a Development Consent Order (DCO) made under the Planning Act 2008 for a gas turbine power generation station at Hirwaun in Rhondda Cynon Taf, Wales. It grants development consent, compulsory purchase powers for land acquisition, authorization for street works, drainage connections, temporary land use, and operation of the generating station. The Order contains standard DCO provisions for a major energy infrastructure project including environmental mitigation requirements, rights of way alterations, and statutory undertaker provisions.

This is a project-specific development consent order for a power generation facility, not a regulatory burden of the type this review targets. The Order facilitates infrastructure development that will enhance electricity generation capacity in Britain. Unlike retained EU laws or gold-plated directives which impose ongoing regulatory costs, this Order is an enabling instrument for a specific approved project. The Planning Act 2008 regime exists because large infrastructure requires coordinated authorization. While one may theorize about market-only energy provision, the practical alternative to DCOs is not deregulation but arbitrary executive discretion or planning paralysis. The costs of deleting this Order would fall entirely on the developer and achieve no regulatory relief for Britons.