Browse regulations

Amends the Landfill Tax Regulations 1996 to increase the credit entitlement rate from 5.1% to 5.7% for contribution years beginning on or after 1 April 2015. This is a technical rate adjustment within the existing landfill tax framework.

Deleting this regulation would revert the credit rate to 5.1%, increasing the landfill tax burden on businesses. The amendment actually reduces regulatory cost by increasing available credits, providing relief to affected taxpayers. While the underlying landfill tax framework is itself a regulatory burden, this specific amendment moves in the right direction by reducing fiscal drag.

Establishes the Ebbsfleet Development Corporation as an urban development corporation with 9 members (plus chairman and deputy chairman) to regenerate a designated area in North Kent spanning Dartford and Gravesham boroughs. The Order came into force on 20th April 2015.

Creates a quango with special planning powers to circumvent normal democratic planning processes — a classic case of treating symptoms rather than disease. If Ebbsfleet needs special treatment to overcome NIMBYism, the answer is reforming the planning system universally, not creating privileged islands of state-directed development. Urban development corporations concentrate power in unelected bodies, distort market signals by giving artificial advantages to specific areas, and perpetuate the cycle of picking winners through political rather than market mechanisms. The 9-member quango structure represents ongoing administrative burden and reduced accountability.

Establishes the Ebbsfleet Development Corporation as the local planning authority for a designated development area from 1st July 2015, transferring planning functions from previous local authorities. The Corporation assumes responsibilities under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, with exceptions for neighbourhood planning functions.

This Order merely reshuffles planning authority from local democratically-accountable bodies to an unelected development corporation while preserving the same restrictive underlying planning legislation. Urban development corporations were historically used to bypass local opposition and speed development, but they do not address the fundamental problem: the state controls land use through the 1990 Act framework. The development corporation model has not demonstrably increased housing supply or reduced costs — it simply changes which bureaucracy makes the decisions. The unintended consequences include: removing democratic accountability for planning decisions, creating regulatory uncertainty for developers who must navigate a different authority, and perpetuating the illusion that government-directed planning can efficiently allocate land resources. A genuinely free-market approach would abolish planning controls entirely, not redistribute them.

The Anti-social Behaviour (Authorised Persons) Order 2015 specifies housing providers (as defined by section 20 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014) as 'authorised persons' for the purposes of section 53(1)(c) of that Act. This delegates certain state powers related to anti-social behaviour enforcement to private housing providers.

This Order delegates state enforcement powers to private housing providers without adequate accountability mechanisms. Housing providers already retain access to civil remedies, police assistance, and local authority intervention for anti-social behaviour. Granting them authorised status creates risks of mission creep, selective enforcement against marginalized tenants, and concentration of coercive power in private hands. The original rationale for delegation was likely convenience rather than necessity — the same goal can be achieved through voluntary cooperation with authorities without creating a class of private entities with delegated state powers.

This Order amends VAT registration thresholds in the Value Added Tax Act 1994, increasing the main registration threshold from £81,000 to £82,000, the acquisition registration threshold from £81,000 to £82,000, and the lower re-registration threshold from £79,000 to £80,000, effective 1st April 2015.

Although this Order moves in the right direction by raising thresholds (reducing short-term compliance burden), the VAT registration threshold regime itself represents arbitrary government intervention that creates market distortions regardless of the specific level set. These thresholds were retained from EU law without parliamentary scrutiny and create perverse cliff effects where businesses near the threshold face incentives to limit growth or restructure to avoid VAT registration obligations. The unseen costs include distorted price signals, misallocated resources as businesses make decisions based on tax threshold considerations rather than market conditions, and the perpetuation of political allocation determining which businesses must bear full VAT compliance costs - an approach fundamentally incompatible with a free-trading nation.

The Animals, Water and Sea Fisheries (Miscellaneous Revocations) Order 2015 revokes multiple obsolete statutory instruments relating to: (1) animal importation controls (Hares, Processed Animal Protein), (2) animal disease administration (Diseases of Animals, Foot-and-Mouth valuation), (3) molluscan shellfish deposit controls, and (4) water administration bodies (National Water Council, Water Space Amenity Commission, and related reorganisation orders from the 1980s). The Order applies to England and/or Wales and came into force on 1 July 2015.

This Order is a deregulatory revocation that removes obsolete regulations whose purposes have long been fulfilled (e.g., water council dissolutions) or which have been superseded by later frameworks. Britons would be worse off if this revocation were deleted because it would leave dozens of spent statutes on the books, creating legal confusion and compliance burdens with no benefit. The original Orders being revoked either established temporary administrative arrangements now concluded, or imposed controls that have been superseded by more effective modern regulatory structures.

Amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 to: (1) add definition of 'the 2007 Act' (Income Tax Act 2007); (2) change 'refusing' to 'reducing' in enterprise initiative scheme provisions; (3) insert new paragraph 2A creating an exemption from collective investment scheme definition for 'social investment schemes' meeting specific conditions including minimum £2,000 contributions, tax relief eligibility under Part 5B of ITA 2007, and defined withdrawal rights (7 years for relevant shares/debentures, 6 months thereafter, or immediate for cash awaiting investment).

While this regulation creates a targeted carve-out that could distort investment decisions, deleting it would leave social investment arrangements subject to full collective investment scheme regulation, imposing greater regulatory burden. The conditions require tax relief eligibility (Part 5B ITA 2007), £2,000 minimum contributions, and withdrawal rights—providing participant protections while enabling social impact investment. Britons would be worse off without this exemption as the alternative regulatory treatment would be more restrictive and costly.

The Local Government Pension Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2015 make technical amendments to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013, including: clarifying active membership timing; expanding temporary reduction in contributions to include child-related leave; improving assumed pensionable pay calculations for absence due to trade disputes; enhancing death grant and survivor benefit calculations for part-time workers with ill-health conditions; introducing suspension notices for exit payments allowing employers 3 years to re-enter the scheme; adding administrative provisions for reserve forces service leave; and updating definitions and references throughout the scheme.

While government-managed pension schemes involve inherent distortions, deleting these amendments would leave the 2013 Regulations in force without technical corrections that prevent administrative confusion and protect scheme members. Key improvements include: the suspension notice mechanism for exiting employers which prevents unnecessary financial disruption; the IRMP certification provisions ensuring part-time workers with ill-health conditions receive accurate benefits; expanded child-related leave provisions; and clearer rules for assumed pensionable pay during trade disputes. Without these amendments, administrative complexity would increase and benefits foregone.

These are the Infrastructure Act 2015 (Commencement No. 2 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2015. They bring sections 26 (timing of appointment of examining authority) and 28 (changes to, and revocation of, development consent orders) into force on specific dates (12th April 2015 and 14th July 2015 respectively), with transitional provisions protecting applications made before those dates from the new requirements.

This is a purely procedural commencement regulation that merely sets dates for when provisions take effect and provides sensible transitional protection for pending applications. It imposes no regulatory burden, creates no restrictions on supply, and does not distort market incentives. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty about when the parent Act's provisions commenced, potentially disrupting ongoing infrastructure planning proceedings. The transitional provisions specifically prevent retrospective disruption to valid applications — a function that serves legal clarity rather than bureaucratic expansion.

This Order applies Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 safeguards (search warrant requirements, execution procedures, access/copying provisions, and retention rules) to search and seizure warrants issued under section 352 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for confiscation investigations, money laundering investigations, detained cash/property investigations, frozen funds investigations, and cryptoasset investigations. It replaces references from 'constable' to 'appropriate officer/person' and makes various procedural modifications while maintaining judicial oversight and procedural safeguards.

Deleting this regulation would remove essential procedural safeguards that protect citizens from arbitrary exercise of state power in asset recovery investigations. The Order extends PACE's established judicial warrant requirements, endorsement obligations, and retention protections to POCA investigations. Without these safeguards, investigators would operate under the older 2003 framework with less clarity. While asset forfeiture powers raise legitimate concerns about overreach, the real danger lies in removing oversight mechanisms rather than in maintaining them. The modifications streamline procedures while preserving core protections against unlawful search and seizure.

These Regulations amend the Infrastructure Planning (Changes to, and Revocation of, Development Consent Orders) Regulations 2011, modifying procedures for non-material changes to development consent orders. Key changes include: inserting consultation/publicity statement requirements; adjusting plan scale requirements (1:2500) with UK marine area exemptions; shifting fee payment obligation to applicants (£6,891); allowing Secretary of State to decide applications without examination; reducing decision timelines (6 months to 4 months for examinations, 3 months to 2 months otherwise); and various procedural changes to consultation and notice requirements for infrastructure projects exceeding 5km in length.

These regulations impose additional compliance costs and administrative burden on infrastructure applicants through new consultation statement requirements, mandatory newspaper notices at 5km intervals for linear works, and fee recovery mechanisms. The complex web of procedural requirements—with multiple exemptions for marine areas and Secretary of State consent provisions—creates uncertainty and delays. While reduced timelines (4 months/2 months) are beneficial, the overall regulatory framework inherited from the 2011 Regulations was a retained EU law never subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny, adding layers of bureaucracy that deter infrastructure investment and inflate project costs without commensurate public benefit.

This Order revokes the Scottish Parliament (Returning Officers' Charges) Order 2011, with the revocation taking effect on 30th June 2015, subject to a carve-out preserving the 2011 Order's effect for any election with a poll date on or before 4th April 2016.

This Order removes a regulatory burden on returning officers by revoking the 2011 charging regime. Deleting it would preserve an unnecessary regulatory cost on the administration of Scottish Parliament elections. The transitional provision for elections before April 2016 shows careful handling of legitimate interests.

These Regulations establish the procedural framework for applying for petroleum exploration and development licences (both landward and seaward), methane drainage licences, and seaward area production licences in the UK. They set out application requirements including documentation, fees, competitive bidding processes via gazette notices with minimum 90-day application windows, information requirements for applicants, and model clause requirements. The regulations repealed earlier 1988 and 1995 Petroleum (Production) Regulations and include periodic review provisions.

These Regulations impose significant barriers to entry in petroleum exploration through mandatory competitive application processes, 90-day notice periods, extensive documentation requirements, and fees. They create government-controlled allocation of petroleum rights rather than allowing free market access. While fair allocation of scarce natural resources has some justification, this procedural framework adds substantial regulatory burden without clear evidence it achieves efficient resource allocation better than alternatives. The regulations inherit and formalize a bureaucratic licensing regime that predates Brexit and could be replaced with a simpler registration or automatic entitlement system that reduces costs and barriers to entry for exploration companies.

The Building Regulations &c. (Amendment) Regulations 2015 amend the Building Regulations 2010 to introduce optional requirements for new dwellings, including: (1) water efficiency optional standard of 110L/person/day instead of the default 125L; (2) optional accessibility standards M4(2) (accessible/adaptable dwellings) and M4(3) (wheelchair user dwellings); (3) new Part Q security requirements for new dwellings; and (4) updated definitions and procedural requirements for building notices and full plans. The regulations also add requirements for rainwater drainage access and sanitary conveniences in material change of use scenarios.

The regulation adds regulatory burden under the guise of 'optional' requirements that become effectively mandatory through planning conditions, as local authorities routinely require them. Part Q imposes new security mandates on new dwellings, increasing construction costs. The 'optional' M4(2) and M4(3) accessibility standards, when triggered, impose substantial compliance costs that raise house prices and reduce housing supply at a time when Britain's planning regime already produces insufficient homes. The material change of use provisions require upgrades that discourage conversion of existing buildings. While the regulation attempts to provide flexibility through optional requirements, this flexibility is illusory given how planning authorities will use these powers, and the net effect is additional regulatory burden layered onto an already over-regulated construction sector.

The Public Service Pensions Revaluation Order 2015 implements section 9(2) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 by specifying a 1.2% price increase for revaluing benefits in the local government pension scheme for the scheme year ending 31st March 2015. It is a narrow, technical instrument setting an annual indexation rate.

This Order merely applies a mechanical price-indexation formula prescribed by the parent Act. Without it, the statutory revaluation mechanism would lack its required annual parameter, creating legal uncertainty and potential contractual disputes. While the underlying LGPS defined-benefit structure is itself problematic (creating unfunded public liabilities), this Order does not impose the scheme's structure—it simply operates within it. Deleting it would not reduce public pension burdens; it would only create administrative chaos. The 1.2% figure reflects actual price growth and does not gold-plate any EU requirement.