Browse regulations

Development Consent Order under the Planning Act 2008 granting Gatwick Airport Limited permission to construct a repositioned northern runway, associated surface access works, ecological mitigation areas, and related infrastructure, with compulsory purchase powers, street works authority, and 43 numbered works subject to parameter plans and environmental requirements.

This DCO represents government picking winners in airport infrastructure rather than allowing market forces to determine capacity allocation. It grants Gatwick Airport Limited discriminatory compulsory purchase powers for private commercial benefit, creates barriers that prevent competing airports from offering equivalent services, and imposes extensive regulatory requirements through Schedule 2 that will inflate costs and reduce operational flexibility. The Order perpetuates Britain's planning system problem described in the brief — restrictive zoning and NIMBYism codified into law — by using executive action to override normal planning processes. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should be used to liberalize infrastructure investment, not maintain this centralist model where specific commercial projects receive special government-granted powers unavailable to competitors.

A correction order that fixes errors in the East Yorkshire Solar Farm Order 2025 by providing a table specifying where corrections are needed, how to make them, and what text to substitute, insert or omit. Comes into force 20th September 2025.

This is a technical correction order that removes confusion and legal uncertainty rather than creating new regulatory burden. Without this correction, the underlying Order would remain ambiguous or inconsistent, potentially causing litigation, project delays, and added costs for the solar farm developer and ultimately consumers. Correction orders do not expand regulatory scope or impose new restrictions—they merely clarify existing legal text. Infrastructure projects like solar farms contribute to energy supply diversity, which supports market competition in electricity generation.

This Order authorizes Walbrook Institute London Limited (company 13621269) to grant taught degree awards under section 42(2)(a) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 for a fixed period from 1st September 2026 to 30th August 2029. The institution may also authorize other institutions to grant such awards on its behalf.

This Order grants a state monopoly privilege that restricts educational competition. Degree-awarding power is a significant state-granted concession that creates barriers to entry for new educational providers, limiting student choice. The fixed 3-year term itself is telling — if the institution is competent, it should have permanent authorization; if not, it shouldn't hold this power at all. The ability to sub-authorize other institutions compounds this by creating a secondary tier of privileged degree-granters. A genuinely free higher education market would allow any qualified institution to seek degree-awarding status through general market mechanisms rather than requiring individual ministerial Orders. Britons are better served by competitive educational markets than by state-picked degree monopolists, however well-intentioned the quality rationales may be.

This Order amends the Power to Award Degrees etc. (Hull College Group) Order of Council 2015, substituting article 2 to extend Hull College Group's competence to grant awards (degrees) for a fixed term from 1st January 2016 to 30th March 2029. It is a regulatory monopoly grant permitting a specific institution to award degrees.

This Order grants Hull College Group an exclusive monopoly to award degrees, restricting competition in higher education. Government-granted degree-awarding powers are inherently anti-competitive, creating barriers to entry for other institutions and limiting student choice. The fixed term until 2029 perpetuates this cartel arrangement without democratic scrutiny. Quality control in higher education can be achieved through competitive accreditation frameworks rather than exclusive franchises. Removing this regulation would open the market to innovative providers and align Britain with its free-trading heritage.

This Order amends the Power to Award Degrees etc. (Hult International Business School Ltd) Order 2023 to: (1) substitute article 2 re-authorising Hult International Business School Ltd to grant taught awards up to master's level in business and management, business computing, psychology (non-specific), economics, and politics; (2) substitute article 3 setting a fixed term from 1 December 2025 to 31 December 2029; and (3) omit the Schedule.

While this represents government-granted authority to award degrees (an inherently restrictive framework), deleting this specific order would harm Hult students who enrolled expecting to receive officially recognised degrees. The harm falls directly on individuals who chose this institution in good faith, whose credentials would become effectively worthless without state recognition under the current system. The issue of degree-awarding monopolies is systemic and cannot be addressed by deleting one institution's authorization in isolation. However, this order should be reviewed when the fixed term expires, and Parliament should consider broader liberalisation of degree-awarding authorities.

These Regulations revoke the Online Safety Act 2023 (Commencement No. 5) Regulations 2025, thereby preventing certain provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 from being commenced into force. The effect is to halt the implementation of specific Online Safety Act provisions that were scheduled to take effect.

This regulation is itself a deregulatory measure — it revokes a commencement order that would have brought additional provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 into force. The Online Safety Act represents significant government intervention in online speech and tech platforms, creating compliance burdens, chilling effects, and regulatory uncertainty that drives business abroad. Deleting this revocation would mean MORE of the Online Safety Act's provisions take effect, which is contrary to the goal of reducing regulatory burden on Britain's tech sector and protecting free expression. Britons are better off with this revocation in place because it preserves the status quo of not implementing these particular provisions.

Revocation regulations that undo the Online Safety (CSEA Content Reporting by Regulated User-to-User Service Providers) Regulations 2025, with effect from 2nd November 2025, extending to all UK jurisdictions.

This revocation removes recently enacted child safety reporting obligations before they have been properly evaluated. The original 2025 Regulations imposed legal duties on user-to-user services to report Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse content — a legitimate government function with direct public safety implications. While regulatory rollback is generally desirable, deleting this revocation preserves the option for Parliament to assess whether the reporting requirements achieved their purpose before deciding to scrap them. Additionally, removing the revocation keeps regulatory flexibility; if the requirements prove burdensome or ineffective, they can be repealed later through proper democratic process. A blanket revocation without review sets a concerning precedent for systematic regulatory removal without evidence-based assessment.

Amends the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) Order 2014 to add Botswana to the list of countries whose nationals require transit visas when passing through the United Kingdom. Includes a grandfather clause for existing bookings made before the Order's commencement date (15th October 2025) for travel by 25th November 2025.

This regulation adds a new visa requirement burden on Botswana nationals with no stated justification or evidence of benefit. Transit visa requirements impose direct costs on travelers (visa fees, processing time, administrative burden) and on carriers who must verify compliance. The grandfather clause implicitly acknowledges harm to those with existing travel plans. No public interest rationale is provided for why Botswana specifically was added — the Order does not cite immigration control failures, security concerns, or abuse of the transit route that would justify this restriction. Without demonstrated costs of removal versus costs of retention, there is no basis to conclude Britons would be worse off if this requirement were deleted. Such restrictions should require affirmative justification, not automatic retention.

This Order amends the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) Order 2014 by substituting 'Palestine' for 'Palestinian Territories' in Schedule 1, which lists countries and territories whose nationals require transit visas. The Order comes into force on 11 November 2025 and extends to the United Kingdom.

This is a technical amendment making a potentially significant change through a minor statutory instrument lacking proper democratic scrutiny. The change from 'Palestinian Territories' to 'Palestine' may have unintended interpretive consequences for visa policy scope, yet was processed as a routine amendment rather than debated policy change. The underlying transit visa requirement for these nationals imposes costs on movement and should be reviewed as part of comprehensive immigration reform, not patched via nomenclature updates. Deleting this amendment preserves the status quo (the 2014 Order's original wording) while the broader transit visa regime receives proper parliamentary consideration.

Amends the Diffuse Mesothelioma Payment Scheme Regulations 2014 by substituting Table 1 in Schedule 4 with updated scheme payment amounts based on age, ranging from £129,721 (age 90+) to £403,969 (age 40 and under). Applies to cases first diagnosed on or after 4th November 2025. The scheme provides lump sum payments to diffuse mesothelioma victims who cannot trace former employers for compensation.

This is a targeted no-fault compensation scheme addressing a genuine market failure: victims with diffuse mesothelioma (a disease with 20-50 year latency) often cannot identify or sue defunct employers. Without this scheme, these dying individuals would receive nothing. The payment amounts represent periodic upward adjustments reflecting actuarial reassessment. While government schemes carry administrative costs, the alternative—leaving asbestos victims without recourse—is demonstrably worse. This is not intrusive economic regulation but compassionate third-party compensation funded by a capped insurer levy.

Correction Order that amends errors in the Oaklands Farm Solar Park Order 2025 by substituting corrected text where indicated in a schedule. Comes into force 9th October 2025.

This is a technical correction Order that fixes errors in a prior instrument. It imposes no new regulatory burdens, restrictions, or costs. Deleting it would leave uncorrected errors in the statute book, creating legal uncertainty for the solar park project. Such machinery Orders serve a necessary function in maintaining accurate legislation and cause no harm to competition, trade, or economic freedom.

Amends Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Code to add two new aggravating factors for murder sentencing: (1) murder connected to the end of the offender's intimate personal relationship with the victim, and (2) murder involving strangulation, suffocation or asphyxiation. These factors apply to offences committed after the regulation's commencement date.

This is a targeted sentencing guideline amendment that enhances judicial consistency in the most serious criminal cases. Unlike economic regulations that distort markets, create barriers to entry, or suppress competition, this rule merely structures judicial discretion by specifying aggravating factors courts must consider when determining minimum terms for murder. It imposes no costs on businesses, entrepreneurs, or market participants, and does not fall within the categories of EU-derived red tape, gold-plating, financial regulation, or planning restrictions that this review targets. Removing it would leave a gap in sentencing guidance without any corresponding economic or competitive benefit.

Amends the Noise Emission in the Environment by Equipment for Use Outdoors Regulations 2001 to implement amendments to EU Directive 2000/14/EC, introducing Schedule 6A for sound power level calculations, adding transitional provisions for equipment placed on market before 22nd May 2025, and inserting a mandatory five-year review clause.

This amendment compounds an existing regulatory burden with additional calculation requirements (Schedule 6A dual methodology) and marking obligations that increase compliance costs for equipment manufacturers without evidence of proportionate benefit. Post-Brexit, the UK should not be automatically incorporating EU directive amendments that impose new burdens. The transitional provisions themselves acknowledge market disruption from the new requirements. A regulatory review clause does not justify the ongoing cost—better to repeal and allow market forces to drive noise standards innovation.

Amends four sets of street works regulations in England: (1) doubles fixed penalty amounts under the 2007 Regulations from £120/£80 to £240/£160; (2) doubles permit scheme penalties under the 2007 Regulations from £500/£120 to £1,000/£240 and early payment discounts from £300/£80 to £600/£160; (3) removes the word 'working' from the 2009 Regulations on prolonged occupation charges; (4) requires Approved Authorities to apply exactly 50% of net proceeds to reducing street works disruption and 50% to highway maintenance under s41 Highways Act 1980.

These amendments expand the regulatory burden on utility companies and highway authorities without evidence the doubled penalties achieve their aims. The mandatory 50/50 split on proceeds removes local discretion and may discourage efficient allocation of resources. Doubling penalties serves as a de facto tax increase on infrastructure investment, potentially delaying vital utility works and increasing costs passed to consumers. The removal of 'working' from the 2009 Regulations likely broadens the scope of charges rather than simplifying the regime. No analysis is provided justifying why the original penalty levels were insufficient or how doubling them will reduce disruption. This represents regulatory expansion through fiscal means without demonstrated benefit.

These Regulations amend the Public Offers and Admissions to Trading Regulations 2024 in connection with the revocation of EU Regulation 2017/1129 (the Prospectus Regulation) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. They substitute regulation 44 concerning FCA powers to appoint investigators for breaches of the new UK regime, and contain transitional provisions allowing authorized persons to add the new regulated activity of operating an electronic system for public offers of relevant securities to their permissions. The regulations extend across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

This regulation perpetuates rather than reduces regulatory burden. While presented as post-Brexit regulatory independence from the EU Prospectus Regulation, it retains a comprehensive regulatory framework for public offers including a new regulated activity (operating an electronic system for public offers), FCA investigation powers, and enforcement mechanisms. The transitional provisions merely phase in compliance with these new requirements rather than removing them. Britons would be better served by genuinely freeing the capital markets from prospectus and admission requirements rather than substituting one regulatory regime for another.