Browse regulations

UK regulations creating exemptions from food/drink advertising prohibitions for brand advertisements under the Communications Act 2003. The rules define 'brand advertisement' as promotion of a brand (not specific products), exempt it from advertising bans on less healthy food and drink, but carve out exclusions for depictions of specific products, realistic images, or brand names that are also product names. Includes grandfather clause for brands established before 16th July 2025.

Restricts commercial speech and creates regulatory barriers that advantage established brands over new entrants. The grandfather clause penalises post-July 2025 brand creation, distorting market competition. Complex definitional requirements (distinguishing 'brand' from 'product', 'realistic image' tests) impose compliance costs that disproportionately burden smaller competitors. The underlying paternalistic premise—that adults cannot evaluate brand advertising for less healthy products—contradicts consumer sovereignty principles. These restrictions on brand promotion will reduce competitive dynamism in the food and drink sector without demonstrable health benefits that could not be achieved through better-informed consumer choices or targeted restrictions on ads directed at children.

The Morgan Offshore Wind Project Generation Assets Order 2025 grants development consent and deemed marine licences to Morgan Offshore Wind Limited for constructing and operating an offshore wind farm comprising wind turbine generators, offshore substation platforms, interconnector cables, and associated infrastructure in the Irish Sea. The Order establishes definitions, procedural requirements, transfer provisions, notice requirements, and environmental safeguards including marine mammal mitigation protocols, archaeological investigations, and fisheries liaison obligations.

This Order exemplifies government's picking of winners in the energy sector through exclusive development consents and deemed marine licences—a form of regulatory monopoly that distorts the market. The extensive bureaucratic apparatus—multiple management plans, monitoring protocols, archaeological schemes, and compliance requirements—imposes substantial compliance costs that ultimately are passed to consumers through higher energy prices. While offshore wind may be part of a legitimate energy strategy, this particular instrument grants exclusive rights to a single developer based on government planning decisions rather than competitive market processes. The Order also retains the problematic EU-era marine licensing framework wholesale without scrutiny, including gold-plated environmental conditions that exceed what is genuinely necessary. Most significantly, such infrastructure authorisations should arise from transparent competitive processes rather than secretive NSIP examinations that concentrate decision-making权力 with the Secretary of State, producing outcomes that favour well-connected developers while the public bears the costs through constrained energy choices and higher prices.

A correction Order for the A122 (Lower Thames Crossing) Development Consent Order 2025, coming into force 12th September 2025. It corrects errors in the original Order by substituting, inserting or omitting text as set out in a Schedule table with three columns indicating location, method, and revised text. Made by statutory instrument under the Planning Act 2008.

This is a technical correction Order that rectifies clerical errors in the underlying 2025 Order. Deleting it would leave unfixed errors in the original Order, creating legal ambiguity and uncertainty for contracts, land agreements, and implementation of the Lower Thames Crossing. Unlike substantive regulations, correction Orders do not impose new regulatory burdens — they clarify existing provisions. Legal certainty is a prerequisite for economic calculation and investment; keeping this Order removes rather than creates cost.

These 2025 Regulations amend the Building Regulations 2010 and Building (Registered Building Control Approvers) (England) Regulations 2024. Key changes include: new regulation 22A mandating completion notices within 5 days of building work completion with detailed requirements for client/contractor/designer statements and compliance declarations; expanded compliance declaration requirements in regulation 18; disciplinary notification requirements in regulation 32; and corresponding cross-references throughout the 2010 Regulations. The regulations add mandatory disclosure obligations, additional administrative procedures, and compliance statement requirements for all building work covered by these regimes.

These regulations represent a net increase in regulatory burden at a time when Britain's planning and construction sectors need relief, not additional mandates. The new completion notice requirement (regulation 22A) imposes a 5-day administrative deadline with detailed content requirements on every building project, adding compliance costs and legal risk without evidence that the existing regime was inadequate. The amendments require additional statements explaining why certain declarations cannot be provided, creating a catch-22 documentation burden. Rather than removing gold-plated or unnecessary EU-derived requirements as post-Brexit opportunities demand, these regulations add new British-imposed burdens on construction. The stated goal of compliance verification can be achieved through existing enforcement mechanisms or private contractual arrangements between clients and builders, without government-mandated statement requirements for every project. These amendments will increase costs for developers, small builders, and homeowners with no corresponding benefit to building safety or quality.

The M60/M62/M66 Simister Island Interchange Development Consent Order 2025 grants development consent for a major highways infrastructure project at the Simister Island Interchange in Greater Manchester. It confers extensive powers on the undertaker (National Highways Limited) including rights to construct, maintain and operate the authorised development; temporarily or permanently close streets and public rights of way; exercise traffic regulation powers; override planning controls; and compulsorily acquire land. The Order creates a comprehensive statutory regime that applies cumulatively with multiple Acts including the Planning Act 2008, Highways Act 1980, and New Roads and Street Works Act 1991.

Development Consent Orders represent the most extreme form of regulatory concentration—bypassing democratic planning processes, overriding property rights through compulsory acquisition powers, and creating a bespoke legal regime that suspends normal statutory protections. This Order grants National Highways Ltd (a private company) the power to close public highways, override traffic regulation orders, and appropriate land without adequate parliamentary scrutiny. While infrastructure may be desirable, this mechanism is precisely the kind of top-down edicut that Adam Smith criticized when he warned against the 'invisible hand' being replaced by the 'visible hand' of state direction. The 2008 Act's NSIP regime was itself a EU-inspired import that concentrates power away from local communities—exactly what post-Brexit regulatory reform should dismantle.

Post-Brexit amendment to FSMA 2000 and the Regulated Activities Order 2001 that removes references to revoked EU Regulation 2017/565 (Commission Regulation), inserts new section 313CBA providing FCA with criteria for assessing when suspension/removal of financial instruments from trading could cause significant damage to investors or market orderly functioning, and updates definitions for 'commodity', 'portfolio management', 'financial instrument' and related terms. Also includes revised Schedule 2 Part 2 provisions clarifying money-market instruments, spot contracts, wholesale energy products, and derivative contract exclusions.

While this regulation adds the 313CBA provision constraining FCA discretion on suspensions, the primary purpose is technical post-Brexit cleanup—removing references to the revoked EU Commission Regulation and adapting UK law. Deletion would create legal uncertainty around financial instrument definitions, FCA powers, and the regulatory framework itself. The deletion of EU references and clarification of definitions (spot contracts, physically settled energy products, commodity storage/bandwidth) reduces gold-plating inherited from EU law and provides clearer, more proportionate UK-specific rules that remove unnecessary regulatory baggage.

This Order amends the 2006 Establishment Order for Kent and Medway NHS trusts by renaming the Kent and Medway National Health Service and Social Care Partnership Trust to Kent and Medway Mental Health National Health Service Trust, simplifying the trust's stated functions to providing goods and services for the purposes of the health service, and setting the accounting date to 31st March. It includes transitional provisions preserving existing rights and obligations.

This amendment Order is purely organizational/administrative in nature, making minor housekeeping changes to rename a trust, simplify its functions description, and set an accounting date. It does not create new regulatory burdens, restrictions on trade, or market distortions. In fact, it marginally reduces regulatory complexity by simplifying the functions article. Deleting it would leave the older 2006 Establishment Order provisions in force, producing no reduction in regulatory burden while creating administrative confusion. The transitional provisions properly preserve existing rights and obligations.

Consequential amendments regulations that update cross-references in UK financial services legislation from the Capital Requirements (Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures) Regulations 2014 to the Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures Regulations 2025, and replace definitional references with the PRA rulebook. Extends to all UK jurisdictions, comes into force 30th November 2025.

This instrument contains no independent regulatory burden - it is purely a housekeeping measure updating broken cross-references following the 2025 Regulations. Without these amendments, other legislation would contain obsolete references to the 2014 Regulations, creating legal uncertainty and potential compliance confusion. The substantive capital buffer requirements remain in the 2025 Regulations (S.I. 2025/653); this instrument merely ensures legislative coherence. As a consequential amendment instrument, deletion would create inconsistencies across the statute book without reducing any actual regulatory requirement.

This Order designates coastal margin land on the Isle of Wight (sections IOW5 Chilton Chine to Colwell Chine and IOW9 Gurnard Luck to West Cowes Chain Ferry) as public access areas under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, specifying 17th September 2025 as the end of the access preparation period.

This Order forcibly imposes public access rights on private coastal land without market-based compensation to landowners, violating property rights principles. The England Coast Path initiative creates ongoing restrictions on agricultural operations, land development, and insurance liabilities for affected landowners. Such access rights should be acquired through voluntary negotiation or outright purchase at market rates, not administrative fiat. The precedent of regulatory seizure of access rights undermines the property rights foundations of a free society.

This Order designates coastal margin land along the England Coast Path between Felixstowe Ferry and Bawdsey, establishing 24th September 2025 as the end date for the access preparation period. It implements section 52(1) approvals of Natural England reports under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, formalizing public access rights for this specific stretch of Suffolk coastline.

While this Order establishes coastal access provisions, it is a minor administrative instrument setting dates for a specific section of the England Coast Path—already authorized by Parliament under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949. Deleting it would create implementation gaps without reducing substantive regulatory burden, as the underlying statutory framework would remain. The Order itself imposes negligible compliance costs beyond standard path management. However, this reflects a broader concern: the England Coast Path represents significant compulsory access rights over private land, and the entire coastal access regime warrants review under Better Britain's mission to protect property rights and reduce government-mandated access obligations.

Amends the definition of 'smaller authority' in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 by raising the financial threshold. For financial years beginning on or before 1st April 2024, the threshold remains £6.5 million; for years beginning on or after 1st April 2025, the threshold rises to £15 million (in both cases measured by the higher of gross income or gross expenditure). This determines which local authorities are subject to lighter audit requirements as 'smaller authorities'.

This regulation reduces regulatory burden by raising the audit threshold from £6.5m to £15m, meaning fewer local authorities face comprehensive audit requirements. Deleting it would maintain the lower threshold, subjecting more authorities to stricter (and costlier) audit regimes. The regulation represents deregulation, not increased bureaucracy — precisely the kind of reform this agency supports. Fewer authorities under intensive audit reduces compliance costs for local taxpayers without removing essential oversight entirely.

Amends EU Regulation 543/2008 marketing standards for poultrymeat to permit poultry reared under free-range methods to continue being marketed as 'free-range' in England when veterinary or public health restrictions temporarily prevent access to open-air runs. Applies to poultry from production methods (c), (d) and (e), excluding guinea fowls reared in percheries.

This regulation provides necessary flexibility during legitimate disease restrictions by allowing truthful labeling - birds were genuinely reared under free-range methods and the restriction is temporary. Deleting it would force costly relabeling and devaluation of properly raised poultry during disease outbreaks, harming producers without protecting consumers from any actual deception. The regulation is narrowly targeted, imposes minimal compliance burden, and prevents unnecessary market disruption when health authorities restrict outdoor access.

These Regulations extend two transitional periods related to Central Counterparties (CCPs) by 12 months: (1) the own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs under EU Regulation 575/2013, and (2) the temporary deemed recognition period under the 2018 CCP Amendment Regulations, changing 'six years' to 'seven years'. Both extensions provide additional time for the financial industry to comply with post-Brexit CCP regulatory requirements.

These transitional provision extensions merely delay the implementation of costly regulatory requirements without removing them. Central counterparties already face significant capital requirements that constrain their ability to operate efficiently; extending the transition period extends the compliance burden rather than eliminating it. The regulations do not reduce the underlying regulatory cost — they only postpone when firms must bear it. Deleting these regulations would accelerate Britain's return to a competitive regulatory environment for clearing services, where shorter transitional periods encourage faster innovation and adaptation rather than perpetuating EU-derived regulatory frameworks that burden the City of London.

The Warm Home Discount (Amendment) Regulations 2025 amend the Warm Home Discount schemes for England/Wales and Scotland. Key changes include: technical amendments to regulation cross-references, extending a deadline from March 1 to March 31, 2026, and for Scotland specifically, increasing the aggregate non-core spending obligation by £39 million for scheme year 15 and requiring the Authority to recalculate each supplier's obligation proportionally. The scheme mandates that electricity suppliers spend specified amounts on fuel poverty measures for low-income households.

The Warm Home Discount mandates that private electricity suppliers spend on social policy, distorting energy markets and adding administrative burden. The £39 million uplift in Scotland is a coerced increase in private spending on government-defined social objectives, with costs ultimately passed to consumers or shareholders. This represents classic regulatory distortion: using private companies as instruments of fiscal policy rather than allowing direct government assistance or market mechanisms to address fuel poverty. The scheme creates cross-subsidies that undermine competitive pricing, imposes compliance costs disproportionate to benefits delivered, and there is no evidence the spending reaches the most vulnerable efficiently. Direct welfare payments would be more transparent and targeted.

These Regulations, made under the Online Safety Act 2023, establish the methodology for calculating 'qualifying worldwide revenue' of providers of regulated online services. They define: what revenue is 'referable' to regulated services; rules for apportioning mixed revenue; conversion of foreign currencies; calculation for single and multi-service providers; inclusion of group undertaking revenues; the qualifying period definition; and group-level revenue calculations for penalty caps.

These regulations support the Online Safety Act 2023's regulatory apparatus, which imposes compliance costs that will drive technology companies and investment away from Britain to jurisdictions like the United States, Singapore, and Dubai where digital innovation faces fewer bureaucratic barriers. The complex rules for calculating group-wide revenue across multiple entities create substantial compliance overhead that disadvantages smaller competitors and enriches regulatory consultants. While revenue thresholds are intended to target 'large' platforms, such definitions inevitably create perverse incentives and regulatory arbitrage. Critically, these retained EU-era regulatory approaches to digital services were not subject to democratic scrutiny when originally enacted and represent the kind of bureaucratic overreach that Adam Smith and the classical economists would have recognised as harmful to commerce and individual liberty.