Browse regulations

This Order revokes two prior sanctions Orders extending to overseas territories: the Côte d'Ivoire (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2012 and the Liberia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2015. It came into force on 10th August 2016, removing economic and trade sanctions previously applied to Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire for listed overseas territories.

This regulation removes trade restrictions, not imposes them. As an instrument of deregulation, it restores commercial freedom by revoking sanctions Orders that restricted trade with Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Britons are better off with this revocation in force, as it eliminates bureaucratic constraints on voluntary commerce and aligns with Britain's heritage as a free-trading nation. Removing this would reinstate the very trade restrictions we seek to eliminate.

These Regulations establish the governance framework for Ada National College for Digital Skills, a further education corporation, by setting out the instrument of government and articles of government in two schedules. The Regulations came into force on 8th August 2016.

This regulation micromanages the internal governance of a single state-established college via government decree, specifying exact instruments and articles of government. From a free-market perspective, institutional governance should be determined organically by founders, stakeholders, and market forces rather than imposed by statutory instrument. While specialized educational institutions may serve legitimate functions, dictating their precise governance structure through primary legislation represents the kind of bureaucratic overreach that Adam Smith and subsequent classical liberals warned against. If this institution requires governance rules, those should flow from its own constitutional documents rather than government regulation.

The Liberia (United Nations Sanctions) (Revocation) Order 2016 revokes the Liberia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2004, thereby ending UN sanctions against Liberia that had been in place since 2004. It extends to the United Kingdom and came into force on 10th August 2016.

This Order does not impose restrictions — it removes them by revoking the 2004 sanctions regime against Liberia. Sanctions are a form of government intervention that distort trade, restrict economic activity, and harm ordinary citizens in targeted nations. Deleting this Order would reinstate the 2004 sanctions, reintroducing trade barriers and economic controls that serve no purpose now that the original crisis conditions have passed.

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This Order amends Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to add five organisations to the list of proscribed terrorist groups: Global Islamic Media Front, Mujahedeen Indonesia Timur, Turkestan Islamic Party, and Jamaah Anshorut Daulah. Proscription makes it a criminal offence to belong to or support these organisations, attend meetings to promote them, or arrange or speak at such meetings.

While regulations generally impose costs through compliance burdens and unintended consequences, proscription of terrorist organisations operates in a fundamentally different domain — protecting citizens from violent coercion. Removing this would eliminate an established legal tool that creates criminal liability for membership and support activities without requiring proof of specific violent intent. These groups pose genuine threats to life and property; the state has a legitimate function in protecting citizens from such violence. Law enforcement agencies have developed operational frameworks around this designation. Even from a classical liberal perspective emphasising individual rights and free markets, the initiation of force against innocents is something a minimal state must prevent.

The Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations 2016 provide income tax exemptions for foreign athletes competing at the London Anniversary Games (July 2016) and World Athletics Championships (July-August 2017). The exemptions apply only to 'duly accredited competitors' who meet a non-residence condition (non-UK resident for the relevant tax year, or UK resident but in a split year with overseas activities). The regulation also exempts related promotional activities performed during the event periods.

This regulation represents targeted tax carve-outs for specific sporting events and foreign competitors, distorting neutral taxation principles. It picks winners among events and creates competitive inequality between foreign athletes (who benefit) and domestic athletes (who do not). The exemption is a form of corporate welfare for event organisers who should compete on commercial merit. Such event-specific tax incentives rarely deliver net economic benefits beyond displacement effects, and the bureaucratic definitions of 'duly accredited competitor' and qualifying activities add complexity without proportionate benefit. A truly free-trading nation would not use the tax code to subsidise particular events.

The York Potash Harbour Facilities Order 2016 grants development consent under the Planning Act 2008 for a nationally significant infrastructure project involving polyhalite export facilities at Teesport, including quay construction, dredging (up to 1.122 million cubic metres), conveyor systems, and associated marine infrastructure. It confers a deemed marine licence under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, street works powers, drainage rights, and protective provisions for buildings. The Order defines phased development (phase 1a, 1b, and phase 2) to facilitate export of 6.5 and then 13 million tonnes per annum of polyhalite.

This Order is a project-specific consent instrument for private commercial infrastructure, not a regulatory burden on the economy. However, it should be deleted because: (1) it represents the Planning Act 2008's intrusive consent regime that requires private infrastructure projects to obtain government approval before building — a system that adds cost, delay, and uncertainty to private investment; (2) the deemed marine licence regime creates government-controlled access to marine resources; (3) the extensive 'requirements' schedule imposes ongoing regulatory conditions on private commercial operations; (4) as a retained EU law context, this demonstrates how EU-derived infrastructure consent regimes were embedded in UK law. The government's role should be limited to enforcing property rights and contracts, not granting consent for private commercial projects. That said, deletion primarily serves to demonstrate opposition to the principle of infrastructure consent regimes — the immediate practical effect would merely be to void this specific project's consent.

Amends the Non-Domestic Rating (Miscellaneous Provisions) (No. 2) Regulations 1989 to modify rateable value ascertainment using the contractor's basis of valuation for properties on non-domestic rating lists from April 2017. Sets 'appropriate rate' assumptions: 2.6% for defence, educational or healthcare hereditaments; 4.4% for all other cases.

This regulation perpetuates the dysfunctional non-domestic rating system by artificially dictating valuation rates rather than allowing market-determined values. The contractor's basis of valuation is itself a bureaucratic construct that distorts property taxation. The dual rate structure (2.6% vs 4.4%) arbitrarily favors certain sectors over others, creating market distortions. Business rates are a significant competitive burden on UK enterprises, driving up operating costs and making Britain less attractive for commercial activity. Rather than reforming this system toward market-based rating, this regulation adds further complexity and government intervention into property valuation.

The Meaford Gas Fired Generating Station Order 2016 is a Development Consent Order made under the Planning Act 2008 granting development consent for a gas-fired power station and associated infrastructure in Staffordshire. It confers compulsory purchase powers, rights to construct and maintain works, street works powers, and operational rights on Meaford Energy Limited. The Order includes environmental requirements (Schedule 2), provisions for temporary land use, street alterations, and protection for statutory undertakers (National Grid, WPD). It applies various legislative modifications including the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981.

This Order represents project-specific consent for energy infrastructure that has undergone the statutory planning process under the Planning Act 2008, including environmental assessment. While a free-market perspective rightly questions regulatory intervention in energy markets, deleting this Order would expose Britons to harms: (1) the generating station may already be operational with existing contractual and property rights dependent on this framework; (2) removing compulsory purchase provisions would create legal uncertainty for land already acquired; (3) deleting environmental requirements in Schedule 2 would remove binding protections for local communities without replacing them; (4) the Order's nuisance and compensation provisions protect affected landowners. Unlike broad regulatory regimes that distort markets generally, this is case-specific consent where removal would create legal chaos rather than free up market forces.

The Cayman Islands Constitution (Amendment) Order 2016 amends the 2009 Constitution Order to modify judicial tenure (raising the compulsory retirement age provision), delete section 97(3), and restructure disciplinary control over judicial officers by redistributing authority between the Governor, Judicial and Legal Services Commission, Chief Justice, and President of the Court of Appeal. It includes transitional provisions for existing judges.

This Order governs judicial governance in the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, not Britain itself. It falls outside this agency's remit of reviewing statutory instruments affecting Britain's dynamic free-trading position, financial competitiveness, or domestic regulatory burden. The instrument is a territory constitution amendment, not a regulatory instrument impacting Britain's economic dynamicism or the concerns outlined in the founding mandate.

Amendment to Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, effective 22nd July 2016. Introduces a new 'marginal' prospects category (45-50% chance of success), modifies 'poor' to mean less than 45%, and expands acceptable prospects thresholds across regulations 42, 43, 56, 58, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 75. Allows borderline or marginal cases to qualify if they involve significant wider public interest, overwhelming importance to the individual, or breach of Convention rights. Includes transitional provisions for pre-July 2016 applications.

These regulations perpetuate government market distortion in legal services through subsidized legal aid, whichFriedman identified as creating artificial demand. The complex multi-tiered bureaucracy determining 'prospects of success' (very good, good, moderate, borderline, marginal, poor, unclear) imposes administrative costs that reduce resources available for actual legal services. Subjective criteria like 'significant wider public interest' and 'overwhelming importance to the individual' create discretionary power prone to political influence rather than neutral application. Hayek would note this perpetuates corporatist privilege for approved legal aid providers. The proper reform would be liberalizing the legal services market to reduce costs rather than rationing access through bureaucratic merit determinations. This amendment merely reshuffles categories without addressing the fundamental intervention.

Establishes the electoral mechanics for the Halton, Knowsley, Liverpool, St Helens, Sefton and Wirral Combined Authority mayoralty, specifying first election date (4 May 2017), subsequent election cycle (every 4 years on ordinary election day), and term of office (4 days after poll to 3 days after next poll).

This Order merely establishes the administrative mechanics for electing a mayor to an already-established Combined Authority. Unlike regulations that restrict trade, impose compliance costs on businesses, or suppress market competition, this is a procedural governance provision. Removing it would not Liberate any economic activity — the Combined Authority would still exist and require democratic accountability. Without such an Order, the authority would lack a lawful mechanism for mayoral elections, creating a democratic deficit. The regulation imposes no costs on private actors, contains no gold-plating beyond what EU directives require, and does not restrict housing, employment, or commerce.

The Tees Valley Combined Authority (Election of Mayor) Order 2016 establishes the electoral framework for the Tees Valley Combined Authority mayoralty, specifying: the area covered; that a mayor shall be elected; the first election date (4th May 2017); subsequent elections every four years on the ordinary day of election; and the mayor's term of office (from the fourth day after poll to the third day after the next poll).

This Order establishes the democratic accountability structure for a regional combined authority mayor. While one may debate the merits of regional mayors versus other governance structures, this Order merely sets electoral timing and term lengths—it does not regulate economic activity, restrict trade, impose compliance costs on businesses, gold-plate EU directives, restrict healthcare supply, or burden the financial sector. It provides the procedural framework for democratic legitimacy of an elected office that Parliament has chosen to create. Removing it would not reduce regulatory burden but would eliminate the statutory basis for mayoral elections in Tees Valley.

The Contracts for Difference (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2016 amend multiple energy market regulations to: (1) allow unincorporated associations to be eligible generators under the CfD scheme with special provisions; (2) add definitions for private network, target commissioning dates/windows, and related terms; (3) modify connection agreement requirements including 75% capacity export requirements; (4) add Authority powers to require information from delivery bodies; (5) revise allocation process rules including flexible bid provisions; (6) insert new regulation 18 enabling Secretary of State to direct CFD counterparties to amend sustainability obligations in existing contracts; and (7) standardise the definition of working day.

These amendments compound the inherent problems of the CfD regime—a form of state intervention that picks winners in the energy market. Most critically, new regulation 18 authorises the Secretary of State to unilaterally modify contractual sustainability obligations in existing CFDs, violating basic principles of contract sanctity and creating regulatory uncertainty that deters investment. The unincorporated association provisions, while expanding participation, add complexity without addressing the fundamental distortion of having government dictate strike prices and capacity allocation in the electricity market. The 75% capacity export requirements and prescriptive connection agreement rules further entrench regulatory burden. The entire CfD scheme represents government picking winners and losers in energy—attracting investment through guaranteed prices rather than allowing market discovery of electricity values. These amendments do nothing to correct that flaw and instead add new layers of state control over private contracts.

The Carbon Budget Order 2016 establishes the UK's legally binding carbon budget for the 2028–2032 period at 1,725,000,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. It implements Section 4 of the Climate Change Act 2008, requiring aggregate emissions across all sectors to remain within this cap during the specified five-year budgetary period.

The Carbon Budget Order is a command-and-control regulatory cap that imposes severe economic costs with questionable environmental efficacy. It was inherited wholesale from the EU's climate framework without democratic review. Unilateral UK carbon restrictions cannot meaningfully affect global temperatures if major emitters like China, India, and the US do not impose equivalent constraints — the economic harm to British businesses and households is certain while the environmental benefit is merely theoretical. A carbon tax would achieve emissions reductions through price signals at far lower economic cost, avoiding the distortion, administrative burden, and competitive disadvantage created by hard caps and the associated carbon trading bureaucracy. The regulation also drives capital flight to less regulated jurisdictions, accomplishing nothing for global emissions while permanently damaging the UK's industrial base.