Browse regulations

Amendment Regulations 2025 that modify the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to remove distinctions between 'CSC-only claims' and other nuclear damage claims, eliminate related definitions and subsections (including special drawing rights provisions), and harmonize the compensation regime under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation framework as enacted in the Energy Act 2023.

This is a genuine simplification measure removing a two-track compensation system in favour of a unified regime. While CSC-only claims are being eliminated as a category, this removes unnecessary complexity and potential gaps in coverage. The changes align with the Energy Act 2023's framework. Any costs from removing specialized carve-outs are offset by reduced legal complexity and greater certainty for claimants and operators alike. As domestic primary legislation (not EU-derived), this reflects deliberate policy choices rather than gold-plating or bureaucratic excess.

Extends existing public audit data matching provisions in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 and Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 to cover adult social care data held by local authorities for individuals aged 18 or over, adding definitions for local authority, local authority social care, and social care.

This regulation enables audit authorities to detect fraud and misuse of public funds in adult social care—a sector involving significant public expenditure. Without data sharing provisions, public money would be more susceptible to fraud and error that data matching could detect. This is not a restriction on economic activity but an enabling measure for public sector accountability. The definitions added are references to existing legislation rather than new regulatory burdens.

Amends the Electricity Capacity Regulations 2014 to establish a mechanism for capacity providers to voluntarily terminate capacity agreements when entering into Carbon Capture and Storage Contracts for Difference (CCS CFDs). Creates new regulation 34A specifying procedures for the Delivery Body to issue termination notices, defines key terms including CCS CFD transfer notice, CCS CFD related termination date, and related administrative provisions. Also makes minor amendments to regulations 16, 34, 60, 68, 69, and 70 to integrate this new termination pathway.

This regulation creates a preferential exit mechanism specifically for CCS technology, distorting market signals by singling out one generation type for regulatory favour. While superficially voluntary, it signals government direction of investment toward CCS rather than allowing market competition to determine technology outcomes. It adds complexity to an already intricate regulatory framework without clear market efficiency benefits, and CCS technology has consistently failed to deliver at scale despite repeated government intervention.

UK-wide regulations prescribing mandatory terms for air traffic services licences under the Transport Act 2000. Requires that any air traffic services licence must include terms specifying (1) the air traffic services authorised under the licence, and (2) the geographic area in which those services may be provided. Comes into force August 2025.

These regulations add a further layer of bureaucratic prescription to an already heavily regulated air traffic services licensing regime. While the specific terms (service scope and geographic area) may seem innocuous, mandating them as 'prescribed terms' creates rigidity where flexibility could allow innovation and competition. Air traffic services regulation should be streamlined, not reinforced with additional statutory requirements. The retained EU-derived regulatory framework for air traffic services suppresses competition and raises costs—these regulations do nothing to address that fundamental problem.

These Regulations, made under the Online Safety Act 2023, establish the procedural framework for 'super-complaints' to OFCOM about online safety issues. They set eligibility criteria for qualifying entities (independence from regulated services, expert status, governance requirements), detailed submission requirements (evidence standards, information obligations), grounds for OFCOM to reject complaints (ineligible entities, repetitive complaints, parallel proceedings), and strict timelines for OFCOM's determinations (30/15 days for eligibility, 90 days for consideration). The Regulations also impose a six-month cooling-off period between complaints.

These regulations create a bureaucratic licensing regime that restricts who can raise complaints about online services, effectively insulating regulated platforms from scrutiny. The elaborate eligibility criteria, subjective 'expert' and 'independence' standards, and detailed evidence requirements impose compliance costs that favor well-resourced established bodies over smaller critics. The six-month cooling-off period between complaints and broad OFCOM rejection powers (including for 'mere repetition') suppress legitimate oversight. While the underlying Online Safety Act represents problematic state intervention in online platforms, these Regulations compound that harm by creating procedural barriers that limit accountability. The super-complaint mechanism, intended to enable systemic scrutiny, is strangled by its own bureaucracy. Britons would be better served by market discipline on platforms rather than this state-mediated complaint framework with its inherent capture risks.

This Order amends section 44 of the Enterprise Act 2002 to redefine 'newspaper' for merger control purposes. It expands the definition to include online publications, establishes detailed criteria for 'news-related material' subject to editorial control, defines periodic publishing to include online updates, and sets UK connection tests based on readership, editorial decisions, or publisher location. It also omits subsection (1) from section 70F. The amendments apply to foreign state newspaper merger situations from 15 May 2025 and to other merger contexts from the Order's commencement date.

This Order expands regulatory definitions rather than reducing them, creating compliance complexity for online publishers and media businesses. By broadening what constitutes a 'newspaper' under merger control, it extends bureaucratic oversight to online publications that may not previously have faced such scrutiny, potentially impeding legitimate media consolidation and digital publishing ventures. The detailed definitional framework (news-related material, editorial control tests, UK connection criteria) adds compliance burdens without clear evidence the original definition was inadequate. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should focus on removing burdens, not inventing new ones.

Amends the Enterprise Act 2002 to create exceptions in Schedule 6B for when a foreign power is not considered to 'control or influence' a newspaper owner. Part 1A provides two key exceptions: (1) state owned investors acting on behalf of a foreign power holding ≤15% indirectly, and (2) associated persons holding ≤0.1% or via investment funds meeting 'genuine diversity of ownership' conditions. Also extends Chapter 3A review provisions to these decisions.

This regulation creates exceptions that reduce regulatory burden on foreign investment in British newspapers, not increase it. The thresholds (15% for state-owned investors, 0.1% for associated persons) and the genuine diversity of ownership condition represent reasonable limits that distinguish genuine passive investment from state influence. Deleting this would create uncertainty, chill legitimate investment, and leave Britons worse off by having broader, less nuanced regulatory scrutiny of foreign newspaper ownership that could deter beneficial capital flows.

Statutory instrument authorizing School-Led Development Trust (The National Institute of Teaching) to award taught degrees up to master's level in education/teaching subjects for a fixed term (Aug 2025-Jul 2029). Awards restricted to enrolled students only.

This Order grants exclusive degree-awarding monopoly powers to one specific organization, picked by government rather than earned through market competition. This is cronyism that harms potential competing providers in teacher education. If School-Led Development Trust offers valuable programmes, they should compete on quality with other providers rather than receive government-conferred privileges that exclude rivals. The restriction limiting awards to enrolled students underscores this is about controlling credentials rather than expanding educational opportunity. Degree-awarding authority should flow from voluntary accreditation and market reputation, not statutory monopoly grants that distort the education market and inhibit innovation in teacher training.

These Regulations bring Section 17 of the Skills and Post-16 Education Act 2022 (concerning initial teacher training for further education) into force on 1st September 2025. They are commencement regulations that merely specify the date on which an existing statutory provision becomes effective.

This is a purely administrative commencement order that merely activates a date for existing primary legislation. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty rather than reduce regulatory burden — the underlying Section 17 remains in force regardless. Commencement orders that simply specify effective dates carry no independent regulatory cost; they provide necessary legal clarity. The substantive policy question of whether initial teacher training for further education should be regulated belongs to primary legislation, not this procedural instrument.

Authorises Northern School of Contemporary Dance to grant taught awards up to master's level for a fixed period (1 Sept 2025 – 31 Aug 2029), and permits the school to authorise other institutions to grant such awards on its behalf.

Degree-awarding authority requires maintaining academic standards to protect students and employers from substandard qualifications. The fixed 4-year term with proper review provides accountability. Deletion would either leave this legitimate institution unable to award proper degrees, requiring costly middleman arrangements with existing universities, or would remove quality oversight entirely, risking a proliferation of unverified credentials that would harm the very people this regulation protects.

The Byers Gill Solar Order 2025 is a Development Consent Order (DCO) granted under the Planning Act 2008, authorising RWE Renewables UK Solar and Storage Limited to construct and operate a large-scale solar photovoltaic generating station with battery energy storage facilities. The Order grants powers of compulsory land acquisition, street works, temporary alteration of public rights of way, and various environmental management obligations. It includes exemptions from certain provisions of the Land Drainage Act 1991 and Control of Pollution Act 1974 during construction, and allows transfer of consent benefits to other parties including Northern Powergrid for specific grid connection works.

This Order exemplifies the worst of government-granted privileges: it creates a compulsory purchase monopoly for a private corporation (RWE), overrides property rights through statutory powers, and exempts the developer from environmental protections that apply to other construction projects. The 12+ management plan requirements (CEMP, CTMP, LEMP, DEMP, plus 8 outline plans) impose layers of bureaucratic compliance with no democratic accountability — these were not scrutinised by Parliament but imposed by the Secretary of State. The Order's benefit transfer provisions allow consolidation of these special privileges across multiple entities without meaningful oversight. While renewable energy is a legitimate policy goal, this Order's mechanism of concentrating land acquisition powers, street work rights, and regulatory exemptions in a single private actor represents precisely the kind of intervention that distorts markets, suppresses alternative uses of land, and creates monopolistic privileges inconsistent with Britain's free-trading heritage.

This Order amends the Power to Award Degrees etc. (TEC Partnership) Order 2024 to authorize TEC Partnership to grant taught awards up to bachelor's degree level for an indefinite period (previously time-limited), and to authorize other institutions to grant such awards on its behalf. It comes into force on 30th November 2025.

This instrument grants specific degree-awarding authorizations to a higher education provider and enables collaborative provision through sub-authorization. It does not restrict competition or trade—indeed, it expands capability by allowing TEC Partnership to authorize other institutions. There is no evidence of EU origin, gold-plating, or disproportionate regulatory burden. Deletion would harm Britons by removing a legitimate, targeted authorization that enables educational institutions to operate and award degrees, with no corresponding benefit from government withdrawal of this specific permission.

This Order amends the Electricity and Gas (Energy Company Obligation) Orders 2022 and 2023, making technical changes to the ECO scheme which mandates energy companies to achieve targets for home-heating cost reduction and low-income energy efficiency measures. Key amendments include: updated rural area classifications; modified TrustMark quality assurance requirements for insulation measures; new provisions allowing reassignment of ECO4 savings to ECO4A scheme with conversion formulas; updates to PAS 2030/2035 specifications from 2019 to 2023 versions; and revised scoring calculation methodologies for determining obligation achievement.

This regulation imposes mandatory obligations on energy companies to achieve government-defined energy efficiency targets, distorting competitive markets through command-and-control mechanisms. The complex scoring formulas, conversion factors (1.251, 1.716, 0.25), phase requirements, and bureaucratic quality assurance requirements (TrustMark, PAS specifications) add significant compliance costs that are passed to consumers. The scheme substitutes political judgment for market signals in addressing fuel poverty, creating inefficient resource allocation. The reassignment provisions and multiple amendment orders demonstrate regulatory complexity that serves neither consumers nor competition. Deleting this would restore market-determined energy efficiency investment and reduce costs for all energy consumers.

These Regulations set the repayment interest rate for alcohol duty repayments, determining the percentage rate paid to businesses when HMRC repays alcohol duty. The rate is tied to the Bank of England base rate with a floor of 0.5% per annum, calculated using a formula based on the Official Bank Rate from the most recent Monetary Policy Committee meeting. The 'operative date' is the 13th working day following that meeting.

This regulation defines how much interest the government pays to businesses when repaying alcohol duty — a debt the state owes to citizens. Without this formula, there would be legal uncertainty about the applicable rate, potentially leading to disputes and litigation. The Bank of England rate linkage is market-based and objective, while the 0.5% floor prevents unreasonably low compensation during low-rate environments. This benefits businesses by ensuring predictable, market-linked compensation for delays in tax repayment — Britons would be worse off without a clear, enforceable rate governing the government's repayment obligations.

This Order appoints 1st September 2025 as the day on which section 101 of the Finance Act 2009 (late payment interest on sums due to HMRC) comes into force specifically for alcohol duty purposes, referencing the alcohol duty definition from the Finance (No. 2) Act 2023.

Deleting this Order would create an inconsistent enforcement mechanism where alcohol duty payments could be delayed indefinitely without interest consequences, unlike other duties subject to section 101. This would create a loophole allowing non-compliant businesses to gain a competitive advantage through delayed payment, effectively receiving an interest-free loan from HMRC. Compliant businesses who pay on time would be disadvantaged relative to those exploiting this gap. The late payment interest mechanism simply ensures the time value of money is preserved and maintains consistent treatment across all duty types.