Browse regulations

These regulations appoint 1st April 2017 as the day on which section 54(3) of the Finance Act 2015 comes into force, specifically in relation to section 88F of the Alcoholic Liquor Duties Act 1979, which restricts buying controlled liquor wholesale.

This regulation merely activates a market restriction on wholesale liquor purchasing. The underlying restriction (section 88F) would persist if deleted, but this regulation accelerates and confirms enforcement of a constraint that limits wholesale market access. Such restrictions create barriers to entry, distort supply chains, and protect established players from competition — costs that outweigh any purported public health or regulatory benefits, which could be achieved through less restrictive means.

The Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2017 enacts several HMRC administrative concessions into formal law. It amends the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 to clarify that beneficiaries with interests under a settlement are not automatically treated as 'participators' in companies controlled by settlement trustees. It also introduces VAT input tax relief (section 26AA) for businesses undergoing insolvency procedures, disapplying the standard rule that denies input tax credits where consideration remains unpaid.

The VAT insolvency provisions (section 26AA) represent a genuine liberalizing reform preventing double-penalty scenarios where businesses face both insolvency and loss of input tax credits—without this provision, entering administration would compound financial difficulty with a VAT cash flow burden that could hasten failure. The CGT clarifications on settlement participators remove an unintended ambiguity that could have captured innocent beneficiaries in complex trust structures. While these are largely enactments of existing extra-statutory concessions, the VAT provisions specifically improve market function by preventing the tax system from exacerbating insolvency cascades, and reversal would harm businesses and creditors in distress.

These Regulations amend the Non-Domestic Rating (Rates Retention) Regulations 2013 and Non-Domestic Rating (Levy and Safety Net) Regulations 2013, modifying how business rates revenue is shared between billing authorities, major precepting authorities (Greater London Authority, West of England Combined Authority), and the Secretary of State. They introduce new percentage allocation formulas for surplus/deficit sharing, adjust levy rates (typically to 0.5 or via formula, with zero for authorities in Parts 1,3,5,7,8 of Schedule 3), and create transitional rules for years beginning April 2017-2019.

This regulation perpetuates Britain's distortionary business rates system, a tax that inflates commercial property values and creates barriers to business entry. The complex tiered percentages (44.8%/55.2%, 99%/94%/100%, 37%/5%) for different authorities are arbitrary government formulas that distort local fiscal incentives. As a retained EU-era technical instrument, it never received democratic scrutiny. Such intricate revenue-sharing rules between government bodies impose substantial administrative compliance costs and represent the kind of bureaucratic complexity that should be swept away in favour of simpler, more transparent arrangements that empower local authorities and reduce reliance on this distortionary tax altogether.

Amendment to the Country-by-Country Reporting regulations implementing the OECD's BEPS framework and EU Directive 2011/16/EU. Requires Ultimate Parent Entities of MNE groups with €750m+ consolidated revenue to file annual CbC reports and notify HMRC of constituent entities, with parallel obligations for UK Entities. Includes exceptions for reports filed in other jurisdictions with exchange arrangements, and voluntary filing provisions for constituent entities.

Imposes substantial compliance costs and administrative burdens on multinational enterprises without clear benefit to Britons. CbCR requirements drive unnecessary complexity in corporate tax structuring and may encourage inefficient operational changes. The information exchange mechanisms create risks of over-disclosure to foreign tax authorities. UK-specific requirements exceed the minimum needed for international tax cooperation — bilateral information exchange agreements can achieve legitimate enforcement objectives without mandating detailed public reporting. The regulations constrain business flexibility and contribute to making the UK less competitive as a corporate location, particularly for the City of London.

The Immigration Skills Charge Regulations 2017 impose a mandatory fee on employers (sponsors) who assign certificates of sponsorship to skilled workers seeking UK work visas. The charge varies by sponsor type (with reduced rates for small/charitable sponsors) and applies to skilled worker immigration routes. The regulations include exemptions for certain occupations, intra-company graduate trainees, students, scale-up workers, and intra-corporate transferees under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Sponsors must pay the charge each time they assign a certificate of sponsorship, and invalid assignments result if the charge remains unpaid.

This regulation imposes a friction cost on skilled immigration that harms UK competitiveness. The charge increases expenses for businesses seeking global talent, potentially driving skilled workers and the companies that employ them to competitor jurisdictions like the US, Singapore, and Dubai. While exemptions exist, they create complexity and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. A tax on employing skilled workers is fundamentally protectionist, shielding domestic labor from competition rather than allowing markets to allocate talent efficiently. The Industrial Revolution succeeded partly because Britain welcomed skilled workers and entrepreneurs; this regulation does the opposite.

This Order amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 to expand the definition of 'advising on investments'. It adds additional activities (exchanging, redeeming, holding, not exercising rights) to the regulated advice definition and introduces a detailed 'personal recommendation' framework with new exceptions for appropriately authorised persons. It also excludes personal recommendations from the newspaper advice exemption in Article 54.

This regulation expands the scope of regulated financial advice without corresponding consumer benefit, adding 'exchanging, redeeming, holding' and 'not exercising' rights to activities requiring authorization. The 'personal recommendation' framework creates compliance burdens that will drive advisory activity offshore to New York, Singapore, and Dubai, eroding City of London competitiveness. The detailed definitional requirements (Articles 1C, 1D) were likely influenced by EU MIFID requirements and represent gold-plating that serves incumbent interests by raising barriers to entry for new market participants, restricting consumer access to affordable financial guidance.

A correcting statutory instrument that amends the North Wales Wind Farms Connection Order 2016 by correcting errors in the original order. It contains a table specifying where corrections are to be made, what changes are required (substitution, insertion, or omission), and the specific text involved. Comes into force on 31st March 2017.

This is a minor technical correction Order that fixes clerical errors in the parent 2016 Order. Britons would be worse off if deleted because: (1) errors in the original Order would remain unaddressed, creating legal uncertainty; (2) unresolved ambiguities could lead to disputes, litigation, or project delays for wind farm infrastructure; (3) the corrections are purely mechanical and add no new regulatory burden. Unlike the gold-plated EU-derived laws under review, this Order merely ensures the original infrastructure authorization functions as intended.

Amends the Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier Obligations) Regulations 2014 to modify the CFD scheme运作. Key changes include: new definitions for 'final reconciliation determination' and 'reserve period'; revised calculations for GP, CP, GE, GT, NDS, NGS, XEP, and AXP; introduction of QGE definitions for electricity suppliers; modified reserve amount requirements (19 in 20 probability standard); new regulation 14A allowing the CFD counterparty to redetermine total reserve amounts downward; adjusted mutualisation provisions; fee increase from £0.0509 to £0.0524; and updated supplier payment amounts from £4,283,000 to £6,241,000.

These regulations implement the Contracts for Difference scheme under the Energy Act 2013, a bureaucratic subsidy mechanism that distorts the electricity market by directing billions in consumer-funded payments to favoured renewable generators. The complex calculations, reserve requirements, and reconciliation mechanisms create administrative burden and uncertainty for suppliers. While technically amendments improving internal运作, they entrench a scheme that: (1) artificially props up non-competitive energy sources at consumer expense through hidden cross-subsidies; (2) creates moral hazard through government-backed counterparty arrangements; (3) deters investment in diverse generation capacity by cherry-picking winners; and (4) adds cost layers that make British industry less competitive. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should include reassessing such interventionist energy market structures, not merely fine-tuning them. The scheme's core problem—government allocation of capital to politically-selected generation types rather than market-determined outcomes—cannot be addressed while retaining these implementing regulations.

Amends the Public Guardian (Fees, etc.) Regulations 2007 to increase fees for registering enduring powers of attorney (EPAs) and lasting powers of attorneys (LPAs) to £82 per application, with a reduced fee of £41 for repeat LPA applications, effective 1 April 2017 or upon making if later.

These fees represent a government monopoly tax on legal planning for incapacity. The Office of the Public Guardian operates as a statutory monopoly with no competitive alternative, allowing fees to be set without market discipline. Higher fees create barriers for elderly and vulnerable individuals seeking to establish legal protections, potentially leaving them without proper attorney arrangements. While the registration function itself may serve a legitimate purpose, the fees function as a revenue extraction mechanism rather than cost recovery, and the reduced 'repeat application' fee penalizes those who need to correct errors. A competitive market for registration services or genuine cost-based pricing would serve Britons better.

Amends the Local Authorities (Public Health Functions and Entry to Premises by Local Healthwatch Representatives) Regulations 2013 by revoking Regulation 5C (Review requirement) and Regulation 8A (Expiry provisions for Regulations 5A-5C). This effectively makes previously time-limited provisions permanent without further parliamentary review. In force from 1st April 2017.

This amendment removes automatic sunset and review provisions, locking in regulatory requirements permanently without democratic renewal. Rather than subject these regulations to proper parliamentary scrutiny, the effect is to entrench compliance burdens on local authorities and service providers indefinitely. The unseen cost is forfeiting the annual review mechanism that would have forced regular reconsideration of whether these requirements remain necessary or proportionate — a core principle of regulatory hygiene that Adam Smith himself would recognise as essential to preventing accumulated bureaucratic inertia.

This Order makes consequential amendments to various Acts and regulations following the Water Act 2014. It updates cross-references, replaces outdated terminology (primarily 'licensed water supplier' with 'water supply licensee' and introduces 'sewerage licensee'), and modifies provisions relating to the new water supply licensing regime introduced by the 2014 Act. The Order affects over 50 pieces of legislation including the Water Industry Act 1991, various Water Supply Regulations, and references across telecommunications, aviation, rail, and utility legislation.

This Order is entirely technical and machinery in nature—it merely updates cross-references and terminology to maintain legal consistency following the Water Act 2014. Deleting it would create legal chaos and incoherence in the statute book, as amendments throughout reference provisions that have been renumbered or renamed. The Order does not itself impose new regulatory burdens or restrictions; it simply ensures existing provisions function correctly with updated terminology. However, it represents missed opportunity—rather than using post-Brexit regulatory independence to liberalize the water sector, it merely carries forward EU-derived licensing frameworks without fundamental reform.

UK statutory instrument requiring 'relevant prescribed persons' (regulatory bodies, ombudsmen, etc.) to publish annual reports on workers' whistleblowing disclosures they receive. Sets reporting periods (12 months from 1st April), publication deadlines (within 6 months), anonymization requirements, and specifies report content including number of qualifying disclosures, actions taken, and impact on functions.

Imposes bureaucratic reporting requirements on prescribed persons with no corresponding market benefit. The regulation adds administrative compliance costs and paperwork burden on regulatory bodies without improving actual worker protections. Whistleblowing itself is valuable, but annual public reporting mandates are unnecessary bureaucratic overhead — prescribed persons already handle disclosures through their normal functions. This is the kind of regulatory ritual that Friedrich Hayek warned about: producing reports rather than achieving outcomes. The specified formats, timeframes, and content requirements constrain efficient operational flexibility.

Amendment Regulations that modify the Judicial Pensions Regulations 2015 to incorporate the Fee-Paid Judges Scheme established by the 2017 Regulations. They update terminology from 'existing scheme' to 'relevant scheme', add transitional provisions for fee-paid judges (including new protection categories for full and tapered protection members), modify calculation of 'final pay' for transition members, and narrow certain forfeiture provisions by removing 'negligent' from grounds for set-off. Technical administrative amendments ensuring the judicial pension schemes operate coherently.

These are technical pension scheme amendments affecting only a defined group (the judiciary). They resolve inconsistencies and close gaps in pension coverage that would otherwise leave judges with incorrect or incomplete pension entitlements. The changes impose no regulatory burden on businesses, trade, or the broader economy — they are administrative in nature, ensuring the proper functioning of a civil servant pension scheme. Deletion would create legislative gaps and inconsistencies in judicial pension administration without any corresponding economic benefit.

This Order establishes the West Midlands Combined Authority and transfers numerous functions from constituent councils (Birmingham, Coventry, Dudley, Sandwell, Solihull, Walsall, Wolverhampton) to the Combined Authority. Key functions include highway and traffic management powers, housing and regeneration functions (via the Homes and Communities Agency), environmental protection, smoke-free enforcement, and anti-social behaviour powers. It establishes a Corporation mechanism for Mayoral development areas, creates mayoral powers including the ability to appoint a political adviser, and sets out financial arrangements including levy powers and cost-sharing between constituent councils.

While this Order concentrates regional power and creates bureaucratic structures contrary to free-market principles, deletion would create a governance vacuum. The regional coordination of transport, highways, and housing functions serves legitimate purposes that require unified regional action. The housing and regeneration functions provide a mechanism (however imperfect) for addressing supply constraints. The statutory framework for Mayoral development corporations cannot easily be replicated by other means. Without this Order, functions would fall back to constituent councils without the coordination mechanism, which could actually reduce accountability. The Order primarily reorganises governmental functions rather than imposing traditional regulatory burdens on private conduct, making wholesale deletion counterproductive.

These Regulations are a commencement order bringing specified provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2015 into force on 3rd April 2017. They activate section 85(1) and certain paragraphs in Schedule 4 (minor and consequential amendments). This is a procedural timing instrument that does not itself impose regulatory burdens.

This is a commencement regulation that merely activates provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2015 on a specific date. It has no independent regulatory effect — all substantive policy was set by the parent Act. As a procedural instrument without regulatory burden of its own, and not being retained EU law, it should be deleted. The underlying Act may warrant separate review, but this commencement order serves no purpose once its provisions are in force.