Browse regulations

Amendment to Infrastructure Planning (Fees) Regulations 2010 and Infrastructure Planning (Changes to, and Revocation of, Development Consent Orders) Regulations 2011. Increases application fees (from £1,000 to £1,500 for development consent, £4,500 to £6,750 for changes), raises pre-examination fees (£19,500-£64,500 depending on panel size), introduces daily rates for initial and final payments (£923-£3,060 per day for initial, £1,845-£6,120 per day for final), mandates annual CPI-linked fee increases, and imposes review obligations on the Secretary of State.

Automatic CPI-indexation removes parliamentary control over fee levels, creating unpredictable cost escalators for infrastructure projects. The fee increases raise barriers to nationally significant infrastructure projects at exactly the moment post-Brexit Britain should be encouraging investment. This regime contributes to the UK's restrictive planning system, which already suppresses infrastructure development through lengthy examination periods and panel costs. Annual automatic increases without democratic review represent regulatory overreach that could drive investment to competitor nations.

These Regulations appoint 5th April 2017 as the date on which section 27 (Two-person Panels) of the Infrastructure Act 2015 comes into force. They are a standard commencement order providing legal certainty for when a specific provision of the Infrastructure Act 2015 takes effect.

This is a purely administrative commencement regulation with no substantive policy content. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty about when section 27 of the Infrastructure Act 2015 takes effect, leaving two-person panel arrangements in limbo. Unlike EU-derived regulations that may impose bureaucratic burdens, this is a domestic date-setting instrument that provides clarity rather than restriction.

These Regulations, which came into force on 1st July 2017, amend the Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Regulations 2009 to create a new regulation 29A allowing certain senior clergy under Common Tenure who have attained age 70 to continue holding office via a formal 'direction' process. The regulation specifies who may grant such directions (archbishops for diocesan bishops; diocesan bishops for suffragan bishops, deans, residentiary canons, archdeacons, and incumbents), conditions for granting them (capability assessment, and for parish-level appointments, pastoral needs justification and PCC consent), and time limits (generally up to age 75, except paragraph 5 which may extend beyond). It also amends the Ecclesiastical Offices (Age Limits) Measure 1975 to ensure the blanket age limits do not apply to appointments made under this new exception pathway.

While narrow and church-internal in scope, these regulations serve a legitimate function for the Church of England which remains a major institution providing significant pastoral and community services to millions. The regulation imposes minimal economic or market costs — it affects only a small number of senior clergy appointments and creates no barriers to commerce, competition, or private enterprise. Deletion would remove a carefully calibrated exception mechanism without producing any meaningful economic liberalisation benefit, while potentially disrupting the Church's ability to retain experienced clergy where pastoral needs require it. The costs of keeping this regulation are effectively zero, while its removal could cause genuine (if niche) institutional harm.

The Turks and Caicos Islands (Finance) Order 2017 abolishes the office of Chief Financial Officer and grants the Governor extensive override powers over financial matters, including authority to prepare Supplementary Appropriation Bills, assent to legislation without House of Assembly approval, withdraw funds via warrant, reverse Minister decisions, require financial information, and appoint a Financial Adviser. It applies to the Turks and Caicos Islands (a British Overseas Territory) and came into force on 1 April 2017.

This Order concentrates financial control in an unelected Governor while circumventing democratic accountability—the House of Assembly can be bypassed for budgetary decisions with only a Secretary of State's approval. It abolishes the Chief Financial Officer role without clear market-based justification, creates an unaccountable Financial Adviser position reporting to the Governor, and establishes a framework for government intervention in financial matters that distorts incentives. These mechanisms reflect the bureaucratic control structures this organization exists to dismantle—they create conditions for misallocation of resources through political rather than market processes. The inconsistency provisions further entrench this regulation's primacy over other applicable law, making reform difficult.

These Regulations designate specific areas in England (York Central Enterprise Zone, Heart of the South West Huntspill Energy Park, Birmingham City Centre, Birmingham City Centre Curzon Extension) as 'enterprise zones' for non-domestic rating purposes. They allow billing authorities to retain business rates from these designated areas for extended periods (25-35 years), calculating baseline amounts and non-domestic rating income proportions to be disregarded for central share calculations under Schedule 7B. The Regulations also amend earlier 2013 and 2016 regulations to extend or modify designated area provisions.

This regulation perpetuates a system of geographic preferences that distorts investment decisions, creates inequity between businesses in designated versus non-designated areas, and amounts to central planning that picks winners and losers. The extended 25-35 year commitment of business rate retention is an arbitrary corporatist subsidy mechanism that should not be codified in law. A genuinely dynamic free-trading Britain would have a neutral, simple business rates system without such preferential geographic carve-outs, which misallocate resources and perpetuate the very bureaucratic interventionism these Regulations claim to modify.

The Nursing and Midwifery (Amendment) Order 2017 amends the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 to restructure the Council's fitness to practise committees. It consolidates the Health Committee and Conduct and Competence Committee into a single Fitness to Practise Committee, with transitional provisions preserving continuity for ongoing cases and existing committee members transferred to the new committee structure.

While this represents organizational restructuring rather than new regulatory burden, deleting it would harm patients and the public. The fitness to practise function protects the public from unsafe nurses and midwives. The transitional provisions ensure continuity for ongoing cases and memberships — removing them without replacement would create regulatory gaps, legal uncertainty, and potential harm to patients awaiting resolution of conduct complaints. This is machinery of government reform that maintains consumer protection while simplifying committee structure, reducing administrative complexity slightly.

Amendment to NHS Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups Regulations 2012, adjusting two payment rate figures: flat rate payment reduced from £156.25 to £155.05, and high band payment reduced from £215.04 to £213.32, effective 1st April 2017.

This is a minor inflation-adjusted price change to NHS payment systems that perpetuates the NHS's near-monopoly on healthcare commissioning. While small in isolation, such technical amendments keep the centralized bureaucratic apparatus functioning and delay meaningful reform. The NHS's structure suppresses private healthcare alternatives and restricts patient choice. Rather than micro-adjusting rates within a broken system, these regulations should be deleted as part of broader liberalisation to allow competition and private provision to flourish.

These Regulations establish a levy system requiring offshore petroleum licensees to pay fees to fund the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA). They set specific annual levy amounts based on licence type (offshore exploration licences pay £9,341.76; offshore production licences pay either £934.18 for micro enterprises with promote licences, £9,341.76 standard rate, or £65,444.77 for licences with active production works). The Regulations include provisions for interest on late payment (Bank of England base rate plus 5%), civil debt recovery, and adjustment mechanisms where levy collections exceed actual regulatory costs.

This levy regulation imposes significant fixed costs (£65,444.77 on production licences) that act as a tax on oil and gas operations, distorting investment decisions and reducing UK offshore competitiveness relative to other jurisdictions. The regulatory burden adds to industry costs with no guarantee of corresponding benefit — the OGA's functions could be funded through general taxation or more efficient user-pays mechanisms. The complex tiered fee structure, interest provisions, and adjustment mechanisms create administrative compliance costs without clear market discipline. Post-Brexit Britain should not perpetuate such interventionist funding models for regulators when alternative approaches exist.

Amendment to Pension Protection Fund (Compensation) Regulations 2005 that modifies how compensation caps apply when entitlement to benefits occurs on different dates. Adds new sub-paragraphs (6B, 6BA, 6BB, 6GA) addressing pension credit transfers and pensionable service scenarios. Also increases the PPF money purchase lump sum threshold from £2,000 to £10,000.

While Better Britain questions the legitimacy of mandatory pension insurance schemes, the PPF exists and this regulation corrects inconsistencies in compensation cap application that could otherwise disadvantage pensioners with fragmented benefit entitlements. Without these amendments, individuals receiving benefits at different dates (e.g., through pension credit transfers) could face unfair cap calculations. The £10,000 threshold increase from £2,000 is modest and overdue. Deleting this would create gaps and internal contradictions in the existing PPF framework.

These regulations implement the International Convention for Safe Containers 1972 (CSC) in Great Britain, applying to freight containers used at work. They require containers to have valid safety approval, safety approval plates fixed to them, proper maintenance, regular examinations, and consistent markings for maximum operating gross mass and stacking/racking values. The regulations establish approval issuing bodies, examination scheme requirements, and conspicuous marking requirements for containers with stacking values below certain thresholds.

While these regulations impose compliance costs on the container industry, deletion would harm Britons by: (1) creating non-compliance with an internationally-recognised IMO convention, meaning UK containers would lose CSC certification required for international maritime trade; (2) removing the safety verification system that protects dock workers, drivers, and others from defective containers; (3) undermining £100bn+ annual container trade that depends on CSC compliance. The CSC plate system provides essential safety information (maximum gross mass, stacking limits) that prevents accidents and enables proper handling. Unlike EU directives that can be replaced, this implements an international maritime convention necessary for UK trade. Alternative less-onerous approaches could be explored but the core safety framework should remain.

This Order abolishes the existing parishes of the Council of the Isles of Scilly and replaces them with 5 new parishes, specifies the number of councillors for each parish, defines boundary interpretation rules (boundaries follow centre lines of geographical features), and establishes the timetable for implementation of these electoral changes.

This is a purely administrative electoral reorganization for a small local authority (population ~2,000). It does not regulate economic activity, restrict trade, impose market burdens, or create bureaucratic barriers. Deletion would create administrative confusion without any corresponding economic benefit. The Order merely establishes technical boundaries and councillor allocations necessary for democratic governance.

The Trade Union (Facility Time Publication Requirements) Regulations 2017 require relevant public sector employers with more than 49 full-time equivalent employees to publish detailed information about facility time (paid leave for union duties). Employers must calculate and disclose the total cost of facility time, total pay bill, number of relevant union officials, and hours spent on facility time and trade union activities. Local authorities must report separately for central function, education, and fire and rescue employees. Information must be published on websites and in annual reports by 31st July following the relevant period.

This regulation imposes significant compliance burdens on public sector employers for dubious transparency gains. The detailed calculations required (hourly cost methodologies, notional hourly costs for identifiable employees, fractional FTE calculations) create substantial administrative overhead. Facility time is a matter for employment negotiation between employers and unions—mandatory public reporting does not reduce facility time costs but merely documents them. The regulation applies only to public sector employers, creating discriminatory regulatory burdens. The UK-specific gold-plating (facility time transparency was never an EU harmonisation requirement) makes this a prime candidate for deletion as part of restoring Britain to a free-trading nation where employment terms are determined by contract, not bureaucratic disclosure regimes.

Amends multiple UK social security regulations to add the Scottish Infected Blood Support Scheme (SIBSS) as a 'qualifying person' and exempt its payments from being counted as income or capital when calculating means-tested benefits (Income Support, Jobseeker's Allowance, State Pension Credit, Housing Benefit, Employment and Support Allowance). Also exempts SIBSS payments from the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Regulations 1997 and Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) (Lump Sum Payments) Regulations 2008.

This regulation does not impose burdens—it exempts payments to infected blood victims from benefit calculations, preventing double-penalisation of individuals who contracted Hepatitis C or HIV through NHS blood products. Removing it would harm the most vulnerable beneficiaries who received no-fault compensation for a medical tragedy. The amendments merely ensure SIBSS is treated consistently with analogous schemes like the Caxton Foundation, adding no new regulatory requirements.

A commencement order bringing specific provisions of the Deregulation Act 2015 into force, namely: section 19 (insolvency/bankruptcy law per Schedule 6 paragraph 12), section 108 (requiring regulatory functions to consider economic growth), and section 110(3) (guidance on the section 108 duty).

This order activates deregulatory measures already enacted by Parliament. Section 108 directly advances the agency's mission by requiring regulators to consider economic growth — reducing regulatory barriers that harm competitiveness. The bankruptcy provisions streamline insolvency law. As a commencement order, it merely operationalises existing deregulation rather than imposing new restrictions. Deleting it would leave enacted reforms unimplemented, preserving the status quo of unnecessary regulatory burden.

Amends the Landfill Tax Regulations 1996 by modifying Regulation 31(3) regarding entitlement to credit, substituting the figure '4.2' with '5.3'. Takes effect for contribution years commencing on or after 1 April 2017.

This is a minor technical amendment to a retained EU-era tax regulation that increases the credit entitlement threshold from 4.2 to 5.3. While the amendment appears modest, it represents continued government intervention in market decisions through tax credits, distorting economic incentives around waste disposal. The underlying principle of using tax policy to influence behaviour rather than allowing price signals to operate freely is philosophically opposed to free-market principles. Additionally, the Landfill Tax regime itself adds compliance costs and administrative burden without clear evidence of environmental benefit that couldn't be achieved through simpler mechanisms. The regulation should be deleted as part of broader regulatory simplification.