Browse regulations

Amends the Offshore Funds (Tax) Regulations 2009 to: (1) insert 'miscellaneous items' alongside 'capital items' in specified provisions (regulation 63(2)(a), headings for regulations 64-65), and (2) add a new category in regulation 65(2) for sums payable to fund managers calculated by reference to NAV increases or performance-based formulas. Takes effect for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 April 2017.

While any tax regulation adds compliance burden, this amendment provides necessary clarity on how performance-based manager remuneration should be classified for offshore fund tax purposes. Without this clarification, fund managers would face uncertainty regarding tax treatment of performance fees, potentially creating disputes with HMRC and adding compliance costs. The amendment is a narrow technical correction rather than a new regulatory burden — it clarifies existing rules rather than expanding them. Deleting it would create more uncertainty than it would remove.

This Order makes consequential provisions for the Scottish Fiscal Commission established by the Scottish Fiscal Commission Act 2016. It designates the Commission as part of the Scottish Administration, creates a legal duty for the Office for Budget Responsibility to cooperate with the Commission, and disqualifies all members of the Commission from sitting in the House of Commons.

The Order imposes mandatory cooperation requirements between the OBR and Scottish Fiscal Commission without evidence of benefit, creates unnecessary administrative coordination costs, and arbitrarily disqualifies Commission members from Parliamentary service—restricting who may serve in Parliament based solely on their occupation in a manner inconsistent with free trade principles of open access to civic participation.

The Public Service Pensions Revaluation Order 2017 sets revaluation rates for public service pensions under section 9(2) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 for the period 1st April 2016 to 31st March 2017. It specifies a 1% price increase and 2.6% earnings increase for revaluing public sector pension liabilities.

This regulation perpetuates the defined-benefit public service pension model, which creates massive unfunded liabilities for future taxpayers. The 2.6% earnings assumption versus 1% price growth means larger-than-necessary pension adjustments, deepening an already unsustainable liability. Such government-mandated pension revaluation distorts labor markets by making public sector employment artificially attractive relative to productive private sector work, and shifts risk from public servants to taxpayers—all while the original 2013 Act's framework itself reflects state paternalism in retirement planning that markets would handle better through portable defined-contribution arrangements.

Amends County of Merseyside Act 1980 to add definitions for 'sewerage licensee' and 'sewerage undertaker' and substitutes section 83(3) to prohibit sewerage charges for the Docks Company in respect of the Dock Estate within Liverpool and Sefton, except for sewage treatment and disposal services.

Creates arbitrary market distortion by granting the Docks Company a preferential exemption from sewerage charges that other businesses must pay. This is a locally-targeted privilege that undermines equal treatment under the law and competitive neutrality. As a retained EU-era regulation affecting only a specific geographic area and specific entity, it received no democratic scrutiny. Deletion would restore equal treatment for all businesses subject to sewerage charges in the region.

These Regulations provide an exception to Section 117P(1) of the Water Industry Act 1991's prohibition on unauthorized use of sewerage systems. They allow a sewerage undertaker to provide services to premises using another undertaker's sewerage system when operating under a main connection agreement or old main connection agreement.

This regulation is an exception that REMOVES a barrier rather than creates one. Without it, normal infrastructure cooperation between sewerage undertakers could technically constitute unauthorized use of the sewerage system, creating legal uncertainty and impeding legitimate service provision. Deleting it would harm Britons by introducing legal complications around shared infrastructure arrangements that are necessary for efficient service delivery in a sector where regional monopolies exist. While the underlying Water Industry Act framework creates problematic monopolies, this specific instrument is a narrow enabling provision that facilitates market flexibility within that structure.

Amendment regulations that: (1) update fee amounts for Ofsted inspections of children's homes, (2) reduce mandatory inspection frequency from 33 to 31 per year, and (3) introduce a new inspection regime where homes rated 'good' or 'outstanding' receive at least one inspection the following year rather than more frequent scrutiny. Also excludes secure accommodation from these provisions.

These regulations impose inspection fees and mandatory frequencies on children's homes, adding regulatory costs that are passed to local authorities and taxpayers. The fixed numerical inspection targets (33 reduced to 31) represent bureaucratic supply-side controls rather than responsive regulation. While vulnerable children warrant oversight, the inspection regime creates compliance costs, distorts resource allocation, and constitutes yet another layer of the Care Standards apparatus that raises operating costs for care providers. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should extend to shedding such bureaucratic burdens that add cost without demonstrated corresponding benefit to the children in care.

The Water Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 amends the 2008 principal Regulations, restructuring them into three parts: Part 1 (Introduction), Part 2 (Welsh undertakers), and Part 3 (English service providers and wholesalers). Part 3, which is the main focus, establishes customer service standards for England's post-2014 water market, prescribing automatic payment obligations (£20-£1,000) when water companies fail to meet standards for appointments, complaint handling, supply interruptions, pressure, and sewer flooding. It creates a regime where wholesalers must reimburse service providers for customer payments made due to wholesaler breaches.

This regulation imposes arbitrary automatic payment penalties (£20-£1,000) that are disconnected from actual consumer harm, adding significant compliance costs that water companies pass on to customers through higher bills. The prescriptive tick-box nature discourages genuine service improvement, preferring box-ticking over meaningful outcomes. The complex wholesaler-service provider payment cascade (regulation 17K) adds administrative burden that particularly disadvantages smaller retailers, potentially stifling the post-2014 competition the Water Act 2014 sought to introduce. Existing consumer protections under the Water Industry Act 1991 and Ofwat's regulatory powers already address these concerns without the rigid, formulaic penalty system that adds costs without proportionate benefit.

This Order amends the Armed Forces and Reserve Forces (Compensation Scheme) Order 2011, updating definitions for constant attendance allowance and mobility supplement, modifying injury/death exclusion rules for those receiving service pensions, increasing armed forces independence payment from £139.75 to £141.10 per week, revising overlapping benefits deduction rules, updating Motability payments to £58.00 per week, and adding new tariff items for neurological disorders (intra-cerebral haematoma), senses (post-head injury hyposmia/anosmia), and musculoskeletal conditions (tarsal avascular necrosis, ligament injuries).

Government-administered compensation schemes inherently distort labor market signals by artificially subsidizing military service, create perverse moral hazard incentives around injury claims, and impose administrative inefficiencies that private insurance markets would naturally eliminate. The UK's military compensation is already among the most generous globally, and this expansion of the tariff system adds complexity without addressing fundamental market failures. While veterans deserve support, a properly functioning private insurance market with voluntary purchase could provide more efficient, tailored coverage without government paternalism.

This Order establishes the Tees Valley Combined Authority and grants it functions corresponding to those of the Mayor of London under the Localism Act 2011, including powers to designate Mayoral development areas, exercise town and country planning functions, transfer property, and provide discretionary relief from non-domestic rates. It requires consent from constituent councils for certain decisions, establishes voting weight percentages for cost-sharing between five local authorities, and applies various provisions from the 1989, 1999, 2003, and 2011 Acts to the Combined Authority and any Corporations it establishes.

Creates unnecessary regional bureaucracy layer with added consent requirements that slow development; planning functions (Article 3 reference to s.202) add another veto point in an already restrictive system; the cost-apportionment mechanism (Article 15) constrains local fiscal autonomy; such regional authorities duplicate existing local government functions while introducing additional regulatory complexity with no clear value-add over constituent councils acting individually or through existing joint arrangements.

The Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority Order 2017 establishes a combined authority body corporate for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, creating a directly elected Mayor position. The Order transfers highway functions, local passenger transport services, financial provisions, and certain education and training functions from upper-tier authorities to the Combined Authority. It establishes funding arrangements where constituent councils must meet costs, creates grant-making powers analogous to section 31 of the 2003 Act, and applies various Local Government Act provisions to the new authority. The Order came into force on 1st February 2017 with mayoral elections on 4th May 2017.

This Order creates a new regional bureaucratic layer with power to levy costs on constituent councils, concentrating highway, transport, and education functions away from locally accountable authorities. The mandatory cost-sharing arrangements (article 8) force constituent councils to fund Combined Authority expenditure, reducing local fiscal autonomy. The elected Mayor position (article 5) with general powers under the Localism Act (article 19) concentrates executive authority without corresponding accountability mechanisms. Transport and highway functions transferred to the Combined Authority remove these services from direct local control. The stated rationale for economic coordination does not require this specific institutional structure—the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Enterprise Partnership already exists for economic planning purposes.

This Order authorises Network Rail to close two level crossings (Northumberland Park in the London Borough of Haringey and Coppermill Lane in the London Borough of Waltham Forest), construct a replacement footbridge over the West Anglia Main Line railway, and create new public rights of way. It includes provisions for compensation for extinguished rights, maintenance obligations, arbitration procedures, and service of documents.

This Order facilitates infrastructure improvements that enhance railway safety and operational efficiency by removing level crossings that cause both safety risks and delays to rail services. The closures are paired with the provision of alternative footpath access via a new footbridge, ensuring pedestrians are not disadvantaged. As a specific infrastructure authorisation rather than a regulatory burden on commerce, it does not impose unnecessary costs on business, restrict competition, or gold-plate EU directives. The compensation and procedural provisions are standard railway law mechanisms that have existed for over a century, and any interference with private rights is accompanied by statutory compensation entitlements.

These Regulations bring into force Schedule 21 of the Finance Act 2016, which establishes penalties relating to offshore matters and offshore transfers. The Regulations specify that the Schedule comes into force on 1 April 2017 for general purposes, with certain provisions (relating to penalty regulations for errors, failure to notify, and failure to make returns) coming into force on 8 March 2017 for regulatory-making purposes only.

This is a purely administrative instrument that merely appoints commencement dates for provisions already enacted by Parliament in the Finance Act 2016. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty and administrative chaos regarding when penalty provisions take effect, without reducing any actual regulatory burden—the underlying penalty provisions would remain in force. Britons benefit from clarity and legal certainty in tax administration, and removing this transitional instrument would harm the very taxpayers it governs by creating ambiguity about applicable penalty regimes.

These Regulations appoint 1st April 2017 as the date on which section 164 of the Finance Act 2016 comes into force. Section 164 amended section 94 of the Finance Act 2009 to require HMRC to publish details of deliberate tax defaulters, creating a 'name and shame' regime for individuals and businesses who deliberately evade tax obligations.

This regulation imposes public shaming as a state-sanctioned punishment beyond standard financial penalties. Publishing names of tax defaulters destroys reputations and livelihoods — an extreme sanction not justified by the regulatory goal of tax compliance. Existing penalties (fines, interest, prosecution) already enforce payment; the state has no legitimate role in weaponizing humiliation. The free market already disciplines bad actors through private reputational mechanisms. This is bureaucratic overreach that adds cruelty to what should be a civil debt collection matter.

The Economic Growth (Regulatory Functions) Order 2017 specifies which regulatory functions are subject to Section 108 of the Deregulation Act 2015, which requires consideration of economic growth in exercise of those functions. It excludes functions under subordinate legislation and applies territorial limitations for Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales based on devolution. It also removes Ofcom's online safety functions from coverage after April 2026.

This Order represents bureaucratic gatekeeping that restricts which regulators must consider economic growth. The carve-outs for online safety functions (with a future sunset) demonstrate political prioritization of regulatory expansion over economic dynamism. By specifying which functions are covered, it creates a tiered system where some regulators can ignore economic consequences while others cannot — distorting regulatory behavior without eliminating the underlying problem of regulator overreach. The devolution carve-outs further fragment the regulatory landscape, adding complexity without adding freedom. Post-Brexit Britain should not retain such EU-inspired regulatory architecture that treats 'economic growth' as a special consideration requiring parliamentary scheduling rather than the natural outcome of freeing individuals and businesses from arbitrary constraint.

This Order brings into force guidance titled 'Growth Duty S.110 Guidance' under Section 110 of the Deregulation Act 2015, which requires regulators to 'have regard to' the desirability of promoting economic growth when carrying out their functions. The guidance was laid before Parliament on 12th December 2016 and comes into force 21 days after the Order is made.

This guidance does not reduce the actual regulatory burden on businesses—it merely instructs regulators on how to consider growth when exercising existing powers. The underlying Section 110 duty is weak ('have regard to' rather than prioritize), making this guidance largely symbolic. Guidance documents of this nature are prone to gold-plating, where regulators interpret them as mandates for additional scrutiny rather than deregulatory tools. The real problem is excessive regulation itself, not a lack of guidance on how regulators should think about growth. This Order adds bureaucratic process without meaningfully advancing economic freedom.