Browse regulations

This Order amends the Feed-in Tariffs Order 2012, making technical corrections to interpretation provisions, updating tariff publication requirements for FIT year 8, inserting new article 35ZA on payment recovery notices, and inserting entirely new Part 8A establishing sustainability criteria, reporting obligations, and audit requirements for anaerobic digestion installations. It also adds Schedule 2A specifying greenhouse gas criteria for biogas production.

Feed-in Tariffs are a market distortion that forces energy companies to pay above-market rates for renewable generation, effectively a subsidy mechanism that picks winners and raises costs for consumers. This amendment compounds these harms by adding layers of compliance bureaucracy—quarterly declarations, annual declarations, mandatory audit reports for installations over 1MW, and detailed greenhouse gas calculations—that increase administrative burdens without improving the scheme's fundamental efficiency. The penalty provisions allowing reduction, withholding, or recoupment of payments represent punitive government intervention that deters investment. While this Order addresses technical aspects and sustainability criteria, the underlying FIT regime itself should be abolished rather than incrementally patched. The unseen costs include reduced investor confidence, higher energy prices passed to consumers, and deterred entry by smaller generators who cannot bear compliance costs.

These Regulations define 'important public services' in the health sector for the purposes of section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. They list ambulance emergency services, A&E, intensive care, psychiatric emergency services, and obstetric/midwifery emergency services as protected services where industrial action restrictions apply. Private hospitals and private ambulance services are explicitly excluded.

This regulation restricts the fundamental right of healthcare workers to take industrial action, effectively suppressing labor market signals that would otherwise compel employers to offer better wages and conditions. By designating certain health services as 'important public services,' it erodes workers' bargaining power and distorts the labor market for healthcare professionals. In a free market, workers in essential services would command premium compensation reflecting their importance, rather than having their strike rights curtailed by statute. Post-Brexit, this EU-derived regulation should be deleted to restore workers' natural rights to negotiate collectively.

These Regulations designate teaching services at non-fee-paying schools, 16-19 Academies, and publicly-funded further education institutions as 'important public services' for the purposes of section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This classification triggers enhanced requirements for lawful industrial action, including a 50% minimum turnout threshold for strike ballots.

This regulation creates a privileged legal category for teachers that distorts the labor market for education services. The 'important public services' designation imposes a 50% turnout requirement on strike ballots, which paradoxically incentivizes unions to pursue industrial action once thresholds are met while discouraging legitimate negotiation. Removing this regulation would treat education labor like any other sector, reducing union leverage and strike frequency over time. Post-Brexit Britain should not maintain EU-inherited labor market rigidities that shield professional cartels from normal competitive pressures.

The Important Public Services (Fire) Regulations 2017 designate fire services as 'important public services' under section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This classification grants firefighters special legal status relating to industrial action, including potential minimum service requirements and enhanced strike notice obligations.

This regulation creates a legally privileged category of workers with special protections for industrial action, distorting the labor market and restricting employers' ability to manage industrial disputes. Such mandatory designation of 'important public services' imposes one-size-fits-all rules that reduce flexibility in collective bargaining. No compelling evidence exists that voluntary arrangements between fire authorities and unions could not achieve any legitimate safety objectives more efficiently.

The Important Public Services (Transport) Regulations 2017 designate specific transport services as 'important public services' under section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This designation imposes additional requirements for lawful strike action in these sectors, including higher thresholds for strike authorization and enhanced procedural requirements. The designated services include London bus services, passenger railway services, civil air traffic control, airport security services, and port security services.

This regulation restricts workers' fundamental right to strike by creating a two-tier labor market that arbitrarily privileges transport workers above others. It artificially props up certain sectors while suppressing the bargaining power of workers in these very sectors. The designation covers a wide range of workers - from security screeners to station staff - where the safety justification is weak or absent. Employers can voluntarily maintain emergency service levels through collective bargaining without government-mandated strike restrictions. Post-Brexit, this EU-derived regulation should be reviewed rather than retained indefinitely without democratic scrutiny. Proper market wages and voluntary agreements are the appropriate mechanism for ensuring critical services, not permanent statutory privileges that distort labor markets.

The Important Public Services (Border Security) Regulations 2017 designate five categories of border security functions (examination of persons and goods, maritime patrol, intelligence collection, and direction/control) as 'important public services' under section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This designation imposes enhanced industrial action ballot requirements on Border Force officers, making their strikes subject to stricter legal thresholds for lawful action.

While this regulation restricts the industrial action rights of public sector workers, the alternative—allowing border security personnel to strike with minimal thresholds—poses unacceptable national security risks. Border security is a core sovereign function where disruption could enable smuggling, illegal immigration, or threats to national safety. The examination of persons and goods at the border cannot be easily replaced by market mechanisms, and the continuity of this function serves a legitimate public interest that justifies the additional ballot requirements. Deletion would weaken the UK's ability to maintain secure borders during industrial disputes.

These Regulations are a commencement order that brings into force various provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016) on 13th February 2017. The IPA 2016, known as the 'Snoopers' Charter', grants extensive surveillance powers to public authorities. These regulations specifically commence provisions relating to: Judicial Commissioner oversight functions; additional directed oversight functions; Technical Advisory Panel; technical capability notices; codes of practice; and various administrative provisions. They also include a transitory provision relating to the Technical Advisory Board.

These regulations bring into force provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, a statute that represents one of the most expansive state surveillance regimes in the democratic world. Mass surveillance powers: create asymmetric information between state and citizen that distorts political power; enable government overreach with inadequate accountability; impose compliance costs on communications providers; and establish precedent for regulatory expansion into private communications. As commencement regulations, they are the mechanism by which this surveillance apparatus becomes operational. The transitory provision maintaining continuity with the previous RIPA framework does not remedy the underlying flaw. The IPA 2016 was criticised by civil liberties organisations, tech companies, and legal scholars as incompatible with a free society. While this is a legal instrument rather than primary legislation, deleting it would prevent the most problematic provisions from taking effect on the specified date, allowing parliamentary reconsideration of these sweeping powers.

These Regulations amend the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 to modify the earnings exception threshold for the benefit cap. Prior to April 2017, the exception applied to earners above £430/month. The amendment replaces this fixed amount with a dynamic threshold calculated as 16 hours per week at the National Minimum Wage rate (converted monthly: ×52÷12). The Regulations include transitional provisions preserving the old £430 threshold for assessment periods beginning before 1st April 2017.

This regulation exemplifies regulatory complexity inflation—replacing a simple £430 figure with a formula requiring ongoing reference to National Minimum Wage Regulations. The benefit cap itself creates steep effective marginal tax rates near the threshold, discouraging labor market attachment. The exception mechanism, rather than addressing this distortion, adds another layer of compliance burden and conditionality. A dynamic threshold tied to NMW introduces regulatory volatility and compliance costs as rates change, requiring beneficiaries to constantly recalculate their position. Simpler mechanisms—such as raising or abolishing the cap entirely—would achieve policy goals more transparently. Furthermore, the transitional complexity (different rules for pre/post April 2017 assessment periods) demonstrates how regulations accumulate technical detail that benefits neither taxpayers nor administrators.

Commencement regulations bringing into force provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 on 1st March 2017, including: 50% ballot turnout requirements, 40% support threshold for industrial action in public services, voting paper information requirements, employer notification periods, union supervision of picketing, political fund opt-in requirements, annual return disclosure of political expenditure, facility time publication requirements, and public sector subscription deduction restrictions.

These regulations impose government-mandated rules on private contractual relationships between unions and their members, adding compliance costs without clear benefits. The 50% turnout and 40% support thresholds do not prevent strikes but rather create arbitrary procedural barriers. The political fund opt-in mechanism (replacing opt-out) adds administrative burden while potentially suppressing voluntary political contributions through friction. The facility time publishing requirements create bureaucracy without addressing any genuine market failure. Critically, these rules restrict union members' freedom to organize according to their own preferences, substituting government judgment for individual choice. The EU-derived framework of labor market regulation was retained post-Brexit without scrutiny, and these provisions exemplify the kind of institutional rigidities that suppress Britain's natural competitiveness in labor markets.

Amends the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Commencement No. 2 and Transitory Provision) Regulations 2017 by omitting paragraphs (b) and (c) from regulation 2. This is a technical amendment that adjusts transitional commencement provisions for the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

This is a spent amendment that merely removed paragraphs from a now-expired transitional commencement instrument. Once the relevant provisions of the IPA 2016 came into force, this amending instrument served its purpose and has no ongoing effect. It adds no regulatory burden but also achieves nothing of substance to retain.

The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017 amend the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 to modify procedural requirements across multiple areas: introduction of initial prosecution details (new r.8.4), bail and custody time limits (Part 14), behaviour orders (Part 31), confiscation proceedings (Part 33), appeals to Crown Court and Court of Appeal (Parts 34, 36, 39), investigation orders (Part 47), and extradition (Part 50). Key changes include requirements for defendants to receive and have time to consider information, streamlined processes for agreed applications, new rules for handling sensitive information in applications, and procedural clarifications for various court proceedings.

These are court procedural rules governing the administration of criminal justice, not economic regulations. They impose no costs on businesses, trade, or market activity. Far from restricting liberty, they enhance fair trial rights by ensuring defendants receive and have time to consider prosecution information. They streamline agreed applications (reducing costs), clarify handling of sensitive information in investigations, and codify existing practices more efficiently. Deleting these would create procedural chaos in criminal courts without advancing any economic freedom objective.

This Order, effective 1st April 2017, revokes the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Trading Fund Order 2011, thereby ending DSTL's status as a trading fund and bringing it under direct parliamentary supply. The revocation eliminates the commercial framework and retained earnings/borrowing authorities that applied under the 2011 Order.

The revocation represents a move away from commercial discipline toward direct government control of DSTL. Trading funds, despite their bureaucratic framing, introduced market mechanisms and efficiency incentives that direct funding cannot replicate. Restoring the 2011 trading fund arrangement would re-impose commercial discipline on a public research body, encouraging cost-consciousness and innovation rather than reliance on parliamentary grants. The original 2011 Order, despite being a form of government intervention, was a superior mechanism to unconditional public funding.

This Order amends the Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme 1983 by substituting updated payment tables in Schedules 3 and 4, effective 10th April 2017. The Scheme provides statutory compensation payment schedules for civilians who sustain personal injuries.

This Order perpetuates a government-mandated compensation scheme that sets payment rates by bureaucratic decree rather than market mechanisms. The underlying Scheme represents state interference in what should be private contractual matters between insurers, employers, and individuals. Such schemes create moral hazard, distort insurance markets, and assume government is better positioned than parties themselves to determine fair compensation. Civilians would be better served by a competitive insurance market and tort law remedies, not a one-size-fits-all tariff. The amendment merely updates figures within an already flawed framework.

The National Health Service Litigation Authority (Amendment) Regulations 2017 amend the governance arrangements of the NHS Litigation Authority by modifying: (1) Article 4 of the 1995 Establishment Order to specify board composition (chairman, 3-5 non-officer members, and 3-5 executive members including CEO and CFO); and (2) the 1995 Regulations Schedule to establish quorum requirements for meetings (requiring at least one officer member plus either two non-officer members or the chairman with one non-officer member).

Britons would be worse off if these regulations were deleted because they provide essential governance frameworks for an NHS body handling clinical negligence claims worth billions. Without clear statutory governance rules on board composition and quorum, decision-making authority would revert to more rigid 1995 provisions, creating uncertainty about legitimate decision-making and potentially exposing the NHS to legal challenges over improper meeting procedures. These are standard administrative governance provisions that any functioning public body requires; their absence would impair the Authority's ability to operate effectively.

Technical amendment Order that modifies three earlier Railway Pensions Orders (1994, 1995, 2001) by extending payment deadline references from 2003/2004/2010 to 2030, inserting a new paragraph A1 governing interest accrual on outstanding balances, and updating cross-references from '7(1)' to '7(A1) or (1)' throughout the Schedules. The changes affect calculations of capital and interest payments for railway pension obligations.

Railway pension obligations represent contractual commitments to workers and retirees that cannot be casually dismissed without harming those who depend on them. Deleting this amendment would create legal uncertainty around existing pension entitlements and potentially leave pensioners without clear mechanisms for receiving accrued benefits. While Britain should indeed shed unnecessary regulatory burden, these are specific, targeted modifications to existing pension arrangements rather than new regulatory imposition—removing them would create gaps in the legal framework governing legitimate contractual obligations rather than freeing economic activity.