Browse regulations

Amends the Individual Savings Account Regulations 1998 to: add a definition of 'long-term asset fund'; require account managers to verify national insurance information before accepting subscriptions; clarify replacement subscription rules for flexible accounts; add a rule preventing withdrawals reducing current year subscriptions below nil; provide transitional treatment for certain UCITS investments until 31 December 2026; and add long-term asset funds as qualifying investments for the innovative finance component.

While these amendments add a national insurance verification requirement (a minor administrative burden), deletion would: prevent long-term asset funds from being eligible ISA investments, restricting investor choice; create disruption for UCITS investments held in ISAs through the transitional provision; and remove clarifications to flexible account replacement rules that benefit savers. The verification requirement, while burdensome, helps maintain ISA eligibility rules and prevents fraud that could undermine the tax-advantaged status upon which millions of savers depend. The expanded investment options for innovative finance ISAs represent a net benefit for Britons seeking diversified savings vehicles.

This Order amends the Gambling Act 2005 (Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2006 to modify rules around converted casino premises licences in England, Wales and Scotland. It introduces a new category (za) permitting gaming machines subject to requirements including: minimum 280m² gambling area, machines limited to Category B/C/D, a cap of 80 machines or 5 times the number of gaming tables, and restrictions on connected premises totalling no more than 80 machines. The Order also introduces definitions, review obligations, and territorial distinctions for England/Wales versus Scotland.

This regulation imposes arbitrary caps on gaming machines (80 maximum), ratios to gaming tables (5:1), and minimum floor areas (280m²) that raise operating costs and create barriers to entry. These restrictions protect incumbent casino operators from competition by limiting supply and increasing capital requirements. The complex rules on 'connected premises' add compliance burdens that favour larger operators. No evidence is presented that these numerical limits achieve any public interest objective better than market competition would. Consumers face reduced choice and higher costs while existing operators enjoy regulatory protection.

These Regulations amend the Gambling Act 2005 and associated regulations regarding casino gaming machines and mandatory conditions. Key changes include: increasing the gaming machine prize multiplier from 2x to 5x; reducing small casino floor area requirements from 500m² to 250m²; introducing definitions for 'extended converted casino premises' and 'larger converted casino premises'; establishing table gaming area requirements; mandating non-gambling areas with recreational facilities; imposing betting position limits based on gambling floor area; and capping maximum gambling area at 1,500m². The regulations also require periodic government reviews of the regulatory provisions.

These regulations perpetuate the casino licensing regime's artificial barriers to entry, including mandatory floor area thresholds, betting position limits, and prescribed physical layout requirements. Rather than liberalising the market, they codify government control over casino operations. The non-gambling area requirements, table gaming area mandates, and recreational facility stipulations represent micromanagement of private business premises. The 1,500m² gambling area cap and betting position limits restrict scalability and competition. These entry barriers and operational constraints harm consumers by limiting supply, reducing choice, and entrenching incumbent operators. The modest liberalisations (reduced floor thresholds, increased machine multiplier) are insufficient to offset the fundamental regulatory burden that makes casino operation unnecessarily difficult and expensive.

Amendment to the Gambling Act 2005 (Premises Licences and Provisional Statements) Regulations 2007, creating a modified application process for converted casino premises licences seeking to vary their licence to enable gaming machines. The amendment specifies alternative scale plan requirements for these applications and makes consequential amendments to regulation 21 regarding interpretation of regulation 4.

This regulation facilitates the expansion of gambling in casinos by creating a streamlined pathway for converted casino licences to offer gaming machines. The amendment appears to serve narrow commercial interests of the casino industry by reducing regulatory friction for a specific type of licence variation. Problem gambling imposes significant social costs, and regulations that ease the path to expanded gambling availability are contrary to the public interest. The original 2007 Regulations themselves represent unnecessary regulatory burden on business, and this amendment compounds that by enabling further gambling expansion without proper democratic scrutiny.

This Order amends the Enterprise Act 2002 to expand the definition of 'newspapers' to 'news media' throughout various provisions relating to public interest considerations in merger control. It introduces definitions for 'news media' (newspapers and news programmes) and 'news programme' (programmes including news-related material in broadcasting). The changes extend special public interest intervention powers to cover broadcast news alongside traditional newspapers, and apply to merger cases from July 2025 onwards.

This Order expands, rather than contracts, regulatory intervention in media markets by extending special public interest merger provisions to broadcast news enterprises. Rather than removing the EU-inherited bureaucratic burden on media, it widens the scope of state oversight. The Enterprise Act's special media merger regime reflects the flawed premise that certain industries deserve government intervention beyond ordinary competition law. Expanding this regime increases compliance costs, creates barriers to entry for new broadcasters, and grants discretionary power to Ministers without evidence of market failure. A genuinely dynamic free-trading Britain would treat media enterprises like any other business under competition law, not preserve and extend preferential regulatory treatment.

Amendment to Child Trust Funds Regulations 2004 providing grandfathering for recognised UCITS investments until 31st December 2026. Investments that fell within qualifying investments via UCITS before 1st October 2024 are temporarily treated as qualifying until the end of 2026, when paragraph (2A) expires.

This regulation merely extends an existing distortion with a sunset clause rather than addressing the underlying problem. Child Trust Fund accounts should not be restricted to specific 'qualifying investments' - such government dictates distort capital allocation, create compliance costs, and presume bureaucrats can identify better investments than individuals can for their own children. The UCITS grandfathering itself acknowledges the original restriction was flawed, as otherwise no transitional relief would be needed. This is regulatory drift that adds complexity while perpetuating government control over how Britons save for their children's futures. A truly liberal regime would allow complete investment freedom within these accounts.

The Oaklands Farm Solar Park Order 2025 is a Development Consent Order (DCO) under the Planning Act 2008 granting development consent for a 49.9MW solar park with battery storage at Oaklands Farm. It grants Oaklands Farm Solar Limited powers to construct, operate and maintain the solar development including street works, traffic management, drainage connections, and temporary closure of public rights of way. The Order also modifies various statutory provisions to facilitate construction and operation, and contains environmental requirements, decommissioning obligations, and transfer provisions.

This Order does not impose regulatory burden — it is a project-specific consent instrument that PERMITS development. Without this Order, the solar park could not be built. As a DCO under the Planning Act 2008, it represents precisely the kind of infrastructure authorization that Britain needs more of, not less. Far from restricting economic activity, it enables investment in clean energy infrastructure worth hundreds of millions of pounds, creating jobs and increasing electricity supply. The suggestion that we should 'delete' development consent orders is fundamentally misaligned with the goal of restoring Britain as a dynamic free-trading nation. No evidence of EU origin, gold-plating, or City of London impact.

Amends the International Tax Compliance Regulations 2015 to update CRS definitions to include 2023 crypto-asset reporting framework amendments, modify FATCA agreement references, introduce mandatory HMRC registration for financial institutions, add new due diligence and self-certification requirements for account holders, create an extensive penalty regime (regs 22A-22H) for failures in due diligence, record-keeping, reporting, registration and information provision, and remove certain client notification obligations. The regulations implement UK's obligations under international tax information exchange agreements.

These regulations impose substantial compliance burdens on financial institutions through mandatory registration, due diligence procedures, record-keeping requirements, and complex reporting obligations to HMRC. The penalty regime (up to £600/day daily penalties, £5000 per return, £300 per account holder) adds significant costs that are ultimately passed to consumers. The Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework provisions extend the regulatory net to new asset classes without evidence of corresponding benefits. The removal of client notification obligations and other simplifications suggest even HMRC acknowledges some requirements were excessive. While international tax cooperation has practical merits, the implementation creates gold-plated domestic requirements beyond what bilateral agreements strictly demand, raising costs for the City of London and potentially driving financial activity to less-regulated jurisdictions.

These Regulations implement the OECD Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) in UK law, requiring UK reporting cryptoasset service providers to apply due diligence procedures, collect user self-certifications, maintain 5-year records, report transaction information to HMRC annually by May 31st, notify users of reporting obligations, and register with HMRC. The regulations establish an electronic reporting system, penalty regimes for non-compliance (ranging from £100 to £5,000+ per violation), and appeal procedures via the First-tier/Upper Tribunal. They apply to cryptoasset service providers subject to CARF obligations in the UK, with exemptions for certain categories under the OECD rules.

Imposes significant compliance costs and administrative burdens on UK cryptoasset service providers, creating competitive disadvantage versus operators in non-CARF jurisdictions. The 5-year record-keeping requirement, electronic reporting mandates, and multi-layered penalty regime (up to £5,000 plus £600 daily continued failure penalties) amount to regulatory overreach that will drive businesses offshore. The notification and self-certification requirements override individual liberty by compelling disclosure of personal financial information as a condition of service. While the stated goal is combating tax evasion, existing fraud and theft laws are sufficient for prosecution—the reporting mandate is a disproportionate interference with voluntary economic activity. By tying UK operators to OECD frameworks, this regulation surrenders British regulatory autonomy to an international body.

The Customs (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2025 make technical amendments to multiple customs regulations, including updates to postal packet declarations, temporary admission procedures, and customs valuation methods. Key changes include: allowing oral and conduct-based declarations for temporary admission (with new approval requirements), updating definitions for foreign designated operators, modifying transaction value rules for royalties and finance interest, and correcting references to international conventions. The regulations came into force on 16th July 2025.

While these amendments contain some liberalizing elements (oral declarations, declarations by conduct), they create new bureaucratic approval requirements (regulations 21A, 27ZA) that add layer upon layer of administrative burden. The regulations perpetuate a complex customs declaration regime that constrains trade. The unseen costs include: compliance costs for businesses navigating updated valuation rules, deterrence of casual importers due to formalities, and perpetuation of customs bureaucracy that could be simplified. Deletion would force a streamlined, principles-based approach to customs rather than this piecemeal accumulation of procedural requirements.

Amendment regulations extending from July 2025 to the day before the 2026 ordinary election day that modify timing rules for local authority referendums on petitions and first elections of mayors. For petitions within this period, referendums must be held within six months after the 2026 ordinary election day. For mayoral elections where the referendum or resolution date falls within this period, the first election must occur on the second ordinary election day after that date.

These regulations do not restrict freedoms or impose significant costs—they provide administrative flexibility by deferring referendums and mayoral elections that would otherwise fall in the pre-election period to more suitable dates. The deferred timing (second ordinary day of election after the trigger date, or six months after the 2026 election day for petitions) actually serves democratic participation by avoiding holding votes during the run-up to scheduled elections when turnout might be suppressed. Britons are not materially worse off with these timing provisions in place; rather, they improve administrative coherence and prevent awkward scheduling conflicts.

These Regulations establish procedural requirements for providers of regulated services under the Online Safety Act 2023 to notify OFCOM about fees. They require notifications to include: confirmation if it's the provider's first fee-paying year, evidence substantiating details of regulated services and worldwide revenue, and a declaration of accuracy made by a senior manager or appropriate individual. Notifications must be supplied in the prescribed manner published by OFCOM.

These Regulations represent the bureaucratic compliance culture that burdens British businesses. The requirement for senior manager declarations, detailed financial evidence substantiation, and prescribed manner of notification adds administrative complexity and compliance costs with minimal demonstrated benefit. Such fee notification procedures are inherently distortive — they create barriers for smaller entrants and new market participants who lack dedicated compliance functions. The underlying Online Safety Act regime itself raises questions about regulatory overreach; these Regulations merely compound the burden by imposing EU-style procedural requirements. Simpler, less prescriptive mechanisms for fee collection would reduce costs while still achieving revenue collection.

This Order amends TB control regulations for animals in England, removing the power to slaughter TB-affected animals from the 2017 Order, extending 'specified area' definitions to include non-civil parish areas, modifying publication of bovine herd information, and adding specific localities (Hodthorpe and Belph, Langwith, and various Hampshire areas) to Schedule 3's listed parishes. The amendments retain Section 32 slaughter powers but recodify them within the 2021 Order framework.

Retained EU-era TB control regime that imposes compulsory slaughter powers, compensation schemes, testing requirements, and area designations without sufficient evidence that these heavy-handed interventions are superior to market-based alternatives. Compensation structures create moral hazard, discouraging proactive biosecurity investment. Post-Brexit independence provides opportunity to replace command-and-control veterinary regulations with voluntary certification schemes, private insurance against livestock disease, and property-rights-based approaches that would achieve disease control more efficiently without distorting farmer incentives or concentrating power in the Secretary of State.

These Regulations amend the Medical Devices Regulations 2002, Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005, and Medical Devices (Northern Ireland Protocol) Regulations 2021 by increasing various fees for device registration, approved body designations, conformity assessments, clinical investigations, and regulatory advice meetings. Key changes include: nearly doubling clinical investigation fees (e.g., class I device fees from £5,711 to £11,701); introducing new £987/hour regulatory advice meeting fees; adding small company payment terms allowing 50/50 split; and omitting pre-consultation meeting fees. Most increases range from 8-15%, though clinical investigation fees approximately double.

These fee increases nearly double costs for clinical investigations, adding substantial regulatory burden that will discourage medical device innovation in the UK and harm competitiveness. The new £987/hour regulatory advice fee creates an additional barrier. While regulatory cost recovery is legitimate, the magnitude of these increases—particularly the ~105% increase in clinical investigation fees—imposes severe unseen costs: fewer medical device companies will pursue UK market entry, patients lose access to innovative treatments, and the medtech sector loses ground to纽约, Singapore, and Dubai. The small company provisions partially offset but do not remedy the fundamental problem that these fees make Britain less attractive for medical device development. Parliament should scrutinise whether such dramatic increases are truly cost-reflective or represent regulatory gold-plating.

The Criminal and Civil Legal Aid (Amendment) Regulations 2025 amend civil and criminal legal aid regulations to remove contribution requirements, simplify administrative processes, and allow authorised providers to make determinations directly. Key changes include: omission of regulation 36 (contributions) from the 2012 Procedure Regulations; removal of contribution obligations from the 2013 Financial Resources Regulations; and transitional provisions waiving contributions due on or after 27th June 2025. The regulations also enable providers to issue representation orders and make eligibility determinations under Director authorisation.

While these amendments remove some bureaucratic burden and simplify procedures, the fundamental structure remains: a government-controlled monopoly on legal aid provision with mandatory taxpayer funding, state-determined eligibility, and professional gatekeeping through approved 'providers'. The removal of contributions shifts costs from users to taxpayers without addressing the underlying distortion. Hayek would recognise this as expansion of state-managed allocation rather than liberalisation. The transitional provisions retroactively waive legally owed debts—a concerning precedent. True reform would open the legal services market to competition, not refine its administrative apparatus.