Browse regulations

This Order amends Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to expand the list of offences eligible for Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs). It removes sub-paragraph (e) from paragraph 22 and inserts paragraph 26ZA, adding three Financial Services Act 2012 offences (sections 89, 90, 91 concerning misleading statements, misleading impressions, and benchmarks) to the list of specified offences for which DPAs may be negotiated.

Extends Deferred Prosecution Agreement mechanisms deeper into financial services, a sector already burdened by extensive regulation. DPAs function as a mechanism that can coerce corporate settlements regardless of actual guilt, creating regulatory uncertainty and chilling legitimate financial activity. The specified offences criminalise statements and impressions in financial contexts, adding to the compliance burden that pushes financial business to rival jurisdictions. Britons are not demonstrably better protected by this expansion—DPA availability primarily benefits prosecutors seeking flexible settlement tools, not the public. This represents another layer of regulatory reach into the City of London's affairs without clear countervailing benefit.

Amendment to Family Procedure Rules 2010 introducing three main changes: (1) Rule 1.5 confirming Welsh language rights in Wales under existing legislation; (2) Rule 5.6 allowing documents in Welsh or English for family proceedings connected to Wales; (3) Rule 7.27 clarification on what constitutes proceedings in another jurisdiction for stay purposes; (4) Rule 30.12A allowing appeal courts to order public hearings with appropriate privacy restrictions when private hearings would otherwise apply.

These procedural amendments implement statutory rights already enacted by Parliament (Welsh Language Act 1993 and Welsh Language Measure 2011), provide necessary jurisdictional clarifications for stay applications, and actually increase transparency by allowing public hearings with appropriate safeguards. They impose no economic burdens, create no market distortions, and do not derive from EU directives or gold-plating. Deletion would undermine established legal rights and reduce procedural clarity.

These Regulations specify which duties of persons subject to service law (and civilians subject to service discipline) constitute 'aviation functions' and 'marine functions' for the purposes of section 93A(3A) and (3B) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. They define roles including flight deck crew, aircraft maintenance, piloting, air traffic control, ship navigation, diving, boarding parties, and weapons handling on aircraft or ships.

This regulation defines core military disciplinary jurisdiction under the Armed Forces Act 2006. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty and gaps in the framework establishing which military and civilian personnel fall under service law for aviation and marine duties. Unlike typical EU regulatory burdens that distort markets, this is a foundational legal instrument establishing command responsibility, safety protocols, and disciplinary authority for armed forces operations. Without it, accountability for critical safety-related duties in aviation and marine contexts would be unclear.

Statutory instrument that abolishes existing wards of Dartford borough and divides it into 20 new wards, specifies councillor numbers for each ward, and reorganises parish wards for Darenth, Stone, Swanscombe & Greenhithe, and Wilmington. Establishes mapping references for boundary determinations and sets commencement dates for electoral and other purposes.

This Order is a technical administrative reorganization of electoral boundaries for Dartford borough and associated parishes. It imposes no economic regulation, does not restrict trade, does not affect business activity, and creates no market distortions. Deletion would create electoral administration chaos as subsequent replacement orders would be required. The regulation is purely about how constituents are represented in local government, not about constraining economic activity or trade. There is no discernible economic cost to keeping it that would justify the administrative disruption of deletion.

This Order updates statutory figures for calculating the taxable cash equivalent of van benefits and car/van fuel benefits under ITEPA 2003. It increases: the car fuel threshold from £23,400 to £24,100, the van benefit cash equivalent from £3,350 to £3,430, and van fuel cash equivalent from £633 to £655, effective for tax year 2019-20 onwards.

This regulation perpetuates a distortionary system of benefit-in-kind taxation for company cars and vans that incentivizes compensation in non-cash form over wage flexibility. These annual indexation updates serve primarily to maintain preferential tax treatment for a specific form of compensation that was originally a wartime rationing artifact. The underlying principle—that certain employer-provided benefits should receive favorable tax treatment compared to cash salary—distorts labor market efficiency, creates compliance complexity, and represents a form of middle-class welfare. Rather than mechanically updating these thresholds each year, the better reform would be to repeal the primary legislation creating these benefits or fundamentally restructure them toward cash-equivalent treatment. The Order itself adds no value beyond the previous year's figures; it merely inflates numbers that should be reconsidered rather than indexed.

This Order abolishes existing wards of Redcar and Cleveland borough and replaces them with 24 new wards, while also reorganizing parish wards for Guisborough, Saltburn, Marske & New Marske, and Skelton & Brotton. It specifies ward boundaries by reference to maps held by the Local Government Boundary Commission for England and assigns councillor numbers to each ward. Provisions for election proceedings come into force the day after making; other provisions take effect at the 2019 ordinary election day.

This is a routine local government electoral administration order implementing boundary commission recommendations. It does not restrict economic activity, impose regulatory burdens on businesses, gold-plate EU directives, or affect planning, healthcare, or financial services. Electoral boundary administration is a legitimate core governmental function. Deletion would leave the borough without lawful ward structures for elections, causing democratic governance problems without any corresponding economic benefit.

The North Devon (Electoral Changes) Order 2018 is a local government boundary reorganization instrument that abolishes existing wards of North Devon district and replaces them with 25 new wards, while also reorganizing parish wards for Barnstaple, Bishop's Nympton, Braunton, Fremington, Ilfracombe, Landkey, and Tawstock. It specifies ward boundaries via reference maps held by the Local Government Boundary Commission for England and assigns councillor numbers to each ward. The Order came into force in stages in 2018-2019.

This Order is a purely administrative electoral boundary instrument that organizes democratic representation in North Devon. It does not regulate economic activity, impose compliance costs on businesses, restrict trade, or distort market incentives. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty around local election proceedings without generating any identifiable economic benefit. Unlike regulations that create monopolies, increase costs, or restrict supply, this Order merely rearranges electoral geography.

The Electricity and Gas (Energy Company Obligation) Order 2018 establishes the ECO scheme for 2018-2022, requiring large energy suppliers to achieve a £8.253 billion home-heating cost reduction target by promoting energy efficiency measures (insulation, heating systems, boiler repairs) at domestic premises. It sets obligations based on supplier market share, imposes solid wall minimum requirements, mandates 15% rural targets, and caps various measure categories (demonstration 10%, innovation 10%, boiler repairs 5%). Qualifying actions must benefit 'help to heat group' households and meet installation standards under PAS 2030/2035 specifications.

This regulation exemplifies the problems Better Britain was created to address: it mandates private companies to spend billions on government-specified measures, distorting investment signals and creating compliance bureaucracy that diverts resources from genuine productivity. The complex formulas, phase-based obligations, and multiple caps (25% on certain actions, 10% innovation, 5% boiler repairs) demonstrate excessive micro-management. While targeting fuel poverty is a legitimate goal, mandating that energy companies install specific measures (solid wall insulation, heating controls) is an inefficient approach that raises costs, creates barriers to entry for smaller suppliers, and forces cross-subsidization through energy bills. Post-Brexit Britain should scrap this retained EU-era approach in favor of more flexible, market-based mechanisms such as direct consumer subsidies or information standards that achieve the same goals without distorting the energy market.

These Regulations establish a UK post-Brexit framework for recognising and supervising third-country central counterparties (CCPs). They amend FSMA 2000 and the EMIR Regulation to transfer recognition authority from EU bodies (ESMA) to the Bank of England, create a Tier 1/Tier 2 systemic importance classification system, provide transitional arrangements (up to 7 years plus extensions) for existing CCPs, establish cooperation arrangements with third-country regulators, and set out application and recognition procedures for non-UK CCPs seeking to provide clearing services in the UK.

Deleting this regulation would create immediate legal uncertainty and market disruption. Third-country CCPs operating in the UK would lose their recognition basis, potentially fragmenting clearing markets and harming UK financial institutions. While this is not ideal free-market legislation, it addresses a genuine Brexit-induced structural problem and contains self-limiting transitional provisions. The regulation does not represent permanent regulatory burden but rather necessary transitional infrastructure that maintains financial stability during the UK's adjustment to standalone regulation. Future liberalization of CCP recognition rules would be preferable once the transitional phase concludes.

EU Exit regulations that amend the Export of Objects of Cultural Interest (Control) Order 2003 to reflect Brexit. Revokes the underlying EU Council Regulation 116/2009 and its implementing regulation, replaces references to EU institutions with UK authorities (HMRC), and renames 'EU Licence' to reflect UK issuance. The regulations ensure continuity of export controls for cultural objects post-Brexit.

While export controls add friction to international art trade, deleting this regulation would create a regulatory vacuum and potentially encourage looting and illegal trafficking of cultural artifacts. The regulation itself imposes minimal burden—it merely transfers the licensing framework from EU to UK authority. Without it, UK cultural object exports would lack any legal framework, harming legitimate trade and emboldening black markets. The costs of deletion (heritage damage, increased illicit trade) clearly exceed the compliance costs of maintaining a simple export licensing system.

The Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendment) Regulations 2018 amend the 2003 Regulations to allow the Information Commissioner to serve monetary penalty notices on individual officers of bodies corporate for privacy/electronic communications contraventions, extending and modifying the Data Protection (Monetary Penalties) Regulations 2010 and Order 2010 to apply these enhanced enforcement powers.

This regulation expands regulatory burden by imposing personal liability on directors, managers, and officers of corporate bodies for corporate privacy violations. It creates a chilling effect on entrepreneurship and corporate governance by exposing individuals to six-figure ICO penalties without corresponding benefits. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should reduce, not increase, the enforcement arsenal against businesses. The original 2003 directive-based regime was retained wholesale without democratic review; this 2018 amendment compounded that error by further expanding ICO powers. Such personal liability expansion should require primary legislation with full parliamentary scrutiny, not secondary instrument creep.

The Spring Traps Approval (England) Order 2018 approves specific spring trap types for pest control under the Pests Act 1954, requiring traps to follow manufacturer instructions and minimize harm to non-target species. It restricts legal trap use to those listed in the Schedule or deemed 'equivalent,' and revokes three prior approval orders.

This regulation creates a government pre-approval barrier that restricts what traps property owners, farmers, and pest control professionals may legally use. By limiting approved traps to specific makes and types, it suppresses competition in the trap market, raises costs for legitimate users, and effectively grants monopoly protection to approved manufacturers. Adults capable of pest control decisions are treated as incapable by requiring official sanction for each trap type. The legitimate goal of humane pest control could be achieved through less restrictive means such as liability law for cruelty, labeling requirements, or public education — without creating a regulatory gatekeeping system that benefits incumbent producers at consumers' expense.

Police (Amendment) Regulations 2018 amend the Police Regulations 2003 to create a 'rejoiner member' category for former police officers re-joining a force, establishing probation requirements and modifying related provisions in regulations 12, 13, 17, and 19A regarding discharge, personal records transfer, and substance misuse testing.

These regulations address legitimate operational concerns around re-employing former officers. Without such framework, forces lack structured processes to assess re-joining officers' fitness for return, potentially compromising public safety and professional standards. The probation requirements, while adding oversight, serve to ensure rejoiner members meet current standards after a period away. The administrative requirements for record transfers are minimal and necessary for continuity. Unlike EU-derived regulations that impose unnecessary bureaucratic burdens, this is domestic police workforce management that balances flexibility with accountability.

These 2018 Regulations amend the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2009 to create transitional procedures for 'relevant proposals' and 'nursery ground proposals' relating to the 2010 local non-domestic rating list, including procedural requirements, deadlines (1st January 2020), and rules for checks on historic hereditaments. They also amend the Business Rate Supplements Regulations 2009 to change a transfer deadline from 31st May to 30th April.

These are transitional, time-limited regulations almost entirely focused on the 2010 rating list with deadlines that have long since passed (1st January 2020). They add complex procedural overlays (new regulation 4AA, specialized proposal requirements, deemed completion rules) for a narrow category of historical ratepayer appeals that are now largely historical artefacts. The only substantive ongoing provision (the BRS deadline change from 31st May to 30th April) is trivial and could be handled in the parent instrument. The regulations represent precisely the kind of EU-derived regulatory complexity that accumulated without democratic scrutiny — creating special rules for special cases rather than principle-based general rules. Post-Brexit regulatory independence calls for deleting such transitional technical amendments that serve no ongoing purpose.

This Order of Council 2018 amended the Nursing and Midwifery Council (Fees) Rules, approved by the Privy Council, effective 28 January 2019. It sets and adjusts the regulatory fees paid by nurses and midwives to fund the NMC, which is the statutory regulator for nursing and midwifery professions in the UK.

Professional licensing bodies like the NMC create artificial barriers to workforce entry, reducing supply of healthcare workers at a time when the NHS faces severe staffing shortages. The NMC's near-monopoly status as the sole regulator means it faces no competitive pressure to keep fees reasonable. High regulatory fees are passed on to healthcare employers and ultimately contribute to higher labor costs in the NHS. While the NMC serves a public interest function in ensuring competency, this could be achieved through lighter-touch regulation or market competition, rather than a mandatory fee-funded body with entry barriers that restrict healthcare workforce supply.