Browse regulations

This Order brings into force provisions of the Wales Act 2014 relating to Welsh tax-setting powers. It appoints 24th July 2018 as the commencement date for sections 8 and 9 (inserting provisions into GOWA 2006 and ITA 2007) and section 11 amendments to the Scotland Act 1998. The Order provides that Welsh rate resolutions may first be made by the National Assembly for Wales for tax year 2019-20, and that the Comptroller and Auditor General's reporting obligations apply from the financial year ending 31st March 2018.

This is a commencement order that merely activates provisions already enacted by the Wales Act 2014, which received Parliamentary approval. Deleting it would leave Welsh tax-raising powers and devolution provisions in legal limbo, preventing the National Assembly from exercising democratically mandated functions. As a procedural/administrative instrument rather than a regulatory burden on economic activity, it creates no compliance costs, restricts trade, or distort market incentives.

The Social Workers Regulations 2018 establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for social workers in England, including: mandatory registration requirements and procedures; fitness to practise proceedings with various orders (suspension, conditions of practice, warning); education and training approval schemes; a register of social workers maintained by a regulator; provisions for emergency registration; renewal and removal from the register; and oversight by the Professional Standards Authority. The regulations create multiple appointed roles (adjudicators, case examiners, investigators, inspectors, advisers) and require continuing professional development for registered social workers.

These regulations impose mandatory state licensing of social workers through a bureaucratic apparatus of appointed adjudicators, case examiners, and inspectors, creating significant barriers to entry into the profession. The requirement that social workers hold 'recognised qualifications' awarded within a specified period, demonstrate 'necessary knowledge of English', meet 'professional standards' for continuing professional development, and obtain regulator approval for registration effectively grants the regulator monopoly control over who may practise as a social worker. Fitness to practise proceedings with conditions of practice orders, suspension orders, and warning orders enable the regulator to restrict or remove practitioners' ability to work. This regulatory monopoly over occupational entry and ongoing practice rights suppresses supply of social workers, increases labour costs, and creates an unaccountable bureaucratic body with extensive powers over individuals' livelihoods — with no competitive alternative or market discipline. The regulations inherited from EU-derived frameworks and expanded under the Children and Social Work Act 2017 represent exactly the kind of institutional capture and supply restriction that Adam Smith and the classical economists warned against.

The 2018 Regulations amend two earlier CFD regime instruments: (1) adding a new 'remote island wind CFD unit' category with specific technical criteria (wind generation on islands 10+km from mainland GB, with 50km+ cabling including 20km+ subsea); (2) removing 'accredited CHP station' and 'CHPQA' definitions, replacing 'accredited' with 'CHP' in two definitions; (3) substituting a waste definition referencing Directive 2008/98/EC with an essentially identical one.

The CFD regime itself is a market-distorting subsidy mechanism that picks winners and losers in energy generation. The remote island wind provisions create a privileged category for particular geographically-situated projects, inviting rent-seeking. The retention of EU Directive references post-Brexit is precisely the 'retained EU laws never scrutinised by Parliament' problem. Removing accreditation requirements (CHPQA) weakens quality standards while government guarantees remain. The regulatory complexity (NETS SQSS definitions, subsea cabling thresholds) adds compliance costs that deter market entry. This instrument should be deleted as part of wholesale CFD regime reform.

The Renewables Obligation (Amendment) Order 2018 amends the Renewables Obligation Order 2015 to introduce ROC caps for certain fossil fuel generating stations, create complex rules for 'mixed generating stations' with both capped and exempt combustion units, add requirements for CHP station declarations regarding pre-2013 capacity, and insert Schedule 6 with detailed annual ROC cap mechanisms (A x 125,000 ROCs per combustion unit) and extensive modifications to how the Order applies to mixed generating stations.

This regulation perpetuates and expands government intervention in the energy market through the Renewables Obligation scheme. The ROC mechanism artificially subsidises certain renewable generation sources, distorting market signals and diverting investment from more efficient or innovative alternatives. The complex cap system with multiple categories (capped combustion units, exempt combustion units, mixed generating stations) creates substantial compliance burdens and administrative costs. Rather than removing this intervention, the 2018 amendment adds further bureaucratic complexity including intricate allocation formulas, reporting requirements, and grandfathering provisions. Britons would be better served by allowing the energy market to operate without political allocation of subsidies—the unintended consequences of ROC subsidies include reduced incentives for cost reduction in supported technologies, market distortions that favour politically-connected generators, and barriers to entry for new market participants.

Amends the 2014 Order on ring-fenced bodies and core activities in financial services. Adds a new exclusion to article 2(2): persons currently or recently (within 6 months) subject to financial sanctions are not considered as conducting a 'core activity' when accepting deposits. Also inserts a definition of 'financial sanctions' by reference to the Policing and Crime Act 2017. Comes into force 31 October 2018.

This amendment merely clarifies the interaction between ring-fencing rules and legal sanctions compliance. Without this, banks complying with legal sanctions obligations (accepting deposits from sanctioned persons as required by law) could face unintended consequences under ring-fencing requirements. While the underlying ring-fencing regime itself imposes restrictions on banking structure, this specific amendment prevents an anomalous outcome where legal compliance would trigger regulatory penalties. Britons would be worse off if deleted because it creates a technical contradiction that could disrupt banks' legal compliance with sanctions law, potentially exposing banks to conflicting legal obligations.

These Regulations establish timeframes determining when the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) may publish or make available to the public 'protected material' obtained from offshore petroleum licensees under the Energy Act 2016. They cover geological surveys (5-15 year disclosure delays), well information, production data, computerised models, pipeline details, and offshore installation information. The Regulations specify various triggering events (licence determination, production start, etc.) that permit disclosure, and define numerous technical terms including petroleum, production licences, computerised models, and petroleum-related samples.

These Regulations restrict when the OGA can disclose information it holds, keeping commercially sensitive petroleum data hidden from the public for years or indefinitely. This serves private interests of offshore licensees at public expense by preventing market participants, investors, researchers, and the public from accessing information about subsurface resources. The extended delays (5-15 years for geological surveys, indefinite for subsurface information) are arbitrary and lack justification beyond protecting incumbent commercial advantage. No compelling evidence shows that removing these disclosure restrictions would reduce investment in offshore petroleum. Markets function better with transparency, and any legitimate commercial confidentiality should be addressed through contract law, not government-mandated information suppression. This represents the kind of regulatory intervention that distorts market information flows without clear public benefit.

These Regulations govern information provision requirements for independent schools and alternative provision Academies in England. They establish registration application procedures, initial and annual return requirements to the Secretary of State, grounds for deregistration, and amend standards for non-maintained special schools and independent school staff suitability checks.

This regulation creates significant bureaucratic burden on independent schools with costs passed to parents in higher fees. The annual and initial return requirements impose ongoing compliance costs without demonstrable benefit—parents can directly request information from schools. The registration regime raises barriers to entry for educational entrepreneurs, reducing supply of alternatives to state education. While safeguarding vulnerable children is a legitimate concern, the market disciplines poor schools through reputation, and excessive regulation paradoxically harms the very children it aims to protect by limiting educational options available to parents.

No regulation document provided

No regulatory text was submitted for review. Without a specific statutory instrument to assess, there is nothing to evaluate against Better Britain's criteria.

These Regulations establish statutory fee limits for English higher education providers, prescribing maximum ('higher' and 'basic') amounts and minimum ('floor') amounts for undergraduate course fees across various categories including full-time, part-time, sandwich courses, Erasmus years, foundation years, and courses with overseas providers. They include provisions for fee reductions based on student numbers, special provisions for legacy students, and amendments to the Higher Education (Fee Limit Condition) Regulations 2017 regarding qualifying persons and stateless leave.

These regulations impose price controls on higher education fees, setting both maximum caps and minimum floor amounts. The floor amounts are particularly harmful as they prevent price competition among universities, effectively guaranteeing supracompetitive pricing. This shields incumbent providers from competitive pressure, reducing incentives for efficiency and innovation. The complex tiered fee structure with multiple categories creates significant administrative burden and compliance costs. The student number reduction mechanisms penalise successful providers that exceed targets, distorting market signals. Post-Brexit, this represents exactly the type of EU-derived bureaucratic price control that should be eliminated to restore the UK's historic position as a free-trading, competitive higher education market where institutions compete on price and quality.

This Order authorizes the Secretary of State to make payments not exceeding £66,000,000 to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as the UK's contribution to the Fund's Eleventh Replenishment, and to redeem any non-interest-bearing notes or obligations issued to IFAD. It is made under powers in the International Development Act 2002.

This Order commits £66 million of taxpayer funds to an international organization with limited democratic accountability or transparency. International development contributions through multilateral bodies like IFAD often suffer from bureaucratic inefficiency, capital misallocation, and distort local agricultural markets in recipient nations by flooding them with subsidized products. Such contributions remove capital from productive domestic uses and remove parliamentary scrutiny over individual spending decisions. The 2002 Act framework was designed for an era when development spending was less questioned; post-Brexit, the UK should reconsider ongoing automatic contributions to international bodies that may not serve clear UK interests. The funds could be better deployed through private trade, bilateral arrangements with greater conditionality, or retained for domestic priorities.

This Order updates codes of practice for covert surveillance and human intelligence sources, amends the 2010 Order's provisions on authorized personnel across numerous public authorities (including DEFRA, Home Office, Environment Agency, Health and Safety Executive, and others), adds the Marine Management Organisation as a relevant public authority, removes certain entries, and modifies rules around combined warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 regarding intelligence services.

This Order makes procedural and personnel-level adjustments to an existing regulatory framework governing surveillance powers. Without these amendments, outdated organizational references, incorrect authorized personnel grades, and inconsistent codes of practice would persist. The Marine Management Organisation addition provides proper authority for marine enforcement. While the surveillance framework itself could be subject to broader debate, this specific Order does not expand surveillance powers but rather updates administrative details and corrects organizational references. Removing it would create administrative confusion and leave outdated personnel authorizations in place.

Food and Rural Affairs (Miscellaneous Revocations) Regulations 2018 - A revocation instrument that removes outdated countryside access regulations (1994-1999) and dairy produce quota regulations (2002-2008) from the statute book. Regulation 3 (partially) takes effect 31 March 2019; remainder in force 1 October 2018. Extends to England and Wales.

This regulation is itself a deregulatory instrument—deleting it would reinstate all the revoked countryside access and dairy quota restrictions. The dairy quota regulations were tied to the EU Common Agricultural Policy and are now obsolete post-Brexit. The countryside access regulations served a purpose but their revocation represents a net reduction in regulatory burden. No case exists for reversing this deregulation.

The Warm Home Discount (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2018 amend the Warm Home Discount Regulations 2011, extending the scheme to cover scheme years 8, 9, and 10 (ending March 2021). The regulation introduces mandatory spending obligations for electricity suppliers to provide rebates to customers in fuel poverty or at risk of fuel poverty, establishes eligibility criteria, creates new categories of 'compulsory smaller electricity suppliers,' sets caps on spending for industry initiatives and debt write-off, and imposes reporting/notification requirements. It also incorporates data sharing provisions under the Digital Economy Act 2017.

The Warm Home Discount mandates that electricity suppliers spend specific amounts on 'non-core spending obligations' for fuel poverty assistance—a government-directed cross-subsidy mechanism that distorts energy markets. These mandatory spending requirements increase costs for suppliers, which are passed on to all consumers through higher energy prices, effectively taxing households to fund a welfare program. The scheme also disadvantages smaller electricity suppliers by creating new categories of 'compulsory smaller electricity suppliers' with mandatory obligations, reducing market competition and creating barriers to entry. The complexity of eligibility criteria, reporting requirements, and spending caps adds significant compliance burdens without addressing underlying causes of fuel poverty. A dynamic free market in energy would allow suppliers to compete on price and service quality, with private charitable initiatives or targeted welfare addressing genuine hardship more efficiently than mandatory cross-subsidies codified into regulation.

These Regulations amend the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2009 and the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009. They clarify timing references for 'date mentioned' provisions, insert a new category (aa) allowing certain former Insolvency Practitioners to make proposals under specific conditions, modify withdrawal procedures to require current ratepayer consent in certain cases, expand party participation rights in proceedings, and add notification requirements for decision notices served on non-IP parties.

These are procedural technical amendments that clarify existing framework ambiguities (particularly date references), expand access to the appeals system for former Insolvency Practitioners who have a legitimate interest in rating matters, and improve party notification rights. Without these changes, ratepayers could face genuine procedural barriers to contesting incorrect valuations. The amendments make the system more precise rather than more burdensome, and removing them would create ambiguity about timing requirements and restrict access to justice for parties with legitimate interests in rating appeals.

The Digital Government (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018 amend the Digital Economy Act 2017 to enable disclosure of information to licensed gas and electricity suppliers about charge restrictions imposed by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority for purposes including assisting households in fuel poverty. It adds definitional provisions for 'domestic customer' and expands the permissible disclosure purposes under section 36.

Without this regulation, information about existing charge restrictions imposed by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority could not be disclosed to energy suppliers for the purpose of administering fuel poverty assistance programs. The regulation is narrow in scope—it merely facilitates information sharing about restrictions that exist under separate primary legislation (Gas Act 1986 and Electricity Act 1989). Deleting it would harm the intended beneficiaries by preventing effective delivery of energy cost reduction programs for vulnerable domestic customers. The regulation itself does not impose price controls; it merely enables disclosure of information about controls already imposed elsewhere in law.