Browse regulations

Amends the National Savings (No. 2) Regulations 2015 to broaden who may purchase bonds on behalf of minors (expanding from parents/guardians/grandparents to any eligible bond purchaser) and to expand discretion regarding who may receive payments on behalf of minors.

These amendments are deregulatory in nature, expanding access to National Savings products and reducing rigid eligibility requirements. Deleting them would revert to more restrictive, paternalistic rules limiting who can act on behalf of minors. The changes give the Director of Savings appropriate discretion while maintaining protections.

The Electricity Capacity (No. 2) Regulations 2019 amend the Electricity Capacity Regulations 2014 to introduce a new T-3 capacity auction (for delivery year commencing 1st October 2022), modify credit cover requirements, adjust capacity payment offsetting rules for relevant expenditure and benefit, and establish transitory provisions linking the T-3 auction to subsequent T-4 auctions. It also makes corresponding amendments to the Electricity Capacity (No. 1) Regulations 2019.

This regulation perpetuates the capacity market regime, a form of central planning that distorts electricity investment signals. The T-3 auction introduces yet another government-directed capacity target, adding complexity and compliance costs. The offsetting mechanisms for 'relevant expenditure' and 'relevant benefit' create bureaucratic incentives that favour certain technologies over others. Such targeted interventions in the electricity market inhibit the natural price signals that would otherwise guide efficient investment decisions, similar to how the Corn Laws distorted grain markets. The complex web of credit cover requirements, standstill periods, and transitory provisions serves to entrench existing participants and raise barriers for demand-side response and new entrants, ultimately harming consumers through reduced competition and innovation.

These are transitional and savings regulations implementing the transfer of social worker regulation from the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) to the new regulator under the Children and Social Work Act 2017. They preserve existing registrations, applications, fitness to practise proceedings, and appeals by treating them as continuing under the new regulatory framework. Key provisions include: deemed registration of transferred social workers with equivalent terms; treatment of pending applications as new applications to the regulator; continuation of fitness to practise cases and register entry cases; transfer of approved courses and qualifications; and preservation of appeal rights.

These are transitional provisions that will naturally expire as pending cases conclude. They impose no permanent regulatory burden - they merely facilitate the orderly transfer of existing regulatory functions from HCPC to the new regulator, preserving existing rights and ensuring continuity for social workers during the transition. Deleting them would create legal chaos and harm social workers whose registrations and proceedings were properly established under the prior regime.

A commencement order bringing into force section 24 (transfer of staff to local policing bodies) and section 132 (Firearms Acts fee applications) of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, with a transitional provision deferring certain fees for firearms applications made before 1st October 2019.

This is a one-time administrative commencement order that has already served its purpose. Once legislation is brought into force, commencement regulations have no ongoing effect—they are inherently transient instruments. The underlying policy matters (staff transfers to policing bodies, firearms fee structures) are evaluated separately through the primary legislation itself, not through this procedural mechanism.

The REACH etc. (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (No. 3) Regulations 2019 is a Brexit secondary legislation instrument that amends the retained EU REACH regulation. It converts EU-derived deadlines (e.g., 'by 1 June 2019') to post-exit timeframes ('within 18 months of exit day'), modifies transitional provisions for substances of very high concern (SVHC), and replaces references to EU directives with UK-specific regulations (e.g., Medical Devices Regulations 2002, Veterinary Medicines Regulations 2013). It primarily ensures the UK chemical regulatory system functions after Brexit by mechanically transplanting EU timeframes and references onto the UK statute book.

This regulation exemplifies the worst of Britain's post-Brexit regulatory inheritance: EU law retained wholesale without democratic scrutiny. The REACH regime is an inherently bureaucratic system that imposes substantial compliance costs on chemical manufacturers and importers while creating barriers to innovation and market entry. Rather than using Brexit to design a leaner, competitiveness-enhancing UK chemical policy, this instrument simply transplants EU deadlines and references onto UK law. The 'substances of very high concern' authorisation regime particularly illustrates regulatory overreach—the sunset date extensions and transitional provisions entrench a system that restricts chemical use even where safer alternatives exist or where economic costs outweigh risks. A genuinely independent Britain should design its own chemicals regulation through proper parliamentary process, not inherit the EU's precautionary-principle bureaucracy. This regulation should be deleted to clear the path for a purpose-built UK chemical regime that prioritises both safety and competitiveness.

The Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 implement targeted financial sanctions against persons involved in the violent repression in Guinea on 28th September 2009. They grant the Secretary of State power to designate individuals for asset freezes, director disqualification sanctions, and immigration exclusions. The regulations prohibit dealing with funds/economic resources owned by designated persons, making funds or economic resources available to or for their benefit, and contain exceptions for legitimate payments, licensed activities, and national security interests.

While targeted at specific individuals rather than broad trade, this regulation exemplifies the problem of administrative punishment without judicial trial — powers that allow asset freezing and sanctions based on ministerial determination rather than criminal conviction. The 'urgent procedure' permits provisional designations on less than full evidence. Sanctions regimes impose significant compliance costs on financial institutions and can harm ordinary Guinean citizens more than their intended targets. The extraterritorial reach over UK persons worldwide creates uncertainty and burden for legitimate international commerce. A consistent free-market approach recognises that state coercion should require proper legal process, and that holding human rights violators accountable is properly achieved through judicial proceedings, not administrative edict. The compliance overhead and risk of overreach outweigh the benefits of this extra-judicial mechanism.

The B1448 Trunk Road (Topcliffe Road, Thirsk) (Detrunking) Order 2019 removes trunk road status from a section of the B1448 at Topcliffe Road, Thirsk, reclassifying it as a classified road. The Order came into force on 26th July 2019.

This is a deregulatory measure that removes trunk road classification, transferring oversight to local authorities and reducing national government control. Britons are better off with this Order in place as it: (1) reduces central government regulatory burden on this road segment, (2) allows local authorities more flexibility in road management, (3) removes stricter trunk road maintenance and signage requirements, and (4) represents exactly the kind of regulatory reduction that improves local governance. Deleting this would reimpose trunk road status, increasing bureaucratic burden without corresponding benefit.

This Order designates newly constructed sections of the A556 trunk road (northbound and southbound link roads connecting to M6 Junction 19) as trunk roads and transfers highway authority from the Secretary of State for Transport to Highways England, taking effect on 1st August 2019.

This is an administrative designation order establishing clear legal authority for actual physical infrastructure (newly built link roads) that exists and is in use. Without such an order, there would be no defined highway authority responsible for these roads, creating legal ambiguity. It imposes no regulatory burden on citizens or businesses—it simply organizes the management of road infrastructure already constructed. Deletion would leave a governance vacuum for real roads that drivers use, with no party having clear statutory responsibility for their maintenance and operation.

A Confirmation Instrument under the Highways Act 1980 that confirms a scheme for constructing slip roads and special roads at M6 Junction 10, operated by Highways England Company Limited. The Scheme is deposited at specified government offices.

This instrument is merely an administrative confirmation of a specific road scheme rather than a regulatory burden itself. The real regulatory apparatus is the Highways Act 1980 and associated planning regime. However, this instrument represents government-mandated infrastructure provision through a state-owned company at public expense, which distorts private sector participation in infrastructure development. Far from Adam Smith's invisible hand, this exemplifies the type of government intervention that suppresses private alternatives. Infrastructure provision, including motorways, is better served by competitive markets than by state-directed schemes through monopoly providers like Highways England.

These Regulations amend the Universal Credit (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2014 to establish a 'managed migration' framework for moving claimants from legacy benefits (income support, income-based JSA, income-related ESA, housing benefit, tax credits) to Universal Credit. They set out: the migration notice process with deadline days; termination of legacy benefits if no claim is made; transitional protection consisting of a capital disregard (for capital over £16,000 for up to 12 assessment periods) and a transitional element (where legacy amounts exceed indicative UC amounts, with gradual reduction as other elements increase); and miscellaneous protections for students and start-up periods. The regulations come into force in stages between July 2019 and January 2021.

These regulations perpetuate dependency on welfare by creating a complex 'transitional protection' mechanism that subsidizes low earners to remain on legacy benefit levels, penalizing work effort and integration into the labor market. The 12-assessment-period capital disregard and earnings-linked transitional element distort incentive structures by effectively taxing earned income at punitive marginal rates during the transition period. This bureaucratic migration apparatus imposes significant administrative costs on both the state and claimants, with over 100 pages of intricate rules governing a process that could be simplified or eliminated by allowing natural market adjustment or implementing a flat universal payment system. The regulations represent a classic example of intervention designed to smooth one distortion (income drop on migration) while creating multiple additional distortions and moral hazard.

Amendment to Town and Country Planning Fees Regulations 2012, introducing a new £96 fee category for house extension applications exceeding certain limits (zab), adding a fee exception for applications relating to specific operations, and including transitional provisions for applications made before commencement.

While this amendment creates a modest fee exemption for certain applications, the fundamental problem is the planning system itself. Fees act as barriers to construction and development, contributing to Britain's housing crisis. The 2012 Regulations and their amendments perpetuate an overly complex, restrictive planning regime that suppresses housing supply. The real solution is comprehensive planning reform, not incremental fee adjustments. These Regulations, even in their amended form, do not address the core issue: that obtaining planning permission in England is prohibitively complex, time-consuming, and uncertain — with or without this fee structure.

Post-Brexit amendment to vehicle type-approval regulations that temporarily modifies emission test thresholds for certain vehicle categories (M1 and N1 set to 1000, others multiplied by factor of two) during a 6-month transition period, and revokes EU Regulation 2019/26 (which was specifically enacted to manage UK withdrawal from EU type-approval systems) while preserving valid UK type-approvals that would otherwise be invalidated by that regulation's withdrawal provisions.

This regulation performs essential Brexit cleanup functions: (1) temporarily adjusts numerical thresholds to provide administrative flexibility during the transition, (2) revokes EU 2019/26 which was explicitly designed to manage the UK's withdrawal from EU type-approval systems - its purpose is now spent, and retaining it would create confusion, (3) revives valid UK type-approvals that would otherwise be invalidated. Unlike regulations that impose new burdens or gold-plate EU directives, this is purely a technical realignment necessary for the functioning of post-Brexit regulatory frameworks. Deleting it would create gaps in the type-approval system and create legal uncertainty for vehicle manufacturers.

This Order brings into force revised codes of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, specifically Codes C and H which govern the detention, treatment, and questioning of persons by police officers. The revised codes come into operation on 21st August 2019.

These codes protect citizens from potential abuses of state power by police. While regulatory burden is a legitimate concern, these particular provisions serve a critical function in constraining government overreach and protecting individual liberty — a principle central to Friedman's work on limited government. Removing these safeguards would leave citizens less protected against arbitrary detention, coerced confessions, and mistreatment, making Britons demonstrably worse off. Furthermore, unlike economic regulations that distort markets, these procedural codes simply ensure the state operates within defined boundaries.

UK domestic traffic regulation establishing variable speed limits on M20 Motorway between Junctions 3-5. Drivers must comply with variable speed limits displayed on electronic signs (diagram 670). Limits apply when signs show a speed, with exceptions for national speed limit signs (diagram 671), road orders/notices under s.14 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, or traffic officer directions under the Traffic Management Act 2004. Regulation defines speed measurement timing and sign interpretation rules.

This is a domestically-derived traffic management tool, not EU-derived bureaucracy. Variable speed limits on motorways serve legitimate purposes: they reduce stop-and-go traffic (which causes accidents and congestion), improve traffic flow during peak periods, and enhance safety during adverse conditions. Deleting this would remove the legal framework that enables Highways England to implement variable limits, likely increasing congestion and accidents on this stretch. The regulation is narrowly targeted and proportionate, representing a reasonable exercise of the state's role in road management rather than unnecessary intervention.

The Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2019 amends the Export Control Order 2008 to add PL9012, prohibiting the export or electronic transfer of submersible vessels, subsea systems, and related components/software/technology to Russia. It covers submersible vehicles, subsea ploughs, marine acoustic systems, navigation equipment, propulsion systems, umbilicals, tethers, underwater vision/communication systems, sensors, launch/recovery equipment, trenching tools, control systems, manipulators, cable handling equipment, syntactic foam, pressure housings, and azimuth propulsion systems (propeller >2m). The controls include exceptions referenced in Article 18.

This export control restricts British companies' ability to engage in lawful commercial activity with Russia, driving trade to competitors in non-allied nations who face no such restrictions. Export controls represent government intervention that distorts market allocation of goods and services. While national security concerns may be cited, the broad scope of this regulation—covering civilian-grade submersible technology, standard marine equipment, and dual-use components—imposes significant compliance costs on British exporters and may simply redirect Russian procurement to less efficient suppliers rather than achieve meaningful security objectives. The regulations governing exceptions (Article 18) suggest this could be better addressed through targeted licensing rather than blanket prohibition.