Browse regulations

This Order amends the Export Control Order 2008 to update references to the EU Torture Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/125), renumber article cross-references to match the new EU regulation structure, make technical amendments to Schedule 2 military goods definitions and chemical listings, remove Eritrea from the embargoed countries list in Schedule 4, and revoke the Export Control (Eritrea and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2011. The amendments take effect 30th June 2019.

While this regulation controls rather than liberates trade, it primarily maintains existing export controls on goods used for torture and capital punishment, which serve a legitimate function in preventing harm to foreign victims. The amendments are largely technical, updating outdated cross-references, and include a liberalizing element by removing Eritrea from embargo lists. The compliance costs are relatively minimal and the controls target genuine harms rather than restricting competition or market access unnecessarily.

These Regulations amend the National Health Service (Pharmaceutical and Local Pharmaceutical Services) Regulations 2013 to introduce Serious Shortage Protocols (SSPs). SSPs allow NHS pharmacists, appliance contractors, and dispensing doctors to supply alternative drugs or appliances (different products or quantities) when the Secretary of State determines there is a serious shortage. The regulations establish the legal framework for substitution, including endorsement requirements, notification obligations to primary care providers, patient labeling requirements, and conditions under which providers may or must refuse to supply.

This regulation centralizes rationing authority in the Secretary of State, allowing government bureaucrats to override prescriber decisions during shortages rather than letting markets and individual professional judgment determine distribution. While pharmacists retain nominal discretion, the protocol framework institutionalizes top-down substitution that displaces the prescriber's direct judgment. The regulation adds compliance burdens (endorsement, notification, labeling requirements) without addressing root causes of shortages—namely, NHS pricing controls and procurement arrangements that distort supply signals. A free market would allow price adjustments, parallel imports, and direct prescriber-pharmacist communication to resolve shortages more efficiently than bureaucratic protocols.

These Regulations establish the fee framework for Ofsted inspections of independent schools in England. They set out: (1) overall inspection fees based on pupil numbers, payable in three installments over three years; (2) a £2,500 registration application fee; (3) fees for progress monitoring inspections. The Regulations revoke the 2018 equivalent Regulations while preserving savings provisions for inspections conducted between April 2018 and July 2019.

Mandatory inspection fee regimes of this kind act as a regressive tax on educational providers, disproportionately burdening smaller and startup institutions and creating barriers to entry for new operators. The £2,500 registration fee plus per-inspection charges deter prospective proprietors from establishing independent schools, reducing supply of educational options for parents. The complex three-fee installment structure and progress monitoring inspection fees create ongoing regulatory uncertainty and cost exposure that distorts investment decisions. While inspection information serves a legitimate market function, mandating it through compulsory state-directed inspection with迫使性 fees is not the only way to achieve quality assurance — voluntary certification, parent-led evaluation platforms, and competitive inspection bodies could provide necessary information at lower cost and with less coercive effect. These Regulations should be deleted to allow a more competitive market for educational quality assurance to emerge.

This Amendment Order modifies the East Anglia THREE Offshore Wind Farm Order 2017, increasing the project's authorized capacity from 1,200 MW to 1,400 MW, raising the maximum number of wind turbines from the prior limit to 172, and inserting a new cap of 100 gravity base foundations. The changes take effect 7th June 2019.

This regulation imposes arbitrary caps on wind farm capacity (1,400 MW), turbine numbers (172), and foundation types (100 gravity bases) that have no apparent technical or economic justification. Such command-and-control restrictions distort market signals, raise development costs by preventing optimal scaling, and suppress private investment. While the government claims to support renewable energy, this and similar arbitrary limits on offshore development contradict that goal by restricting supply and increasing costs to consumers. The planning permission regime's NIMBYism extends even to offshore infrastructure, where arbitrary numeric caps prevent developers from responding efficiently to market demand and technological improvements.

The Smart Export Guarantee Order 2019 establishes a framework requiring certain electricity licensees (SEG licensees) to pay small-scale generators for electricity exported to the grid. It sets verification criteria for anaerobic digestion installations seeking SEG payments, establishes quarterly and annual verification requirements by the Authority (Ofgem), mandates reporting on export tariffs and generation volumes, and caps eligible installations at 5MW total installed capacity.

This regulation distorts the electricity market by mandating that licensed utilities must purchase exported electricity at regulated prices, creating cross-subsidies from general consumers to small generators. The extensive verification, reporting, and compliance requirements impose administrative burdens that raise costs and create barriers to entry. Hayek would recognise this as price-fixing that prevents the discovery of market-clearing rates for exported power. If renewable energy warrants support, it should come through transparent fiscal mechanisms rather than regulatory mandates embedded in licence conditions that distort investment signals and entrench particular technologies over alternatives.

This Order designates the parish of Abbotskerswell (Teignbridge district) as a rural area for Right to Buy purposes under section 157 of the Housing Act 1985, and designates Devon County as the relevant region for discount and valuation calculations for qualifying dwellings in that parish.

This instrument perpetuates the Right to Buy subsidy regime, which distorts housing markets by providing select tenants with discounts averaging £40,000-£80,000 below market value, funded by general taxpayers. The rural designation creates additional pricing distortions by capping discounts differently than in urban areas. Such micro-designations add regulatory complexity without addressing the fundamental problem: government-mandated below-market transfers reduce social housing supply and create inequitable outcomes where similar tenants receive vastly different subsidies based on arbitrary geographic designations.

These Regulations specify conditions for tax-exempt accommodation allowances payable to armed forces personnel under section 297D(2)(c) ITEPA 2003. They define qualifying allowances as payments from the Ministry of Defence under Joint Service Publication 464, compensating for rent, mortgage repayments, council tax (above national average), and tenancy agreement costs.

While this regulation creates preferential tax treatment for armed forces, deletion would reduce military compensation, harming recruitment and retention in essential national defence. The tax exemption is targeted and addresses a genuine need to compensate service personnel fairly. Alternative approaches (direct salary increases) would be more distortionary and subject to income tax themselves. Removing this would make Britons worse off through weakened armed forces readiness.

Amends the Social Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001 to add paragraph 12D to Part 8 of Schedule 3, which disregards HM Forces' Accommodation Allowance (payments exempt from income tax under section 297D of ITEPA 2003) when calculating earnings for National Insurance contribution purposes. Comes into force 2nd July 2019.

This regulation merely aligns National Insurance contribution treatment with existing income tax treatment for a specific armed forces payment. The accommodation allowance is already income tax-exempt under ITEPA 2003; this prevents the anomaly of a tax-exempt payment still being subject to NICs. Deleting it would create inconsistency between tax systems and potentially reduce take-home pay for armed forces personnel for no policy reason. This is a technical harmonisation provision, not a new regulatory burden.

Amends Personal Independence Payment (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2013 by inserting regulation 27A, which exempts certain persons of pensionable age from section 83(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. This allows disabled individuals who previously qualified under regulation 27 (certain circumstances) to continue receiving PIP when their award is revised or superseded under the 1998 Act, preserving continuity of payment for this population.

Deleting this regulation would harm disabled Britons by removing a targeted protection ensuring PIP continuity for pension-age claimants who met prior eligibility conditions. No market distortion exists—this is a means-tested welfare provision for a vulnerable population with no competitive or trade implications. The regulation corrects an anomaly in the welfare system where reaching pensionable age would otherwise terminate legitimate entitlement, without restricting supply, creating monopolies, or imposing compliance burdens on businesses.

These Regulations revoke EU Euratom legislation relating to nuclear research and fusion energy: the Euratom Research and Training Programme (2019-2020), and three Council Decisions establishing and amending the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and Fusion Energy. They take effect on Brexit exit day as part of the UK's departure from EU atomic energy frameworks.

As an EU Exit revocation instrument, this regulation merely transplants existing EU law onto the UK statute book without replacing it with a purpose-built domestic framework. It severs UK participation in world-leading fusion energy research (ITER) and Horizon 2020 research programmes without any demonstrated plan for equivalent domestic provision, sacrificing scientific collaboration and R&D access that private actors voluntarily value. The regulation also fails to address the underlying issue that EU-derived laws were never properly scrutinised by Parliament — this instrument merely removes one layer without establishing democratic oversight of what replaces it.

This Order, which came into force on 8 July 2019, revokes the Value Added Tax (Finance) (EU Exit) Order 2019. It is a deregulatory instrument that removes VAT-related requirements on financial services that had been imposed earlier in 2019 in preparation for Brexit.

Deleting this revocation would reinstate the earlier 2019 Order's compliance burdens on the finance sector, including additional VAT reporting, record-keeping, and administrative obligations. These costs would ultimately be passed to consumers through higher fees and reduced service availability. Since this revocation removes regulatory burden rather than adding it, Britons would be worse off if it were deleted and the original burdensome VAT requirements were restored.

This Order specifies that the reverse charge VAT mechanism under Section 55A of the VAT Act 1994 applies to gas and electricity certificates. It defines 'gas' as gas supplied through the natural gas distribution system and 'gas or electricity certificates' as electronic documents containing information on energy source and production method. The reverse charge requires customers to account for VAT on these supplies rather than suppliers, a measure designed to combat missing trader VAT fraud.

This regulation directly addresses missing trader fraud, a form of VAT evasion that costs the exchequer hundreds of millions annually while creating unfair competition for legitimate businesses. The reverse charge mechanism shifts accountability to the customer, closing the loophole where fraudulent traders collect VAT but disappear without remitting it. Without this, Britons would face higher prices from fraudsters undercutting lawful suppliers, reduced tax revenues requiring offset from other sources, and increased burden on compliant businesses competing against fraudulent operators. The specified scope (gas and electricity certificates) is narrowly targeted at sectors particularly vulnerable to this fraud pattern.

This Order amends the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust governance structure by substituting article 4(1) of the 2006 Establishment Order to specify that the trust must have 5 executive directors and 7 non-executive directors (in addition to the chairman). It comes into force on 24th June 2019.

Removing this would create a governance vacuum for a specific NHS Trust, leaving its board composition undefined. While board size mandates may seem arbitrary, NHS trust accountability requires defined governance structures to ensure proper oversight of public healthcare expenditure and patient safety. The alternative—allowing individual trusts unrestricted autonomy over their own governance—could lead to capture, reduced accountability, and inconsistent standards across the NHS without corresponding benefits.

These Regulations establish procedural requirements for applying to the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (Ofgem) for electricity licences under the Electricity Act 1989, including generation, distribution, supply, transmission, and interconnector licences. They set out application formalities, required documentation, fees, notice periods (10 working days), and publication requirements. The 2010 Regulations are revoked and these regulations supersede them with transitional provisions for pending applications.

This regulation exemplifies the bureaucratic burden that suppresses market entry and competition. Detailed prescriptive requirements for licence applications—specific forms, documentation mandates, fee structures, and procedural steps—create unnecessary barriers to entry that protect incumbent electricity providers. The 10-day prescribed notice period and publication requirements add compliance costs without commensurate benefit, as equivalent outcomes could be achieved through general administrative law or Ofgem's existing supervisory powers. Such procedural licensing regimes characteristically favor established players who understand the process, reducing dynamism and innovation in the sector. Critical infrastructure considerations can be addressed through targeted safety and security requirements rather than comprehensive licensing procedures that function primarily as a gatekeeping mechanism.

These Regulations establish the procedural framework for applications to Ofgem for gas licences (supplier, shipper, transporter, interconnector) and for extensions or restrictions of such licences. They set out requirements for application form, documentation, fees, publication of applications, and transitional provisions replacing the 2010 Regulations.

While primarily procedural, these regulations provide essential administrative structure that prevents arbitrary regulatory discretion. Deletion would create uncertainty in the licensing process, potentially increasing barriers to entry by giving Ofgem undefined procedural power. The regulations ensure consistent, transparent handling of licence applications essential for market confidence and the functioning of the gas sector.