Browse regulations

This statutory instrument amends Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 on verification of data and accreditation of verifiers under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, adapting it for post-Brexit UK operation. It replaces EU Directive references with UK regulations (primarily the 2012 Regulations), substitutes EU institutional references (Member States, national accreditation bodies) with UK authorities, updates harmonised standards to specific ISO standards (EN ISO 14065:2013, EN ISO/IEC 17011:2017), and removes EU-specific mechanisms such as free allocation data reporting and baseline/new entrant data reports.

While the underlying EU ETS represents government intervention in the market, this amendment is a necessary technical instrument that simply ports existing requirements into UK law post-Brexit. Deleting it would create regulatory chaos, as it is the operative mechanism that allows the UK's own Emissions Trading Scheme to function. The verification and accreditation framework ensures emissions data integrity. The opportunity for fundamental reform lies in restructuring the ETS itself (e.g., moving to a carbon tax), not in deleting a technical amendment that merely preserves existing operational structures.

This Order appoints 1st June 2019 as the day on which sections 101 and 102 of the Finance Act 2009 come into force, introducing penalties for failure to comply with the disclosure of tax avoidance schemes regime under section 98C of the Taxes Management Act 1970 and regulation 22 of the National Insurance Contributions Regulations 2012. It also amends section 103A to exclude section 98C penalties from interest charges.

While disclosure of tax avoidance schemes regimes impose compliance burdens, this Order merely brings into force penalties that Parliament has already enacted. Deleting it would create regulatory uncertainty and undermine an existing framework without addressing the underlying policy. The penalties serve a legitimate enforcement function for a disclosure regime that, whatever one's view of its desirability, currently exists in law. Removing penalties would create an incoherent regulatory situation.

Brexit implementation SI that amends the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, modifies EU Regulation 611/2013 (data breach notification), EU Regulation 2015/2120 (open internet access and intra-EU roaming charges), and revokes EU Regulation 2018/1971 (BEREC), along with numerous Commission Decisions relating to .eu domains, leased lines, roaming, and audiovisual media services. Primarily replaces references to 'competent national authority' with 'Information Commissioner' and removes UK from EU regulatory frameworks and bodies.

This is essential Brexit implementation legislation. Without these amendments, legal chaos would result: statutes would reference defunct EU bodies, the Information Commissioner would lack clear statutory authority as the competent authority, and the UK would remain bound by EU regulatory frameworks without participation rights. The alternative is not a freeer Britain but a legally incoherent one where electronic communications regulation becomes inoperable. While many underlying EU regulations warrant separate review on their merits, deleting this SI would create immediate harm by destroying the legal architecture needed for any post-Brexit communications regulation.

The Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 2019 prescribes specific types of devices for recording traffic violations under section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. It specifies devices designed or adapted for photographic/image recording of vehicular traffic in two cases: (1) contravention of light signals not to enter or proceed in a traffic lane, and (2) driving on the hard shoulder of a motorway. Such recorded evidence is thereby made admissible in court for speeding and related offences.

This regulation unnecessarily restricts which technologies may be used to capture evidentiary images for traffic enforcement. By prescribing only specific device categories, it stifles innovation in traffic monitoring technology and creates barriers to adoption of superior detection methods (such as AI-assisted systems or new sensor types) until formal amendment. The market and case-law precedent can establish evidentiary standards for new technologies more flexibly than primary legislation. Additionally, once such devices are deployed, this regulation serves merely as an administrative gatekeeping function for admissibility rather than conferring any substantive benefit — courts already possess inherent discretion to assess the reliability of evidence. The restriction imposes compliance costs on technology providers and law enforcement alike while yielding no corresponding public safety dividend that could not be achieved through less prescriptive means.

This Order appoints 1st June 2019 as the day on which sections 101 and 102 of the Finance Act 2009 (penalty provisions) come into force for three disclosure regime purposes: Schedule 17 to the Finance (No. 2) Act 2017 (VAT and indirect tax avoidance scheme disclosure), Schedule 35 to the Finance Act 2014 (promoters of tax avoidance schemes), and Schedule 16 to the Finance (No. 2) Act 2017 (enablers of defeated tax avoidance).

This Appointed Day Order activates penalty enforcement for disclosure regimes that impose significant compliance costs on businesses and professionals without commensurate benefit. The underlying disclosure requirements for tax avoidance schemes create bureaucratic burdens, chill legitimate tax planning, and grant HMRC powers to penalise activities that are otherwise lawful. Penalty provisions with no natural sunset clause and no evidence of effectiveness in reducing avoidance should not be perpetuated through activation orders.

These Regulations mandate Relationships Education in primary schools and Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) and Health Education in secondary schools in England, coming into force on 1st September 2020. The Regulations set out curriculum requirements that schools must follow.

This regulation represents state overreach into parental rights and educational autonomy, mandating a one-size-fits-all curriculum for sensitive topics that families should decide. It removes flexibility from schools to tailor education to their communities. The unseen costs include suppressing educational innovation, removing school autonomy, and establishing government control over intimate aspects of child upbringing. As Friedman noted, too often we look at what government does and ignore what it prevents people from doing for themselves.

These Rules amend various Tribunal Procedure Rules to: (1) add procedures for trade remedies cases under the new Trade Remedies Authority established post-Brexit; (2) add certification procedures for FOI/Data Protection contempt cases; (3) modify road transport case appeals; (4) add tenant fees cases to Property Chamber jurisdiction; and (5) make minor amendments to Lands Chamber rules. The Rules include transitional provisions for periods before the TRA is operational.

These are procedural tribunal rules governing how cases are brought and decided. They do not restrict trade, impose economic burdens, or create barriers to market entry. The trade remedies provisions simply establish appellate procedures for the new Trade Remedies Authority—a post-Brexit institution that allows the UK to conduct its own trade defence investigations rather than relying on the EU's system. Removing these rules would create procedural chaos, not freedom. Britons would be worse off without clear rules for resolving disputes in trade, transport, information rights, and property matters.

The Proxy Advisors (Shareholders' Rights) Regulations 2019 implement the EU Shareholder Rights Directive for UK-regulated proxy advisors. They require proxy advisors to disclose code of conduct adherence, methodology details, information sources, voting policies, dialogue practices with companies, and conflict of interest policies. The FCA is empowered to investigate, issue warnings, impose penalties, and pursue enforcement actions against non-compliant proxy advisors. The regulations apply to proxy advisors providing services to shareholders of companies with UK/Gibraltar registered offices whose shares trade on UK or Gibraltar regulated markets.

This regulation imposes substantial compliance costs on proxy advisors through mandatory disclosures about methodologies, information sources, voting policies, and conflict management—costs ultimately borne by shareholders and institutional investors who hire these services. The mandated transparency requirements risk homogenizing proxy advice, as firms may avoid innovative approaches to sidestep disclosure complications. Smaller proxy advisors face disproportionate regulatory burdens relative to incumbents, creating barriers to entry that protect established players rather than serving client interests. These are private contractual relationships between sophisticated institutional investors and their advisory providers; the market naturally provides incentives for credibility and disclosure that government compulsion duplicates at higher cost. The FCA enforcement apparatus adds further regulatory overhead without clear evidence of market failure in this sector.

This Order increases the maximum borrowing limit for the Meteorological Office Trading Fund from £200,000,000 to £300,000,000, effective 5th June 2019. It is made under the Government Trading Funds Act 1973 and amends the Meteorological Office Trading Fund Order 1996.

As a trading fund operating on commercial principles, the Met Office's borrowing limit must be periodically adjusted to reflect operational needs and inflation. Deleting this would reimpose an artificially constrained borrowing limit (£200M, set in 1996) that would hinder the Met Office's ability to manage its commercial operations efficiently. This is not a regulatory burden on the private sector—it is a technical adjustment to a self-financing government trading fund. The Met Office provides essential services (weather forecasting for aviation, shipping, agriculture) where operational continuity matters.

This Order grants individual exemptions from the Electricity Act 1989's prohibition on unlicensed electricity generation to two specific wind farms (Blackcraig Wind Farm and Clocaenog Forest Wind Farm), subject to conditions including a 100 MW export limit and connection to the total system. The exemptions prevent these operators from being classified as licensed generators.

This Order perpetuates a problematic licensing regime rather than abolishing it. The underlying prohibition on unlicensed generation is itself a barrier to entry that raises costs and restricts competition in electricity generation. The arbitrary 100 MW threshold creates market distortions based on arbitrary size cutoffs rather than actual risk or market principles. More problematically, the condition requiring these companies NOT to be licensed generators actually restricts their flexibility and options compared to other market participants, effectively penalising them for using this exemption. Rather than granting company-specific exemptions that create a two-tier system of favoured and unfavoured generators, the correct policy approach is to remove the underlying licensing requirement for generation entirely, as Adam Smith would support free entry into all lawful trades and professions. This Order is a band-aid on a fundamentally flawed regulatory structure.

This Order amends section 105(3) of the Utilities Act 2000 by inserting paragraph (azb), which creates an additional exception to the general restrictions on disclosure of information. It permits Ofgem (the Authority) to disclose information when necessary to perform its functions under the Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act 2018 — essentially enabling information sharing to enforce the energy tariff price cap.

The underlying Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act 2018 represents classic price control interventionism that distorts market signals, reduces incentives for suppliers to compete on price, and creates regulatory capture opportunities. This Order merely facilitates its enforcement by permitting information disclosure. Critically, the Tariff Cap Act would remain fully operational without this amendment — Ofgem could still perform its functions through alternative legal pathways or simply request explicit powers in primary legislation. Deleting this Order would not weaken consumer protection but would modestly restrain the expansion of the tariff cap regime's bureaucratic reach. Most importantly, retaining this Order normalizes information-sharing infrastructure for price-fixing activities, creating a precedent for further interventionist expansion.

A narrow statutory instrument permitting members and employees of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) to disclose information obtained in the exercise of their functions to members of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel. It authorizes disclosure both directly and through managerial authorization.

This Order PERMITS information flow that would otherwise potentially be prohibited by the CCRC's confidentiality obligations. Without this exception, the independent panel investigating the Daniel Morgan murder could be denied access to relevant information held by the CCRC, impeding a serious investigation into a historical miscarriage of justice. Deletion would restrict transparency and potentially shield information relevant to public accountability.

These Regulations revoke EU Regulation 1287/2013 which established the COSME programme (2014-2020) for competitiveness of enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises. They come into force on the later of exit day or 22 days after laying, implementing the revocation of this EU programme from UK statute books post-Brexit.

This SI correctly removes a defunct EU programme framework from UK law. The COSME programme was an EU funding and support mechanism the UK no longer participates in post-Brexit. Keeping this revocation prevents confusion and maintains clean statute books. Any UK SME support should be designed independently rather than through inherited EU frameworks.

This Order amends the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Commencement No. 31) Order 2019 to modify definitions of 'couple' for benefit purposes, particularly regarding mixed-age couples (where one partner has reached state pension credit qualifying age but the other has not). It provides transitional rules allowing members of mixed-age couples excluded from universal credit to instead claim income support, jobseeker's allowance, or employment and support allowance, with modified eligibility conditions. The Order also applies Universal Credit Regulations 2013 rules on treatment of couples and polygamous marriages to housing benefit and state pension credit assessments.

This regulation perpetuates a complex patchwork of means-tested welfare provisions that distort individual decisions around work, retirement timing, and family formation. By creating special transitional rules for mixed-age couples excluded from universal credit, it preserves regulatory complexity and administrative burden rather than simplifying the welfare system. The different treatment of couples based on age creates perverse incentives - a person below the state pension age threshold may face pressure to delay work or adjust household arrangements to maximize benefits. Furthermore, these transitional provisions delay the inevitable simplification that universal credit was meant to deliver, keeping alive legacy systems (income support, JSA, ESA) that should be phased out. Deletion would accelerate the move toward a unified, simpler welfare system, reducing compliance costs for claimants and administrators alike.

The Communications Data Acquisition Regulations 2019 amend the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to expand collaboration arrangements between police forces and local authorities for communications data acquisition. They permit cross-authorization of surveillance requests, allow designated senior officers to grant authorizations to officers of collaborating forces, and enable single points of contact arrangements. The regulations create additional authorized persons beyond those in the original Act and modify how sections 61 and 61A apply in collaboration scenarios.

These regulations expand surveillance powers through secondary legislation without full Parliamentary scrutiny. They create additional authorized persons and cross-authorization pathways that circumvent the oversight mechanisms Parliament established in the IPA 2016. The expansion of local authorities as relevant public authorities with acquisition powers, and the facilitation of inter-agency data sharing, increases the surveillance state's reach while potentially diluting accountability. Revoking Schedule 1 provisions from the 2018 Regulations further removes safeguards.