Browse regulations

Post-Brexit amendment regulation that modifies two retained EU electricity regulations (ITC Regulation and Electricity Balancing Regulation) and revokes two EU regulations (CACM and FCA guidelines) relating to electricity market trading, capacity allocation, and congestion management. Does not apply to Northern Ireland.

These are retained EU laws establishing highly prescriptive electricity market rules that were never subject to meaningful democratic scrutiny by Parliament — inherited wholesale from the EU acquis. While this regulation makes minor amendments for exit purposes, the underlying frameworks impose significant compliance burdens on energy companies and restrict the UK's ability to design a more competitive, market-driven electricity trading regime. Post-Brexit Britain should have the opportunity to develop its own lighter-touch approach to electricity markets, unconstrained by rules designed to harmonise with the EU internal energy market. The revocation of CACM and FCA guidelines is welcome, but the amended ITC and Electricity Balancing Regulations should also be reviewed and replaced with UK-specific rules that prioritises market efficiency over bureaucratic process.

EU Exit amendment regulations that modify two retained EU electricity network regulations (Commission Regulation 2017/1485 on transmission system operation and Commission Regulation 2017/2196 on emergency and restoration) to function within the UK legal framework post-Brexit. Does not extend to Northern Ireland.

While these regulations originated from EU law, they govern critical electricity grid infrastructure where coordination failures cause severe economic harm. Deletion would create legal ambiguity regarding grid operational standards at a time when the UK electricity system requires clear, functioning coordination rules. The amendments merely adapt retained EU law for post-Brexit operation rather than introducing new regulatory burden. However, the substantive underlying regulations (particularly capacity allocation and congestion management rules) should be prioritized for future review as part of the broader regulatory reform agenda.

Post-Brexit statutory instrument that amends the Electricity and Gas (Market Integrity and Transparency) regulations to ensure legal continuity after EU exit. Updates definitions of 'REMIT' to distinguish between pre and post IP completion day applicability across England/Wales/Scotland and Northern Ireland jurisdictions, incorporates EU Regulation 1227/2011 into UK law, and makes minor amendments to remove '(other than the United Kingdom)' references from deemed service provisions.

This regulation is a technical Brexit continuity measure that preserves existing market integrity frameworks rather than creating new burdens. Deleting it would create a legal vacuum in wholesale energy market oversight, potentially enabling market manipulation and reducing transparency to the detriment of British energy consumers and market participants. While the underlying EU REMIT framework has costs, simply deleting this implementation regulation without any replacement would leave no enforcement mechanism for market abuse - harming rather than helping Britons. The minor amendments removing '(other than the United Kingdom)' provisions represent genuine improvements that correct gold-plating from the original EU text.

These Regulations amend employment rights legislation as part of Brexit preparations, ensuring EU-derived employment protections continue to function after EU exit. They modify the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999 and other employment rights legislation extending to England, Wales, and Scotland. The regulations came into force on exit day (31 January 2020) with certain provisions taking effect the day after making.

This regulation merely transposes EU-derived employment laws onto the UK statute books without Parliamentary scrutiny or democratic review. Post-Brexit, Parliament should actively decide which employment protections serve Britain's interests rather than inheriting them wholesale from EU directives. The EU's employment directives were frequently gold-plated, adding compliance costs that harm competitiveness without proportional benefit to workers. Furthermore, as a Brexit implementation measure now that exit has occurred, its transitional purpose is spent, and the underlying substantive employment laws it preserves should be subject to comprehensive review rather than preserved by default.

Employment Rights (Amendment) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019 - Brexit secondary legislation that amends employment rights legislation extending to England, Wales, and Scotland. The regulations establish the legislative framework for modifying employment rights derived from EU law following the UK's exit, with a Schedule containing the substantive amendments and saving provisions.

This SI is a Brexit-derived consequential amendment instrument that serves no ongoing purpose now that the transition period has ended. It represents the type of 'retained EU law' inherited without democratic scrutiny that the Better Britain mandate seeks to address. Employment rights in the UK can be better governed through primary legislation and domestic rule-making rather than through post-Brexit amendments to EU-derived legislation. The regulation's only function is to modify existing law—it does not itself create any substantive rights or protections that would be lost if deleted.

EU Exit statutory instrument extending to Northern Ireland only, which amends employment rights legislation to ensure operability following UK withdrawal from the EU. Comes into force on 'exit day' with certain provisions commencing the day after making. The Schedule contains substantive amendments to employment rights law.

These regulations were designed as transitional provisions for the Brexit moment (exit day), not as standing law. EU Exit SIs were rushed through Parliament with minimal scrutiny, inheriting EU-derived employment protections without democratic review. The specific amendments in the Schedule (which contain the actual regulatory changes) cannot be assessed without full text. However, as a class, EU Exit regulations that were time-specific to the withdrawal moment are now largely spent instruments. Deleting them would remove retained EU law that has never been properly assessed on its merits by Parliament, while the underlying employment rights can be preserved through primary legislation if genuinely justified.

Post-Brexit statutory instrument extending to Northern Ireland only, which amends employment rights legislation to address the effects of EU exit and contains a saving provision to preserve certain rights.

These Regulations are a transitional mechanism designed to preserve EU-derived employment rights wholesale after Brexit, rather than a genuine exercise of regulatory independence. The 'saving provision' indicates retention of the status quo without scrutiny. Post-Brexit independence provides the opportunity to reassess whether all EU-derived employment protections remain appropriate for Britain's labour market — many impose compliance costs that reduce hiring, particularly affecting small businesses and young workers. A blanket preservation approach foregoes the chance to rationalise employment law to the benefit of both workers and employers. This regulation should be deleted and its provisions reviewed individually to determine which merit retention on their own merits rather than inherited automatically from the EU acquis.

EU Exit regulations that amend the Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products Regulations 2010, Energy Information Regulations 2011, and related EU Commission regulations on ecodesign and energy labeling. Inserts references to EU Commission Delegated Regulations (874/2012, 65/2014) into UK law. Extends to England, Wales, Scotland (and partially Northern Ireland). Comes into force on IP completion day (Brexit).

Retained EU law imposing mandatory ecodesign product standards and energy labeling requirements that add compliance costs, restrict consumer choice through minimum efficiency thresholds, and perpetuate EU-derived bureaucratic burden without democratic review. Energy efficiency can be achieved through market mechanisms, private certification schemes (e.g., Energy Star), and consumer preference rather than mandatory government regulation. These product standards exemplify the EU's eco-bureaucracy that post-Brexit Britain should shed to restore its free-trading competitiveness.

This Order specifies 11 UK government bond securities (Treasury Gilts) as 'gilt-edged securities' for the purposes of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. It defines which securities qualify for special capital gains tax treatment under that Act.

This Order merely lists securities to which an existing tax distinction already applies. The underlying preferential capital gains treatment for government bonds over other investments is itself a market distortion that subsidizes government borrowing at the expense of private capital formation. While Parliament may wish to define certain securities administratively, the retention of this Order preserves a tax privilege that: (1) distorts investment decisions by favoring government debt over private sector investment, (2) represents a hidden subsidy to government borrowing costs, and (3) creates artificial distinctions in how different securities are taxed without clear market rationale. The underlying policy goal of this Order cannot justify retaining a regulation that props up an economically distortive tax preference.

This UK statutory instrument amends the EU Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (2015/2365) to adapt it for post-Brexit use by replacing 'Union' with 'United Kingdom', substituting 'ESMA' with 'FCA', and transferring supervisory responsibilities from EU bodies (ESMA, EBA, EIOPA) to UK bodies (FCA, Bank of England, PRA). It establishes UK-specific trade repository registration procedures, creates new definitions for UK-specific terms, and provides a framework for reporting SFTs directly to FCA when trade repositories are unavailable. The instrument is part of the Brexit statutory instruments suite designed to make retained EU law functional in the UK.

This regulation does not impose new regulatory burden but rather converts existing EU regulatory infrastructure into a functional UK framework. Deleting it would leave the underlying SFT reporting requirements in force as broken, unworkable retained EU law — with EU bodies like ESMA referenced but unable to exercise jurisdiction, and UK authorities lacking clear legal authority. The underlying transparency requirements for securities financing transactions serve legitimate market integrity purposes and cannot be easily replicated by contract. While imperfect, this instrument simply maintains regulatory continuity during the transition to UK autonomy, and removing it would create operational chaos in UK securities markets without reducing actual regulatory substance.

These Regulations establish the fee regime for the Office for Students (OfS) to register and maintain registration of higher education providers in England. They set initial registration fees (based on a formula using ongoing fees and months until July) and ongoing annual fees (tiered by full-time equivalent student numbers from under 500 to over 25,000). Small providers (≤300 FTE) that are micro-entities are exempt, and new providers (≤1,000 FTE) receive phased-in fee relief over several years. The OfS may waive/refund fees, charge interest on late payment (Bank of England rate + 5%), and recover unpaid fees as civil debts.

Registration fees create barriers to entry that suppress competition in higher education, favoring established providers over new entrants. The complex tiered structure with exemptions for micro-entities and new providers still imposes administrative compliance costs that disproportionately burden smaller institutions. The fee regime functions as a regulatory moat that protects incumbent providers from competition, similar to how occupational licensing protects established practitioners — reducing innovation, limiting student choice, and entrenching existing institutions. The OfS's ability to charge interest and recover debts as civil debts further compounds this burden on new providers.

The Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Amendment and Power to Modify) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 amend three existing Carbon Dioxide storage regulations to ensure functionality after Brexit. Key changes include: replacing EU references with UK-specific definitions (climate change legislation, emissions, greenhouse gas, Monitoring Regulation); removing obligations to provide information to the European Commission; modifying cross-boundary cooperation provisions from 'member States' to 'United Kingdom or another state party to an agreement'; and granting the Secretary of State power to modify Annex requirements by secondary legislation. The regulations maintain the existing EU-derived licensing and permitting framework for CO2 storage with minimal structural change.

This regulation exemplifies the worst of Brexit continuity - it preserves an entire EU-derived regulatory apparatus for carbon dioxide storage with no democratic review or cost-benefit analysis. The licensing regime imposes substantial compliance costs on a nascent technology that requires competitive development, not bureaucratic licensing. The broad definition of 'climate change legislation' creates regulatory uncertainty by capturing any future carbon tax. The Secretary of State's power to modify Annex requirements via secondary legislation circumvents Parliamentary scrutiny. Rather than using post-Brexit independence to reduce regulatory burden and attract investment to UK carbon storage, these regulations perpetuate EU-style control structures. The complete absence of any impact assessment or justification for maintaining this elaborate permit regime suggests it exists solely from regulatory inertia, not demonstrated need.

The Pensions Increase (Review) Order 2019, made under the Social Security Pensions Act 1975, provides for annual increases of 2.4% to official pensions (including derivative, substituted, and relevant injury pensions) that began before 8 April 2019. The Order establishes formulaic calculations for proportionate increases based on months of entitlement, includes provisions for lump sum increases, and contains complex guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) reduction requirements.

This Order exemplifies the problem of inherited regulatory complexity — a 1975 Act framework that has spawned decades of technical amendments creating administrative burden for pension authorities without clear benefit. The 2.4% mechanical increase rate is arbitrary and reflects political timing rather than actuarial reality. The GMP reduction provisions (sections 59(5ZA) and 59A) layering additional complexity for what amounts to modest adjustments represent precisely the kind of bureaucratic process that would scandalise Adam Smith. Permitting authorities to 'may' increase rather than mandating creates uncertainty while still requiring compliance overhead. The fundamental issue: this is government dictating compensation terms for services already rendered, distorting the labour market by making pension promises artificially expensive and less flexible.

The Aviation Security (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 is a Brexit statutory instrument that amends the Aviation Security Act 1982 and four EU regulations (300/2008, 272/2009, 1254/2009, and 2015/1998) to reflect the UK's withdrawal from the EU. It replaces references to 'common standards,' 'Member States,' and EU institutions with UK authorities ('the appropriate authority,' 'the Secretary of State'), removes EU Commission oversight, and adds parliamentary procedure requirements for new regulations. The regulation maintains nearly identical security standards while merely transferring regulatory authority from EU to UK bodies.

This regulation represents bureaucratic relocation rather than genuine deregulation. It preserves the EU's prescriptive approach to aviation security while merely relabeling 'Member States' as 'appropriate authority' and 'Union' as 'United Kingdom.' The promised benefits of post-Brexit regulatory independence are illusory here—the substance of the rules remains unchanged. Aviation security can be better achieved through performance-based regulation focused on outcomes (threat mitigation) rather than prescriptive process requirements. The regulation imposes compliance costs on airlines and airports without demonstrating that its specific measures improve security outcomes beyond alternative approaches. Genuine free-market reform would replace box-ticking requirements with principles-based standards that allow operators to achieve security objectives through innovation and efficiency.

Post-Brexit amendment regulations that transpose EU vehicle CO2 emission standards (Regulation EC 443/2009 and EU 510/2011) from EU Commission/Member State oversight to UK Secretary of State authority. The regulations replace EU institutional references with UK ones, redirect reporting obligations from Brussels to London, and maintain the existing EU framework for monitoring, reporting, and certifying vehicle CO2 performance standards and innovative technologies for both cars and light commercial vehicles.

These regulations perpetuate the EU's command-and-control approach to vehicle CO2 emissions, imposing mandatory fleet average targets (95g/km for cars) that restrict consumer choice and increase vehicle costs. Rather than seizing post-Brexit regulatory independence to liberalise this area, the regulations merely substitute 'Secretary of State' for 'Commission' while preserving the entire bureaucratic apparatus of emission mandates, innovative technology certification queues, and reporting requirements. The monitoring and reporting obligations themselves impose unseen compliance costs on manufacturers that are ultimately passed to consumers. Britons would benefit more from a competitive regulatory environment where emission standards are set by market forces rather than government mandates, and where the UK automotive sector can compete globally without EU-style restrictions.