Browse regulations

This Order amends the Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme 1983 by updating rates of pensions and allowances for disabled civilians and survivors. It substitutes new tables in Schedule 3 (disablement rates including constant attendance allowance, unemployability allowances, mobility supplements) and Schedule 4 (death-related pensions including surviving spouse/civil partner pensions, child allowances, parent pensions). The rates generally increase from previous levels, with maximum amounts ranging from £0.25 per week for certain parent pensions to £189.80 per week for 100% disablement.

Without this scheme, civilians who suffered life-altering personal injuries (often from wartime service or industrial accidents) and their families would have no statutory fallback for compensation. Private insurance markets are poorly suited to covering rare but catastrophic injuries at scale. While rate-setting by bureaucrats is imperfect, the alternative—leaving catastrophically injured people without guaranteed support—would cause greater harm. The scheme's retention is justified by the practical impossibility of private market provision for these specific, severe contingencies.

These Regulations implement EU Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure in the UK. They establish mandatory fuel-type labelling requirements for alternative fuel refuelling points (requiring infrastructure operators to affix fuel identifiers on nozzles and dispensers), for motor vehicles (requiring manufacturers to affix identifiers near fuel filler caps and include fuel information in user manuals), and for motor vehicle dealers (requiring them to make fuel identifier information available to prospective buyers). The Regulations create an enforcement regime including information notices, compliance notices, civil penalties (up to £500 per dispenser/nozzle breach for operators, £100 per vehicle for manufacturers/dealers), powers of entry to premises, and a review mechanism.

Without mandatory fuel labelling requirements, consumers face significant risk of misfuelling alternative fuel vehicles, potentially causing severe engine damage. While a free market might eventually develop voluntary standards, the coordination problem is genuine: fuel identifier standardisation requires industry-wide consistency that no single firm can achieve unilaterally. The consumer harm from misfuelling is immediate, concrete, and costly, and the information asymmetries here are real. The regulatory burden is relatively modest—primarily requiring affixing of labels and providing information—and the objectives of enhancing environmental performance of transport and enabling consumer choice in alternative fuel vehicles would be significantly harder to achieve without standardisation. This is not a case of regulatory overreach but of addressing a genuine coordination and information problem where the alternative fuel market requires interoperable labelling to function effectively.

This Order makes electoral boundary adjustments in Tonbridge & Malling following the 2017 community governance reorganisation. It transfers areas that moved from East Malling & Larkfield parish to Kings Hill parish from the East Malling district ward to the Kings Hill district ward, and from Malling Central county electoral division to Malling Rural East county electoral division. The changes take effect in stages for different electoral purposes in 2019 and 2021.

Without this order, residents in areas that were legitimately transferred to new parishes by the 2017 Order would remain in incorrect electoral wards, creating a mismatch between where people live and their democratic representation. Deleting this would leave affected residents without proper representation in their actual district wards and county divisions. This is a technical alignment measure that corrects boundary anomalies rather than imposing new restrictions or burdens.

These Regulations, made on exit day (Brexit), revoke Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 — an EU Regulation on mutual administrative assistance between Member States' customs and agricultural authorities. The effect is to remove this EU law from the UK statute book.

This regulation removes inappropriate EU law from UK statute books. The original EU Regulation 515/97 was designed for the EU's internal market and multilateral administrative cooperation between Member States — a framework inapplicable to post-Brexit Britain. Retaining it on the UK statute book made no sense legally or economically. The revocation clears the way for the UK to establish independent bilateral customs cooperation arrangements with EU member states and third countries. While mutual customs assistance has value, it can be achieved through separate international agreements negotiated on UK's own terms rather than inherited as a relic of EU membership.

These Regulations commence section 181 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (confirmation by inspector) in Wales on 6th April 2019, transferring confirmation authority for certain compulsory purchase orders from Welsh Ministers to inspectors. The transitional provision limits the amendments to CPOs submitted on or after that date, preserving the old process for pre-existing cases.

This regulation merely commences a power already enacted in primary legislation and provides sensible transitional protection for ongoing cases. Britons would be worse off if deleted because it ensures the statutory framework for CPO confirmations in Wales operates efficiently with appropriate delegation to inspectors, while the transitional provision prevents disruption to cases already in the pipeline. As a commencement instrument rather than substantive regulation, its direct costs are minimal.

A commencement regulation that brought sections 21(1) and (3), and section 23 of the Tenant Fees Act 2019 into force on 1st April 2019. Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government.

This is a spent commencement instrument that served only to activate specific provisions of the Tenant Fees Act 2019 on a particular date. Once the provisions came into force, the regulation became functionally obsolete with no ongoing legal effect. Commencement regulations are purely administrative machinery that become redundant after their specified provisions take effect. The regulation neither creates rights nor imposes obligations — it merely fixed a date for other legislation. Such instruments should be removed from the statute book once they have served their temporal purpose.

These Regulations set commencement dates for provisions of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 (section 13 and Schedules 4, 5, and 7), and establish transitional arrangements delegating trade remedies functions from the Secretary of State to the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) until the TRA is formally established. They provide that decisions made by the Secretary of State during the transitional period have effect as if made by the TRA once established, and specify 'transitional functions' that transfer from the Secretary of State to the TRA.

This regulation is now obsolete — the Trade Remedies Authority was established in 2021. More fundamentally, it represents exactly the kind of EU-derived retained law that was inherited without democratic scrutiny: it merely transitions existing trade remedy functions without substantive review of whether those functions serve British interests. The underlying anti-dumping and countervailing duty regime it administers was designed for an EU context and adds costs to imports that British consumers and businesses ultimately pay. Deleting this instrument would restore clarity that the transitional period has concluded and open reconsideration of whether the UK's trade remedies framework should be liberalized rather than preserved in EU-derived form.

UK autonomous sanctions regime targeting the Democratic Republic of Congo, implementing UN Security Council obligations (resolutions 1807, 2078, 2136, 2198, 2293, 2360, 2582, 2641) plus additional UK measures. Prohibits arms exports to non-governmental persons, imposes asset freezes and financial restrictions on designated persons involved in human rights violations, armed conflict, or undermining democracy/governance in DRC. Creates designation power for Secretary of State, criminal offences for circumvention, and includes director disqualification sanctions.

These regulations implement binding UN Security Council sanctions obligations which take precedence over domestic regulatory considerations. While they impose compliance costs on UK financial services and exporters, and the 'involved person' definition is broader than strictly necessary, the core restrictions target armed groups, human rights violators, and those undermining democracy in DRC. Deleting would breach international law and remove tools preventing resources from reaching groups responsible for mass rape, child soldier recruitment, and attacks on civilians. The security and humanitarian benefits justify the regulatory burden.

The South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 implement UN Security Council sanctions against South Sudan under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The regulations impose asset-freezes and arms embargoes on designated persons involved in serious human rights violations, breaches of peace agreements (ARCSS/R-ARCSS), or threats to South Sudan's peace and security. They also include director disqualification sanctions and immigration restrictions on designated persons. The regulations apply to UK persons worldwide and create offences for dealing in funds/economic resources, making military goods available, and providing related financial or technical services.

These regulations implement binding UN Security Council resolutions (2206, 2290, 2428) to which the UK is legally obligated under international law. While the 'additional purposes' go beyond strict UN obligations, the core measures—targeted asset freezes on individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses and an arms embargo—are legitimate tools for addressing threats to international peace and security. Unlike broad regulatory regimes that distort markets, targeted sanctions against specific bad actors represent a proportionate response to demonstrable harms. The Regulations give effect to multilateral obligations that Parliament has authorised the Government to implement, and unilateral deletion would isolate the UK from allied enforcement mechanisms and undermine international sanctions regimes designed to protect vulnerable populations in conflict zones.

These Regulations establish a levy system for the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) to fund its regulatory functions over petroleum licences. They set the total levy at £26,420,000 for 2019/20, comprising a production levy for offshore production licences and a non-production levy for exploration and certain production licences, with discounts of 80-90% for micro-enterprises. The Regulations also increase certain statutory fees (£168 to £183, £82 to £98) in three other statutory instruments relating to offshore petroleum activities and pollution prevention.

While this levy imposes costs on the oil and gas industry, the alternative - deletion - would leave the OGA without its primary funding mechanism for regulating an industry with significant safety, environmental, and infrastructure implications. The fee increases in the amendments appear to represent cost recovery adjustments rather than new regulatory burdens. The OGA's regulatory functions, including environmental protection and safety oversight of offshore operations, serve legitimate public interests that would be difficult to achieve through purely market mechanisms. Removing this funding would harm Britons through degraded regulatory oversight of a hazardous industry and the consequent risks to both workers and the marine environment.

This Order amends the Armed Forces and Reserve Forces (Compensation Scheme) Order 2011. It clarifies definitions around exogenous infections for injury/death exclusions, revises the 'relevant date' interpretation for injury benefit claims, uprates armed forces independence payment from £145.35 to £148.85 and Motability payment from £59.75 to £61.20, and adds new medical descriptors for mental, neurological and musculoskeletal disorders in the compensation tariff schedule.

This amendment makes technical adjustments to an existing armed forces compensation scheme. Without the uprated payments, injured service personnel and their families would receive below-inflation compensation, causing genuine hardship. The new descriptors improve accuracy of assessments. These changes impose no new regulatory burden on businesses, do not restrict trade or competition, and represent routine administrative corrections to maintain adequate support for those who serve. Deleting this would leave armed forces personnel worse off when injured in service to Britain.

Establishes 500-metre safety zones around offshore oil and gas installations specified in the Schedule, pursuant to section 21(7) of the Petroleum Act 1987. The zones restrict navigation and marine activities near these installations. Part 1 covers installations already stationed; Part 2 covers installations to be stationed, with provisions for when the zone takes effect upon arrival.

Without this regulation, offshore workers and expensive infrastructure would lack legally enforceable protection from ship collisions. While the 500m radius may appear arbitrary, deleting it would remove the primary legal mechanism establishing exclusion zones that prevent catastrophic accidents, explosions, and oil spills. Market negotiations cannot adequately protect third-party vessels from liability exposure or prevent irreversible environmental harm. The rule is narrowly targeted to specific installations listed in the Schedule rather than imposing blanket restrictions.

These Regulations revoke three EU Regulations (Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020 and Europe for Citizens Programme) following Brexit, and empower the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance to persons whose EU-funded project applications were approved by the European Commission on or before 31 December 2020, ensuring they receive payments they would have been entitled to had the UK not left the EU.

While revocation of retained EU laws is generally desirable, this SI merely creates a bureaucratic bridge from EU programmes to UK taxpayer-funded substitutes for cultural subsidies — continuing the distortion of redirecting resources to politically-favoured creative projects rather than allowing the market to allocate capital. The transitional assistance provision sets a precedent of UK government picking up EU spending commitments, creating dependency and perpetuating misallocated resources. A genuine free-trading nation would let these programmes die and allow the cultural sector to compete on merit.

The Trade Remedies (Increase in Imports Causing Serious Injury to UK Producers) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 establish the UK's post-Brexit safeguarding framework administered by the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). The regulations set out procedures for investigating whether increased imports have caused or are causing 'serious injury' to UK producers, and allow for imposition of provisional or definitive safeguarding remedies (tariffs or tariff rate quotas). They cover initiation of investigations, evidence gathering, confidential information handling, public files, questionnaires, authentication visits, hearings, and determinations.

This regulation perpetuates EU-derived protectionist trade defence mechanisms that contradict Britain's historical role as a champion of free trade. Safeguarding remedies impose costs on downstream British businesses and consumers while protecting entrenched domestic producers from foreign competition. The 'serious injury' standard is vague and subject to political manipulation, creating opportunities for cronyism. The retained EU system inherited post-Brexit was designed to shield uncompetitive industries rather than promote economic dynamism. A genuinely free-trading Britain would not need such elaborate machinery to restrict imports — the Corn Laws were repealed precisely because protectionism harms the broader economy. While some targeted anti-subsidy measures may have merit, this comprehensive safeguard regime reflects the worst of EU corporatism and should be deleted to restore Britain's position as the world's premier free-trading nation.

The Trade Remedies (Dumping and Subsidisation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 establish the framework for determining whether imported goods are being dumped (sold below normal value) or subsidised, and authorise the imposition of countervailing duties. They set out detailed methodologies for calculating normal value, export price, and subsidy amounts; define review mechanisms (expiry, interim, new exporter, absorption, circumvention, scope reviews); and allocate functions between the Secretary of State and the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). The regulations implement WTO Agreement obligations and were designed as transitional legislation pending full establishment of the TRA.

These regulations perpetuate EU-derived protectionist mechanisms that shield inefficient UK industries from global competition. Anti-dumping duties are a form of trade barrier that ultimately harms British consumers through higher prices and restricts their choices. The complex bureaucratic apparatus for calculating 'normal values' and 'subsidies' creates opportunities for rent-seeking by domestic industries seeking shelter from competition rather than genuinely addressing market distortions. While marketed as temporary transitional rules, they codified the EU's protectionist trade defence regime into UK law without democratic scrutiny. A truly free-trading Britain should trust its industries to compete globally and allow consumers access to the best available goods at the lowest prices, rather than accumulating layers of trade barriers that benefit politically-connected domestic producers at public expense.