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delete TABLE TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE TABLE IN PART 2 OF SCHEDULE 1 TO THE PRINCIPAL ORDER uksi-2020-150 · 2020
Summary

Amends the Naval, Military and Air Forces Etc. (Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 2006 by substituting updated payment rate tables in Schedules 1 and 2 for service disablement and death benefits. Comes into force 6th April 2020.

Reason

This amendment merely updates payment rate tables for an existing scheme. While veterans' compensation is a legitimate government obligation, the inflation-indexed adjustment of rates could occur through automatic mechanisms or simplified delegated authority rather than requiring a full affirmative statutory instrument. The principal flaw is that such detailed rate-fixing by affirmative SI perpetuates parliamentary time on administrative matters, creates compliance costs, and maintains a paternalistic structure where the state micromanages compensation rather than setting framework principles and allowing discretion. The scheme itself should be reviewed fundamentally rather than incrementally amended via orders that consume parliamentary resources.

delete The Taxation of Income from Land (Non-residents) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 uksi-2020-151 · 2020
Summary

Amends the Taxation of Income from Land (Non-residents) Regulations 1995 to introduce an optional election allowing non-resident property investors to deduct financing costs up to a 'financing costs allowance' (30% of income less non-financing expenses, plus unused allowance from prior quarters) rather than actual financing costs incurred. Allows excess financing costs to be carried forward and excess allowance to be carried forward as a deduction in subsequent quarters. Excludes corporate interest restriction rules from the definition of deductible expenses for these purposes. Applies to annual periods commencing on or after 1 April 2020.

Reason

This regulation introduces complex new compliance requirements for non-resident property investors—including intricate election mechanisms, quarterly calculations of financing costs allowances, and carry-forward provisions—that impose administrative burdens with no corresponding public benefit. The 30% arbitrary cap on deductible financing costs distorts investment decisions by artificially favoring certain financing structures. The exclusion of the corporate interest restriction (a EU-derived rule) demonstrates this is retained EU law that should have been reviewed post-Brexit. These rules likely reduce inbound investment in UK property, harming both investors and the broader economy, while enriching HMRC with compliance costs.

delete The Universal Credit (Work-Related Requirements) In Work Pilot Scheme (Extension) Order 2020 uksi-2020-152 · 2020
Summary

Extends the Universal Credit In Work Pilot Scheme, originally created in 2015, for an additional twelve months from 19th February 2020. The pilot tests work-related requirements and support mechanisms for Universal Credit claimants who are already in employment.

Reason

A pilot scheme running since 2015 has exceeded any reasonable testing period and become de facto permanent policy without proper evaluation. Conditionality requirements on employed claimants add regulatory friction, may discourage employers from hiring Universal Credit recipients, and represent government interference in voluntary employment relationships. The extension perpetuates this burden without demonstrating net benefit.

keep The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (Commencement No. 17) Order 2020 uksi-2020-155 · 2020
Summary

Commencement Order bringing section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (video recorded cross-examination or re-examination for vulnerable witnesses) into force on 24 February 2020, limited to 9 specified Crown Courts where the witness qualifies under section 16 (age or incapacity grounds).

Reason

Deletion would force vulnerable witnesses—primarily children and those with incapacity—to give face-to-face testimony in criminal proceedings, increasing trauma and potentially deterring cooperation with prosecutions. The restricted geographic scope (9 courts) represents a reasonable pilot implementation before wider rollout, not a permanent market distortion. This is court procedure facilitating evidence-taking, not a regulation restricting competition, trade, or supply.

delete The Northamptonshire (Structural Changes) Order 2020 uksi-2020-156 · 2020
Summary

The Northamptonshire (Structural Changes) Order 2020 abolished the County of Northamptonshire and restructured local government by creating two new unitary authorities: North Northamptonshire Council and West Northamptonshire Council, each comprising former district councils. The Order established shadow authorities during a transition period (May 2020 to April 2021), set governance arrangements including executive structures, monitoring officer requirements, member allowances, and detailed provisions for the dissolution of existing councils and the transfer of functions.

Reason

This Order represents government consolidation rather than liberalisation — abolishing competing local authorities and replacing them with two larger monopolies reduces the regulatory competition that historically drove efficiency in English local government. While local government reform may sometimes be warranted, this particular restructuring was crisis-driven (Northamptonshire County Council effectively went bankrupt in 2018), not a market-based reform, and the transition mechanisms imposed significant administrative burden. Most provisions are now spent (implemented by April 2021), but the structural damage to local democratic competition persists. The Order should be repealed and replaced with genuine liberalisation that allows different localities to experiment with governance structures rather than mandating consolidation.

keep The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (Consequential Amendment) Regulations 2020 uksi-2020-157 · 2020
Summary

These 2020 Regulations amend section 267 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, changing a cross-reference from 'section 264(6)(a)(ii)' to 'section 264(6)(d)'. It is a consequential amendment, likely correcting an erroneous or outdated cross-reference in sentencing legislation.

Reason

This is a minor technical correction that removes legal uncertainty by ensuring the correct cross-reference in section 267. Deleting it would leave an erroneous cross-reference in primary legislation, potentially causing confusion in sentencing proceedings. The regulation imposes no new obligations, compliance costs, or regulatory burden — it merely corrects a reference. There is no identifiable benefit to Britons from retaining an incorrect statutory reference.

delete The Council of Europe Convention on Cinematographic Co-production (revised) Order 2020 uksi-2020-159 · 2020
Summary

This Order implements the 2017 Council of Europe Convention on Cinematographic Co-production (revised) into UK law, updating the 1992 Convention framework. It defines criteria for treating films as 'British films' under Schedule 1 of the Films Act 1985 based on co-production arrangements with contracting states, and revokes the 2006 Order.

Reason

This Order perpetuates government intervention in the film market by determining which films qualify for 'British film' status—a classification that unlocks subsidies, tax incentives, and regulatory benefits. Rather than enabling beneficial market outcomes, it distorts film financing by creating privileged categories that reward certain productions over others. The revised 2017 Convention appears to have been retained EU-derived law with no independent democratic scrutiny. While deleting this would create uncertainty around British film classification, that uncertainty would itself exert pressure to either remove the underlying subsidy regime or make it more market-neutral. The status quo keeps in place a system where civil servants and ministers rather than consumers determine which films succeed.

delete The Communications (Television Licensing) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 uksi-2020-160 · 2020
Summary

Amends the Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004 to modify simple payment plan licence rules for TV licensing. Changes include: extending regulations to Channel Islands and Isle of Man; redefining 'issue date' and 'expiry date'; adding new eligibility circumstance D; updating debt advice charity definition; changing enforcement terminology; and revising fortnightly and monthly instalment payment tables with updated fee amounts.

Reason

TV licensing represents a state-enforced monopoly on broadcast reception that distorts the market for media services. These regulations perpetuate this monopoly by controlling who may obtain a licence and the precise mechanics of payment instalments. The complex tariff tables (Tables 1 and 2 with 25 different payment configurations) impose unnecessary administrative burden and restrict voluntary commercial arrangements. While consumer protection for payment plans has some merit, this objective could be achieved through private contractual arrangements between broadcasters and viewers. The core issue is that retained TV licensing regulations — many originating from EU directives — create an artificial market structure that limits consumer choice and competition in the media sector.

delete THE LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (A601(M) PARTIAL REVOCATION) SCHEME 2019 uksi-2020-165 · 2020
Summary

This instrument confirms the Lancashire County Council (A601(M) Partial Revocation) Scheme 2019, formally establishing the partial revocation of the A601(M) motorway scheme in Lancashire. It comes into force upon publication of confirmation notice per the Highways Act 1980. Copies are deposited at the Department for Transport and Lancashire County Council.

Reason

This instrument confirms a partial revocation—a deregulatory action that removes a road scheme rather than imposing new regulatory burdens. As a confirmation instrument under the Highways Act 1980, it merely formalises administrative changes to local infrastructure planning. The A601(M) was never fully completed and this revocation clears dead weight from the books. No regulatory cost, no gold-plating concern, no competitive harm to City of London, no NHS or planning permission implications. Its administrative function is exhausted upon confirmation.

keep Variation of the Avon Fire Services Combination Scheme uksi-2020-168 · 2020
Summary

The Combined Fire and Rescue Authorities (Membership and Allowances) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 amend various fire services combination schemes across England and insert a provision into the Local Authorities (Members' Allowances) (England) Regulations 2003 prohibiting fire and rescue authorities from paying any allowance to Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) members appointed to those authorities.

Reason

This regulation Restrains (rather than expands) government expenditure by explicitly prohibiting fire and rescue authorities from paying allowances to PCC members, preventing potential double-dipping where police and crime commissioners might receive compensation from both their police role and fire authority membership. Without this prohibition, fire authorities could face pressure to provide supplementary payments to PCCs, increasing costs to taxpayers with no corresponding service improvement.

keep The Proscribed Organisations (Name Change) Order 2020 uksi-2020-169 · 2020
Summary

This Order adds 'System Resistance Network' as a alias name to 'National Action', an organisation already proscribed under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It ensures that individuals associated with the System Resistance Network are treated as associates of a proscribed organisation for legal purposes.

Reason

Without this order, extremist groups could simply rebrand under new names to circumvent proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. The regulation closes a technical loophole without imposing broad restrictions — it merely ensures existing counter-terrorism designations cannot be evaded through rebranding. The cost to general Britons is negligible, while deletion would create an exploitable gap that undermines a core government function: protecting citizens from terrorist harm.

delete Map of Manchester Metrolink Network uksi-2020-170 · 2020
Summary

A minor amendment Order that updates a map schedule in the 2013 Greater Manchester Light Rapid Transit System Exemptions Order. It comes into force on 16th March 2020 and simply substitutes an updated map for the original.

Reason

This Order is purely administrative cartographic correction with no实质性 regulatory effect. The underlying exemptions from the 2013 Order remain intact regardless. Maintaining an up-to-date map serves administrative convenience but imposes no regulatory burden reduction — the exemptions themselves are the source of any costs, not the map reference. Deleting this leaves the regulatory position unchanged while removing an unnecessary legislative layer.

keep Consequential provisions – primary legislation uksi-2020-176 · 2020
Summary

This Order abolishes the Public Works Loan Commissioners, transferring their functions, land, property, rights and liabilities to the Treasury and Public Works Loans Secretary. It requires the Treasury to produce a final report on the Commissioners' activities, makes consequential amendments to legislation, and provides continuity provisions for ongoing legal proceedings.

Reason

Britons would be worse off if this were deleted because it eliminates an unnecessary bureaucratic layer by consolidating the Public Works Loan Commissioners' functions into the Treasury, which is already directly accountable to Parliament. This reduces administrative overhead and streamlines public lending governance without reducing oversight — the Treasury remains fully accountable for these functions. Deleting this Order would preserve an obsolete governance structure that serves no purpose beyond adding an extra tier of bureaucracy to a function that can be managed more efficiently by the Treasury directly.

delete The Local Government Pension Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2020 uksi-2020-179 · 2020
Summary

These regulations amend the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013 to revise how exit credits are calculated when employers exit the scheme. Key changes include: replacing the previous calculation method with a discretion-based approach for administering authorities; requiring authorities to consider factors including excess assets over liabilities, the proportion arising from employer contributions, and representations from parties; mandating notification procedures and 6-month payment timeframes; and applying retroactively from 14 May 2018. The changes affect how surplus pension funds are distributed to departing public sector employers.

Reason

This regulation exemplifies the state substituting its judgment for contractual arrangements in defined benefit pension schemes. The discretion granted to administering authorities to determine exit credits 'which may be zero' creates regulatory uncertainty and机会主义行为 risk. Rather than allowing parties to negotiate exit terms based on actual contributions and scheme rules, this mandates bureaucratic consideration of vague 'factors' before payment. The retroactive effective date (14 May 2018) further demonstrates overreach, attempting to rewrite legal relationships retrospectively. Such micro-management of pension scheme exits would be better governed by the original contractual terms between parties, not by central government decree. The regulation does not stem from EU law and represents domestic regulatory expansion that should be reconsidered.

delete The Value Added Tax (Refund of Tax) Order 2020 uksi-2020-185 · 2020
Summary

The Value Added Tax (Refund of Tax) Order 2020 specifies four public bodies (HS2 Ltd, East West Railway Company Ltd, Transport for Wales, and the Single Financial Guidance Body) as entitled to VAT refunds under section 33E of the VAT Act 1994, effective 1 April 2020.

Reason

This Order creates discriminatory competitive distortions by granting VAT refund privileges to selected public bodies while private sector entities performing similar functions must absorb VAT costs. These organizations receive government funding anyway, making the refund mechanism a hidden subsidy that evades standard budgetary scrutiny. Private construction firms, transport operators, and financial guidance providers are placed at a competitive disadvantage. The Order represents picking winners through the tax system rather than allowing market forces to allocate resources efficiently, contrary to Britain's free-trading heritage.