Browse regulations

Transitional and saving provisions consequent on the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018, effective 6 April 2020. Ensures that existing provisions in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and Court of Protection Rules 2017 continue in force after the 2018 Act's repeals, treating them as if made under section 67B(1) of the Courts Act 2003. Also validates actions taken by justices' clerks before that date.

This regulation imposes no regulatory burden whatsoever — it is purely a technical transitional measure that preserves existing legal arrangements during a structural change. Deleting it would create a legal vacuum when the 2018 Act's provisions take effect, rendering court procedures without valid legal foundation and potentially invalidating past and ongoing court proceedings. The regulation merely redirects existing rules to a new statutory basis; it adds no new requirements, restrictions, or costs. Without this saving provision, court staff would lack clear authority for functions they already perform, and parties could challenge prior actions taken under orphaned provisions.

Sets the Pension Protection Fund compensation cap at £41,461.07, establishes the levy ceiling for pension schemes, and revokes the 2019 Order. The Order implements parameters under the Pensions Act 2004 framework governing the PPF's operation.

The compensation cap is a government price control that distorts the pension and annuity market by artificially limiting what beneficiaries can receive. This creates moral hazard, suppresses private annuity market development, and imposes arbitrary limits that benefit neither scheme members nor the broader economy. The levy ceiling similarly represents state intervention in what should be market-determined insurance pricing. While the underlying PPF framework exists in primary legislation, this Order perpetuates regulatory intervention without demonstrated benefit that outweighs the cost of keeping it.

Amends the Employment and Support Allowance (Transitional Provisions, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit) (Existing Awards) (No. 2) Regulations 2010 by removing paragraph (c) of regulation 21(1), which governs termination of transitional additions. The amendment removes one of the conditions triggering termination of transitional payments, effectively allowing some recipients to continue receiving them. The amendment comes into force on 27th February 2020.

While ESA represents a transfer payment that distorts labor market incentives, deleting this amendment would restore the original three-condition test for terminating transitional additions. Recipients have relied on these payments, potentially having structured their finances around them. Sudden removal without adequate transition would cause genuine hardship to vulnerable individuals who planned based on existing rules. The regulatory framework, while imperfect, serves a social safety net function where immediate repeal causes measurable harm to identifiable people.

The Victims' Payments Regulations 2020 establish the Troubles Permanent Disablement Payment Scheme for individuals permanently disabled (14%+ assessed disablement) by Troubles-related incidents between 1966-2010. The Regulations establish the Victims' Payments Board, define eligibility criteria including exclusions for those with relevant convictions, create assessment mechanisms for determining degree of disablement (including interim assessments), set payment rates linked to armed forces disablement pension rates, provide for backdating entitlements, and establish appeal procedures. The scheme extends primarily to Northern Ireland with some provisions covering England, Wales, and Scotland.

This scheme represents a costly, bureaucratic administrative apparatus that picks winners among victims based on arbitrary disablement thresholds and conviction exclusions. The complex offsetting provisions against other compensation sources (Social Security disablement pensions, Armed Forces compensation, Police injury benefits, Civil Service schemes, NHS injury benefits) create perverse incentives where applicants must navigate multiple government systems simultaneously. The 14% minimum threshold arbitrarily excludes those with lesser injuries. The scheme's existence may discourage private insurance markets and alternative compensation mechanisms from developing for Troubles-related injuries. The administrative overhead of the Board, panels, health care professional assessments, and appeals processes imposes substantial ongoing costs that reduce resources available for actual victims. A free-market approach would allow private insurance, tort claims, and charitable mechanisms to provide more flexible, efficient, and personally tailored compensation without government-mandated bureaucratic selection criteria.

This Order amends section 105 of the Utilities Act 2000 to explicitly extend whistleblowing (protected disclosure) protections to workers in the utilities sector. It inserts text into section 105(3) clarifying that certain disclosures qualify as protected disclosures under the Employment Rights Act 1996, and modifies section 105(4)(g) to permit disclosures made in reliance on sections 47B or 103A of that Act.

Without explicit whistleblower protections, workers in critical utility infrastructure would face retaliation risk when reporting safety violations, fraud, or regulatory breaches — harming consumers and public interest. While the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides general protected disclosure rights, this Order ensures utilities sector workers have clear, unambiguous protection, encouraging the reporting of wrongdoing that market discipline alone cannot address. Deleting this would leave a gap in protection for workers in sectors handling essential services and critical infrastructure.

These Regulations amend the Statutory Auditors and Third Country Auditors regime in connection with Brexit, adding Chinese authorities (Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulatory Commission of PRC) to approved lists, removing Indonesia's authority, extending South Africa's approval term, and establishing transitional provisions for audits before IP completion day. They create an approval regime for third countries and third country competent authorities based on 'comparability' assessments of audit regulatory regimes, with powers to suspend or revoke approvals. The Regulations also modify definitions of 'key audit partner' and various technical disclosure requirements.

This regulation imposes significant barriers on international audit services trade. The approval regime for third countries based on 'comparability' of audit regimes creates bureaucratic discretion that can be used to restrict competition from foreign audit firms. The Secretary of State's power to grant, suspend, or revoke approvals based on subjective assessments of foreign regulatory regimes serves as a non-tariff barrier that disadvantages foreign auditors and limits UK companies' access to diverse audit services. While maintaining audit quality is important, this can be achieved through disclosure and transparency requirements rather than discretionary approval systems that concentrate power in the state and limit market access. The transitional provisions also perpetuate EU-era restrictions that should have been reconsidered post-Brexit to promote the UK's competitive position as a global financial centre.

Amendment Regulations 2020 to the Trade in Animals and Related Products Regulations 2011, making minor technical changes: updating enforcement authority terminology for certain marine products in regulation 12(4), and removing redundant 'but is entitled' phrasing from regulations 20 and 23.

These amendments are purely technical clarifications that remove redundant legal phrasing and update product classifications. The underlying 2011 Regulations remain in force establishing health controls for animal and product trade. Deletion would leave confusing, outdated wording in place without removing any substantive requirements. The amendments reduce rather than expand regulatory burden.

Amends the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 by adding a £20,000 capital disregard in Schedule 2 for ex-gratia payments made to former British child migrants under a scheme established in response to the IICSA Investigation Report on Child Migration Programmes, which opened for applications on 1st March 2019.

Without this disregard, former child migrants who suffered serious institutional abuse under a government-administered scheme would have their statutory compensation depleted to pay for care costs—a perverse outcome where victims of state-caused harm are punished twice. While the 2014 Regulations represent broader issues with social care provision, this specific carve-out addresses a discrete historical injustice and is narrowly targeted to its purpose. The £20,000 disregard is proportionate compensation for those who suffered documented abuse.

The Network Rail (East West Rail) (Bicester to Bedford Improvements) Order 2020 is a Transport and Works Act order authorising Network Rail to construct railway improvements between Bicester and Bedford, including scheduled works, compulsory acquisition of land, closure of level crossings, construction of replacement highways and footpaths, and extensive powers to execute street works. It incorporates numerous Victorian railway statutes, grants exemptions from environmental and watercourse regulations, and establishes compensation mechanisms for extinguished private rights of way.

This Order represents classic government-picked-winner infrastructure planning that distorts market signals and allocates capital according to political rather than economic criteria. The compulsory purchase powers, the blanket exemptions from environmental permitting and land drainage byelaws, and the suspension of street works coordination requirements demonstrate how state direction of railway investment systematically overrides property rights and environmental considerations. Hayek's fatal conceit is exhibited when planners believe they can engineer optimal infrastructure outcomes — the Order's intricate web of rights extinguishments, temporary possession powers, and mandated road alterations reveals how regulatory intervention creates a cascade of unintended consequences: distorting land values, suppressing private alternatives, and entrenching Network Rail's quasi-monopolistic position. The market, not the state, should determine railway investment; this Order perpetuates the very planning regime Britain must shed to restore its economic dynamism.

These Regulations make retrospective carbon accounting provisions for 2018, setting a domestic aviation emissions cap and requiring adjustments to the UK carbon account based on comparisons with a 152,311,507 threshold for EU ETS installations. They impose a duty to cancel certain carbon units credited for 2018 between 2023-2024, amend the 2009 Carbon Accounting Regulations to update references to EU allowance definitions, and require the Secretary of State to use 'best available data' for emissions calculations.

Retained EU law that: (1) relies on vague 'best available data' standard giving discretionary power to the Secretary of State; (2) embeds EU regulatory definitions (Emissions Trading Directive, Commission Regulation 389/2013) into UK law without democratic review; (3) creates ongoing bureaucratic cancellation obligations long after the 2018 reference year; (4) represents the kind of technical carbon accounting machinery that, while perhaps well-intentioned, perpetuates a complex cap-and-trade system that distorts market signals and imposes compliance costs on businesses with no proven benefit over simpler carbon pricing mechanisms.

These are the Electricity and Gas (Standards of Performance) (Suppliers) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, which amend the 2015 Principal Regulations. They introduce new definitions for 'prepayment meter' and 'supplier transfer', insert regulations 6ZA (obligation to complete supplier transfers within 15 working days), 6ZB (avoidance of erroneous transfers requiring valid contracts), 6CA (final bill issuance within 6 weeks), and add exemptions (7AA-7AC) to standard payment obligations when suppliers fail to meet performance standards.

This regulation imposes government-mandated timeframes (15 working days, 32 days, 6 weeks) on private commercial transactions between energy suppliers and customers. Such micromanagement of business processes adds compliance costs that are passed to consumers and creates barriers that favor larger established suppliers over new entrants. The regulatory standards of performance and associated payment obligations represent a bureaucratic compensation mechanism that could be handled through contract law and competition. While the regulations aim to prevent 'slamming' and protect consumers during transfers, these outcomes can be achieved more efficiently through market mechanisms and private contractual arrangements. The complexity of exemptions (7AA-7AB-7AC) demonstrates how regulation proliferates and creates layered administrative burden without eliminating the underlying need for dispute resolution.

The Land Registry Trading Fund (Revocation) Order 2020 revokes four statutory instruments (1993, 1996, 2003, and 2018 Orders) that established and extended Land Registry's trading fund status. It comes into force on 1 April 2020, ending Land Registry's framework as a commercially-funded trading fund.

Revoking the trading fund model removes a structure that forced Land Registry to operate with commercial profit incentives rather than public service principles. Trading funds create pressure to maximize fees to cover costs, undermining theregistry's role as essential national infrastructure. Revocation allows funding to be reconsidered on terms that serve citizens rather than cost recovery metrics. The old Orders' commercial logic is obsolete given modern digital service delivery.

The A30 Chiverton to Carland Cross Development Consent Order 2020 is a statutory instrument granting development consent for the upgrade of the A30 trunk road in Cornwall. It authorizes compulsory purchase of land, construction of new highways, de-trunking of existing roads, alteration of rights of way, and various street works. It appoints Highways England as the undertaker and includes provisions for road classification, speed limits, traffic regulation, and maintenance obligations. The Order consolidates multiple consent powers under the Planning Act 2008 for this Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project.

This Order does not impose regulatory burdens on private actors—it is an enabling instrument for public infrastructure investment that will improve connectivity in Cornwall. As a development consent order for a specific road project, it does not exhibit the harmful characteristics targeted for deletion: it is not a retained EU regulation lacking democratic scrutiny, not gold-plating of directives, not a financial regulation driving business offshore, not an NHS monopoly restriction, and not a planning permission barrier causing housing scarcity. While compulsory purchase powers raise legitimate property rights concerns, these are balanced by public benefit and compensation requirements. Infrastructure development of this nature can enhance economic dynamism and trade, consistent with Britain's free-trading heritage.

These Regulations amend several street works regulations in England to mandate electronic communications and digital service requirements for notices. Key changes include: requiring certain notices to be given via the Department for Transport's digital service for roadworks planning; specifying technical requirements for electronic notices (legible, accessible, permanent); adding API specification compliance requirements; and modifying permit scheme fee structures to ensure minor/standard works fees are lower than major works fees. The regulations apply to street works and works for road purposes under the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991.

These regulations represent regulatory overreach through delegated legislation without proper parliamentary scrutiny, compounded by the inherent problem that any mandatory digital service creates lock-in, barriers to entry for smaller utilities, and ongoing compliance costs tied to API specifications that change 'from time to time' without guaranteed notice. While the goal of modernizing notice procedures is legitimate, mandating a specific government digital service for core administrative functions limits innovation and flexibility that the private sector could otherwise provide through competition. The regulation imposes compliance burdens that could be better achieved through performance-based standards rather than prescribed digital channels.

These regulations amend the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013 to facilitate the creation of Buckinghamshire Council from the merger of Buckinghamshire County Council, Aylesbury Vale District Council, Chiltern District Council, South Bucks District Council, and Wycombe District Council. They insert provisions specifying that no exit payment or exit credit is due in connection with this specific structural change, and update pension fund schedules to reflect the new authority.

This is a one-time, jurisdiction-specific administrative adjustment to facilitate a local government reorganisation that has already occurred. It does not impose ongoing regulatory burdens on businesses, suppress competition, or distort market incentives. Deletion would create administrative complications around pension liability transfers without any economic benefit. The regulation merely ensures smooth administrative transition for an event that is now complete history.