Browse regulations

This instrument confirms the Worcestershire County Council (Kepax Bridge) Scheme 2020 under the Highways Act 1980. It is an administrative confirmation instrument that validates a local highways scheme for a bridge, with deposited copies at specified government offices. The scheme comes into force upon publication of confirmation notice.

This is an administrative confirmation instrument, not a regulatory burden. It validates a pre-existing local authority highways scheme and imposes no compliance requirements, market restrictions, or costs on individuals or businesses. Highways infrastructure development is a legitimate government function, and this instrument merely formalises the confirmation process under Schedule 2 of the Highways Act 1980. Deleting it would serve no free-market purpose as the scheme has already been lawfully confirmed.

This Order amends the Hinkley Point C (Nuclear Generating Station) Order 2013, making technical changes to the development consent for the HPC nuclear power station. Changes include: renaming buildings (Auxiliary Administration Centre to Building, Emergency Response Store to Back-up Emergency Equipment Store), removing helipad references and substituting general helicopter flight provisions, updating plan revision numbers (Rev 03 to Rev 04), replacing 'Vehicle search area' with 'Off-site Delivery Checkpoint', and updating the operational car park reference number. Part 3 approved plans are updated to reflect these changes and new plans are added for Emergency Response Centre and Emergency Response Energy Centre.

This amendment Order makes technical and administrative updates to an existing Development Consent Order for a nuclear generating station. The changes are minor in nature—renaming structures, updating plan revision references, and substituting specific helipad provisions with broader helicopter flight provisions. As a procedural amendment to an already-approved major infrastructure project, it does not impose new regulatory burdens but rather clarifies and updates the existing consent. Nuclear power stations require appropriate regulatory oversight for safety, and Development Consent Orders are necessary coordination mechanisms for nationally significant infrastructure. Removing this amendment would create administrative uncertainty without advancing free-market objectives.

These 2021 Regulations prohibit Belarusian-owned, chartered, operated, or registered aircraft on scheduled services from flying in UK airspace, with exceptions for Secretary of State or Swanwick/Prestwick ATC permission. They revoke the Belavia-specific 2021 Regulations.

These sanctions regulations fail to achieve their stated geopolitical objective while imposing real costs: they restrict voluntary commercial transactions, harm UK travelers and businesses, disadvantage UK carriers through likely reciprocal Belarusian restrictions, and punish Belarusian citizens broadly for their government's actions. Sanctions based on nationality are inherently discriminatory and ineffective at changing sovereign behavior. A targeted approach addressing specific bad actors would impose far lower economic and liberty costs while being more precise.

The Customs (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2021 amend multiple EU Exit customs regulations to update version references and dates for preferential tariff and origin reference documents to version 1.x dated 28th December 2021. It also adds procedural provisions clarifying how claims for relief made in customs declarations are handled, amends trade preference scheme country lists, and corrects technical errors in tariff classification codes.

This regulation primarily updates administrative references to reflect the most current tariff and origin documentation. Removing it would create legal uncertainty as businesses and HMRC would rely on outdated document versions. The new procedural provisions for relief claims (paragraphs 2A, 2B, 3A-3C, 4A) clarify existing rights rather than restrict them, reducing ambiguity that could lead to disputes. The country list updates and technical corrections to tariff codes reflect actual trade arrangement changes. While much of this regulation could theoretically be achieved through deregulation, the specific trade agreement references require statutory updates to maintain legal clarity and operational functionality.

Amends Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/466 by extending the expiry date of COVID-19 related temporary measures for control systems from 31st December 2021 to 1st July 2022. The original EU regulation established temporary measures to contain risks to human, animal and plant health and animal welfare during serious disruptions to Member States' control systems due to COVID-19.

Extending 'temporary' COVID-19 measures to mid-2022, when vaccines were widely available and the pandemic response was well-established, defeats the purpose of labelling them 'temporary.' This regulation perpetuates emergency powers long after their justification expired. Post-Brexit, Britain should not be extending EU emergency frameworks without scrutiny. The control systems in question had adapted by 2022, and maintaining this amendment simply prolonged regulatory uncertainty rather than addressing genuine ongoing risks.

Sets the non-domestic rating multiplier (B) for England at 294.3 for the financial year 2022-23, with implementation requiring House of Commons approval before consideration of the local government finance report.

This is a tax rate-setting mechanism rather than regulatory burden in the traditional sense. While business rates are themselves a distortionary tax, deleting this Order would not abolish business rates—it would merely default to the previous year's multiplier, leaving the underlying system intact. As a purely administrative instrument setting the poundage rate for a legislated tax, its removal would create fiscal uncertainty without advancing free-market goals. The business rates system, though imperfect, provides local government with a transparent, property-based revenue stream that could theoretically be reformed. This Order does not gold-plate EU law, does not restrict competition, and does not create the typical regulatory barriers to entry that characterise the burdensome retained EU legislation Better Britain seeks to eliminate.

This Order brings into force on 31st December 2020 (or day after Parliamentary approval) a revised code of practice under section 23 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The code governs disclosure of unused material in criminal investigations and prosecutions.

This Order merely enacts a Parliamentarily-approved procedural code; it does not itself impose restrictions but operationalises disclosure rules that protect defendants' rights to a fair trial. Deleting it would leave the previous (potentially less clear) code in force rather than achieving regulatory reduction, and the associated costs fall on criminal justice participants rather than economic activity.

These Rules establish the procedural framework for Police Appeals Tribunals in England and Wales, enabling police officers and former police officers to appeal against disciplinary findings and decisions under the Conduct, Performance, and Vetting Regulations. They set out grounds for appeal (unreasonableness, new evidence, procedural breach), timeframes, hearing procedures, representation rights, witness rules, and the role of the Director General in presenting cases.

These Rules govern internal police disciplinary appeals—a procedural tribunal system entirely separate from economic regulation, trade, or market competition. They provide essential procedural protections ensuring fair hearings for police officers facing disciplinary action. Deletion would remove due process safeguards without any corresponding economic benefit, and would not advance any of the organization's stated objectives around free trade, planning reform, financial services, or healthcare competition. This is not an EU-derived regulation, imposes no gold-plating, and has no material connection to Britain's economic dynamism or international competitiveness.

The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 implement Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, establishing the procedural framework for handling complaints against police officers, misconduct investigations, disciplinary proceedings, and death or serious injury (DSI) matters. The Regulations set out requirements for: recording complaints, referring matters to the Director General (IOPC), conducting investigations, severity assessments, the special procedure for police officer interviews, notification requirements to complainants and interested persons, and the management of investigations including combining/splitting cases. They supersede the 2012 Regulations and contain detailed definitions, timeframes, and procedural safeguards for police accountability.

This regulation exemplifies the bureaucratic proliferation that plagues British public services. The IOPC quango it mandates costs over £30 million annually to administer a process that routinely takes 18+ months to complete—outcomes neither complainants nor police officers find satisfactory. The extensive procedural requirements (severity assessments, notifications, terms of reference, police friend provisions, representation rights) create structural incentives for adversarial rather than conciliatory resolution. Critically, the regulation suppresses alternative accountability mechanisms: private investigation firms, ombudsman schemes, or market-based disciplinary systems cannot compete with this state-mandated monopoly. The 12-month 'relevant period' before progress reporting—extendable indefinitely by 6-month intervals—demonstrates how regulatory process itself becomes a barrier to justice. These provisions were inherited wholesale from EU-era administrative law traditions and retain all the inefficiencies of that heritage without sufficient scrutiny of whether they actually achieve their stated goals of police accountability and public confidence.

These Regulations establish a two-stage process for addressing unsatisfactory performance or attendance by police officers, including first stage meetings with line managers, second stage panel meetings, written improvement notices, and appeal procedures. They apply to police officers below chief superintendent rank who have completed probation, and work alongside the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025.

These Regulations impose an elaborate multi-stage procedural framework with extensive notice requirements, panel appointments, representation rights, and time limits that add significant administrative burden to addressing police performance issues. The two-stage meeting process, combined with the panel system and appeal structures, creates a compliance-heavy mechanism that could be simplified without sacrificing procedural fairness. The retention of these detailed procedural rules reflects regulatory overreach rather than any inherent market failure or demonstrated need for this level of prescription in managing police performance.

The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 establish the framework for handling allegations of misconduct, gross misconduct, and practice requiring improvement against police officers in England and Wales. They define key terms including Standards of Professional Behaviour, establish procedures for misconduct meetings and hearings, accelerated misconduct hearings, suspension conditions, rights to police friend or legal representation, appeal processes, and transitional provisions from the 2012 Regulations.

These Regulations substantially replicated the 2012 framework they replaced while adding procedural complexity including expanded delegation rules, modified provisions for former officers, and detailed suspension/review procedures. The regulation imposes significant bureaucratic overhead on police forces with extensive procedural requirements that add cost without proportionate benefit to public safety or fairness to officers. While police accountability is essential, this prescriptive approach to misconduct proceedings was largely carry-over from previous regulations with additions that complicated rather than improved the system, making it a candidate for deletion in favour of a streamlined, principles-based approach to police conduct regulation.

These are the 10th Commencement Regulations for the Policing and Crime Act 2017, bringing into force on 1 February 2020 provisions relating to police complaints handling, IPCC investigations, disciplinary proceedings, and Police Appeals Tribunals. The Regulations include transitional provisions specifying when new complaint handling procedures apply versus grandfathered old procedures, and exclude certain regulatory bodies (UK Border Agency, Revenue and Customs, etc.) from the new regime.

As a commencement order, this instrument does not create regulatory burden but merely activates provisions Parliament has already enacted. However, from a consistent regulatory reduction standpoint, this order activates an expanded police complaints and oversight apparatus including IPCC re-investigation powers, additional procedural requirements, and new appeal mechanisms that will increase administrative burden on police forces without demonstrated corresponding benefit. The transitional savings actually confirm the existing framework was functioning—suggesting the new expanded regime is unnecessary gold-plating. Deleting this order would preserve the status quo ante rather than imposing new regulatory infrastructure.

This Order sets the revaluation factor (8.2%) for transitional state pensions under the Pensions Act 2014, effective from April 2020. It implements the statutory requirement to adjust pensions for price inflation during the review period, applying to persons reaching pensionable age on or after 7th April 2020.

Without this Order, transitional state pension recipients under the Pensions Act 2014 would receive incorrectly calculated pension amounts, causing direct financial harm to a specific vulnerable population. The revaluation mechanism is mandated by primary legislation; this Order merely provides the technical inflation factor required for proper implementation. Deletion would create legal uncertainty and payment errors for pensioners, with no regulatory burden removed - only administrative chaos inflicted on those relying on accurate pension calculations.

The State Pension Debits and Credits (Revaluation) Order 2020 sets revaluation percentages for state pension debits and credits arising from pension sharing orders (used in divorce proceedings). It ensures that when a state pension is split between ex-spouses, the value of credits/debits keeps pace with inflation over time. The Order specifies different commencement dates: 29 January 2020 for advance retirement claims, and 6 April 2020 for general purposes.

Without statutory revaluation rates, pension sharing orders from divorce would become outdated as the state pension changes, creating legal uncertainty and driving costly case-by-case litigation. Recipients of shared pension credits depend on this mechanism to maintain the real value of their entitlement over time. While the state pension system itself involves redistribution, removing this specific mechanism would harm individuals who relied on pension sharing orders—predominantly homemakers and lower earners—whose financial security would be eroded by inflation if credits failed to keep pace with the state pension they were credited toward.

Amends the Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013 to add stalking protection order proceedings under sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 to the list of criminal proceedings qualifying for criminal legal aid.

Criminal legal aid for defendants facing stalking protection order proceedings is essential for ensuring fair proceedings and due process. Without legal representation, individuals cannot adequately defend themselves against state-initiated proceedings, leading to unjust outcomes, potential wrongful restrictions on liberty, and inefficient court processes. The state, having created these proceedings, has an obligation to ensure fair access to justice.