Browse regulations

Technical amendment rules to the Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 2022, making procedural corrections including typo fixes (exercised/executed, a at/at a), cross-reference corrections, formatting standardisation (09.00 hours), insertion of missing references, and addition of new Rule 166A specifying required content for administrator notices (court reference, institution details, administrator details, authentication).

These are purely technical corrections and procedural clarifications with no substantive regulatory burden. Typos and cross-reference errors that could cause confusion in insolvency proceedings should be fixed. The new Rule 166A simply codifies existing best practice for administrator notice content. Deletion would leave inaccurate, confusing rules that could cause procedural errors in insolvency cases, harming creditors and stakeholders.

Designates three specific geographic areas in the East Midlands (Centre of Excellence for Modern Construction, Hartington Tax Site, and Infinity Park Derby Tax Site) as 'special tax sites' under section 113(1) of the Finance Act 2021, effective 26th February 2025. The regulation uses map references to define boundaries and appears to confer tax advantages to businesses operating within these zones.

This regulation represents government picking winners and losers through tax policy, designating specific geographic areas for preferential tax treatment. This distorts market allocation of capital, creates unequal treatment between regions, and risks triggering a race to the bottom as other areas lobby for similar status. Genuine economic growth comes from allowing markets to determine productive investment, not from bureaucrats designating which areas deserve tax advantages. Such interventions suppress private-sector decision-making and create dependency on government favor rather than competitive merit.

These Regulations amend the Valuation Tribunal for England (Membership and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2009 by raising the general disqualification age from 72 to 75 for tribunal members. The change takes effect on 1st April 2025 and extends to England and Wales.

While raising the disqualification age from 72 to 75 is a marginal improvement over the status quo, the very existence of government-mandated disqualification ages for tribunal service is itself a paternalistic restriction on individual liberty and labor market flexibility. Such mandatory retirement ages have no clear justification—they force experienced professionals from service based solely on age rather than competence. The amendment addresses only the symptom (the specific number) rather than the underlying flaw (the principle of government-dictated retirement ages for tribunal service). A truly liberalised system would allow tribunal membership based on merit and fitness without arbitrary age caps. Furthermore, as a retained EU-derived instrument with minimal Parliamentary scrutiny, this regulation exemplifies the uncritical inheritance of bureaucratic constraints that post-Brexit regulatory reform should address.

Establishes the Hull and East Yorkshire Combined Authority as a body corporate, creates an elected mayor position for the area with elections on 1st May 2025 and every fourth year thereafter, transfers transport functions (bus services, local transport plans, highways, traffic management, permit schemes), housing and planning functions, business rates supplements powers, and various other functions from constituent councils (East Riding of Yorkshire and Kingston upon Hull) to the new Combined Authority, with certain functions exercisable only by the Mayor.

Creates a new layer of regional bureaucracy with an elected mayor, political advisers, and corporate structures that will increase administrative costs and political intervention in markets. The transfer of housing, planning, transport, and business rates functions to a new quango removes those functions from direct democratic accountability of existing councils. The concentration of planning powers under a mayoral development corporation framework risks exacerbating the very NIMBYism and restrictive zoning this Order should dismantle. Combined authorities are creatures of central government direction with no historical pedigree in Britain's free-trading tradition — Adam Smith's principles of voluntary exchange and minimal governmental interference suggest Britons would benefit from abolishing such regional coordination bodies rather than creating new ones.

These Regulations facilitate the transfer of Ministry of Defence Police staff employed at gas facilities to the Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA) on 1st April 2025. They apply TUPE-like protections to this specific transfer, preserving employment rights, contract terms, and providing pension protections by reference to the TUPE Regulations. Affected staff may object to the transfer, and MoD Police members become members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary under the Energy Act 2004.

This is a narrow, targeted administrative regulation implementing a specific workforce transfer between public sector bodies. It imposes no ongoing regulatory burden on businesses, creates no compliance costs for the private sector, and does not restrict competition or economic activity. Deleting it would leave affected employees without clear statutory protection during the transfer, potentially causing material detriment to hundreds of workers and creating legal uncertainty for both the transferor and transferee. It achieves its purpose through reference to existing TUPE frameworks rather than creating novel regulatory mechanisms.

These Regulations establish the Devon and Torbay Combined County Authority as a new local government body corporate, transferring to it numerous functions from constituent councils (Devon and Torbay) and district councils. The Authority receives housing and land functions (from the 2008, 1985, and 1990 Acts), transport functions (from the Transport Acts 1985 and 2000), highway authority functions, economic development functions, and related powers. The Regulations include provisions for concurrent exercise of functions during a transition period ending 31st March 2026, financial apportionment between constituent councils, and modifications to various Acts to accommodate the new Authority.

These Regulations create another regional bureaucratic layer that concentrates power away from local communities. The combined authority model has consistently failed to deliver housing supply — regional bodies typically amplify NIMBY restrictions rather than solve them. The transfer of housing, planning, and regeneration functions to yet another quango removes democratic accountability from local councils without any market mechanism to discipline decisions. The concurrent exercise provisions and complex consent requirements during the transition period add administrative friction without improving outcomes. Free markets require competitive jurisdiction, not consolidated regional authorities that smooth over local differences with bureaucratic uniformity.

The West Burton Solar Project Order 2025 is a Development Consent Order (DCO) made under the Planning Act 2008, granting development consent for a solar power generating station and associated development (including battery storage, substations, and grid connections). It confers compulsory purchase powers over land within Order limits, authorizes street works, temporarily disapplies various environmental and water-related legislation, grants the undertaker (West Burton Solar Project Limited) powers to alter streets and public rights of way during construction, and provides limited nuisance immunity for construction noise. The Order contains 35 articles plus 13 schedules covering requirements, streets subject to works, land plans, and various management plans.

This is not a regulatory burden in the sense contemplated by my mandate. It is project-specific consent legislation for a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project, not an EU-derived regulation or general regulatory instrument. As a DCO, it represents Parliament's decision that this specific energy project serves the public interest, having undergone examination via the Planning Inspectorate. Unlike directives that impose blanket restrictions, this grants specific rights to one entity subject to conditions. Furthermore, solar energy development supports energy market liberalization and reduces reliance on fossil fuels. Deleting this would not reduce regulation—it would simply prevent a specific approved project from proceeding.

Establishes the Greater Lincolnshire Combined County Authority (GLCCA), a new regional body corporate with a directly elected mayor. Transfers to the GLCCA functions previously exercised by constituent councils (Lincolnshire, North Lincolnshire, North East Lincolnshire) regarding housing, planning, compulsory acquisition, transport, highways, traffic enforcement, and business rate supplements. Creates Corporation entities for development purposes with powers corresponding to Mayoral development corporations under the 2011 Act. Contains provisions for mayoral consent requirements, concurrent exercise of functions during transition period ending 31st March 2026, and power for the Mayor to direct constituent councils on eligible powers under the 2023 Act.

Creates an unnecessary new bureaucratic layer duplicating functions already exercised by accountable local councils. The combined authority model concentrates power rather than dispersing it, reducing local democratic accountability. Powers to designate Mayoral development areas and compulsorily acquire land for 'regeneration' are prone to NIMBYism and political allocation of resources, distorting land markets. Business rate supplement functions enable taxation without proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Mayor's power to direct constituent councils under regulation 22 overrides local democracy. Overall this represents the kind of regional bureaucracy that fragments accountability and creates barriers to market-led development.

Establishes the Lancashire Combined County Authority (CCA) as a new regional governmental body to exercise functions previously held by constituent councils (Lancashire County Council, Blackpool, and Blackburn with Darwen). The CCA assumes extensive powers over housing provision and land development, transport planning and enforcement, highway authority functions, traffic management, economic development, and licensing. The regulation creates a corporate body with authority to acquire land, exercise compulsory purchase powers, implement permit schemes, levy charges, and coordinate regional planning under the guise of 'sustainable development' and 'good design' objectives.

Creates a costly new regional bureaucracy that concentrates power away from locally accountable councils. The CCA's housing and planning functions (including compulsory acquisition powers) codify government control over land use rather than allowing markets to determine development. The 'sustainable development' mandate enables planning restrictions that suppress housing supply and distort property markets. Transport functions will add to costs through a new levy system. This regulation exemplifies the NIMBY-planning nexus and regional bureaucracy that increases costs, reduces supply, and harms Britons by restricting both housing and economic freedom. It should be deleted to allow local governance and market forces to operate.

This Order (effective 6th February 2025) formally recognizes the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands as a superior court for purposes of the Judicial Committee Amendment Act 1895, thereby enabling the court's appeals to proceed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final appellate body for this British Overseas Territory.

While the Cayman Islands' semi-autonomous legal system is relatively removed from UK domestic regulatory concerns, this Order provides essential procedural clarity for appellate jurisdiction in a jurisdiction that handles substantial international commercial disputes. Without this recognition, legal uncertainty would arise regarding appeal rights and the constitutional relationship between Cayman courts and the Privy Council. The regulation imposes no economic burden or market distortion—it merely formalizes an existing constitutional arrangement for a British Overseas Territory.

The Exempt Charities Order 2025 declares St Mary's University, Twickenham to be an 'exempt charity' under the Charities Act 2011, exempting it from Charity Commission registration and oversight requirements that apply to most other charities.

This regulation exemplifies the arbitrary nature of charity law exemptions — creating differential regulatory treatment based on government designation rather than principle. There is no evident justification for why St Mary's University requires this specific exemption while comparable institutions do not. Such ad hoc exemptions distort competitive equivalence between educational institutions and perpetuate a system where institutional autonomy depends on state permission. The underlying framework of Charity Commission oversight itself warrants review rather than incremental exemptions that entrench selective regulatory relief.

This Order appoints Sir Ian Bauckham as the chief executive of the Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual), to be known as the Chief Regulator of Qualifications and Examinations, from 6th February 2025. It extends to England and Wales but applies in England only.

This is a routine appointment order filling an administrative vacancy in an existing regulatory body. Deleting it would leave Ofqual without a legally appointed chief executive, creating a governance vacuum in the body responsible for regulating qualifications and examinations in England. Unlike substantive regulatory instruments that impose new burdens, this merely fills an existing post and creates no new regulatory requirements on businesses or individuals.

This Order updates the monetary limits of liability for air carriers under Articles 21 and 22 of the Montreal Convention (an international treaty on air carrier liability). It applies across the UK and supersedes the 2021 version. The limits cover compensation for death/injury (Article 21) and baggage/delay claims (Article 22).

These are international treaty obligations under the Montreal Convention, which the UK has ratified. Far from restricting airlines, the liability caps actually protect carriers from unlimited litigation exposure. Deleting this would create legal uncertainty, fragment UK law from international standards, and harm the aviation sector's competitiveness by removing the predictability that facilitates commercial planning and insurance underwriting.

This Order amends the UK Emissions Trading Scheme Order 2020 to establish allocation rules for the 2026 scheme year. It defines '2026 incumbents' (installations with prior allocation history), categorizes them as type 1 or type 2, sets out detailed calculation methodologies for free allowance allocations, creates a 2026 allocation table, and modifies various procedural rules. It maintains the industry cap of 31,623,876 allowances and incorporates EU-derived Free Allocation Regulation concepts.

This regulation perpetuates a fundamentally flawed carbon allocation system that distorts market signals through administrative allocation rather than price mechanisms. The complex rules governing type 1/type 2 incumbents, sub-installations, reduction factors (0.7462 for electricity generators), ALC adjustments, and provisional figures create massive compliance burdens while achieving questionable environmental outcomes. Free allocation of emissions allowances is economically incoherent — it creates windfall profits for incumbents while the arbitrary industry cap is set by bureaucrats rather than market forces. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should mean replacing this EU-inherited scheme with a simple carbon tax, not maintaining and expanding its bureaucratic machinery. The rule allowing operators to 'renounce' allocation by June 2025 illustrates the distortive incentives — participants are gaming a system designed to appear market-based while functioning as central planning.

The Excise Duties (Miscellaneous Amendments and Revocations) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 amend the 2024 Regulations of the same name by omitting regulation 10. This is a deregulatory instrument that removes a previously enacted regulation from the statute book.

This regulation is a deregulatory measure that removes regulation 10 from the 2024 Regulations, reducing the regulatory stock. As a deregulatory action aligned with the goal of restoring Britain's free-trading heritage and reducing bureaucratic burden, keeping this amendment furthers that mission. Without evidence that omitting regulation 10 would cause harm to public health, safety, or market integrity, the default should favour removal over retention.