Browse regulations

A 1995 statutory instrument that transferred trust property from Herefordshire Health Authority to the Hereford Hospitals NHS Trust on 26 April 1995. It defines key terms (Authority, Trust, trust property) and effectuates a one-time administrative asset transfer within the NHS.

This Order is fully executed and obsolete — the property transfer occurred on 26 April 1995 and has long since been completed. There is no ongoing regulatory burden, restriction on trade, or market distortion. Retaining a completed administrative transfer order serves no purpose and clutters the statute book with historical relics that have no current effect.

A one-time administrative Order effective 26th April 1995 that transfers specified trust property from West Kent Health Authority to the newly established Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust, based on a schedule agreed by both parties on 7th December 1994.

This Order effected a single historical property transfer that occurred in 1995 — it has no ongoing regulatory function. It imposes no obligations, restrictions, or requirements on any party today. Like a completed contract, its purpose was exhausted the moment the transfer took effect. Maintaining such spent instruments on the statute book serves no legitimate regulatory purpose and contributes to unnecessary legislative clutter that obscures действующее law.

These 1995 Regulations establish the finance regime for grant-maintained schools and grant-maintained special schools in England, determining how maintenance grants are calculated and paid. They set out detailed formulas referencing comparable local authority-maintained schools, include provisions for school meals funding, contingencies, deficits, and special educational needs support. The Regulations layer upon previous years' finance regulations (1989-1994) and contain extensive cross-references and 'deemed' provisions assuming hypothetical comparable schools exist.

This regulation governs grant-maintained schools, a category that has been substantially reformed or abolished since 1995. The Regulations are saturated with complex cross-references to a cascade of predecessor regulations (1989-1994), creating an impenetrable thicket of bureaucratic formulas. The 'deemed' provisions (e.g., regulation 6(9) assumes comparable maintained schools exist even when they do not) exemplify the kind of fictional constructs that obscure rather than clarify funding decisions. The tolerance thresholds (80.01%, 88.9%) and the intricate fallback mechanisms for schools becoming grant-maintained at different points in the financial year suggest regulatory complexity serving bureaucratic convenience rather than educational outcomes. Post-1995 education reforms have rendered much of this regime obsolete.

This Order facilitates the transfer of trust property (items in a schedule prepared and agreed by the Authority and Trust on 8th December 1994) from the North and Mid Hampshire Health Authority to the Winchester and Eastleigh Healthcare NHS Trust, effective 26th April 1995. It is a machinery provision establishing the legal mechanism for the property transfer.

This Order effected a one-time administrative transfer of property that was completed on 26th April 1995. It has no ongoing regulatory effect, imposes no obligations, restricts no activity, and creates no ongoing bureaucratic burden. It is entirely retrospective, documenting a completed transaction between NHS bodies. There is no cost to Britons from deleting this spent instrument, as the transfer it authorized has already been executed and cannot be reversed by repealing the enabling legislation.

One-time administrative Order transferring trust property (specified items) from Buckinghamshire Health Authority to Stoke Mandeville Hospital NHS Trust, effective 26th April 1995. The schedule of property was agreed and signed by both parties on 28th October 1994.

This Order is entirely obsolete — it performed a single, one-time administrative function that was completed on 26th April 1995. The property transfer it effected has long since occurred and cannot be undone by repealing the instrument. It imposes no ongoing regulatory requirements, compliance burdens, or restrictions on trade or competition. As a purely historical record of a completed administrative action, it serves no current legal function that couldn't be established through alternative property documentation. Like many NHS reorganisation instruments from this era, it clutters the statute book without contributing any regulatory constraint or benefit.

Ministry of Defence Police (Police Committee) Regulations 1995 - A transitional statutory instrument that came into force on 1 May 1995, establishing the regulatory framework for the Ministry of Defence Police Committee and revoking the 1988 Regulations. The instrument serves primarily to update and re-enact the earlier regulations with such modifications as were thought necessary.

This regulation governs the governance structure of the Ministry of Defence Police Committee, which oversees a armed specialist police force protecting Ministry of Defence assets and personnel. While the regulation dates from 1995, it likely contains substantive provisions regarding committee membership, powers, and procedures that remain operationally necessary. Without this framework, the statutory governance structure for MoD Police oversight would be unclear. The potential existence of subsequent amendments does not justify deleting the primary instrument, as those amendments would presume its continued existence.

A 1995 Order designating Liberty Communications Limited's Applicable Systems as a public telecommunication system, effective 2nd May 1995.

This company-specific designation order from 1995 is an obsolete artifact of telecommunications liberalisation. The telecom sector has been fully liberalised for decades; such individual designations served a transitional purpose that no longer applies. Maintaining this on the statute books serves no purpose and represents the kind of micro-regulatory intervention that should be swept away.

These Regulations establish the remuneration framework for legal representatives providing legal aid in contempt proceedings under section 29 of the Legal Aid Act 1988. They set standard fees (£71.75 per day of appearance, split between advocate £45.75 and other representative £26.00), provide for exceptional circumstances claims to exceed standard fees, establish a claims submission process with 3-month time limits, and create review procedures for dissatisfied legal representatives. Fees are capped by reference to the Costs Regulations.

This regulation perpetuates government price-fixing in legal services, artificially suppressing legal aid remuneration below market rates. The standard fee structure creates barriers for competent legal representatives to undertake legally aided contempt work, reducing supply and quality of representation. The exceptional circumstances mechanism adds bureaucratic overhead without achieving genuine market equilibrium. The administrative apparatus for claims, further information requests, extensions, and review processes imposes compliance costs that further deter participation. Post-Brexit, this retained EU-derived scheme should be replaced with competitive market mechanisms or devolved to professional self-regulation rather than perpetuating Treasury-controlled fee schedules that distort the legal services market.

A 1995 amendment to the Legal Advice and Assistance Regulations 1989 that updates cross-references in regulation 4(1)(b) and regulation 30, substituting Schedule 6 for Part I of Schedule 1 to the Costs Regulations. It governs legal aid cost determinations for legal advice and assistance work done from 24th April 1995 onwards.

This is a technical machinery amendment that updates outdated cross-references in the 1989 Regulations after the Costs Regulations were restructured. Deleting it would leave the principal 1989 Regulations referencing a non-existent Schedule, creating legal uncertainty, inconsistent administration, and potential disputes over legal aid cost determinations. Without updated references, courts and legal practitioners could not determine which schedule governs legal aid costs. While legal aid itself involves government subsidy of legal services, this amendment merely corrects cross-references to enable the existing framework to function; it does not expand regulatory scope or add new burdens.

These Regulations amend the Legal Advice and Assistance at Police Stations (Remuneration) Regulations 1989 by substituting the Schedule containing remuneration rates for legal advice and assistance provided at police stations. They came into force on 24th April 1995 and apply to work done from that date onwards.

These regulations perpetuate government price-fixing for legal services at police stations, distorting the market for legal advice. While access to justice is a legitimate concern, state-determined remuneration schedules suppress competitive pricing and create inefficient allocation of legal resources. The market for police station legal advice would function better with competition-driven pricing or less distortionary alternatives such as portable regulations or open access rather than fixed fee schedules. Retaining these regulations maintains an artificial compensation structure that harms long-term market efficiency.

Amendment Regulations 1995 to the 1989 Duty Solicitor Remuneration Regulations, inserting definitions of 'contract' and 'franchisee' and amending regulation 5(2) to replace 'basic' with 'prescribed' rates and add reference to paragraph 1A for franchisee work. Applies to work done from 24th April 1995.

These regulations perpetuate the Legal Aid Board's administered price system for duty solicitor work, fixing remuneration rates that suppress competition and limit solicitor choice. The franchising concept introduced creates additional bureaucratic layers without addressing the fundamental problem: state-controlled pricing in legal services distorts the market, reduces supply, and produces the very wait time crises that plague publicly-funded legal assistance. The 1989 Regulations themselves should be reviewed as part of wholesale reform to introduce competitive pricing or private alternatives to this near-monopoly system.

Amendment regulations to the Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 1989, adjusting fee rates for legal aid work in criminal and care proceedings. Establishes prescribed hourly rates for preparation, advocacy, attendance, travelling/waiting, and routine correspondence. Sets standard fees for various proceeding types (jury trials, guilty pleas, appeals, committals). Differentiates between London rates (legal aid area 1), standard rates, and higher rates for franchisees. Updates various fee limits and substitutes new rate tables.

These regulations exemplify government price-fixing in legal services, a classic intervention that distorts market incentives. By artificially suppressing legal aid rates below market levels, they reduce the supply of willing legal aid providers, worsen access to justice through longer wait times, and drive experienced practitioners out of criminal legal aid work entirely. A Hayekian approach recognises that the state cannot possess the knowledge required to set 'correct' prices for legal services — only voluntary exchange can establish this. From a Misesian perspective, such price controls predictably produce shortages and quality degradation in the very sector they aim to protect. While access to legal representation is a legitimate societal interest, it is better achieved through funding mechanisms (vouchers, direct subsidies, or tiered support) that allow market rates rather than price controls that suppress supply. These regulations inherit and perpetuate a failing model.

Amendment Order 1995 that modifies the VAT (Special Provisions) Order 1992 by removing words referencing article 9 in article 8(2)(d) and omitting article 9 entirely — a deregulatory simplification removing an entire regulatory provision.

This Order reduces regulatory burden by deleting article 9 and its cross-references, simplifying VAT compliance. From a free-market perspective, removing regulations that distort supply, increase compliance costs, and create unnecessary complexity for businesses aligns with restoring Britain's competitive trading position. If article 9 imposed costs or restrictions without corresponding benefits, its deletion makes Britons better off by reducing deadweight losses and administrative burden on businesses.

The Value Added Tax (Treatment of Transactions) Order 1995 governs VAT treatment of second-hand goods and works of art imported under temporary admission procedures. It provides that transfers of ownership and related services for auction goods and exhibition artworks under temporary customs duty relief are treated as neither supply of goods nor services. The Order includes multiple exceptions and definitions covering works of art, antiques over 100 years old, and collectible items under section 21 of the VAT Act 1994.

This regulation exemplifies the type of complex, distortionary VAT carve-outs that burden British businesses. It grants preferential treatment to auction houses and art dealers while imposing intricate compliance obligations. The multiple exceptions (Article 3(1) exclusions, Article 4 carve-outs) reveal a patchwork that distorts market competition by favoring certain transaction types over others. Such targeted exemptions increase administrative complexity and compliance costs without clear justification beyond protecting particular industry interests. A simpler, more transparent VAT system would eliminate the need for this level of regulatory intervention.

This SI amends the 1993 Exmoor Environmentally Sensitive Areas Designation Order by converting hedgerow maintenance payment rates from £2.40 per 10 metres (24p per metre equivalent) to 24p per metre. It includes a transitional provision excluding payments relating to periods before 1 April 1995.

This is a retained EU-derived agri-environmental subsidy scheme that distorts farmer decision-making through payments contingent on land management practices. Such direct payments for environmental practices create bureaucratic compliance burdens, distort land markets, and represent government picking economic winners through designation. The scheme's administrative costs likely consume significant portions of payments, and similar environmental outcomes could be achieved through simpler mechanisms or private conservation agreements. Post-Brexit Britain should not maintain this bureaucratic payment apparatus inherited from EU CAP agri-environment schemes.