Browse regulations

The Non-Domestic Rate (Scotland) Order 1995 sets the non-domestic rate (business property rates) for Scotland at 43.2 pence per pound for the financial year 1995-96, pursuant to section 7B of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975.

This order pertains exclusively to tax rates for fiscal year 1995-96, rendering it entirely obsolete. As a one-year rate-setting instrument for a closed financial period, it imposes no ongoing regulatory burden. However, the underlying non-domestic rate regime itself represents a tax on commercial property that increases business costs and distorts investment decisions. Business rates have been widely criticised as a drag on High Street retail and commercial property development, contributing to vacant shops and deterring investment. The system, in part inherited from EU frameworks, lacks the competition and flexibility that would emerge from local government finance based on user-pays principles rather than centrally-prescribed tax rates.

This Order prohibits mopeds from being ridden in the subway beneath Malden Way (A3 trunk road) in Kingston Upon Thames, citing safety reasons, and revokes the 1970 Traffic Order that preceded it.

The prohibition restricts lawful use of a public route based on vehicle type with no demonstrated market failure or safety incident data justifying the ban. Such categorical prohibitions on specific vehicle types in specific locations represent the kind of micro-regulatory intervention that distorts travel choices and may merely divert mopeds to longer, potentially more dangerous alternative routes. Without evidence that this prohibition achieves its safety aim more effectively than less restrictive alternatives (signage, physical barriers, speed limits), it represents an unjustified constraint on freedom of movement.

This Order varied certain fees under section 48 of the Gaming Act 1968 by updating the sums specified in that section (previously amended by the 1992 Order). It came into force on 1 April 1995 and did not extend to Scotland. The 1992 Order was revoked upon commencement.

This Order perpetuates a fee structure imposed by the Gaming Act 1968, a penal statute regulating an entire industry. Such fee regulations act as barriers to entry, inflate compliance costs, and represent government price-setting rather than market determination. Gaming regulation in Britain has historically been used to restrict competition rather than merely protect consumers from fraud. The continuous amendment of fees through statutory instruments, rather than allowing market pricing, distorts incentive structures and contributes to restricted supply in a sector where competition would benefit consumers through better services and lower prices. Since this Order only updates figures in a pre-existing restrictive framework, its deletion would remove one component of the regulatory apparatus that inflates costs without corresponding benefit.

This Order amends the Gaming (Bingo) Act (Fees) Order 1986 by increasing two fee thresholds: from £145,000 to £148,000 in paragraph (a) and from £140,000 to £143,000 in paragraph (b). It also revokes the Gaming (Bingo) Act (Fees) (Amendment) Order 1992. The Order relates to fees under the bingo licensing regime established by the Gaming Act 1968.

This regulation increases regulatory fees on the bingo industry with no corresponding public benefit justification. Regulatory fees act as a cost of doing business that is passed on to consumers through higher prices or reduced service availability. The industry already operates under extensive licensing requirements under the Gaming Act 1968. Fee increases without demonstrated service improvement are purely extractive, reducing capital available for investment, innovation, and employment in a sector that competes with other leisure activities. The original 1986 Order and its amendments created this fee structure, and the cumulative effect of successive increases adds significant compliance burden over time.

This Order sets fees payable to the Gaming Board for Great Britain for lottery-related applications and registrations under the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976. It establishes: registration fees for societies (£550) and local authorities (£550), periodic fees of £55 every three years, per-lottery fees scaled by ticket sales (£65-£495), exemptions for small lotteries (£2,000 or less) and after 7 lotteries per year, inspection fees (£2), and lottery manager certification (£2,150). It revokes the 1993 Order.

This Order imposes regulatory fees that function as a tax on charitable fundraising through lotteries, reducing proceeds available for beneficial causes. The tiered fee structure based on lottery size creates compliance burdens and paperwork that disproportionately affect smaller societies. The exemption threshold of 7 lotteries per year acknowledges the regulatory burden but only partially mitigates it. The Gaming Board's regulatory oversight of lotteries - a voluntary transaction between willing participants - represents the kind of bureaucratic intervention that Adam Smith and classical liberal economists would caution against. Market mechanisms and consumer choice provide better protection than prior restraint through registration fees.

Administrative Order transferring trust property (land, buildings, and assets) from Nottingham Health Authority to Nottingham City Hospital NHS Trust on 14th March 1995, pursuant to NHS legislation establishing NHS Trusts.

This is a straightforward property transfer instrument resolving legal ownership of NHS assets between public bodies. Deletion would create title uncertainty and potential legal disputes over property rights, harming both the Authority and Trust's ability to operate. While the NHS monopoly is undesirable, this Order merely regularises an administrative rearrangement of public assets and imposes no regulatory burden on private enterprise or trade.

Experimental traffic order from 1995 establishing the A3 Trunk Road (Wandsworth) Red Route Clearway, prohibiting vehicles from stopping at any time on specified lengths of road. Contains extensive exemptions for taxis, coaches, doctors, disabled persons, loading/unloading, buses, emergency services, and Royal Mail. Suspends conflicting provisions in Wandsworth (Waiting and Loading Restrictions) Order 1976.

Red route clearway restrictions represent government control over road use that disproportionately benefits certain vehicle types (buses, taxis) while restricting others. The labyrinthine exemption structure (taxis, coaches, doctors, disabled, loading, buses, emergency, mail) reveals the regulation's fundamental arbitrariness—each exemption acknowledges a legitimate stopping need that the blanket prohibition ignores. Loading and unloading restrictions harm freight efficiency; the 20-minute loading limit imposes arbitrary constraints on commerce. Such time-based restrictions with minimal periods do not reflect actual road conditions or demand, serving only to concentrate enforcement discretion. The regulation suppresses flexible use of public road space in favor of bureaucratic control, displacing legitimate activities to less suitable areas and creating perverse incentives that harm the very traffic flow it claims to achieve.

Experimental traffic order establishing 'Red Route' controls on the A3 trunk road in Merton, prohibiting vehicles from stopping during specified restricted hours on designated lengths of road, with exemptions for taxis, coaches, doctors, disabled persons, loading/unloading, buses, emergency vehicles, and Royal Mail. Replaces/suspends the GLC 1977 No 107 Merton (Waiting and Loading) Order 1977.

Red Route restrictions are a quintessential example of regulatory interference in the free movement of goods and people — restricting stopping on a major trunk road imposes significant costs on commerce, delivery operations, and citizens while creating a complex web of exemptions that distort behavior. The numerous categorical exceptions (taxis, coaches, doctors, disabled badge holders, loading, buses, emergency services, Royal Mail) demonstrate that the underlying premise — that stopping should be broadly prohibited — is acknowledged as unworkable without exceptions, suggesting the regulation itself is flawed. Less restrictive traffic management approaches exist that would achieve flow objectives without centrally dictating when and where vehicles may stop. The regulation suppresses the natural use of public highway space for economic activity.

This Order establishes the A3 Trunk Road (Kingston upon Thames) Red Route Clearway, prohibiting vehicles from stopping at any time on specified lengths of road. The 1995 experimental order contains extensive exemptions for disabled badge holders, licensed taxi cabs, coaches, doctors, solo motorcycles, vehicles being loaded/unloaded, buses at stops/stands, Royal Mail vehicles, and emergency services. It suspends the existing Kingston upon Thames (Waiting and Loading Restriction) (No 1) Traffic Order 1994 in so far as it relates to the clearway.

This 1995 experimental order has presumably become permanent despite having no democratic review of its continued existence. The blanket prohibition on stopping restricts property rights and economic activity without adequate justification. The extensive exemption list (taxis, coaches, doctors, disabled persons, loading/unloading, buses, Royal Mail, etc.) demonstrates the regulation's fundamental flaw—it prohibits behaviour that the authorities actually deem necessary in many circumstances, creating a patchwork of arbitrary exceptions. Red route clearways have expanded across London without evidence that benefits outweigh costs; they restrict highway use rights and drive traffic to less suitable routes. As an EU-derived traffic regulation retained post-Brexit, this should have been reviewed by Parliament rather than persisting indefinitely.

This Order establishes a 'Red Route' clearway experimental scheme on the A3 trunk road in Merton, prohibiting vehicles from stopping at any time on specified lengths of road. Implemented March 21, 1995, it creates a blanket no-stopping restriction with numerous exemptions including disabled persons, taxis, coaches, doctors, motorcycles, loading/unloading operations, buses, emergency vehicles, and Royal Mail. The Order suspends the pre-existing GLC 1977 No 107 Merton (Waiting and Loading) Order 1977 in affected areas and grants the Traffic Director for London power to modify provisions.

This 1995 experimental traffic order imposed blanket stopping restrictions on a major trunk road without adequate parliamentary scrutiny, creating a criminal offense for a basic liberty—stopping one's vehicle on a public road. The extensive exemption list (doctors, disabled, taxis, coaches, delivery vehicles, buses, etc.) reveals the regulation's fundamental problem: it prohibits an activity that society legitimately needs, then musters dozens of exceptions to patch over the flaw. Red route clearways harm local businesses by deterring customer stops, drive economic activity to less regulated areas, and impose compliance costs. Such traffic control measures are quintessentially local decisions that should be made by democratically accountable local authorities, not dictated by a central Traffic Director. Post-Brexit regulatory independence provides opportunity to repeal this type of bureaucratic restriction inherited from an era of over-regulation.

This Order establishes 'red route' experimental traffic controls on the A3 Trunk Road in Kingston upon Thames, prohibiting vehicles from stopping during specified restricted hours on designated lengths of road. It provides extensive exemptions for disabled persons, loading/unloading, buses, coaches, taxis, doctors' vehicles, motorcycles, Royal Mail, and emergency services. The Order suspends the prior Kingston upon Thames (Waiting and Loading Restriction) Traffic Order 1994 in so far as it relates to the red route. The order came into force on 21st March 1995 as an 'experimental' measure.

Red route controls serve legitimate traffic management functions on a major trunk road, preventing obstructive parking that would cause congestion on an arterial route. While government intervention in road usage carries inherent costs, the extensive exemptions built into this Order (disabled persons, loading, buses, taxis, emergency services, etc.) represent reasonable accommodations that minimise harm while achieving the objective of keeping major roads flowing. Deletion would likely increase congestion on this trunk road, harming businesses that depend on efficient transportation. The experimental nature and specific local scope distinguish this from the EU-derived regulatory burden Better Britain targets.

Scottish regulations from 1995 providing statutory compensation for local government employees who lost jobs due to redundancy or premature retirement during a reorganisation period (April 1995 - March 1997). Sets eligibility conditions based on age and service length, prescribes compensation formulas (up to 66 weeks remuneration), and amends the 1979 and 1994 Regulations. Applies to public sector bodies including local authorities, water boards, and passenger transport executives.

The prescribed period (April 1995 - March 1997) expired over 29 years ago, making the core operative provisions functionally obsolete historical artifacts. As a transitional measure tied to a specific reorganisation now complete, these regulations served their purpose and should be repealed. Furthermore, mandated redundancy compensation schemes distort labor markets by artificially increasing public sector employment costs, reducing workforce flexibility, and creating barriers to efficient reorganisation — the exact opposite of the dynamic free-market approach that made Britain great.

A local statutory instrument transferring trust property (items specified in a schedule agreed between North Cumbria Health Authority and Carlisle Hospitals NHS Trust on 14 November 1994) from the Authority to the Trust, effective 15 March 1995. Purely administrative machinery for an intra-NHS property transfer.

This is administrative machinery, not regulatory burden. Without this Order, the agreed property transfer lacks legal effect, creating title uncertainty for the NHS Trust and potential disruption to healthcare service delivery. The transfer was jointly agreed by both parties; deleting it serves no liberalising purpose and would merely create legal chaos for an already-decided administrative matter.

Administrative order transferring trust property from North West Lancashire Health Authority to Guild Community Healthcare NHS Trust on 15th March 1995. Defines key terms (Authority, Trust, trust property) and formalises the property schedule agreed between parties on 11th November 1994.

This Order served its singular purpose in March 1995 and is now entirely spent. As a one-time administrative property transfer with no ongoing regulatory mechanisms, it imposes no current burden on competition, enterprise, or healthcare supply. Retaining it on the statute book serves no practical purpose — the transfer it authorised has long been executed and there are no residual obligations. Obsolete administrative orders should be cleared to maintain a purposeful statute book.

A 1995 statutory instrument that transferred trust property from the Ealing Hammersmith and Hounslow Health Authority to the newly established Hounslow and Spelthorne Community and Mental Health NHS Trust on 15th March 1995. It defines key terms and provides for the mechanical transfer of assets specified in a schedule agreed by both parties.

This Order effected a one-time administrative transfer of NHS property in 1995 that has long since been completed. It imposes no ongoing regulatory burden, creates no restrictions on trade or competition, and has no bearing on market access, private healthcare supply, or planning permission. The transfer it authorized is irreversible and already fully executed. Keeping an obsolete administrative transfer order on the statute books serves no purpose and adds unnecessary legislative clutter without providing any benefit that a simple record-keeping system could not achieve at far lower cost.