Browse regulations

These regulations establish annual licence charge calculations for wireless telegraphy licences in the 3.4 GHz and 3.6 GHz frequency bands, using a CPI-indexation formula. They apply to holders of Spectrum Access 3.4 GHz and 3.6 GHz to 3.8 GHz licence classes, with payments due on 15th November each year, and revoke the 2019 versions of these regulations.

Spectrum licence fees indexed to inflation impose compounding cost increases on licensees with no corresponding service improvement. OFCOM's monopoly on spectrum allocation means these charges function as a de facto tax on mobile network operators, raising costs that are passed to consumers and eroding the competitiveness of UK telecom firms against operators in jurisdictions with lighter regulatory burdens. The CPI indexation creates a ratchet effect ensuring fees always rise, regardless of market conditions or spectrum usage efficiency.

Sets a £10,000 cap on damages recoverable in court reviews under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, with an exception where failure to disapply the cap would breach Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.

This regulation shields the government and its agencies from full liability exposure when individuals challenge sanctions-related decisions, creating a one-sided risk allocation that distorts incentives for both parties. By capping damages at £10,000, it reduces the cost of government error or overreach while limiting victims' compensation to amounts that may be grossly inadequate relative to actual harm suffered. Such caps on private litigation outcomes are inherently interventionist and perpetuate a culture of governmental immunity. The exception for Convention rights does not save the rule—it merely acknowledges that some breach would be so severe that even this inadequate remedy must be available, confessing the cap's insufficiency. Full private law liability creates proper incentives for the state to act carefully; capping it encourages reckless exercise of sanctions powers knowing liability is artificially constrained.

A commencement regulation that brings section 13 of the Elections Act 2022 into force on 26th October 2022, with a saving provision excluding elections where the poll date predates the ordinary day of election in 2023.

This is a procedural commencement instrument with no regulatory burden. Without it, section 13 of the Elections Act 2022 would lack a specified commencement date, creating legal uncertainty around when and how the provision applies to elections. The saving provision provides a reasonable transition period. Deleting this would create administrative chaos for electoral administration rather than reduce any economic or regulatory burden on citizens or businesses.

The Railways (Penalty Fares) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 amend the 2018 Regulations to create England-specific penalty fare rules. Key changes include: defining penalty fares in England as £100 (or £50 if paid within 21 days) plus the full single fare; specifying travel authorization destinations; adding 'time on appeal' provisions that freeze the 21-day payment period during appeals; requiring collectors to provide additional information including reduction amounts and authorized destination stations; mandating refunds of amounts exceeding the full single fare within 10 working days; and requiring signage in English stations with specific wording. The regulations apply only to England.

This regulation perpetuates government price-fixing of penalty fares at £100/£50, preventing rail operators from competing on penalty fare policies. The 21-day discount window is a government-mandated price control, not a market mechanism. While consumer protections exist (refunds, appeals), these add compliance costs and administrative burden that increase rail operator costs and ultimately train fares. The fundamental approach—government prescribing exactly how penalty fares work, including precise amounts, wording requirements, and procedures—represents regulatory overreach that should be a matter of commercial contract between operators and passengers. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should be used to remove such interventions, not preserve them. The original 2018 Regulations inherited from EU frameworks should have been repealed entirely rather than amended with additional prescriptive requirements.

Commencement regulation specifying dates for when various provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2021 come into force: Court Martial constitution (1 Jan 2023), Service Police Complaints Commissioner appointment (1 Nov 2022), and tri-service serious crime unit framework (5 Dec 2022).

This is a procedural commencement instrument that merely schedules effective dates for provisions already enacted by Parliament in the Armed Forces Act 2021. Deleting it would create legal uncertainty regarding when critical military justice provisions take effect, potentially leaving Service Police oversight mechanisms and the Court Martial without clear operational dates. As a pure administrative scheduling instrument with no independent regulatory burden, it merely facilitates democratic will already expressed through primary legislation.

The Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2022 amend the 2018 RHI Regulations to: (1) create a 'proposed plant' definition for unaccredited ground source heat pumps/shared ground loop systems, (2) modify capacity modification procedures for such proposed plants, (3) temporarily disapply wood pellet quality requirements for 12 months, and (4) grant the Secretary of State power to further suspend wood pellet standards during supply disruptions.

The RHI scheme is a government subsidy programme that distorts the energy market by picking winners and losers. These amendments extend bureaucratic oversight to 'proposed plants' before they receive accreditation, adding regulatory control over private investment decisions. The temporary suspension of wood pellet quality standards during supply disruptions removes accountability from an industry that cannot meet established quality benchmarks, effectively bailing out participants who relied on government-mandated preferences. Rather than reducing intervention, this regulation adds new compliance layers and government discretion over an already distorted subsidy regime.

Post-Brexit amendment to Public Sector Bodies Accessibility Regulations 2018 that removes EU institutional references (European Commission, Official Journal, harmonised standards) and replaces them with UK equivalents (Minister for the Cabinet Office). Updates reporting deadlines from 2021 to 2024, changes reporting obligation from EU Commission to published UK report, and revokes three EU Implementing Decisions. Preserves the substantive accessibility requirement (WCAG Level A and AA compliance).

This amendment merely substitutes 'Brussels' for 'London' without reducing regulatory burden. The underlying 2018 Regulations imposed EU-derived accessibility mandates on public sector bodies without evidence of market failure or proper cost-benefit analysis. WCAG standards are internationally developed by W3C and can be adopted voluntarily or through procurement standards without statutory mandate. The reporting requirements and model accessibility statement provisions create bureaucratic compliance costs for already resource-constrained public sector bodies. Replacing EU Commission oversight with Cabinet Office oversight provides no meaningful regulatory relief — public sector bodies remain subject to the same compliance obligations. A genuinely free-trading Britain would trust public procurement and market demand for accessibility rather than mandating it through retained EU law.

Amendment to the Digital Government (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018 that extends the disclosure framework to include the Scottish early learning and childcare objective. Allows specified persons (under Schedule 4 of the relevant Act) and service providers to share information to identify parents of relevant children and make contact for purposes of fulfilling duties under section 47 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014. Does not extend to Northern Ireland.

This is a narrow, Scotland-specific data sharing provision for early learning and childcare coordination between public sector bodies. It does not impose regulatory burdens on private businesses, appears to be domestically derived rather than EU-derived gold-plating, and serves a targeted public service purpose. The information sharing is limited to specific enumerated persons and a defined public policy objective. Deletion would impair coordination of early years services in Scotland without producing offsetting economic benefits.

The Energy Bill Relief Scheme Regulations 2022 established a temporary government support scheme for non-domestic electricity and gas customers in Great Britain, providing discounts on energy supply prices from October 2022 to March 2023. The scheme required suppliers to apply discounts calculated against a government-supported price, with suppliers recovering the difference from the Secretary of State. The regulations defined contract types (fixed, flexible, variable price), set maximum discounts, and established reconciliation mechanisms.

The scheme was explicitly a time-limited emergency measure (Oct 2022 – Mar 2023) that has now expired. As a subsidy intervention, it distorted energy market price signals, prevented necessary economic adjustment to higher wholesale prices, risked propping up inefficient businesses, and created taxpayer burdens. While enacted during an energy crisis, retaining the regulatory framework serves no ongoing purpose — the reconciliation provisions can be addressed through sunset clauses rather than maintaining the entire interventionist apparatus. Post-Brexit Britain should reject permanent subsidisation frameworks that replicate EU-style market distortion.

These Regulations implement the Energy Bill Relief Scheme for heat networks, requiring intermediaries (heat suppliers via heat networks) who receive scheme benefits (discounts on energy supply prices) to pass those benefits on to end users. They establish: notification requirements (regulation 4) obliging intermediaries to inform end users of benefits received; pass-through requirements (regulation 5) mandating benefits be passed to end users via bills, credits, or adjustments; complex calculation methodology for pass-through amounts (regulation 6) allowing intermediaries to retain amounts reflecting their costs and losses; billing information modifications (regulation 7) requiring disclosure of pass-through calculations; civil debt recovery for non-compliance (regulation 8); mandatory membership in Energy Ombudsman redress schemes (regulation 9); and information reporting requirements to authorities (regulation 11). The scheme was effective from November 2022 to address the 2022 energy crisis.

These regulations impose substantial ongoing compliance costs on heat suppliers through complex notification, calculation, billing, and reporting requirements that have no automatic sunset mechanism despite being designed for the 2022 energy crisis. The pass-through mechanism, while theoretically sound, creates administrative burden that is disproportionate to benefits in non-crisis conditions. Without these regulations, heat network customers would still receive EBRS support directly from energy suppliers under the EBRS Regulations themselves; the intermediary layer merely adds cost and complexity. The elaborate enforcement machinery (civil debt recovery, redress schemes, information powers, civil sanctions) represents regulatory overreach for what should have been a simple, temporary subsidy with clear termination dates.

These 2022 regulations implement pass-through requirements for the Energy Bills Support Scheme (EBSS) and Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) - emergency measures providing £400 energy bill discounts and price caps during the 2022 energy crisis. They require 'relevant intermediaries' (landlords, park home site owners, etc.) who receive scheme benefits on behalf of end users (tenants, residents) to pass those benefits through to end users. The regulations set out calculation methods for pass-through amounts, notification requirements, and enforcement via civil debt recovery with interest.

These are emergency regulations from November 2022, timed to coincide with the 2022 energy crisis caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent gas price spike. By 2026, the emergency conditions that justified these regulations have passed - energy prices have normalised and the EPG has been phased out. These regulations impose significant compliance burdens on intermediaries including complex calculation rules, notification requirements, record-keeping, and potential civil liability. The cost of compliance for landlords, park home operators, and other intermediaries likely exceeds the administrative benefit to tenants in many cases. As temporary crisis legislation, these regulations should have been repealed already. Keeping them in force creates ongoing compliance costs without corresponding benefit, since the underlying schemes have ended. The pass-through mechanism, while well-intentioned, adds bureaucratic overhead to energy provision that is no longer justified by emergency conditions.

These Regulations implement the pass-through requirements for the Energy Bill Relief Scheme (EBRS), requiring 'relevant intermediaries' (landlords, managing agents, site operators etc.) who receive energy bill discounts under the EBRS to pass those benefits through to their end users (tenants, residents etc.). They set out calculation rules for 'just and reasonable' pass-through amounts, notification requirements to end users within 30 days, and enforcement mechanisms allowing end users to recover unpaid pass-through amounts as civil debt with interest (Bank of England base rate + 2%). The scheme applies from 1st October 2022 to 31st March 2023.

While designed to ensure government energy relief reaches intended beneficiaries, this regulation adds significant compliance burden and distorts price signals. Intermediaries must track scheme benefits, calculate proportional pass-through amounts, notify end users within 30 days, and maintain records for potential appeals — imposing administrative costs that may exceed the pass-through benefits for small intermediaries. The regulation's existence reflects a deeper problem: the EBRS itself intervened in energy markets. Rather than correcting this distortion, it layers additional mandated pass-through obligations on top. Most critically, it creates a paternalistic framework assuming intermediaries will abscond with benefits, when contractual relationships and market competition would normally discipline such behavior. The threat of civil debt recovery and interest claims adds a litigation dimension to what should be simple commercial arrangements between parties.

The Energy Prices (Designated Domestic Energy Price Reduction Schemes for Great Britain and Designated Bodies) Regulations 2022, effective 1st November 2022, designate the Energy Price Guarantee schemes for domestic electricity and gas consumers in Great Britain under the Energy Prices Act 2022. It also designates district councils in England with county councils as designated bodies for administering these schemes.

This regulation implements the Energy Price Guarantee — a government price cap on energy — which distorts market signals, discourages investment in energy infrastructure, and misallocates resources. Creating designated bodies to administer price controls introduces bureaucratic overhead and perpetuates market intervention that should be phased out. Post-Brexit Britain should allow energy markets to function freely, enabling price signals to guide supply, investment, and consumption decisions. Such price control mechanisms were emergency interventions that should be deleted rather than retained as permanent features of the regulatory landscape.

These Regulations extend the Energy Prices Act 2022 to Northern Ireland only, providing definitional clarity for 'NI domestic electricity supply' and 'NI domestic gas supply' for purposes of domestic energy price interventions. They define domestic supply based on premises use and tariff application, establishing which electricity and gas supplies qualify under the price control regime.

This SI is a definitional extension of the Energy Prices Act 2022's price control regime to Northern Ireland. Price controls distort market signals, create supply inefficiencies, and typically require ongoing government intervention. The definitional structure artificially segregates customers into 'domestic' categories eligible for price caps versus commercial users who bear higher costs, distorting supplier pricing behavior and cross-subsidisation patterns. As a purely definitional instrument enabling price controls rather than addressing any market failure directly, its continued existence perpetuates market distortions and reduces incentives for energy suppliers to invest in supply capacity or efficiency improvements. The underlying Energy Prices Act 2022 itself reflects a misguided approach to energy affordability through price control rather than supply expansion.

The Energy Bill Relief Scheme (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2022 established emergency government subsidies for non-domestic electricity and gas customers in Northern Ireland during the energy price crisis. It created the 'electricity scheme' and 'gas scheme' (collectively 'the scheme'), providing discounts calculated as the difference between a reference wholesale price and a government-supported price, capped by a maximum discount. The scheme applied to supply contracts for energy supplied from 1st October 2022 to 31st March 2023, with suppliers applying discounts to customer bills and subsequently recovering the difference from the Secretary of State. The regulations defined various contract types (fixed price, variable price, flexible price, DAI price), established discount calculation methodologies, and created reconciliation and recovery mechanisms.

This regulation is a temporary emergency subsidy scheme that has already expired (scheme period ended 31 March 2023). As a market intervention, it distorted energy prices during the crisis period by artificially capping costs for non-domestic customers, creating moral hazard and over-consumption. Its retention serves no ongoing purpose. While energy price support may be warranted during crises, such interventions should be time-limited and revisited—leaving this regulation on the books creates precedent for permanent intervention, imposes administrative compliance burdens, and leaves in place rules governing recovery claims and reconciliation that are relics of a past emergency. The regulation should be repealed in its entirety as an expired, distortive intervention whose purpose has been served.