Browse regulations

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (US Regulated Market Equivalence) Regulations 2022 determine that 16 US futures exchanges (including CME, CBOE, ICE, CBOT, NYMEX, and others) are equivalent to UK requirements under EMIR for OTC derivatives clearing. It allows UK entities to recognize these US markets post-Brexit and revokes the prior EU equivalence decision.

This regulation restricts market access by requiring government equivalence determinations rather than allowing open competition. It arbitrarily limits recognition to 16 named US exchanges while excluding other legitimate foreign markets. Britons would benefit from a fully open system where firms can access any market that meets basic standards, rather than Treasury officials picking winners. While deletion would create transitional uncertainty, the market itself is better positioned than bureaucrats to determine which venues offer value.

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These Regulations amend the Scotland Act 2016 Commencement No. 5 Regulations 2017 by further delaying the commencement of section 23(5) (payment of benefits for maternity, funeral and heating expenses in Scotland) from 1 April 2020 to 1 April 2023. They also revoke the 2019 Amendment Regulations which had previously made a similar change.

This is a pure administrative timing instrument that merely postpones an already-delayed commencement date. It creates no regulatory obligations, imposes no compliance burdens on businesses, restricts no economic activity, and adds no gold-plating. Deleting it would simply leave the underlying commencement date unchanged or require fresh subordinate legislation — neither outcome harms economic liberty. The regulation serves no independent purpose beyond marking time on devolved welfare provisions.

The Trade in Dual-Use Items (Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 amends retained EU Council Regulation 428/2009, which establishes the UK's export control regime for dual-use items (goods, software, and technology that can be used for both civilian and military purposes). The amendments make technical corrections: adding a definition of 'Resolution', fixing abbreviations and typographical errors, updating cross-references (e.g., 1B234 to 1B235), correcting temperature range wording, standardising 'aluminium' spelling, and clarifying notes regarding cultivation chambers and isolators.

These are technical corrections that improve the precision of retained EU law without expanding regulatory burden. The underlying export control regime for dual-use items serves legitimate national security and non-proliferation objectives. Deleting these amendments would leave inconsistencies in the regulatory text (misspelled words, incorrect cross-references, missing definitions) while the base export control requirements would persist. Britons would be worse off with a less coherent legal framework governing exports of potentially dangerous items, creating compliance uncertainty and potential security gaps.

Amends the Energy Performance of Buildings (England and Wales) Regulations 2012 to reduce two administrative fees for entering data onto the energy performance register: from £1.64 to £1.50 (paragraph a) and from £1.89 to £1.70 (paragraph b). Extends to England and Wales, in force 1 April 2022.

This amendment merely adjusts administrative fees downward on an EU-inherited regulatory regime without addressing the underlying compliance burden. The Energy Performance of Buildings regime, derived from the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, imposes costs on property transactions through mandatory certificates and register entries that add friction to the housing market without clear evidence of net benefit. Fee reductions, while directionally welcome, do nothing to reduce the fundamental regulatory overhead of this scheme. The original 2012 regulations should be reviewed in their entirety as part of the retained EU law cull — this amendment addresses only a symptom, not the disease.

The Trade Remedies (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2022 amend three EU Exit statutory instruments governing UK trade remedies. Key changes include: adding 'overseas producer' definitions; modifying 'pace of liberalisation' for safeguards; and creating a new Part 3A establishing a formal exemption review process allowing importers or overseas exporters to seek exemption from UK trade remedies measures (anti-dumping/countervailing duties) that originated as EU measures extended after EU circumvention reviews. The regulations also amend transition review requirements and expand appeal/reconsideration rights.

This regulation expands, rather than contracts, the apparatus of trade intervention. While creating an exemption mechanism, it preserves and institutionalises anti-dumping and countervailing duties—protectionist instruments that distort markets by imposing tariffs on imports deemed to be 'unfairly' priced. The exemption process introduces multiple layers of bureaucracy (TRA review, Secretary of State decisions, public notices, appeal rights) without addressing the fundamental harm of the underlying duties. Rather than liberalising trade, it creates additional government discretion over who may or may not escape import restrictions. The circumvention review framework imported from EU law (Article 13 anti-dumping, Article 23 countervailing) codifies the very protectionism Britain should be shedding post-Brexit.

These are commencement regulations for the Sentencing Act 2020, bringing into force on 6th April 2022 specific provisions (paragraphs 81-83 of Schedule 22) relating to minimum sentences for firearms offences and repeat weapon offences. The regulations also make technical amendments to Schedule 20 and section 315 to substitute actual dates for placeholder 'amendment date' references.

These are administrative commencement provisions that merely activate already-enacted parliamentary legislation. Without this instrument, the Sentencing Act 2020 provisions would not take effect on the intended date, creating legal uncertainty. The technical amendments substituting '6th April 2022' for undefined 'amendment dates' are necessary for the legislation to function coherently. As machinery for implementing democratic legislation rather than independent regulatory burden, deletion would cause confusion and operational problems without reducing any substantive regulatory requirement.

Amends the Social Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001 to increase the main Class 1 National Insurance rate from 5.85% to 7.1% for earnings paid before 6 November 2022-23, in effect raising NICs for both employees and employers during that period.

This regulation raises the National Insurance contribution rate, increasing the tax burden on employment. Higher NIC rates increase labor costs for employers and reduce take-home pay for employees, creating disincentives to hire and work. From a free-market perspective grounded in Mises, Hayek, and Friedman, this is a tax increase that distorts the labor market, reduces employment opportunities, and erodes the competitiveness of British businesses. The revenue raised does not justify the economic harm caused by higher labor costs.

Commencement regulation that brings into force various provisions of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 on 6th April 2022, including sections on sale/delivery of corrosive products, bladed articles, offensive weapons restrictions, and related enforcement powers. Includes saving provisions for pre-commencement deliveries.

This regulation merely commences an Act that restricts legitimate commerce in corrosive products and bladed articles, imposes criminal penalties for possessing weapons on further education premises, and grants broad search powers. While commencement regulations are technically procedural, this one activates a regime that: restricts sale of kitchen knives and other legitimate products to adults; creates criminal liability for possessing common items; and enables searches for corrosive substances with minimal justification. The underlying Offensive Weapons Act 2019 was itself likely gold-plated EU-inspired legislation. The saving provisions demonstrate the regulation's burden on ordinary commercial activity. Deleting this commencement would preserve parliamentary time for genuine economic reform and signal intent to review the restrictive substantive law.

These Regulations amend EU Regulation 576/2013 on non-commercial pet animal movement, inserting a new point 2A into Annex 4 which creates an exception to point 2(b). The exception allows dogs and other pets to be imported without meeting standard rabies vaccination timing requirements if they have undergone an antibody test (≥0.3 EU/ml using ELISA method) meeting OIE validation standards. The Regulations apply to England only, came into force the day after being made, and were set to expire on 1st October 2022.

The regulation has already expired (1st October 2022), making its substantive effect void. More fundamentally, the antibody testing pathway creates ongoing compliance costs (laboratory fees, waiting periods, administrative burden) that burden pet owners and transporters without proportionate public health benefit — rabies antibody levels naturally decline over time and the 0.3 EU/ml threshold is an arbitrary cutoff that restricts trade in pets unnecessarily. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should have been used to simplify pet movement rules, not create additional derogations to existing restrictions. A free-trading Britain should trust pet owners and veterinarians rather than mandate government-administered tests with rigid validation standards from an external body (OIE).

A correction Order that amends the South Humber Bank Energy Centre Order 2021 by correcting drafting errors, with corrections detailed in a Schedule (column 1 location, column 2 method, column 3 substituted/inserted/omitted text). Comes into force 5th April 2022.

This is a technical correction Order that remedies drafting errors in the parent Order 2021. It does not impose new regulatory burdens or restrictions — it merely corrects mistakes that could otherwise cause legal uncertainty or unintended effects. Deleting this would leave uncorrected errors in force. As a mechanical administrative fix rather than a new regulatory intervention, Britons are not worse off with it in place.

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The East Anglia ONE North Offshore Wind Farm Order 2022 grants development consent for a 800MW offshore wind farm off the Suffolk coast under the Planning Act 2008 regime. It authorises: wind turbine generators with foundations, offshore electrical platforms, inter-array and export cables, onshore grid connection works including substations, and associated infrastructure. The Order contains 43 numbered works, deemed marine licences under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, compulsory acquisition powers for land and rights, temporary use permissions, street works authority, and approximately 40 associated management plans and strategies addressing ornithology, fisheries, archaeology, navigation, drainage, and traffic. It grants the undertaker (East Anglia ONE North Limited) power to transfer or lease consent benefits to other licence holders.

This Order exemplifies the state picking winners in energy infrastructure through project-specific consent rather than technology-neutral market mechanisms. It grants coercive compulsory purchase powers overriding property rights for private commercial benefit. The 40+ compliance plans and strategies (outline fisheries liaison, outline SPA crossing method, outline Sabellaria reef management, etc.) demonstrate regulatory overreach that adds cost without proportional benefit. While offshore wind may be commercially viable without mandated consent, the Planning Act 2008 regime forces developers through an昂贵且耗时的审批程序 rather than allowing competitive energy markets to determine infrastructure deployment. The Order's extensive NIMBY-protective provisions (activity exclusion zones, red-throated diver protocols) codify restrictions that raise costs and limit innovation in renewable energy deployment.

The East Anglia TWO Offshore Wind Farm Order 2022 is a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) development consent order granting planning permission, deemed marine licences, and compulsory acquisition powers for a 800MW offshore wind farm off the Suffolk coast. The Order comes into force on 22nd April 2022, establishes the undertaker (East Anglia TWO Limited), defines approximately 100 technical terms, grants development consent for the authorised development comprising Work Nos. 1-43 (offshore turbines, platforms, cables, and onshore substations), authorises ancillary works, provides for street works, temporary stopping up of rights of way, compulsory land acquisition, and includes 14 schedules containing requirements, deemed marine licences, and various outline management plans covering construction practice, traffic, ornithology, fisheries, archaeology, and landscape ecology.

This Order exemplifies the fundamental problem with Britain's planning regime: it is not a regulation that government should be in the business of issuing at all. The NSIP regime concentrates enormous coercive powers—compulsory acquisition of land, deemed marine licences bypassing standard consenting, and 14 schedules of requirements—into a single executive instrument that bypasses ordinary democratic planning processes. While the stated goal is clean energy, the mechanism is state-directed infrastructure approval that distorts the energy market, creates barriers to entry for alternative energy solutions, and establishes precedent for further intervention. A genuinely free-market energy policy would allow private actors to develop energy infrastructure subject to property rights and common law liabilities, not require them to navigate 500+ pages of ministerial discretion. The Order's 100+ definitions, 14 schedules, and dozens of 'outline' plan requirements demonstrate the compliance burden that makes Britain uncompetitive compared to jurisdictions with simpler permitting regimes. Most critically, the compulsory purchase powers violate the classical liberal principle that private property rights should not be overridden except for truly public purposes—and even then, only with full compensation through transparent judicial process, not administrative orders. This Order should be deleted as a paradigm case of how government intervention distorts the energy market, erodes property rights, and creates regulatory barriers that make Britain less dynamic.

The Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Russian Aircraft) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022 prohibit Russian aircraft (owned, chartered, operated by persons connected with Russia, registered in Russia, or flying with a Russia-related flight plan) from UK airspace. Exceptions exist with Secretary of State or air traffic control permission. This implements UK sanctions policy against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.

This is a targeted sanctions measure against an adversarial state that invaded a European country, not a bureaucratic regulatory burden. It is not EU-derived, not gold-plating, and serves a clear national security purpose aligned with international allies. Deleting it would leave Britons worse off by undermining sanctions enforcement against a hostile nation, damaging diplomatic relationships with allies, and creating security gaps in UK airspace. The regulation includes appropriate exemptions for legitimate purposes.