Browse regulations

The Nottinghamshire County Council (City of Nottingham) (Staff Transfer) Order 1998 was made consequential on the Nottinghamshire (City of Nottingham) (Structural Change) Order 1996. It provided for the transfer of specified employees from Nottinghamshire County Council to Nottingham City Council following a local government reorganization on 1st April 1998. The Order ensured that contracts of employment of 'designated employees' (those named or described in a designated list) would continue with the new authority, and preserved rights under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.

This Order effected a one-time local government structural change that occurred on 1st April 1998. The employee transfers it governs have long since been completed. The Order no longer serves any active regulatory function and exists only as historical record. Maintaining it on the statute books serves no purpose — it cannot be repealed in the ordinary sense as it merely memorialized the consequences of a past administrative event. Its continued presence contributes nothing to the dynamism of Britain's free-market economy.

This Order facilitated the transfer of employees from Shropshire County Council to the District of The Wrekin Council as a consequence of the 1996 structural change. It defined 'designated employees,' preserved their contracts of employment through the transfer date (1st April 1998), and incorporated TUPE protections by reference. It was a one-time administrative measure for a specific local government reorganisation that has long since been completed.

This Order was a transitional, one-time consequential measure for a local government reorganisation that occurred on 1st April 1998. It has no ongoing regulatory effect, imposes no continuing obligations on any party, and creates no ongoing compliance burden. The staff transfer it provided for has been fully executed. Any employee rights from that transfer are now governed by general employment law and the TUPE Regulations 1981, which this Order expressly preserved. Keeping a spent transitional order on the statute books serves no purpose and clutters the regulatory record.

The Kent County Council (Borough of Gillingham and City of Rochester upon Medway) (Staff Transfer) Order 1998 was made consequential on the Kent (Borough of Gillingham and City of Rochester upon Medway) (Structural Change) Order 1996. It provided for the transfer of employees from Kent County Council, Gillingham Borough Council, and City of Rochester upon Medway Council to the newly created Medway Towns District Council, effective 1 April 1998. It defined 'designated employees,' incorporated TUPE-like protections into domestic law for that specific transfer, and created a designated list identifying which employees transferred. The Order was a one-time transitional measure for local government reorganization.

This Order is entirely spent and obsolete. It was a one-time transitional instrument to facilitate a specific local government reorganization that occurred on 1 April 1998 — nearly 28 years ago. All employee transfers contemplated by this Order have long since been completed. The designated list and transfer mechanisms were of historical relevance only to that specific reorganisation. No ongoing regulatory effect remains; deleting this instrument would not affect any current employment rights or administrative arrangements, as the Medway Towns District Council structure it created has long since been established and operational. Keeping an executed, spent Order on the statute book serves no purpose beyond historical record-keeping, which is better maintained in archives rather than in active legislation.

Consequential order ensuring staff transfer from Berkshire County Council to successor borough/district councils following the 1996 structural changes. Defines 'designated employee' procedures, preserves employment contracts through the transfer date (1 April 1998), and incorporates TUPE protections.

One-time transitional order for a 1998 local government reorganization that has long since been completed. Imposes no ongoing regulatory burden but is functionally obsolete - all staff transfers it was designed to facilitate occurred nearly 30 years ago. Maintaining it on the statute book serves no purpose and adds unnecessary legislative clutter.

Consequential Order facilitating the transfer of Devon County Council employees to Plymouth City Council and Torbay Borough Council following the 1996 structural change. It defines 'designated employees' via a formal designated list, preserves their contracts of employment through the reorganisation date, and ensures continuity as if originally employed by the receiving council, while preserving TUPE 1981 rights.

This regulation imposes no regulatory burden on economic activity, businesses, or market mechanisms. It is purely facilitative administrative law ensuring employees are not wrongfully dismissed during a legitimate local government reorganisation. Deletion would create legal uncertainty, leave transferred staff vulnerable to contract termination, and provide zero economic benefit. The regulation merely implements what TUPE already requires, adding specificity for this particular case without adding costs.

The Spreadable Fats (Marketing Standards) (Amendment) Regulations 1998 amends the 1995 principal regulations by incorporating additional EU marketing standards (Commission Regulation EC 577/97 and its amendments) into UK law. It updates definitions, procedural references, and extends the application of Food Safety Act 1990 provisions to these marketing standards for spreadable fats (butter, margarine, and similar products). The regulations govern labeling, designations, and marketing requirements for dairy spreadable products.

This regulation imposes marketing standards that restrict how producers may lawfully describe and sell spreadable fat products, creating barriers to competition and limiting consumer choice. Such marketing controls typically serve incumbent producers rather than consumers, raising costs for new entrants and preventing differentiated products from reaching the market. The EU-derived standards were likely gold-plated during transposition, adding compliance burden beyond the original Brussels requirement. Post-Brexit, these retained EU marketing regulations should be repealed to restore Britain's historic free-trading position in food products.

Amendment regulations updating the Common Agricultural Policy (Wine) Regulations 1996 by: substituting 'Chief Executive of' for 'Secretary to' in administrative references; inserting numerous 1997 EU Regulation citations into Schedules; amending Schedule 3 to delete 'Elbling' and insert 'Red Elbling' and 'White Elbling' vine varieties; replacing the extensive list of English counties in Schedule 4 Part I; substituting 'Ceredigion' for 'Cardiganshire' in Schedule 4 Part II; and amending Schedule 5 vine variety list similarly to Schedule 3.

This regulation perpetuates the EU's Common Agricultural Policy framework that restricts which grape varieties can be used for wine production and limits which regions can produce 'quality wines psr.' These are classic government-enforced monopolies that distort the market: British winemakers cannot freely choose grape varieties, and certain regions hold exclusive rights to quality designation that no private standard-setting body would grant. Post-Brexit, this retained EU law creates artificial barriers to entry for new grape varieties and wine-producing regions, suppressing competition and limiting consumer choice. The administrative updates to EU regulation citations merely perpetuate dependency on an obsolete supranational framework. Deleting this regulation would allow British wine producers to compete freely, innovate with new grape varieties, and establish quality standards through private certification rather than statutory mandate.

This Order amends the Gaming (Bingo) Act (Fees) Order 1986 by increasing two fee thresholds: paragraph (a) from £148,000 to £152,000, and paragraph (b) from £143,000 to £146,500. It revokes the 1995 amendment order and comes into force on 1 April 1998. The regulation sets licensing/exemption fees for bingo operators.

These gaming fees function as barriers to entry in the bingo industry, raising costs for operators and reducing competition. The precise fee levels (£152,000 and £146,500) appear arbitrary rather than cost-reflective of any regulatory service. The 1995 order's revocation suggests this is merely a consolidating inflation adjustment with no substantive regulatory reform. Post-Brexit Britain should not retain inherited EU-era gaming fee structures that impose unnecessary costs on operators and ultimately consumers. The original 1986 Order's fee structure was never subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny as it predates modern regulatory review mechanisms.

This Order sets fee levels for the Gaming Board for Great Britain for lottery-related applications and registrations under the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976. It establishes registration fees (£620), periodic continuation fees (£65), per-lottery fees based on ticket sales (£70-£555), inspection fees (£5), and lottery manager certification fees (£2,400). It also provides exemptions for small lotteries (£2,000 or less) and after seven lotteries per calendar year.

This regulation is obsolete — the Gaming Board for Great Britain was dissolved in 2007 and its functions transferred to the Gambling Commission, yet this Order still references the defunct body. The fees imposed administrative costs on societies and local authorities running lotteries, effectively a hidden tax on charitable fundraising that reduced amounts available for beneficial causes. The graduated per-lottery fees based on ticket sales created compliance burdens that disproportionately affected larger lotteries seeking to raise more money. The exemption structure (after 7 lotteries, or small lotteries under £2,000) itself demonstrated the regulator acknowledged the burden was excessive. A competitive, market-oriented approach to lottery regulation would rely on voluntary participation and reputation rather than fee-based bureaucratic oversight.

This Order adjusts fees payable under the Gaming Act 1968 by substituting the sums specified in the 1995 Orders with updated figures in Column 4 of the Schedule. It comes into force on 1st April 1998 and revokes the 1995 Orders that it supersedes. The Order is a mechanical fee-revision instrument affecting various gaming-related permits, licenses, and registrations.

This Order merely updates fee levels to reflect current costs, a standard administrative function. Unlike substantive regulatory burdens, fee schedules that reflect actual administrative costs are preferable to outright prohibition or arbitrary caps. Deleting it would simply revert to 1995 fee levels without reducing regulatory requirements. However, this reveals a broader concern: the Gaming Act 1968 itself represents significant government control over a private activity, and the ideal reform would be comprehensive deregulation rather than piecemeal fee adjustments. This Order is keep on pragmatic grounds—not because it is good policy, but because its deletion without more fundamental reform would achieve nothing of substance.

This Order transferred land (shown on deposited maps) from the London Docklands Development Corporation to the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority, effective 24th March 1998. It also amended the Lee Valley Regional Park Act 1966 to grant the Authority new powers to acquire land via orders under section 165B of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, and deemed such acquired land to be part of the park for purposes of the 1966 Act.

This Order transferred assets from one public body to another as part of the planned winding-down of the London Docklands Development Corporation. It did not impose new regulatory burdens on private citizens or businesses. The amendments to the Lee Valley Regional Park Act expanded administrative powers for land acquisition, but such acquisitions require Secretary of State approval via existing statutory mechanisms with built-in safeguards. This is routine public administration, not the type of burdensome regulation—gold-plating, occupational licensing, or supply-restricting rules—that this review targets. Britons are not worse off from this administrative transfer.

Amendment Order that updates fees payable under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 by renumbering paragraph 1 and inserting a new introductory paragraph in Table VI of Schedule 1 to the Department of Transport (Fees) Order 1988.

Vehicle excise and registration fees fund legitimate government services including vehicle registry administration and road infrastructure. Without this fee structure, there would be no statutory basis for recovering the costs of these services from users. While fee levels should be kept competitive, the regulatory mechanism itself serves a practical function in funding DVLA operations and vehicle administration rather than restricting trade or creating bureaucratic burden. The deletion of this Order would leave a lacuna in the statutory fee framework without any compensating liberalising benefit.

Amendment to Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Charges) Regulations 1995, deleting regulation 3(7) and substituting Schedules 2 and 4 with new schedules. Takes effect 1 April 1998.

While wireless telegraphy licensing inherently restricts spectrum use, this amendment merely streamlines administrative fee schedules and removes a redundant provision. Deleting the parent 1995 Regulations wholesale would create regulatory chaos; this targeted amendment actually reduces compliance burden by removing regulation 3(7) and updating schedules to reflect current fees. Britons are not worse off from this specific change.

These 1998 Regulations amend the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Notice of Transfer) Regulations 1992 to streamline procedural requirements. The key change introduces regulation 3A, which exempts documents already supplied from needing to be re-supplied, and updates Forms 1 and 2 to reflect this change. The effect is to eliminate redundant paperwork by acknowledging that where documents have already been provided to a party, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.

Deleting this regulation would revert to the 1992 regime requiring full duplicate document supply, increasing administrative burden on criminal justice proceedings. This regulation reduces costs and paperwork by eliminating redundant document copying where materials have already been provided. Britons would be worse off under the more burdensome original regime, which serves no meaningful purpose beyond generating unnecessary paperwork.

The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Amendment) Order 1998 amends permitted development rights for telecommunications infrastructure. It relaxes restrictions on small antenna installation on dwellinghouses, increases height limits for certain telecommunications apparatus (from 90cm to 1.3m in some cases), and creates new deemed consent provisions for telecom equipment on masts and buildings. The Order clarifies definitions for 'small antenna' and modifies restrictions in protected areas (article 1(5) land).

This regulation exemplifies regulatory creep in the telecommunications sector, establishing detailed bureaucratic requirements for antenna placement, height restrictions, and location rules that should be entirely a matter for landowners and operators to determine privately. The permitted development regime it creates creates uncertainty, compliance costs, and delays for infrastructure deployment. While nominally liberalising some rules, it codifies into law an elaborate permission regime that distorts investment decisions and impedes network deployment. The fundamental problem is that antenna installation on one's own property should require no government approval whatsoever — the property rights implications alone make this regulation antithetical to economic freedom. Furthermore, such technical specifications (exact centimetre measurements, profile area calculations, specific location prohibitions) are better determined by industry standards and individual contracts than by statute.