Browse regulations

Amends the Non-Domestic Rating (Levy and Safety Net) Regulations 2013 to update business rates baseline calculations, levy rates, and safety net thresholds for English local authorities for years from April 2021. Introduces new formulas incorporating COVID-19 business rates relief (Expanded Retail Discount, Nursery Discount, CARF) into retained rates income calculations. Adds Schedules 1B and 6 with authority-specific baseline figures.

This amendment perpetuates and expands a highly complex, distortionary system of business rates taxation and central government control over local authority funding. The regulation embeds temporary COVID-19 relief measures (which should have expired) into permanent formulaic calculations, creating ongoing political allocation of resources rather than market-determined outcomes. The maze of definitions, formulas, and authority-specific schedules (Schedules 1B and 6 with their column A/B/C/D/E/F referencing) imposes significant administrative compliance costs on billing authorities and distorts business location decisions through rate relief that picks winners and losers across sectors. Business rates themselves are a distortionary tax on commercial property that increases costs for retailers and businesses; this amendment doubles down on that approach rather than moving toward fundamental reform.

Framework regulation delegating legislative powers to appropriate authorities (Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, Scottish Ministers, DAERA) for making technical regulations related to retained EU waste law (including Landfill, Mining Waste, Batteries, WEEE, End-of-Life Vehicles directives) and CAP-related EU Regulation 1306/2013. Provides mechanisms for updating standards, criteria, and specifications to reflect scientific and technical progress.

This regulation is a delegated powers framework for updating retained EU law rather than the substantive regulatory burden itself. However, it perpetuates the post-Brexit regulatory inheritance without democratic scrutiny - allowing technical standards to be modified via secondary legislation without parliamentary debate. Deleting it would force primary legislation for any changes, requiring full democratic accountability. The regulation adds complexity with its devolution carve-outs and does not reduce the underlying substantive regulations (2016 Regulations, End-of-Life Vehicles Regulations 2003, etc.) which would remain in force.

The Polygraph (Amendment) Rules 2022 amend the Polygraph Rules 2009, extending to England and Wales. They govern the qualifications, training, supervision, and operational requirements for polygraph operators working within the probation service, particularly for monitoring sex offenders. Key changes include: extending initial training from 15 to 30 days; extending supervised practice from 12 months to 2 years; requiring liaison with probation practitioners when setting questions; and modifying reporting requirements to the Secretary of State.

Polygraph testing has highly disputed scientific validity - major bodies like the American Psychological Association have concluded the evidence for polygraph accuracy is 'suggestive' at best. These rules impose compliance costs on the probation service and restrictions on professional practice without addressing the fundamental problem that the underlying technology may produce unreliable results. Increasing training requirements (15 to 30 days), supervision periods (12 to 24 months), and administrative requirements (probation practitioner liaison, additional reporting) raise costs without demonstrated public safety benefits. If polygraphs are to be used at all, lighter-touch professional standards would suffice; the current regulatory burden is disproportionate to uncertain benefits. The rules create barriers to entry and operational costs that are not justified by evidence that polygraph examinations reliably achieve their stated purpose of monitoring offenders.

Amendment to the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Russian Aircraft) Regulations 2022, which removes the exemption 'on a scheduled service' from regulation 2(1), thereby broadening the restriction on Russian aircraft from scheduled services to all Russian aircraft operations in UK airspace.

While restrictions on flying are generally contrary to free trade principles, this regulation implements sanctions against a nation engaged in unprovoked aggression. Removing the 'scheduled service' exemption was a targeted broadening that closed a loophole - Russian aircraft not on scheduled services could otherwise circumvent the ban. The costs of this narrow aviation restriction are diffuse (affecting few flights) while the policy objective of applying economic pressure on the Russian regime serves broader international stability interests. Deletion would undermine the UK's foreign policy credibility and commitment to collective sanctions against aggression.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022 amend the 2019 Russia Sanctions Regulations to impose additional financial restrictions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Key measures include: (1) prohibitions on dealing with transferable securities/money-market instruments issued by designated persons or those connected with Russia with maturities exceeding 30 days; (2) new categorisations of restricted loans (categories 1-4) targeting lending to designated persons, UK-incorporated entities owned by sanctioned parties, and Russian-connected entities; (3) new regulation 17A prohibiting UK financial institutions from maintaining correspondent banking relationships with designated persons or processing sterling payments to/from such persons; and (4) expanded Treasury licensing powers with humanitarian exceptions for medical goods, food, diplomatic missions, and spaceflight activities.

These sanctions target a foreign aggressor state that has invaded a sovereign nation, not domestic commerce. Unlike typical regulatory burdens that distort market incentives and suppress economic freedom, these targeted financial sanctions are a legitimate defensive measure to deny resources to an adversarial regime committing aggression. Deleting them would leave Britons worse off by eliminating a critical foreign policy tool that applies diplomatic pressure on a hostile power, emboldening further aggression and signaling weakness to other potential adversaries. The regulation's built-in exceptions (humanitarian aid, medical goods, food, diplomatic functions) appropriately limit collateral harm while maintaining pressure on the sanctioned regime.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2022 amend the 2019 Russia Sanctions Regulations to expand export restrictions from military goods/technology to 'restricted goods/technology' encompassing critical-industry goods, dual-use items, and military items. The amendment adds definitions for 'critical-industry goods' and 'critical-industry technology' (Schedule 2A), introduces exceptions for personal effects, civilian communication devices, software updates, and aircraft/vessels, extends emergency exception provisions to critical-industry items, and omits the separate Chapter 3 on dual-use items (incorporating dual-use into the broader restricted category).

This regulation perpetuates and expands government control over trade with Russia under the guise of sanctions. While sanctions may serve geopolitical objectives, they fundamentally restrict Britons' freedom to engage in voluntary commerce, distort market allocation of resources through political rather than economic criteria, impose compliance costs on businesses, and represent institutional coercion that Mises, Hayek, and Friedman would recognise as harmful. The 'critical-industry' category creates new prohibitions without demonstrated benefit beyond existing military and dual-use controls. The exceptions added (personal effects, civilian devices) acknowledge the overreach of the underlying prohibitions.

Amends Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Education, Children's Services and Skills (Fees and Frequency of Inspections) (Children's Homes etc.) Regulations 2015 to: introduce definitions for 'multi-building children's home' and 'secure children's home'; modify fee structures for registration, variation and annual fees for multi-building children's homes; adjust inspection frequency requirements and timelines (due to COVID-19 disruptions); and update various fee amounts across children's homes, boarding schools, and residential colleges.

These regulations impose layered fee structures on already heavily-regulated children's homes, reducing supply of providers and increasing costs that ultimately fall on vulnerable children. The complex tiered fee system (£2911/£910 for registration, £4254 base annual fee plus £283 per place for multi-building homes) adds administrative burden without clear marginal benefit. While inspections of children's homes serve a legitimate protective function, the fee-based regulatory model creates barriers to entry that harm the very vulnerable population these rules claim to protect. The regulation also creates arbitrary exemptions (schools, secure homes) that distort market competition rather than applying uniform standards.

Minor amendment to M271 motorway speed limit regulations that increases a specified distance from 80 metres to 135 metres where fixed speed limits apply between Junction 1 and Redbridge Roundabout. Comes into force 22nd March 2022.

Speed limits on motorways are legitimate road safety regulations where the costs of government intervention are low and benefits to public safety are clear. This is a minor technical adjustment reflecting actual road geometry, not gold-plating or regulatory burden. Removing it would create uncertainty about speed limit applicability zones, potentially compromising road safety without any corresponding benefit.

These regulations amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to impose shipping sanctions against Russia. They prohibit Russian-owned, controlled, chartered or operated ships, as well as ships flying Russian flag or registered in Russia, from accessing UK ports. The regulations grant the Secretary of State extensive powers to: specify ships for sanctions; give port entry, movement, and detention directions; direct harbour authorities; and order the refusal or termination of ship registration in the UK. They create criminal offences for non-compliance and allow confidentiality restrictions on information sharing.

Sanctions regulations grant the Secretary of State sweeping discretionary powers over shipping with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. The 'specified ship' mechanism allows blacklisting based on vague 'reasonable grounds to suspect' thresholds. These measures drive economic activity away from UK ports to competing jurisdictions, harm innocent parties (crews, seafarers, port workers), impose substantial compliance costs on the maritime industry, and concentrate power in bureaucratic hands rather than market mechanisms. While sanctions may pursue legitimate foreign policy aims, these particular provisions replicate the protectionist logic Smith and the Repeal of the Corn Laws heroes fought against — restricting voluntary trade through bureaucratic ukase rather than allowing competitive markets to function.

These Regulations establish the levy and fee framework for the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) for the charging period 1st April 2022 to 31st March 2023. They impose a production levy on offshore production licensees (£32.88m total), a non-production levy on exploration licensees, and amend the Oil and Gas Authority (Fees) Regulations 2016 to adjust various consent and licence application fees. The regulations include discounts (80-90%) for micro-enterprises holding promote or innovate licences.

While the OGA performs necessary regulatory functions, these Regulations impose a £32.88m levy on the oil and gas industry plus substantial fee increases for licences and consents. The North Sea is a mature, declining basin facing increasing competition from global energy markets. The cumulative effect of these fees—combined with the broader regulatory burden on the sector—reduces investment incentives and accelerates capital flight to less regulated jurisdictions. A more proportionate approach would tie OGA funding more directly to specific services rendered rather than blanket levies, or transition the OGA to general taxation where the regulatory functions are genuinely public goods.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 5) Regulations 2022 amend the Russia (Sanctions) Regulations 2019 by inserting new regulation 18A, which prohibits providing financial services for foreign exchange reserve and asset management to Russia's Central Bank, National Wealth Fund, Ministry of Finance, and associated persons. The regulation includes licence exceptions for humanitarian assistance, financial regulation, financial stability, firm safety and soundness, and extraordinary situations. It adds related provisions to regulation 64 (Treasury licences) and Schedule 5 (licence purposes).

While sanctions against Russia may serve legitimate foreign policy objectives, this regulation exemplifies the broader problem of economic interventionism that distorts market signals and grants discretionary power to the Treasury. The prohibition on financial services restricts voluntary transactions between willing parties, creates compliance burdens for UK financial institutions, and may drive business to competing financial centers. The licence exceptions (humanitarian, financial stability, safety/soundness) are so broad they effectively negate the prohibition's coherence. Furthermore, such targeted financial restrictions have unclear effectiveness against state actors while imposing real costs on the regulated sector.

These regulations amend the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 by removing coronavirus-specific provisions. Key changes include: modifying the 'premises' definition to include surrounding grounds, removing the 'processing' definition, deleting regulation 12(3)-(6) on safe care and treatment, simplifying regulation 17(2)(d) on good governance, and revoking two prior coronavirus amendment regulations from 2021 and 2022. The regulations come into force on 15th March 2022.

These regulations represent COVID-era emergency measures that are being appropriately sunset as the public health situation has evolved. While the specific COVID provisions being removed may have had marginal utility during the pandemic, their revocation reflects the principle that temporary emergency powers should not become permanent fixtures. The amendment itself demonstrates that Parliament recognized these provisions were context-specific rather than permanent regulatory requirements. However, this instrument should be deleted as it is a transitional cleanup measure that has served its purpose and is already being superseded by its own operation.

Amends Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014 (Pilot Common Project for European ATM Master Plan) by extending multiple implementation deadlines: character access (1 Jan 2024→2027), Departure Management (2021→2025/2029), Time-Based Separation (2024→2025), surface movement automation (2024→2029), Airport Safety Nets (2021→2029), FRA (2022→2028), and other milestones (2025→2025/2027). Extends across UK.

This regulation merely extends arbitrary government-set deadlines for EU-derived ATM technology mandates that industry proved unable to meet. The original dates were bureaucratic projections, not market-driven timelines. Keeping it maintains the fiction that politically-set implementation dates serve any useful purpose when the industry itself couldn't achieve them. Aviation safety standards exist independently; deleting this removes implementation timeline bureaucracy without affecting safety. The repeated extensions demonstrate these mandates were unrealistic government impositions rather than sound regulatory requirements.

The Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases) Amendment Regulations 2022 amend the 1985 Regulations to modify the definition of prescribed disease A15 (a hand/arm vibration-related condition). The amendment replaces a simple definition of 'fixed flexion deformity of inter-phalangeal joints' with a complex four-limb test distinguishing between metacarpophalangeal joints (>45 degrees) and interphalangeal joints, with separate criteria for onset during versus after the exposure period, and requirements for evidence of metacarpophalangeal involvement or palmar changes. The regulation also simplifies the occupation column by removing paragraph (c). These changes took effect on 28th March 2022 and apply to England and Wales.

This amendment compounds the complexity of an already bureaucratic industrial injuries scheme inherited from EU-era legislation. Rather than simplifying or modernising the framework, it introduces a four-limb diagnostic criteria structure that will generate increased administrative burden, more disputes over eligibility, higher compliance costs for employers, and greater overhead for the government agency processing claims. The amendment does not address any market failure but rather codifies into law an increasingly prescriptive clinical definition that will evolve into its own bureaucratic Quango. Such technical prescription of medical diagnostic criteria in statute is precisely the type of gold-plating that inflates costs without corresponding benefit to injured workers.

This Order implements the statutory revaluation requirement under section 9(2) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, specifying that for the period 1st April 2021 to 31st March 2022, public service pensions must be revalued by reference to a 3.1% price increase and 4.1% earnings increase. It is a mechanical indexation mechanism for calculating pension revaluation.

This regulation perpetuates the defined-benefit public sector pension model, which creates massive unfunded liabilities (£2 trillion+ estimated) that constrain fiscal policy and future taxation. The mandatory revaluation mechanism adds to these long-term commitments without corresponding benefit—private sector workers bear market risk in their pensions while public sector workers receive government-guaranteed indexation. Such entrenchment of one pension model over others distorts the labor market, makes public sector recruitment artificially attractive relative to productive private employment, and embeds intergenerational inequity into statute. The state should not be in the business of mandating how private occupational pensions are structured, and retaining this encourages continued expansion of public pension promises rather than transitioning to sustainable defined-contribution models.