Browse regulations

Transitional savings order made under FSMA 2000 that continues to apply Schedule 2C of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 (which was repealed) for the purpose of ongoing insurance business transfer schemes and applications that were pending when FSMA 2000 commenced on 1 December 2001. It modifies references in the old Schedule 2C to align with new FSMA 2000 concepts (Part IV permission, Schedule 3 authorisation) and addresses treatment of Lloyd's members in transfers.

This is a transitional provision from 2001, now 25 years obsolete. Any 'relevant petitions' or 'relevant applications' pending on 1 December 2001 would have long since been determined. The modifications it contains (replacing old Insurance Companies Act references with FSMA 2000 equivalents) served a purpose only during the transition period. The underlying policy of insurance business transfers is now governed by FSMA 2000 directly, and Schedule 2C itself has no current operative effect. Retaining this instrument creates confusion by suggesting ancient transitional provisions remain relevant when they cannot possibly apply to any live situation.

This Scottish Order modifies the application of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to financial services regulated by the Financial Services Authority. It allows spent convictions to be disclosed and considered when determining whether directors, controllers, or managers of deposit-taking institutions, insurers, and other financial services entities are 'fit and proper' persons. The Order saves and modifies provisions from the Banking Act 1987 and Financial Services Act 1986, and amends the 1975 Exceptions Order to add insurers and building societies to regulated occupations subject to these exceptions.

Without this regulation, Britons would be worse off because: (1) retail depositors and insurance policyholders cannot practically assess whether those controlling their savings and policies are trustworthy, making the 'fit and proper' test essential for consumer protection; (2) financial institutions enjoy implicit government backing and their failure creates systemic externalities affecting all taxpayers; (3) market discipline alone is inadequate since fraud may remain hidden for years and reputation alone does not discipline institutions with limited customer visibility of management; (4) while the regulation does restrict reformed offenders, the cost of excluding some from specific senior roles is proportionate given the scale of potential harm from placing deposit-takers and insurers under the control of persons with relevant fraud convictions.

This Order modifies the Electricity Act 1989 by lowering the consent threshold from 50 megawatts to 1 megawatt for offshore wind and water-driven generating stations situated in waters within or adjacent to England and Wales (outside areas requiring planning permission). It requires consent under s.36(2) for any such station exceeding 1 MW capacity, effectively creating a significant regulatory barrier for small-scale offshore renewable energy projects.

This regulation creates an unnecessary barrier to small-scale offshore wind and water renewable energy projects by requiring consent for stations as small as 1 MW, compared to the standard 50 MW threshold. This restricts supply of renewable generation capacity, raises costs through regulatory delay and compliance, advantages large incumbent energy producers over smaller entrants, and likely reflects NIMBY-driven gold-plating rather than genuine environmental necessity. The original 50 MW threshold in the parent Act provided adequate oversight without suppressing market entry.

This is an Appointed Day Order that designated 1st December 2001 as the date on which certain provisions of the Finance Act 1996 (section 167(11) and (12)) and the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (Schedule 14 paragraph 8(8)(a) and Schedule 15 paragraphs 8A and 18(3)(c)(i)) would come into force for tax purposes.

This Order is entirely obsolete — it appointed a day that passed over 24 years ago (1st December 2001) and has no ongoing legal effect. The operative event has long since occurred. While the underlying tax provisions may retain current relevance, this specific instrument is a spent historical administrative order that no longer serves any purpose and clutters the statute book.

The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 designates the UK's proposed derogation from Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to liberty and security) for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. Made on 13th November 2001, it anticipated the UK's formal derogation in response to terrorism threats following the September 11 attacks, enabling the government to lawfully detain individuals under expanded powers while remaining compliant with the HRA framework.

This Order represents the procedural mechanism enabling a derogation from fundamental rights, but the underlying framework itself—the Human Rights Act 1998—is the source of the problem. The HRA imported the ECHR into UK law, subordinating Parliamentary sovereignty to European court interpretations and creating exactly this kind of mechanism where government can justify eroding civil liberties through formal derogation processes. The real costs are not the procedural designation but the retention of the HRA itself, which constrains Britain's ability to respond to national emergencies through primary legislation and normal democratic process. Deleting this Order would force proper Parliamentary engagement with the substantive detention powers rather than allowing them to proceed through a bureaucratic designation.

This Order specifies which financial activities and investments fall within the misleading statements and practices provisions of FSMA 2000 (s.397), defining 'controlled activity' and 'controlled investment' by reference to the Financial Promotion Order. It covers funeral plan contracts, qualifying credit, collective investment schemes, stakeholder pension schemes, and Lloyd's syndicate management as subject to the misleading statements regime.

This Order merely defines scope for FSMA 2000 s.397's misleading statements prohibition - it does not itself create the substantive prohibition, which already exists in primary legislation. Scope-specifications of this kind enable regulatory creep: each new activity added to the 'controlled' list expands the regulatory perimeter without clear parliamentary scrutiny. The underlying prohibition on fraud/misleading statements remains fully intact in s.397 independent of this Order. General fraud law already covers deceptive conduct in financial services. The compliance burden and uncertainty created by defining elaborate categories of controlled activities outweigh the marginal clarification benefit, particularly given the documented pattern of gold-plating where UK regulation exceeds EU requirements.

This Order established transitional provisions for the transfer of information requirements and investigation powers from the pre-FSMA 2000 financial services regime (Banking Act 1987, Insurance Companies Act 1982, Financial Services Act 1986) to the new Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 framework on 1st December 2001. It treated outstanding information requirements as requirements under section 165 of FSMA 2000, outstanding report requirements as requirements under section 166, and provided for the continuity of investigator appointments by treating them as appointments under the new Act. The Order also contained savings provisions preserving certain pre-commencement offences and limiting penalties to what could have been imposed under the old regime.

This Order is entirely transitional and served its purpose in 2001-2002 to bridge the regulatory transition to FSMA 2000. Any 'outstanding' requirements or investigations from that era have long since been resolved or lapsed. The Order is now a historical artifact with no ongoing legal effect, yet it remains on the statute book creating unnecessary legal complexity. Its savings provisions merely perpetuate references to repealed legislation that can serve no current purpose. As a retained EU law that was never properly scrutinised by Parliament, it should be deleted to clean the statute book of obsolete transitional legislation.

Transitional Order from December 2001 making savings in relation to the repealed Industrial Assurance Acts 1923 and 1948 and Northern Ireland Order 1979, in connection with the commencement of FSMA 2000. Preserves existing rights and defines 'existing policies' to include pre-commencement policies and post-commencement policies pursuant to pre-commencement proposal forms. Contains schedules with savings provisions for Great Britain, Channel Islands, and Northern Ireland.

This is a transitional savings instrument from 2001 facilitating the repeal of the Industrial Assurance Acts - a 25-year-old relic of a completed regime transition. By definition, 'existing policies' are policies effected before December 2001 or pursuant to pre-commencement proposal forms. Any such policies are now extraordinary outliers (policies 25+ years old), and the savings provisions serve mainly to keep repealed legislation technically alive. The Order adds regulatory clutter without meaningful ongoing benefit, as the transition it was designed to manage has long since concluded.

This Order implements provisions from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 regarding confidential information held by the Bank of England. It applies restrictions on disclosure (sections 348, 349, 352 of FSMA) to overseas regulatory information supplied by foreign authorities, companies information obtained under Companies Act powers, and transitional information previously subject to Banking Act 1987 restrictions. The Order establishes the Bank as a 'primary recipient' for information-sharing purposes and sets conditions for further disclosure, including requiring Secretary of State consent for certain disclosures under Part IV of the Disclosure Regulations.

This is a transitional/consequential Order that maps pre-existing confidentiality restrictions from the Banking Act 1987 onto the new FSMA 2000 regime. It serves a machinery function rather than imposing substantive new regulatory burdens. However, the framework restricts information flow between regulators and imposes consent requirements that could delay legitimate information sharing. The Order largely preserves restrictions without demonstrating their ongoing cost-benefit case, and many provisions are purely transitional (dealing with information already obtained before December 2001). Deletion would allow a cleaner FSMA framework without the complex transitional apparatus.

Transitional Order made under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to update the statute book following the commencement of FSMA 2000. It repeals six legacy financial services Acts (Policyholders Protection Act 1975, Insurance Companies Act 1982, Financial Services Act 1986, Banking Act 1987, and two others) and revokes three sets of 1990s EU implementation regulations. It then makes consequential amendments to the Companies Act 1985, replacing old FSMA 1986 references with FSMA 2000 references, updating definitions (insurance business, securities, derivatives, recognised clearing house, etc.), and inserting cross-references to FSMA 2000 definitions. It is purely a mechanical tidying-up exercise accompanying the largest reform of UK financial services law in a generation.

This Order is a transitional, housekeeping measure that has already been fully implemented since 1st December 2001. It performs essential statute book maintenance by updating cross-references from repealed legislation to the new FSMA 2000 framework that Parliament has already decided to enact. Deleting it would create legal chaos, with dozens of amended provisions referencing non-existent legislation. The substantive policy question — whether FSMA 2000's regulatory architecture is optimal — is beyond the scope of this consequential Order, which merely reflects the policy choices already made. This Order imposes no independent regulatory burden; it merely ensures the statute book remains coherent after the FSMA 2000 reforms.

The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 2001 is a transitional Order making technical amendments to implement FSMA 2000. It amends definitions of collective investment schemes (excluding funeral plans, certain bodies corporate, and LLPs), updates the Financial Promotion Order to exempt appointed representatives' unsolicited communications, modifies the Professions (Non-Exempt Activities) Order to add regulated mortgage contracts, and contains extensive transitional provisions for transferring regulatory responsibilities from predecessor bodies (PIA, IMO, SFA) to the Financial Services Authority, including provisions for property/rights/liabilities transfer, continuation of existing permissions, and savings for prior regulatory obligations.

This Order is predominantly transitional and technical, designed to facilitate the orderly transition from the Financial Services Act 1986 regime to FSMA 2000. Most provisions are self-limiting (sunset clauses, transitional periods ending by 2002). The exclusions for funeral plan contracts and certain bodies corporate from collective investment scheme definitions are actually deregulatory. The transitional provisions for existing authorized persons prevent legal chaos during regime change. Deleting this would create legal uncertainty, disrupt existing contractual arrangements, and harm the very market stability this Order preserves. Its costs are bounded by design.

Technical amendment regulations that modify the formula for calculating weekly housing costs (mortgage interest) payable under Income Support and Jobseeker's Allowance benefits. The formula A×B÷52 calculates the weekly amount by multiplying the qualifying loan amount (A) by the standard rate (B) and dividing by 52. These are domestic UK welfare regulations, not EU-derived law.

While these regulations are part of a welfare system that creates dependency and work disincentives, the specific question is whether removing the calculation formula would harm Britons. Deleting this would create a gap in how housing costs are calculated for vulnerable income support and JSA recipients, causing genuine hardship without addressing the underlying welfare policy. The calculation methodology itself is a reasonable technical approach to determining benefit levels. Broader welfare reform should be addressed through primary legislation, not by deleting technical implementing regulations.

This Order establishes the High Peak and Dales Primary Care Trust as a statutory NHS body effective 16th November 2001, with full operational date of 1st April 2002. It defines membership (chairman, 5 officer members, 5 non-officer members), sets out the preparatory period during which the North Derbyshire Health Authority covers costs, and requires other NHS Trusts to make facilities and staff available during the preparatory period.

This Order is wholly obsolete. Primary Care Trusts were abolished by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which dissolved all PCTs and replaced them with Clinical Commissioning Groups. The High Peak and Dales PCT it establishes no longer exists. Furthermore, PCTs represented the bureaucratic commissioning layer that contributed to NHS inefficiency and restricted private healthcare alternatives. Keeping defunct regulatory architecture on the books serves no purpose beyond legal clutter. As Mises recognized, institutions that fail to achieve their objectives should be dismantled rather than preserved in legal limbo.

This Order establishes the Leeds North West Primary Care Trust as a statutory NHS body effective 16th November 2001, with an operational date of 1st April 2002. It defines membership structure (chairman, 5 officer members, 5 non-officer members), specifies the preparatory period functions (NHS contracts, employment contracts, preparatory activities), and requires Leeds Health Authority to fund preparatory costs. It also mandates resource-sharing arrangements with Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and Leeds Community and Mental Health Services Teaching NHS Trust during the preparatory period.

This Order perpetuates NHS bureaucratic structures that suppress private healthcare alternatives. Primary Care Trusts created monopolistic commissioning bodies that restricted patient choice and drove talent to competitor jurisdictions. The mandated resource-sharing from other NHS trusts distorts resource allocation across the system. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should be used to introduce competition into healthcare commissioning rather than preserve these inherited EU-era structures. The preparatory period provisions and forced resource-sharing arrangements create inefficiencies that market mechanisms would otherwise eliminate.

This Order establishes the Blackpool Primary Care Trust as a National Health Service body on 2nd November 2001 with operational date 1st April 2002. It defines membership structure (5 officer and 5 non-officer members plus chairman), creates a preparatory period for the trust to enter contracts and prepare for operations, and requires the North West Lancashire Health Authority to fund preparatory costs and provide premises, facilities and officers. The Blackpool, Wyre and Fylde NHS Trust must also provide premises and staff during the preparatory period.

This regulation is wholly obsolete — Primary Care Trusts were abolished in 2013 under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and have not existed for over a decade. Even when active, PCTs represented bureaucratic extensions of the NHS near-monopoly, restricting private healthcare competition and choice. The Order establishes public sector structures funded by redirecting costs from one NHS authority to another, with no market mechanisms or competitive elements. Post-Brexit regulatory review should clear such defunct instruments that serve only to maintain state monopoly provision of healthcare.