Browse regulations

The School Discipline (Pupil Exclusions and Reviews) (England) (Amendment and Transitional Provision) Regulations 2023 amend the 2012 Regulations to: remove COVID-related 'coronavirus' definitions; introduce 'remote meeting request' provisions allowing virtual participation in exclusion hearings; create new cancellation rights for head teachers to cancel exclusions; and add transitional provisions extending time limits for meetings delayed by extraordinary events. The regulations apply to maintained schools, pupil referral units, and Academies in England.

These amendments exemplify the regulatory creep that burdens Britain's educational institutions. While removing the coronavirus definition is welcome, the regulation introduces new procedural requirements (remote meeting requests, cancellation mechanisms, extended time limit provisions) that add administrative complexity without corresponding benefit. Head teachers and governing bodies already possess inherent flexibility to handle exclusions fairly; codifying remote participation rights and cancellation procedures creates compliance burden and potential for delay tactics by vexatious parties. The regulations reflect a post-COVID overcorrection that should not be permanently enshrined in law — schools should determine their own meeting procedures based on local circumstances rather than mandated options. Removing these amendments restores maximum operational autonomy to educational institutions while the core 2012 framework remains intact for legitimate exclusion review processes.

Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2023 - Amends the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to introduce an 'intermediate track' for cases valued between £25,000 and £100,000, restructure Part 36 offer rules, modify fixed costs regimes, and add Section IX to Part 46 establishing costs limits in Aarhus Convention environmental claims. Key changes include: updated case management timetables, revised costs consequences for accepted offers and judgments, new fixed costs tables, and provisions limiting costs exposure for environmental judicial review claimants.

While court procedural rules differ from commercial regulations, these amendments perpetuate a fixed costs regime that artificially depresses legal fees, restricts access to quality legal representation, and distorts market pricing in civil justice. The intermediate track adds procedural complexity without demonstrable benefit. The mandatory fixed costs tables (Tables 10-15) constitute price-fixing that harms both lawyers and litigants by creating arbitrary caps on recoverable costs, reducing the supply of legal services for these claim values, and forcing claimants to bear costs above the caps themselves. A competitive legal market would allow pricing based on value and complexity rather than government-dictated tables.

These are commencement regulations that bring section 116 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 into force on the day after the regulations are made. They extend to England and Wales and define key terms used throughout the instrument.

Commencement orders are procedural instruments that give effect to Parliament's will regarding when specific statutory provisions take effect. Without this instrument, section 116 of the Act would lack its designated commencement date, creating legal uncertainty. Deletion would leave a gap in the statute book without a mechanism to bring the provision into force as Parliament intended, requiring emergency secondary legislation to rectify.

These Regulations amend Schedule 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which governs powers to extract information from electronic devices. The effect is to expand the scope of authorised persons to include Royal Navy Police, Royal Military Police, and Royal Air Force Police for all purposes under sections 37 and 41 (rather than only section 37 previously).

This regulation expands state surveillance powers by granting military police broader authority to extract information from electronic devices without evidence of justification or sunset provisions. Such expansion of coercive state power, particularly affecting civil liberties around privacy and property rights, should require affirmative parliamentary deliberation rather than being enacted via subordinate legislation. The change was likely inserted without adequate scrutiny of whether the expanded powers are proportionate or necessary.

These Regulations amend the National Health Service Pension Scheme Regulations 2015 to substitute new contribution percentage rate tables for employees and practitioners. The amendments update pensionable earnings bands and corresponding contribution rates (ranging from 5.1% to 13.5%), with retrospective effect from 1 April 2023.

While the NHS pension scheme itself represents a state monopoly over public sector retirement provision that would benefit from reform or privatisation, these specific amendment regulations merely adjust contribution rate tables within an existing scheme structure. Deleting them would create administrative chaos and uncertainty for hundreds of thousands of NHS workers, disrupt pension calculations, and provide no alternative mechanism for setting contribution rates. The regulation imposes no new regulatory burden—it simply updates technical pricing parameters for an existing defined benefit scheme that workers have already contracted into. Any harm from the NHS pension scheme monopoly is a structural policy question beyond the scope of these technical contribution rate amendments.

These Regulations require the Secretary of State to determine whether the UK's assigned amount under the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment period (2013-2020) exceeded its domestic carbon budgets, and if so, calculate the excess UK assigned amount units and ensure they cannot be used to offset greenhouse gas emissions. The regulations implement international treaty obligations regarding emissions accounting.

The second commitment period (2013-2020) has concluded and the Doha Amendment establishing these obligations was not ratified by the EU. Post-Brexit, the UK has its own emissions targets (notably the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended). This regulation imposes restrictions preventing excess assigned amount units from being used as offsets, which limits economic flexibility and could drive emissions-intensive activities to jurisdictions with more flexible accounting rules. The UK's participation in Kyoto's second commitment period is now historical, making this retained EU/international law increasingly irrelevant to current UK climate policy while still imposing compliance costs and restrictions on economic activity.

Authorises LIBF Limited (London Institute of Banking & Finance, company number 13621269) to grant taught awards under section 42(2)(a) and 42(3) of the relevant Act, for a fixed term from 1st June 2023 to 31st August 2026. Also permits LIBF to authorise other institutions to grant such awards on its behalf.

Britons who hold or are pursuing LIBF degrees and professional qualifications would suffer immediate harm through credential devaluation and loss of recognised academic awards. Unlike restrictive market regulations that suppress supply, this Order grants limited powers to a specific institution—removing it would not liberalise the degree market but would instead strand thousands of students and professionals with worthless qualifications. The fixed-term structure already imposes review, and the authorization is narrowly tailored to a legitimate regulated institution.

The Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order 2023 updates definitions of regulated markets and securities for insider dealing legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 1993. It specifies which exchanges (NASDAQ, SIX Swiss Exchange, NYSE, UK/EU/Gibraltar markets) qualify as regulated markets, defines covered securities including derivatives and emission allowances, and revokes four older Orders from 1994-2002 while replacing Schedule 2's securities definitions.

While insider trading regulations impose costs on market participants by restricting information use, deletion would create severe legal uncertainty around the scope of the criminal offense in the 1993 Act. Without updated definitions of 'regulated markets' and 'securities', prosecutions would be hamstrung, creating a regulatory vacuum that could actually harm market confidence and investor protection more than the compliance costs of the regulation. This Order streamlines and updates retained EU market abuse definitions for post-Brexit Britain, narrowing scope where appropriate by explicitly including non-UK venues (NASDAQ, SIX, NYSE) to maintain competitiveness while preserving essential market integrity provisions.

This Order establishes a block exemption from Competition Act 1998 Chapter 1 prohibition for motor vehicle aftermarket agreements (MVA agreements) covering aftermarket goods distribution and repair/maintenance services. It specifies conditions including market share thresholds, prohibitions on hardcore restrictions (such as restricting sales to independent repairers), and excluded restrictions (access to information/tools for independent operators). It replicates the retained EU Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER) post-Brexit, extends until end of May 2029, and provides a transition period for pre-existing agreements until May 2024.

This Order perpetuates a government-granted exemption regime that shields motor vehicle manufacturers from full competition law scrutiny. Its 'excluded restriction' provisions legitimize barriers preventing independent repairers and distributors from accessing tools, information, and training on equal terms with authorized partners—codifying a two-tier system that suppresses consumer choice and inflates repair costs. The hardcore restrictions on sales to independent repairers distort market competition. Rather than simply removing this exemption regime to restore full competition in the motor vehicle aftermarket, this Order retains and formalizes the EU-derived regulatory structure that favours incumbents over new entrants.

The Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2023 amend EU Regulation 748/2012 on aircraft airworthiness and environmental certification. Key changes include: new record-keeping obligations (21.A.5), requirements for instructions for continued airworthiness (21.A.7), access for CAA investigations (21.A.8), amendments to type-certificate transferability, a new continuing structural integrity programme for large aeroplanes (21.A.65), provisions for stand-alone changes to continued airworthiness instructions (21.A.90C), and Safety Management System (SMS) requirements with a July 2026 compliance deadline after which non-compliant organisations face certificate revocation, limitation or suspension.

This regulation layers additional compliance burdens on aviation businesses without demonstrated safety benefit. The SMS requirements with certificate revocation consequences impose significant costs on design and production organisations, yet the underlying EU framework already ensures safety outcomes through existing certification specifications. The extensive record-keeping (21.A.5) and manual maintenance requirements (21.A.6) add administrative costs with no corresponding safety improvement. Post-Brexit regulatory independence should streamline rather than replicate EU bureaucratic structures. The 2026 SMS deadline was arbitrary and benefits no one except consultants. Aviation safety can be maintained through international ICAO standards and targeted certification requirements rather than comprehensive management system mandates.

These regulations amend the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 to: (1) modify the definition of 'other relevant support' in regulation 34, clarifying when government payments for childcare are excluded from income calculations to prevent double-payment; and (2) increase maximum childcare costs element from £646.35 to £950.92 for one child and from £1,108.04 to £1,630.15 for two or more children. The changes take effect 28th June 2023 and apply to England, Wales, and Scotland.

These regulations expand welfare dependency and distort labor market decisions. The ~47% increase in childcare subsidies creates perverse incentives—encouraging reliance on state support rather than market-based solutions or family provisioning. By artificially subsidizing childcare costs, these rules inflate demand without increasing supply, driving up equilibrium prices for all families. The 'other relevant support' amendment further entangles government in family financial decisions, reducing personal responsibility. Free markets, not bureaucrats, should determine childcare provision and pricing.

UK Treasury equivalence determination for Central Counterparties (CCPs) established in India. Recognizes India's legal and supervisory framework (as implemented by the Reserve Bank of India) as equivalent to EU EMIR requirements (Regulation (EU) 648/2012), enabling specified CCPs authorized by RBI to operate in UK markets. Grants legal recognition that India's CCP oversight meets UK standards for derivatives clearing and financial market infrastructure.

Equivalence determinations reduce rather than increase regulatory burden by accepting equivalent foreign regulatory standards, facilitating UK financial institutions' access to Indian CCPs. Deleting this would isolate UK firms from a major global market, harm the City of London's competitiveness, and impose duplicative regulation rather than remove it. The UK's financial services sector benefits from continued integration with global markets, and removing this recognition would not reduce regulation but rather sever beneficial cross-border market access.

These Regulations amend retained EU law (Regulation (EC) No. 2195/2002) to update Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) terminology, replacing 'the handicapped' and 'handicapped' with 'disabled people' and 'disabled' respectively in two CPV codes (85311200-4 and 85312120-6) across both Annex 1 and Annex 2.

This regulation is purely terminological housekeeping with zero economic impact. It imposes no compliance costs, no market restrictions, and no competitive distortions. However, it represents unnecessary regulatory volume that requires no parliamentary time to maintain. The terminology update could be achieved through non-regulatory administrative guidance or industry practice without the overhead of a statutory instrument. As a regulation with purely symbolic effect and no material consequences in either direction, it should be deleted to reduce regulatory clutter and uphold the principle that only regulations with meaningful costs or benefits warrant retention.

These 2023 Regulations amend the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 to mandate that grant-aided schools provide age-appropriate, comprehensive, and scientifically accurate education on sexual and reproductive health and rights, including prevention of early pregnancy and access to abortion, for key stages 3 and 4. They require the Department to issue guidance by January 2024, mandate that school governors have regard to this guidance, and require further regulations on parental opt-out provisions. The regulations also amend curriculum minimum content requirements and mandate a report on implementation by September 2026.

This regulation represents state-mandated curriculum content on sensitive personal matters, removing flexibility from parents and schools. While the stated goals (preventing early pregnancy, ensuring accurate health information) are admirable, the mechanism of compulsory centralized curriculum requirements suppresses diversity in educational approaches. The parent opt-out requires additional future regulations, indicating this is merely the first step in expanding government control over what children learn on intimate topics. Hayek's concern about central planning's knowledge problem applies: no single curriculum can accommodate the diverse values, cultural backgrounds, and parental preferences across Northern Ireland's communities. A free society would allow parents and schools to determine appropriate sexuality education without government prescription, with market and reputational mechanisms ensuring adequate information is available for those who want it.

These Regulations, effective July 4th 2023, prescribe CQC functions under s.46B(1) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 for the purpose of charging fees for reviews and performance assessments of integrated care systems. They extend to England and Wales.

This regulation imposes fees that fund the Care Quality Commission's bureaucratic oversight apparatus for integrated care systems. The fees represent a cost burden on healthcare providers, contributing to the UK's restrictive regulatory environment that suppresses supply and competition. Rather than enabling market mechanisms, this regulation perpetuates government-mandated organizational structures and funds a regulatory body whose compliance requirements add administrative costs throughout the healthcare system. The fees themselves constitute an unseen cost passed on to patients and taxpayers, while the reviews they fund do nothing to increase healthcare supply or reduce wait times — problems that would be better addressed through deregulation and market competition.