Browse regulations

These Regulations designate Infected Blood Compensation Scheme payments as 'qualifying payments' for tax exemption purposes under Schedule 15 of the Finance Act 2020. They provide that compensation payments from the Infected Blood Compensation Authority (established under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024) are exempt from inheritance tax (para 3), capital gains tax (para 4), and income tax (para 5) where payments are received, disposals made, or deaths occur on or after 23rd August 2024.

Deleting this regulation would subject genuine compensation payments to victims of the infected blood scandal to taxation, effectively reducing their compensation. While the free market principle generally opposes targeted tax reliefs, this regulation corrects a specific injustice without distorting market incentives or creating regulatory barriers to entry. The compensation addresses a documented historical harm where victims contracted HIV/hepatitis C through NHS blood products. Removing these exemptions would make Britons worse off by taxing victims twice for harm inflicted upon them by the state medical system.

This Order extends the deadline for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament the Government's response to the Committee on Climate Change's 2024 report (laid 18th July 2024) from the original statutory period to 19th December 2024. It applies to the whole United Kingdom and comes into force on 14th October 2024.

This Order imposes no regulatory burden on private actors—it merely extends an administrative deadline for government response to a committee report. The substantive climate change regulatory framework lies in the Climate Change Act 2008 itself, not in this procedural timing mechanism. Removing this Order would not reduce any actual economic regulation, restrict any market, or lower costs on businesses and individuals. It is a purely internal government procedure that does not touch upon the free market concerns Better Britain seeks to address.

Transitional provisions order amending the Registration of Births and Deaths (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2024, effective 9th September 2024. Provides that deaths not yet registered where a medical certificate has been signed and no coroner's inquest is required remain subject to prior regulations rather than the new 2024 amendments (specifically regulations 2(2)-(7), 2(13)-(19), and 2(21)(a)(i) and (b)).

This transitional provision merely preserves the status quo for deaths already in the registration pipeline when new regulations come into force. Deleting it would create abrupt compliance burdens for families mid-process, with no corresponding benefit—these deaths already have proper medical certification and don't require coroner involvement. The provision smooths regulatory transition without imposing new costs or restrictions.

These regulations establish a compensation regime for third parties who suffer loss or damage resulting from acts done in preparation for or connection with the designation of the Independent System Operator and Planner (ISOP) under the Energy Act 2023. They set out eligibility conditions for claims (excluding indirect/consequential losses, double compensation, and licensed revenue restriction compensation), procedural requirements for bringing claims within 6 months, Secretary of State determination powers, and court appeal rights.

These regulations create a bureaucratic compensation apparatus for government-caused harm that generates moral hazard, distorts market incentives, and adds regulatory complexity to energy sector restructuring. By cushioning third parties from the costs of regulatory actions, they reduce pressure on the state to avoid harmful interventions in the first place. The ISOP designation itself represents significant state intervention in energy markets; compensating victims rather than preventing the harm reflects the wrong priority. Such compensation regimes invite further regulatory interventions by making them appear costless to affected parties, encouraging risk-taking that assumes state backing.

Transitional provisionOrder extending to England and Wales, in force 9th September 2024, which grandfathers certain deaths from new Welsh language registration requirements. Where a death had not yet been registered, a medical practitioner had already signed a cause-of-death certificate (forms 14/15 or Welsh forms 11/12), and no coroner inquest was required, these Regulations do not apply — permitting use of old forms rather than new Welsh language versions.

This transitional provision does not impose costs — it provides exemptions that reduce compliance burden during the regulatory changeover. Without it, registrars and families would have faced unnecessary disruption when deaths already in the registration pipeline were subjected to new Welsh language requirements. Since it represents regulatory relief rather than regulatory burden, Britons would be worse off if deleted, as it preserves a smoother transition mechanism that prevents forced restarts of pending registrations under new bureaucratic requirements.

Amends the Accounts and Audit Regulations 2015 to extend publication deadlines for local authority accountability statements (statement of accounts, annual governance statement, narrative statement) for financial years 2015-2027 to dates ranging from December 2024 to November 2028, with exceptions for ongoing audit objections. Also adds definition of 'auditor's annual report', modifies public rights period commencement for 2024-2027, and makes corresponding amendments to the Non-Domestic Rating (Transitional Protection Payments) Regulations 2013 and Non-Domestic Rating (Rates Retention) Regulations 2013.

This regulation perpetuates rigid EU-style bureaucratic timelines for public sector financial reporting that serve no market discipline function. The extended deadlines (e.g., November 2027, November 2028) indicate the original regime was overly prescriptive. While transparency has merit, mandating specific publication dates, narrative statements, and governance statements through secondary legislation creates administrative burden without ensuring better financial outcomes. The additional reporting requirements (annual governance statement, narrative statement) go beyond basic accountability and impose compliance costs on local authorities that could be better deployed on public services. Freedom of information already provides citizen access to these documents; prescriptive timing mandates serve bureaucracy, not citizens.

These Regulations amend the Education (School Inspection) (England) Regulations 2005, modifying the criteria triggering school inspections in England. The changes remove the requirement that schools must be graded 'good' or better to qualify for extended inspection intervals, replacing grade-based triggers with broader assessments of whether educational quality has been maintained, improved, or deteriorated since the previous inspection.

While the inspection regime imposes costs on schools through administrative burden, preparation time, and disruption, the alternative of relying solely on market mechanisms or parental choice is insufficient in the education sector due to information asymmetries and the inability of children to easily switch schools. Schools that fail or deteriorate could otherwise continue unchecked for years, harming generations of pupils. The modifications actually modestly reduce regulatory burden by replacing specific grade thresholds with broader quality assessments, suggesting the regulations achieve their protective purpose with reasonable flexibility. Removing these regulations entirely would eliminate a key accountability mechanism for educational quality in a sector where consumer sovereignty is limited.

This Order amends Schedule 8 to the Value Added Tax Act 1994 to modify zero-rating eligibility for caravans. It requires caravans to meet British Standard BS 3632 (version effective from 17 June 2005) to qualify for zero-rate VAT, with a special provision for second-hand caravans occupied before 6 April 2013 that met earlier versions of the standard.

This regulation distorts the caravan market through preferential VAT treatment based on manufacturing dates and technical standards. The arbitrary date cut-offs (17 June 2005, 6 April 2013) and reliance on a specific BSI standard create compliance complexity, favor certain manufacturers, and artificially limit consumer choice. Zero-rating should either apply uniformly to all caravans or not at all—the currentpatchwork approach props up certain segments of the market while taxing others, reducing market efficiency without clear justification. Removing this distortion would simplify the tax code and allow price competition to function properly.

Amends the New Towns (Compulsory Purchase of Land) Regulations 1977 to distinguish between England and Wales prescribed forms. Adds regulation 3A specifying 11 forms for England compulsory purchase procedures, renames the existing regulation 3 heading to 'Prescribed Forms: Wales', updates terminology from 'Schedule hereto' to 'relevant Schedule', omits regulation 4, and restructures schedules. Technical amendment to reflect devolution and clarify which forms apply in each jurisdiction.

While the underlying compulsory purchase regime is open to critique on free-market grounds, this specific amendment is purely administrative—clarifying which prescribed forms apply to England versus Wales following devolution. Deleting it would leave the 1977 regulations with inconsistent references and no clear distinction between jurisdictions, potentially causing procedural confusion in land acquisition cases. The amendment does not expand compulsory purchase powers; it merely tidies existing administrative arrangements. However, this agency notes that the underlying compulsory purchase legislation itself warrants separate review as part of broader planning reform.

The Land Compensation (Additional Compensation) (England) Regulations 2024 establish the procedural framework for claiming additional compensation under Schedule 2A to the Land Compensation Act 1961. They set out requirements for: applications to the confirming authority for a direction for additional compensation; notification procedures to acquiring authorities, local planning authorities, and affected persons; procedures for written representations; claim requirements including details for mortgaged properties; and provisions for calculating qualifying losses, interest, and costs. The regulations require extensive public notice procedures including publication in the London Gazette, Estates Gazette, Farmers Weekly, and local newspapers.

These regulations impose substantial compliance costs on acquiring authorities (typically public bodies) through elaborate notification and publication requirements spanning multiple newspapers and websites, without proportionate benefit to claimants. The additional compensation mechanism itself, while providing theoretical protection against inadequate initial valuations, creates perverse incentives for protracted disputes and undermines the finality of original compensation settlements. The extensive procedural framework - with multiple stages of representations, notifications, and deadlines - adds bureaucratic friction that benefits legal practitioners more than affected landowners. Furthermore, the prescribed interest rate mechanism and qualifying loss provisions introduce additional complexity and potential for disputes that the original compensation process should have resolved. The core objective of fair compensation can be achieved through simpler, less costly procedures or through reform of the initial valuation process itself.

This Order amends the London Legacy Development Corporation (Establishment) Order 2012 to update map references, and revokes the London Legacy Development Corporation (Planning Functions) Order 2012. It transfers planning functions exercised by the LLDC back to London borough councils as successor local planning authorities, with transitional provisions for ongoing matters. The Order comes into force on 1st December 2024.

This Order dissolves the LLDC's planning authority and returns functions to locally accountable London borough councils — a deregulation that eliminates an extra layer of quango oversight. The planning functions transferred to the LLDC in 2012 were themselves a departure from normal local government accountability; this Order corrects that by restoring democratic oversight. The revocation imposes no new costs — it removes bureaucratic control from the Olympic legacy area and returns planning authority to councils where residents can hold elected representatives accountable.

This Order makes consequential amendments to numerous UK-wide benefit regulations to incorporate references to Scottish disability assistance payments (pension age disability payment, adult disability payment, and child disability payment) created under the Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018. It ensures these new Scottish devolved benefits are properly recognised in means-tested benefits including Income Support, Jobseeker's Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, State Pension Credit, Housing Benefit, and related regulations. The amendments primarily add definitions, update residence/care conditions, and ensure Scottish disability assistance is treated equivalently to Attendance Allowance in benefit calculations.

Without these amendments, vulnerable Scots receiving devolved Scottish disability assistance would be excluded from or receive incorrect amounts of UK-wide means-tested benefits. The Order is purely machinery - it copies existing EU-derived definitions and embeds them in the UK's benefit framework. Deleting it would create regulatory gaps, inconsistency between Scotland and rUK, and administrative chaos without reducing a single meaningful regulation. The underlying benefit architecture may warrant review, but this technical harmonisation Order itself causes no regulatory harm.

These Regulations amend Police Pension Fund Regulations 2007 and Police Pensions Regulations 2015 to remove the fixed 31% employer contribution rate, replacing it with a variable rate determined by the Secretary of State after consulting the scheme actuary. They also revoke the 2019 Amendment Regulations.

While variable actuarial-based contributions are theoretically preferable to a rigid fixed rate, these regulations substitute statutory certainty with discretionary administrative power. The Secretary of State is not bound by the actuary's recommendation, creating unaccountable price-setting authority over a significant public sector cost. The fixed 31% rate, while potentially stale, at least provided transparency and predictability for police force budgeting. This change transfers pricing power from democratic statute to ministerial discretion without adequate safeguards.

Amends the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) Order 2014 to add Jordan to the list of countries whose nationals require transit visas when passing through the UK. Includes a grandfather clause exempting Jordanian nationals with pre-existing bookings made before 11th September 2024.

Transit visa requirements impose costs on passengers, airlines, and airport operators while driving transit business to competitor hubs in Dubai, Istanbul, and European cities. As a post-Brexit freedom, Britain should be removing not adding movement restrictions. The grandfather clause itself demonstrates the regulation causes genuine hardship to travelers who had legitimate bookings. Security objectives can be achieved through less restrictive means such as enhanced passenger screening, intelligence cooperation with Jordanian authorities, and departure/arrival monitoring systems — tools that achieve security without creating barriers to legitimate transit.

These Regulations extend two existing transitional periods related to Central Counterparties (CCPs) by 12 months each: (1) Article 497 of EU Regulation 575/2013 regarding own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs is extended so the transitional period ends six years rather than five years after application submission, and (2) the temporary deemed recognition period in the 2018 EU Exit Regulations is extended from five to six years. Both extensions provide additional time for financial institutions to adjust to post-Brexit CCP regulatory arrangements.

Extending transitional periods that were designed as temporary Brexit accommodations perpetuates regulatory limbo rather than providing certainty. CCPs are critical financial market infrastructure, and the original 5-year transitional period (from 2018) was itself a generous adjustment window. A further 12-month extension simply delays the inevitable adjustment without addressing underlying regulatory architecture. This regulation does not reform or improve the regulatory framework — it merely pushes existing EU-derived rules further into the future, denying Parliament the opportunity to reconsider these requirements with fresh eyes now that the UK has regulatory autonomy post-Brexit. Financial institutions should have used the original transitional period to adapt; extending it again rewards inaction and discourages the competitive innovation the City of London needs to compete with New York, Singapore, and Dubai.