Browse regulations

These regulations implement the carbon capture revenue support mechanism under s.68 of the Energy Act 2023. They define eligible carbon capture entities (industrial emitters capturing CO2 for storage, excluding grid-connected electricity generators), set procedural requirements for Secretary of State directions to carbon capture counterparties, mandate contract publication with confidentiality exclusions, and require counterparties to maintain registers and notify the Secretary of State of performance issues.

These regulations institutionalize government subsidy of carbon capture technology through guaranteed revenue support contracts, picking winners in the energy market at taxpayer or consumer expense. The eligibility exclusions (electricity generators but not industrial emitters) are arbitrary market distortions. As with the abolished ROC regime, such corporate welfare distorts investment signals, crowds out alternative technologies that must compete without state backing, and perpetuates uneconomical technologies that should succeed or fail on market merits alone. The procedural framework merely facilitates this subsidy mechanism and cannot be separated from it.

These Regulations require the Secretary of State to reduce delinked agricultural payments by specified percentages before disbursement for the 2024 payment year. They modify how Part 3 of the Agriculture (Delinked Payments and Consequential Provisions) (England) Regulations 2023 operates, effectively lowering farm income support payments through a percentage-based reduction mechanism applied to payment calculations.

Delinked payments were designed to decouple farm support from production, yet this regulation imposes further arbitrary reductions on those payments without clear justification. These are not regulatory standards or market interventions protecting consumers or competition—they are fiscal deductions from farm income. Such payment reductions lack democratic scrutiny through the appropriations process and represent hidden taxation on agricultural businesses. The mechanism adds administrative complexity and uncertainty to farm financial planning without addressing market failures or consumer protection. If fiscal savings are needed, they should be pursued through transparent budgetary channels rather than regulatory backdoors that bypass proper parliamentary debate.

The Procurement Regulations 2024 implement the Procurement Act 2023, establishing a central digital platform for all government procurement notices, requiring suppliers to register and submit detailed 'core supplier information' (basic details, economic/financial standing, connected person information, and exclusion grounds), and creating unique identifier systems for procurements, contracts, dynamic markets, suppliers, and contracting authorities. The regulations extend across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

This regulation creates substantial barriers to free competition in public procurement. The mandatory central digital platform with extensive supplier registration requirements—including economic/financial information, connected person data from PSC registers, and exclusion ground disclosures—imposes compliance costs that disproportionately burden small and medium-sized enterprises. The 'connected person' definition risks capturing legitimate business relationships, and the overall regulatory infrastructure enables government control over who can supply to the public sector. While transparency has merits, thisgold-plates procurement requirements beyond what is necessary, creating an unnecessarily complex compliance regime that restricts supplier participation in public contracts and suppresses the competitive market that produced Adam Smith's wealth of nations.

This Order sets maximum recoverable amounts for returning officers' charges in parliamentary elections in England, Wales, and Scotland. It specifies caps for 'specified services' (arrangements and duties), 'specified expenses' (personnel, travel, printing, equipment, security, training, stationery, etc.), and an overall maximum per constituency. For uncontested elections, the overall maximum is capped at £1,750. The Order revokes and replaces the 2019 versions of the same regulations.

This Order concerns reimbursement of returning officers for election administration costs - a core governmental function essential to democratic legitimacy. Unlike business regulations that distort markets, this simply caps expenditure on a constitutional process. Deletion would create uncertainty around election funding, potentially compromising the integrity of parliamentary elections without producing any economic liberalisation benefit. The caps actually serve as cost-containment rather than regulatory expansion.

This Order amends the Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme Order 2007 by increasing the subsidy cap from £500,000,000 to £750,000,000, providing additional government funding to maintain the Post Office network across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

This regulation increases the subsidy cap for a state-owned enterprise by £250 million, imposing greater costs on taxpayers and distorting the postal services market. Subsidies to the Post Office unfairly prop up a government-backed entity competing against private operators, discouraging efficient private investment in postal infrastructure. The increase represents an expansion of state intervention rather than the deregulation Britain needs post-Brexit. Essential postal services can be better delivered through competitive market mechanisms rather than perpetuating public subsidies that mask economic inefficiency.

Post-Brexit amendment regulations that modify multiple product safety and metrology instruments (Noise Emission, Machinery Safety, Aerosol Dispensers, Ecodesign, Toys, Hazardous Substances in EEE) to: 1) remove transition period references ('IP completion day'), 2) create 'Further use of UK marking' pathways allowing products certified under EU Directives to access the UK market with modified requirements, and 3) establish equivalence mechanisms between EU conformity assessment procedures and UK requirements.

These amendments reduce regulatory duplication by accepting EU certification as a pathway to UK market access, lowering compliance costs for manufacturers while maintaining product safety standards. Removing the 'IP completion day' references appropriately cleanses retained EU law of transition period artifacts. The regulations represent sensible mutual recognition that benefits British consumers and businesses alike — allowing UK firms to use EU-certified processes and enabling continued trade without wasteful dual certification regimes that would otherwise drive business to less-regulated jurisdictions.

Grants Seagreen Wind Energy Limited a time-limited exemption from transmission licensing requirements for the Seagreen Offshore Wind Farm transmission system, effective from 20th June 2024 until system transfer to a successful bidder or 31st March 2025, whichever occurs first.

This Order grants a targeted, time-limited exemption from an existing regulatory burden (transmission licensing) for a specific infrastructure project. It does not impose new restrictions but rather removes a barrier temporarily for the Seagreen offshore wind farm. The exemption auto-terminates by design (either upon system transfer or March 2025), contains no ongoing compliance costs, and facilitates renewable energy infrastructure development without creating permanent market distortions or competitive advantages.

TemporaryOrder extending licensing hours during UEFA Euro 2024 for premises in England and Wales when England or Scotland reach semi-finals or final. Allows on-premises alcohol sales to continue until 1am (2 hours beyond normal 11pm limit) on match days in July 2024. Does not extend to off-sales or regulated entertainment.

Obsolete - this was a time-limited, event-specific Order applicable only to matches scheduled July 2024, all of which have now passed. Even setting aside its transitory nature, the regulation reflects arbitrary government favoritism toward one sporting event, creating preferential licensing rules that discriminate against other entertainment. If venues desired extended hours for celebrations, the existing Temporary Event Notice regime provides a market-based mechanism without government picking winners and losers among events and nations.

These regulations implement the Glue Traps (Offences) Act 2022 by delegating glue trap licensing functions to Natural England and authorizing fee collection. They establish a fee structure comprising fixed charges per application type (listed in a Schedule) plus an hourly rate of £121 for time spent assessing applications, with rounding to quarter-hours. Natural England may reduce or remit charges at its discretion.

This regulation creates a licensing bureaucracy imposing £121/hour fees on individuals seeking to control pests on their own property. The underlying Glue Traps (Offences) Act 2022 already restricts an activity that should be a matter of property rights, not government discretion. Licensing regimes of this nature suppress private alternatives, create barriers to legitimate pest control, and generate administrative burden with no corresponding market-based justification. Fees collected for routine government functions represent a friction cost on economic activity that a free-trading, property-rights-respecting Britain should eliminate.

These Regulations bring into effect revised Prevent duty guidance for Scotland, issued under section 29(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, on 19th August 2024. The guidance provides instructions for specified authorities (schools, universities, NHS, local authorities, etc.) on how to fulfill their legal duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

This regulation merely brings into effect guidance interpreting an existing statutory duty (s.29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015). The underlying Act remains in force regardless. Deleting this guidance would not remove the Prevent duty but would leave authorities without clear operational direction, potentially leading to inconsistent implementation, greater legal uncertainty, and higher compliance costs. While the Prevent duty itself has attracted criticism regarding its scope and effects on free speech, those concerns pertain to the primary legislation, not this instrument which simply operationalises existing law. The guidance, if well-designed, can actually limit over-reach by providing clearer boundaries.

The Securitisation (Amendment) Regulations 2024 amend the Securitisation Regulations 2024 to: (1) restrict securitisation special purpose entities (SSPEs) from being established in FATF high-risk jurisdictions, (2) impose extensive due-diligence requirements on occupational pension scheme trustees before holding and while maintaining securitisation positions (regs 32B-32D), (3) require the Pensions Regulator to monitor and enforce compliance with these requirements, and (4) preserve prior EU Securitisation Regulation requirements for pre-commencement securitisations.

This regulation imposes significant new compliance burdens on occupational pension schemes, requiring extensive verification, due-diligence assessments, ongoing monitoring, stress testing, and record-keeping before and while holding securitisation positions. Regulation 8A restricts legitimate financial activity by prohibiting SSPE establishment in FATF-listed jurisdictions, adding complexity without evidence of market failure. Pension trustees are sophisticated investors with fiduciary duties who can assess risks through market mechanisms and disclosure. The regulation creates substantial administrative costs that will discourage pension schemes from legitimate securitisation investments, reducing market efficiency and limiting options for retirement savings. The additional regulatory layer imposed via the Pensions Regulator adds enforcement costs with no clear benefit over existing fiduciary frameworks.

These Regulations make numerous consequential amendments to the Gas Act 1986, Electricity Act 1989, Utilities Act 2000, Energy Acts 2004/2008/2010/2013, and various other statutes to implement structural changes from the Energy Act 2023. Key changes include: creation of new licence types (code manager licence under sections 7AC of Gas Act and 6(1)(g) of Electricity Act, gas system planner licence under section 7AA of Gas Act, electricity system operator licence under section 6(1)(da) of Electricity Act); designation of an Independent System Operator and Planner (ISOP); updates to definitions of 'statutory undertaker' across multiple Acts; modifications to information disclosure provisions; and updates to various secondary legislation to reflect new licence categories and frameworks.

These amendments are purely consequential to the Energy Act 2023, which itself represents a significant expansion of state control over the energy system. The creation of new licence types (code manager, gas system planner, electricity system operator) adds regulatory barriers that inhibit competition and entry. The establishment of the ISOP centralises planning functions that are better left to market mechanisms. These regulations multiply complexity across dozens of statutes and statutory instruments without adding any net benefit to the economy — they merely transmit the dysfunction of the parent Act. As pure consequential amendments, they inherit and perpetuate the original legislation's flaws: licensing proliferation, bureaucratic coordination mechanisms, and expanded regulatory reach that harms consumers through reduced choice and higher costs.

This Order brings into effect a Code of Practice on Dismissal and Re-engagement, which provides guidance on the process employers must follow when dismissing employees who do not agree to contractual changes and then offering to re-engage them under new terms. The Code applies to England, Wales and Scotland from 18th July 2024, but does not apply where dismissal/re-engagement was already raised before that date.

This Code of Practice restricts employers' contractual freedom by imposing procedural requirements on dismissal and re-engagement. As a statutorily-recognized code under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, it effectively elevates bureaucratic guidance to quasi-legal status, creating barriers to legitimate business restructuring. Employers should retain full freedom to negotiate contracts with their employees, including the right to end employment relationships when terms cannot be agreed. Such codes, however well-intentioned, reduce market flexibility, increase legal uncertainty, and presume that government bureaucrats in Westminster understand business conditions better than employers and employees negotiating freely. The 'fire and re-hire' practice, while controversial, is a legitimate business tool for maintaining competitiveness — subjecting it to a code of practice merely adds cost and friction without demonstrable benefit to workers, who retain full protection under existing unfair dismissal and redundancy legislation.

These Regulations amend the Contracts for Difference (Allocation) Regulations 2014 to introduce a new 'sustainable industry reward' mechanism for offshore wind CFDs allocated in the seventh, eighth and ninth allocation rounds. The regulations establish a parallel allocation framework allowing the Secretary of State to make additional payments to eligible generators based on assessments of their contribution to supply chain development, including productivity, innovation, employment, infrastructure, sustainability, and investment in deprived areas. The framework includes new notice requirements, application windows, budget mechanisms, and assessment criteria administered by the delivery body and CFD counterparty.

This regulation represents classic industrial policy and corporate welfare. By directing taxpayer-funded or levy-financed payments to generators based on subjective assessments of their 'contribution' to supply chains, the government is picking winners rather than allowing markets to allocate capital efficiently. The extensive criteria (productivity, innovation, employment, sustainability, community benefits, investment in deprived areas) micro-manage private enterprise in ways that create compliance burdens, distort incentives, and risk cronyism. The limitation to only the 7th, 8th and 9th allocation rounds reveals this as a temporary political intervention rather than a principled policy. Such interventions, however well-intentioned, ultimately increase energy costs for consumers, create market distortions, and represent exactly the kind of bureaucratic intervention that Britain should be eliminating post-Brexit.

These Regulations implement the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters into UK law by amending the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. They establish procedures for registering foreign judgments from 2019 Hague Convention States in UK courts (High Court in England & Wales/Northern Ireland, Court of Session in Scotland), create appeal mechanisms for registration decisions, provisions for judicial settlements, and evidentiary rules for foreign judgments. The Regulations apply across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

These Regulations facilitate international commerce by providing clear, predictable mechanisms for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Without such frameworks, UK businesses face heightened risk in cross-border transactions—unable to enforce contracts or recover damages abroad, deterring participation in international trade. This is legal infrastructure enabling commerce, not a regulatory burden restricting it. Deletion would disadvantage UK firms seeking to operate internationally and discourage foreign parties from contracting with UK entities, harming Britain's position as a global trading nation.